
00067646

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Dr. Geetha Ravikumar
on 02 April, 2019

ATONEMENT AND PERSONALITY

ATONEMENT AND PERSONALITY

By R. C. MOBERLY, D.D.

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
CANON OF CHRIST CHURCH

67646
ae

A-J-13

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET
1901

232.3
Mcb/Ato
67646

Ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ γένοιτο καυχᾶσθαι εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δι' οὗ ἐμοὶ κόσμος ἐσταύρωται κἀγὼ τῷ κόσμῳ.



TO

THE CHURCH

ONE HOLY CATHOLIC

THE BODY OF THE SPIRIT

OF JESUS CHRIST

VERY GOD OF VERY GOD

INCARNATE

WHICH IS

THE REGENERATION AND HOPE

OF THE WHOLE WORLD

PREFACE

ATONEMENT is a reality much too fundamental to human consciousness, to be capable of any ready explanation. Our explanations, at their best, are still always partial explanations. It is always more than our understanding of it.

From this there follow two direct results. The first is a certain duty of what has been called "reverent agnosticism." Our insight into the doctrine may be adequate. That it should be exhaustive is inconceivable. All explanations must be given with this reserve. They are not, and never can be, the whole truth. There is always more than human logic can express, or human imagination conceive. "Quod si aliquatenus quaestioni tuæ satisfacere potero, certum esse debebit, quia et sapientior me plenius hoc facere poterit; imo sciendum est, quidquid homo inde dicere vel scire possit, altiores tantæ rei adhuc latere rationes."[1]

The second result is that human explanations, being all, of necessity, aspects which are less than complete, must from time to time vary and be re-adjusted. Atonement can, and must, become intelligible, to different stages of human intellect. It can, and must, express itself in the terms of thought of different generations, and to some extent different philosophies.

[1] St Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, ch. ii.

The fact of such historical variations is a witness to the stability, not the instability, of the underlying truth. So far as the intellectual illustration which meets the needs of our own generation may differ from that of our predecessors, the difference condemns neither us nor them. St Anselm may correct, but he does not condemn, those who had gone before him. Nor do later theologians condemn St Anselm, when they show where his explanations will not hold. If we differ a good deal from some earlier explanatory theories, we do not therefore hold that they were all false. On the contrary, it is of some importance to insist that in their own time, and their own way, they were all true. As real and living theories they did represent real aspects of the great reality. By their truth they lived. But by the incompleteness of their truth, or the disproportioned statement of it, they in time decayed.

But if our own explanations in turn have a temporary character, if they too will be felt in time to be incomplete, or are not free from some strain of disproportion, this does not mean that we ought to, or could possibly, live without them. On the contrary, explanations are, in each age, indispensable. Without illustrative explanation we cannot apprehend or hold the truth, which it is vital to hold and to apprehend; even though our illustrative explanations be none of them in the long run—as they none of them can be—fully adequate. It is not only true, on what may be called the negative side, that difficulties which are themselves the creation of intellect must be intellectually disposed of. This is true indeed, and important. And in fact the intellectual objections which are felt to the doctrine of atonement are all of this character. They are logical fictions, which must be answered by logic. And this alone

would more than justify the intellectual treatment of the doctrine in every generation. But besides this more negative or apologetic necessity, it is true also positively, in every generation, that to be held at all by those who on all grounds dutifully wish to hold it, the doctrine must be, however incompletely, yet positively and really, apprehended by the intellect. We must needs, in each generation, so interpret it to ourselves as both to meet and answer intellectual objections, and also to possess, for our own lives, a positive, tangible, and living, conception of the meaning of Atonement.

The following pages would hardly have assumed their present shape, if the writer had not been, for his own part, convinced of two principles, which it may be worth while to mention here. The first is that the difficulties which are generally felt about Christian atonement arise neither from the Evangelical history of the Cross itself, nor even from anything in the original apostolic proclamation of the fact, or of the doctrine, of the Cross; but rather from the inadequacy of certain more or less current explanations, logical and inferential, of the original apostolic doctrine. Such inferential structures (the most untrue of which has considerable relation to truth) are precisely the things which ought to be closely re-examined and reconstructed. They are no part of the original tradition. They are practically almost unknown in the earliest ages of Christianity. They are the work of human intellect, honest, instructive,—and visibly inadequate. They are stages in the human assimilation of a truth more fundamental and inclusive than the assimilating power of human intellect. It does not take any exceptional knowledge of the history of the doctrine, especially in the earliest Christian centuries, to detach them

from the doctrine itself; and, if not fully to correct them, at least to see the elements in them which are most obviously open to question and correction. Some rather fragmentary dealing with the history of the doctrine, sufficient, as it is hoped, for this particular purpose, has been attempted in an appended chapter, which is rather subsidiary to, than an integral part of, the effort of the present volume.

The second conviction is that, for our minds at least, current difficulties about atonement are largely bound up with, and inseparable from, current—and questionable—conceptions of personality. There are presuppositions about personality which have so aggravated the moral difficulty as to make it appear to many minds insuperable. And it is the correction of such presuppositions about personality which will be the natural solution of the difficulties. Two principles may be mentioned, which our thought is apt to assume; first, that the essentia of personality is mutual exclusiveness, or (in vivid metaphor) mutual impenetrability: and the second that (as a corollary from the first) what was done by another, being vital in him not in us, cannot make an essential contrast of content or character within ourselves. Our distinctness from one another, and from Christ, regarded as primary, essential and final, and exaggerated to a point at which distinctness becomes not distinctness only but mutual separation, exclusiveness, independence,—perhaps even antithesis: this is a fundamental root of much difficulty that is felt, whether consciously or unconsciously, upon the whole subject. It is a difficulty which has grown up out of the developed assumptions of human intellect. It is hardly inherent or original. But is the assumption true? Is this really an axiom, involved in

self-conscious recognition of personality? The question is one which it concerns us, at this particular moment, to point out rather than to discuss. It belongs to the following chapters to vindicate, if they can, the position that is taken about it. For it is upon this that the real argument of the volume depends.

It has seemed therefore only right to give to these pages the title "Atonement and Personality"; and that, not only in order to emphasize the belief that no explanation of atonement can be adequate which is not, at every point, in terms of personality; but also, and perhaps even more, because it seemed to become increasingly clear, on analysis of thought, that neither could any explanation of personality be adequate, which was not, in point of fact, in terms of atonement.

If this saying sounds hard or abrupt, we may make it perhaps more intelligible by saying that personality cannot be explained except in terms of that self-identification of the Christian with the Spirit of Christ,—that constitution of Christian selfhood by the Spirit of Christ,—which is the key to the explication of atonement, and without which atonement remains incapable, not of being received, indeed, but of being explained. But if that which alone makes atonement intelligible is itself the explanation of personality; if, in explaining personality, it explains atonement; and only by that which is involved in, and expressed as, atonement, makes its explanation of personality coherent and clear; then it is hardly an audacious mode of speech to say that personality is explained in terms of atonement.

The conception of these pages as a whole is one which, as I cannot but believe, needs to be explicitly stated at the present time. And I trust they may serve at least to make

clear the coherence of the several parts of the conception. At point after point in the detail of the several parts, I cannot but be painfully aware of the inadequacy of what has actually been said. But after all it is the conception as a whole, it is the relation of the parts of the thought to one another, rather than the elaborate completeness of the parts in themselves, which will probably constitute the value, if any there be, of the present contribution. And it is possible that any elaborated attempt to present the several parts in more adequate detail, even if it were in any measure successful, might rather obscure than assist the clear presentment of their relation to each other.

Slight, then, though in many ways the filling in of the outline sketch may be, yet, such as it is, I submit it—with, as I believe, a real sincerity of submission,—to the conscience and judgment of the Church of Christ.

I greatly regret that the volume on Personality, by the Rev. Wilfrid Richmond, did not appear in time for me to make any use of it in my own writing, or at least to examine my own writing in the light of it. But the general line of Mr Richmond's thought was not unfamiliar to me; and I am conscious that my debt to it is great. He speaks, no doubt, as a philosopher to philosophers: and will, in that region, be well able to maintain his own position. I will only express a hope that in the things which I have tried to say in this present volume (in a way far unlike the minuteness of an expert in philosophy) nothing may be found to be untrue in substance to that central principle of truth which I believe that I have learned from him.

Among the many obligations which I owe to the—conscious or unconscious—help of many friends, I must express my special gratitude to Dr Sanday, for the generosity with

which he has endeavoured, at certain points, to preserve me from blundering; and has been willing to lend to me some fragments of the richness of his special knowledge. He has done this none the less, although there is no single statement throughout the volume for which he is responsible; and indeed it remains to be seen whether he will, or will not, be able to look upon it as a whole with approval.

I must also thank my kind colleague of former years, the Rev. R. B. Rackham, for his ungrudging sympathy in all ways, and for not a little of the special help of his singular accuracy, in the exposure of errors in detail.

CHRIST CHURCH,
Advent, 1900.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PUNISHMENT

PAGE

All our experience is of *imperfect* punishment (or penitence, or forgiveness). The object is to see what these would mean —not as imperfect, but in their own reality . . . 1

What is punishment? Dr Dale's View. Pain—inflicted—because of wrong. Further statement; Pain—related to the sufferer's capacity of self-consciousness of wrong—as an effect of righteousness. It is only possible in a person, or explicable in reference to personality. It is a moral means to a moral end. The "retributive" aspect belongs to the necessary imperfectness of human justice. Justice that is not omniscient can only be a very rough figure of what absolute justice would be. The "equation" theory is a corollary from the imperfectness of the "retributive" . . 3

Is there, then, no punishment which is not restorative? This view contradicts both experience on earth, and the possibility of Hell. But all punishment begins as moral discipline, and only in proportion as it fails to moralize, becomes ultimately "vengeance." Different as these are, the difference lies in the reception of punishment by the punished, not in the punisher. Limits within which it is right to conceive of a "punisher" at all 11

Guilt has two streams of consequence, (*a*) vengeance, (*b*) remorse. Endurance of vengeance, as such, has no atoning tendency whatever. But even such endurance can become an element, or education, towards penitence. Punishment taken up into the suffering personality as penitence, really tends to diminish guiltiness. Such penitence, however little it can on earth avert punishment, can quite transform its inner character. Punishment is meant to be trans-

PAGE

muted into penitence; and it is only as penitence that it has any restorative or atoning quality 17

Punishment, as retribution, cannot be predicated of Christ. Our own attitude towards punishment 23

CHAPTER II

PENITENCE

Penitence is as wide as humanity—yet distinctively Christian. It can only be personal—a condition of personality, under sin, yet made for, and capable of, righteousness. All conscious wretchedness is capacity of penitence. Penitence as love: and as belief. Penitence is a real change of self. It is the triumph of righteousness *within* 26

All experienced penitence is imperfect. Sin has affected the central self, past, present, and future. Real deliverance from sin must touch all three. How the present includes the future and the past. Perfect penitence would be such a change of self, as would, by contradiction, make the past dead, and re-identify the self with righteousness. Experienced penitence, though imperfect, bears clear witness to the nature of penitence. Its climax would be personal self-identity with holiness; and righteousness and love would be one in embracing it 31

Such penitence is impossible. Sin once for all has marred the capacity of it. Its climax would only be really possible to one who, personally, was really sinless 41

On second thoughts, it is not only the climax of penitence, but any reality of it, that is, to sinful nature, impossible. Yet Christian experience is so full of it, that it may almost be said to constitute Christian experience. And the experience of its unconsummated reality is the pledge of the real possibility of its consummation 44

Whence then comes it? It is the indwelling Spirit of the Crucified 46

CHAPTER III

FORGIVENESS

All Christian hope—and duty—hinges on "forgiveness." What is forgiveness? "Remission of penalty" a first stage of thought, which experience must begin with, and must

PAGE

transcend. The true forgiveness is *right* forgiveness, *i.e.* the forgiveness of Righteousness 48

Forgiveness is not simply not punishing: or treating as if innocent: or regarding as innocent. These things are not even moral, apart from a justifying cause. Forgiveness is only possible towards a person; and must have its justification in his personality. It is exactly correlative to "forgiveableness"; not arbitrary nor optional but (as it were) self-acting 53

Does this empty the word "forgiveness" of all meaning? not if man's "forgiveableness" is itself God's work, not man's. In any case the logical difficulty is not greater on this view than on any which makes God's forgiveness other than irrational. But in fact all experienced forgiveness is provisional—a means to an end. The unforgiving servant. Forgiveness is not a transaction, but an attitude. It is= love. But love is called "forgiveness" just in the stage when it is still anticipatory, *i.e.* just when, and because, it provisionally outruns the capacity of deserving, or of any real correspondence with love 58

Human forgiveness is to correspond with Divine. The nearest analogue is a parent's forgiveness of a little one. Postulates involved in this. They do not directly apply to the case of a man outraged by his fellows. What is forgiveness in him?—(*a*) a turning from them to God, (*b*) a looking, and, if possible, a working, towards their personal recovery to holiness. His relation may possibly become almost parental 63

Forgiveness not finally consummated till the consummation of holiness. Then it is wholly merged in love. All Christian hope of "forgiveness" must necessarily mean hope of personal holiness 71

CHAPTER IV

THE PERSON OF THE MEDIATOR

That the unholy may become holy, how can any mediation be relevant? In experience, which is deeper than logic, a friend who will bear is the best practical hope of the sinner's reformation 74

The impossibility seems most absolute in the forensic atmosphere. Some mitigations of it perhaps just conceivable even here

PAGE

—in proportion as he who would suffer is (*a*) uniquely capable of identification with the punished, and (*b*) uniquely capable of identification with the punisher . . . 77

Illustration of a father with an erring child, and the mother between them bearing the weight of penitence, carries our thought further—yet breaks down at the point; for each is still not the other 80

Just here Catholic doctrine comes in. Christ IS God—not generically but identically. Tendency of thought to fall short of this truth. Popular Tri-theism. Dread of Sabellianism deters "orthodox" thought from adequate insistence on the unity of Deity 81

Again, there is a real unity of humanity; and Christ IS Man—not generically but inclusively. Only Adam besides could ever be Man inclusively: and even Adam in an inferior sense. The Humanity of Christ is the Humanity of Deity. Hence its unique capacity of universal relation—through Spirit. If we realize very imperfectly what this means, so we do what our own personal being means. Yet the principle that Christians are one with, and are *in*, Christ, is inseparable from the whole New Testament; and is the basis of the Sacramental, which is the characteristic, worship and life of the Church 86

Christ then is not an intervening third term; because He is simply identical with the first, and simply identical with the second also 92

CHAPTER V

THE OBEDIENCE OF CHRIST

Jesus Christ is God as man. His Humanity not impersonal. Himself Personally expressed in and through humanity . 93

This Personal expression of Deity in humanity is always *vi terminorum* a *human* expression. In Incarnation He is never not Incarnate—not two, but One—God as man, rather than God and man. He is therefore a real revelation not only of the truth of Divine character, but also of the truth of human character 95

Christ as the revelation of human nature. His life of obedience—its main characteristic, dependence. His Personal character as man, consists in being the reflection of Another. Dependence inwardly, as meditation and prayerfulness. Dependence in outward action, as obedience. The obedi-

PAGE

ence always to God. Contrast between this and His subjection at Nazareth 98

The phrase "not of Myself." Importance of this. Capacity, in a sense, of independent selfhood. The complete self-repression no mere phrase, but an intense moral reality . 104

The relation to the Father asserted by Himself in Incarnation, is the relation of the Incarnate more directly than of the pre-existent 107

CHAPTER VI

THE ATONING DEATH OF CHRIST

Christ "was made" sin; "condemned" sin. Reality of His relation to sin. Perfection of holiness, and perfection of contrition—the two impossibilities which would restore man to God—both realized in Him 109

Christ the perfect reflection of God,—in moral character, prayerful dependence, active obedience. Even for the perfecting of these, the necessary climax of His life was death. The death of Christ unique even as the climax of discipline, and of temptation. His power to save Himself, with the will not to use it 111

But it is also, in reference to past sin, an atoning and undoing. Perfect penitence requires an identity of the very self with holiness which is possible only to the personally sinless. Vicarious penitence, in some sort, a profound truth of experience. Personalities not so distinct as we assume—often for sheer lack of unselfish will. Personality completed less in itself than in the reflexive correspondence of other personalities 116

Is the penitence of the good really possible? It is *more* possible than the penitence of the evil, which is reached through it. The case of a mother whose heart is broken for the sin of her child. Her capacity of this depends not upon her own possible share in the guilt; but upon the completeness of (*a*) her own holiness, and (*b*) the love in her which makes her one with her child. Such oneness is (*a*) of nature,—which does not include actual sin, but does include natural capacity of temptation to sin, and (*b*) of love, which perfects the capacities of community in nature. Both these things only at most approximate in any mother 121

But both deliberately assumed by Christ; and realized in their perfectness only by Him whose love was quite literally

PAGE

infinite, and whose consciousness of the nature and measure of sin was that of one who gazed upon the undimmed vision of the Holiness of God. With eyes full open to God He realized the fulness of the (otherwise unimaginable) consciousness of sin—within that bodily nature which had been the instrument, and was open to the galling access, of sin. Within the consciousness of sin He realized the appalling character, which is also the doom, of sin; while by His own inherent self-identity with holiness He attained to the (otherwise impossible) conditions of a perfectly atoning penitence 126

Thus was penitence consummated, at the cost of a gradual, and voluntary, dissolution of Himself. Punishment, or pain, in any other sense but this, would not really have had an atoning character at all. But the destruction, by inches, of that nature in Him which constituted the avenue, or possibility, of sin—and therefore also the instrument for the conquering of sin—was the absolute destruction of sin. In His death, sin was dead: and human penitence, which involves human holiness, once for all an accomplished fact 129

NOTE.—On the Cry upon the Cross 134

CHAPTER VII

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE

The problem of the relation of the historic atonement to ourselves. Difficulty in the fact that it *is* historic; and therefore anterior to, and outside of, our personal history. Truth in the subjective plea against a transaction that is merely outward. Failure of the subjective plea, if nothing happened in outward history at all. Objective and subjective are terms mutually correlative—and inseparable. What either would mean apart from the other . . . 136

The atonement was objective first that it might become subjective: historical fact that it might become personal experience. How? preliminary answers, — belief; contemplation; love. To "love" and to "be in love with"—a person or a cause. Love does transcend exclusions. What we really love is never wholly without us 143

But (*a*) is the atonement, then, merely an appeal to our emotions? Or (*b*) is any adequate response from our emotions within our possibility? The answer to both is "No." On these conditions the whole would quite certainly

PAGE

fail. The failure is within the meaning, and incapacity, of the personal "I" 148

The answers hitherto, then, are merely preliminary and suggestive. What is needed is the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Calvary without Pentecost is Calvary not yet in vital relation with ourselves. The relation of atonement to man is incapable of explanation except in terms of Pentecost—the indwelling Spirit of Christ reconstituting and characterizing man 151

CHAPTER VIII

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN RELATION TO THE BEING OF GOD

The unity of God is the basal truth. Revelation of Divine "Persons" explains and expands, but does not contradict, unity. Personality not to be defined by distinction in terms of negation. Nor does God work in several "parts." Ὑπόστασις and Persona. Value of the word Person. If personality is only intelligible to persons; can Tri-Personal be intelligible to uni-personal consciousness? Mutual personality inherent in Divine Being. Our position wholly incompatible with Sabellianism. Unity of comprehensiveness, and of love, higher than unity of exclusion, or of number. Why this sounds a paradox to us. The sense limited in which we can say that one Person of the Trinity "is not" another. The presence of the Spirit *is* the presence of the Son and of the Father 154

Analogies to the Trinity in creation,—and in man. Their value —and limitation. Risk of distinguishing the Divine Persons as diverse qualities. The analogy of a man (1) in himself, (2) in his bodily expression, (3) in his effective operation—the response which he has produced to himself. 170

Orthodox desire to believe in His Personality should not prevent our understanding the Spirit as fully as we can as Response, Gift, etc.—just as the Theist reaches a higher conception of Divine Personality by dropping, for a time, personal terms. It is by making the most of the aspects we do understand that we rise, through them, to what is higher . . . 176

The Paraclete revealed, historically, as explaining the perpetuity of the Presence and work on earth of the Incarnate. Thus the revelation both of "Son" and of "Spirit" is a result of Incarnation. In what sense Father, Son, and Spirit, are all words of metaphor—and in what sense the complex fact

PAGE

of the Incarnation seems to be implied in, and to underlie, the whole sacred terminology 181

New Testament language and thought entirely dominated by the fact of the Incarnation of God. The phrase "from God the Father and from our Lord Jesus Christ"—the Epistle to the Ephesians—the salutations of all the Epistles in the New Testament. The reference is not to the pre-existent Trinity: but to God the Eternal and God the Incarnate. And the realization of them *is* God the Holy Spirit;—the Spirit of the Incarnate, and therefore of the Eternal also 185

It is as the Spirit, or perpetual inward presence, *of the Incarnate*, that He is primarily revealed. Passages which expressly so speak of Him, particularly Rom. viii. and Eph. iii. The presence of the Spirit of the Incarnate *is* the presence of the Incarnate, — which is the presence of the Eternal, God. It is God, the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit. The witness of 1 John to this theology . 195

Summary and conclusion 202

NOTE A. St Augustine's caution against distinguishing the Persons of the Trinity in terms of separate qualities . . 206

NOTE B. Question to what extent the word "Son" is directly applied to the Logos as pre-incarnate, with special reference to Hippolytus (against Noetus) and to Marcellus of Ancyra 208

CHAPTER IX

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN RELATION TO HUMAN PERSONALITY

Speculation, starting from the conscious self, is apt to assume that selfhood at least is both complete and unchanging. This has been markedly assumed in theories of atonement. Atonement only rightly intelligible if personality is conceived aright. Reason, Free Will, and Love—three strands, or proofs, of personality 216

I. Free will—we cannot but claim it: yet our will is largely not free. What is free will? (*a*) It is not equal power of doing evil or good. Power to sin is a mark of will not really free. (*b*) Nor is it, exactly, power to make whatever we do wholly our own—to be an adequate cause to oneself. But (*c*) it is power to make wholly one's own what is wholly on the lines of one's own truest self. To realize it, then, is to be possessed by the Spirit of Christ: to be a mirror of human perfect-

PAGE

ness. It is obedience—to God, not to man. Fallacies about obedience, in the nursery or the convent. The obedience of Christ. Only, then, as obedience (in the true sense) is will really free or true selfhood realized . . 220

II. Reason—it means not ratiocinative machinery, but true insight into truth. Individualism is the reverse of correspondence with truth. The more complex is the higher truth: moral higher than abstract; and spiritual than moral. Spiritual insight not non-rational, but the highest possibility of reason. Reason therefore not perfected till it is spiritually informed. Its real development is apt to be its apparent sacrifice. Its consummation is the indwelling Spirit of Christ. The paradox explicitly Scriptural. In their consummation free will and reason so coalesce as aspects of one whole, that they cease to be even distinguishable . 233

III. Love—it is inherently within our nature, yet so imperfectly that it is only through refusal and sacrifice that it realizes its ultimate character as love: and that only, at last, as realization of the Spirit of Christ 245

Thus none of the claims of selfhood are realized apart from Christ. Persons good and evil do not equally illustrate what true personality means. The inherent presence of the Spirit of Christ is not merely a gift or adornment, but the realization, for the first time, of what selfhood inherently and always had meant. "I yet not I but Christ" a formula for Christian personality 248

CHAPTER X

THE CHURCH AND SACRAMENTS

All religion implies "dependence on another" in the form, at least, of (*a*) meditation and prayer, and (*b*) obedience in act as correlative with these. These are at their highest in the Church of Christ: but absorbed and transcended in that Sacramental life which differentiates the Church. The Church is the region, or expression, of the Spirit of Christ. It is relatively to that region, or capacity, of Spirit, that Her ordinances are what they are 256

Baptism, as admission into Spirit. The analogy of birth. Baptism and Confirmation theologically one initiation. Initiation into Spirit is initiation into Christ—once for all . 260

Holy Communion, as living on Christ—in Spirit. His Flesh

PAGE

and Blood = His Humanity; and especially in respect of its atoning sacrifice. The analogy of food in Scripture—its meaning. Such "feeding" is as indispensable within, as it is impossible without, the region of "Spirit." The literal use of the Sacrament is identified, rather than identical, with this feeding upon the Flesh and Blood. The whole sacramental language and practice are emphatic vindication of the bodily side of spiritual life: yet no less emphatically spiritual in their reality. Insidiousness of tendencies to materialize the spiritual 265

The position, then, set out in the ninth Chapter, is entirely corroborated in the Church of Christ, and the sacraments which characterize the Church. The whole sacramental system means nothing else than personal identification, of the Church and all Her members, in the region and method of Spirit, with Christ 275

CHAPTER XI

RECAPITULATION

Atonement cannot be a fictitious transaction, nor punishment a merely retributive pain: real penitence is not compatible with continuance in evil, nor real forgiveness with condonation of evil. But ideally, on analysis, punishment is found to involve the idea of penitence; and penitence that of perfect holiness; and forgiveness to be love's embrace of holiness 277

Christ is whole God in whole man. His life and death were the actual holiness (holiness as responsive obedience, and the holiness of ideal penitence), in, and of, human nature 279

The Pentecostal Spirit is the perpetuation of Christ's Presence in human nature, which is = the Church. This is the atonement of man; and our own self-identity with this is atonement in each one of us 281

The realization of Christ's Spirit in us is not the loss, but the consummation, of personality — the real attainment of ourselves 284

This is the one real meaning of Christ's Church and Sacraments 285

Our atonement, then, is Christ in us: ourselves realized in Christ 286

CHAPTER XII

OUR PRESENT IMPERFECTION

PAGE

The real difficulty of our exposition is its apparent failure in life 287

Shall we acquiesce in lowering our ideal? No. The view of the world is wrong in fact. To spiritual insight the atonement is not a failure. What the real drama of life and history consists of 289

Immense value, for practical life, of ideal beliefs in general, and of belief in the atonement in particular 294

The failure of conventional Christianity—secularizing of ideals—"poisoning the springs"—non-communicant Churchmanship—cynicism—indifference to evil—lack of zeal for missions—the real spiritual deadness 299

The power of any fearless appeal to the standard of Christ. The indirect witness of spiritualism 306

Mysticism, its indispensable positive truth; only out of proportion when treated as an exceptional compartment of experience 311

The consciousness of saints. Their faith is the real insight of experience. Yet though—or because—they know themselves in Christ, it is they who are the real penitents . . . 316

Atonement, then, is objective and separate, only till the subjective identification with it is consummated. St Paul's "self" and "not self." The consummation never reached on earth. Even here it is, and is to be, discerned by aspiring faith; yet the curtain of death falls upon man still adoring—in faith not fruition—the figure of the Crucified . . . 319

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER

THE ATONEMENT IN HISTORY

Purpose of this historical chapter. History of a doctrine not always helpful, as history 324

References in the Apostolic Fathers—slight but instructive, and with no touch of later misconceptions. Clement, Ignatius, Barnabas, Epist. ad Diognetum 326

The New Testament. Christ's Death, its place, and meaning. Sacrifice and Priesthood. "For us." Three groups of illustrative phrases. Older misconceptions mainly misinterpret the first group. Use and misuse of the word "metaphorical." Protestant misconceptions mainly misinterpret the second group. The third group not worked out enough 332

PAGE

Irenæus and Origen. Their illustrations, so far as untenable, enter but little into their own real thought, and still less into that of the Church's worship 343

Athanasius. Essential relation of the Logos to humanity. Only Deity within humanity could restore it, by living through death, and bringing man into unity with God. In the death of the Incarnate Logos all died: and His exaltation was the exaltation of all: because the Spirit was His: and He is in us by His Spirit 349

The misconceptions which sometimes seem to us immemorial, grew into Christian thought very gradually. Not for a thousand years did they constitute a serious burthen to worship or faith 366

Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo?* Its value. Its failure—a necessary result of the way in which the question is stated . . . 367

Abælard. Conforms largely to current language; though his own real thought is different. "The love of Christ in us." Abælard to Heloissa. The injustice of Bernard. How near Abælard's thought comes to the truth. Why it fails after all 372

Present thought. Mr Maurice. The late Master of Balliol. Dr Dale. His real work the assertion, against Latitudinarianism, of the objective reality of the Sacrifice. His failure to correlate objective and subjective. The Cry on the Cross, and the "actual penalty of sin." Total omission of the Holy Spirit. His exegesis of Romans stops short of Chapter viii. 382

Dr Macleod Campbell. Atonement not the cause, but the effect, of God's love. Forgiveness—Punishment. Christ's death the perfect repentance of humanity—the Amen in humanity to God's judgment on sin. Not suffering, but righteousness, is its true *essentia*. Penitence the true atonement 396

Yet the identification of Christ with humanity imperfectly conceived. The very statement of it lays too much stress on distinctness, and contrast. Minimizing phrases—"dealing with the Father"—"confessing our sins." Minimizing explanations of the "shame" and the Cry on the Cross. The Pentecostal Church, and sacramental life, have no place in his exposition of atonement 402

Archdeacon Wilson; an impertinent suggestion 410

CONCLUSION 411

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

ATONEMENT AND PERSONALITY

CHAPTER I

PUNISHMENT

AN obvious preliminary to any serious attempt to give an explanation of the doctrine of Atonement is a careful examination of the terms which are, and cannot but be, freely used in any discussion of the subject. Some of these claim a place at once so immemorial in human experience, and so fundamental to any conception of the doctrine itself, that it is apt to be assumed that they are, as it were, already current coin; that is to say, that they may be made use of, on all hands, without examination or definition, as having already stamped on them an indisputable meaning or value, which will at once be intelligible, and intelligible in the same sense, to all who use them.

It seems worth while to begin by an attempt to cross-examine, one after another, three such primary terms or thoughts, so as at least to be clear, for further purposes, what we do, or do not, understand them to mean. The three are Punishment, Penitence, and Forgiveness. In each case it will perhaps be obvious to thoughtful people that it is easier to use these words, with general acceptance, than to define them exactly,—to others, or even to ourselves. In each case it may be no rashness

to suggest that current thought is apt to be confused in respect of the teaching which makes use of these words, in great measure at least because it is first confused as to its own meaning in the words themselves.

There is one general suggestion, which equally applies to all three, which may be stated here. It is this: that whereas, in our experience, we are familiar with every one of these three things, punishment, penitence, and forgiveness, in a certain inchoate or imperfect condition, but with none of them in its own consummation of perfectness; we are apt to frame our notions of what the words even ideally and properly mean, on the basis of our imperfect realization of them; and so to introduce elements and aspects, which belong only to their failure, into our ideal conceptions of what they themselves, in their own true nature, really are. No doubt, if all our experience is of their imperfectness, and all our conceptions must be based on experience; it may be said, with a certain verbal exactness, that all our conceptions must be framed on the basis of imperfectness. But if we realize the fact of imperfectness; if, even within the imperfect experience, we discern the tendency and direction in which (though we fail to attain it) the consummation of these experiences would ideally be found; we may, on the basis of imperfect experience, approximately attain a true conception of what perfect realization would mean. This is the true use to make of imperfect experience. It is indeed only thus that we can discern the true meaning of free will, of love, of personality;—of everything, indeed, to which our own consciousness bears inherent witness, but whose perfectness none of us has attained. This is to distinguish, in our experience, what it is that belongs to the lines of our true nature, and what to our own imperfect realization of it. This is the precise distinction which it is the aim of the present inquiry to make. But this is a widely different

thing from taking the imperfect experience as we find it; and, without distinction, assuming blindly that whatever we there find,—in human free will, for instance, or in human penitence,—is itself a necessary element in what the words "free will" or "penitence" properly mean.

It follows that our inquiry is ideal even more immediately than it is practical. We desire not so much to find a working theory, say, of punishment, for our own ordinary use of it, as to find its ultimate meaning in the highest possibilities of human consciousness. Rudimentary experience of punishment comes in chiefly as supplying the data for a theory which will certainly transcend all present experience; but which, as the goal towards which even the earliest experience is working, will really illuminate and explain, as certainly as it transcends, all its own rudimentary beginnings.

But it is time to come face to face with our inquiry. What, then, first of all, is to be the real meaning, for us, of the word "punishment"?

As a preliminary answer let us take what will embody at all events a good deal of the popular feeling as to the meaning of punishment. Punishment, according to this, may be described as pain; deserved pain; avenging pain; pain that is, as pain, inflicted, from without, by another,—because of, and in proportion to, wrongdoing. The cause is the wrongdoing of the person punished. The action is the action of another. The object of the action is to hurt. And the hurt constitutes a kind of equation with the wrongdoing. If the person has been rather wicked, he has to be hurt a little. If he has been very wicked, he has to be hurt a great deal. If the question be asked, what is the further object to be gained by the suffering of the guilty person, the answer will be that there is no object within the person himself: that the object of punishment regarded as punishment is a public declaration or manifestation on

behalf of righteousness. It expresses the righteousness of the punisher; it exhibits righteousness to all those who stand by and look on. But, in respect of the punished, the direct object of the punishment, as punishment, is simply that he should suffer.

I may say that in these descriptive words, I have before me the view of punishment which I understand to be taken by Dr Dale, a view which the position commonly accorded to his volume on the Atonement would appear to stamp as at least a general and representative view. Not reformation, he insists, but retribution is the essential view of punishment. It is not, to quote his own words, "a painful process to effect future reformation; it is the suffering which has been deserved by past sin. To make it anything else than this is to destroy its essential character."[1] Again, "the only conception of punishment which satisfies our strongest and most definite moral convictions" . . . . "represents it as pain and loss inflicted for the violation of a law."[2] "Suffering inflicted upon a man to make him better in the future is not punishment, but discipline."[3] "By some external force or authority he is being made to suffer the just consequence of his past offences. Whatever moral element there is in punishment itself—as punishment—is derived from the person or power that inflicts it."[4]

I propose to criticize and to disallow the position which these phrases represent. But, before going further, I should like to point out that whilst these expressions of Dr Dale's tend certainly too much to an idea of punishment as an external transaction of an arithmetical or quantitative kind, there are, nevertheless, on analysis, at least three positive strains of thought underlying them, which we may, without hesitation, accept. The three are these: first, whatever its ultimate rationale may be, punishment takes the form of suffering: suffering of body,

[1] P. 376. [2] P. 383. [3] P. 383. [4] P. 386.

perhaps, but suffering anyhow, whether through the body or not, of mind and spirit. Secondly, this suffering is addressed to, and has direct correspondence with, a sense of guilt. It has no meaning, except in relation to the capacity, in the sufferer, of a consciousness of guilt. If I am to receive punishment as punishment, and to put some meaning into that word punishment as distinct from the merely physical sensation of pain, I must absolutely have some sense of right and wrong; some capacity at least of self-judgment, and of saying of myself, in the light of what is right, that I am identified with wrong. Even at this stage I cannot help remarking in parenthesis that to correlate punishment with a capacity of self-consciousness in wrongdoing is not the same thing as to correlate it with wrongdoing simply—apart from consciousness of wrong; and that the difference between the two will work out very importantly in the result. Thirdly, it follows from what has been said about self-consciousness of wrong in the light of what is right, that the pain which is recognized as punishment is thereby recognized as somehow representing and proceeding from righteousness: it is a manifestation or mode of righteousness: it is, in some way, the effect or operation of righteousness declaring and effecting itself upon (at least) if not within, me. It is, then, not simply a hurting, but the hurting of righteousness; the assertion of righteousness in the form of the chastisement of unrighteousness.

Now so far I have endeavoured to put, in my own way rather than in Dr Dale's, three thoughts which seem to be implied in Dr Dale's conception. But there is a fourth consideration, clearly indeed implied in the way in which the three have been stated, which should be emphasized as cardinal for any real understanding of punishment. It is then of real importance to insist that, whatever punishment means, it is impossible to punish anything

other than a conscious personality. Punishment only has meaning in—and in reference to—a *person* punished. You can break to pieces a stick that has hurt you: you can burn to ashes a paper that contains a slander against you: but you cannot *punish* anything inanimate. If you talk of punishing an animal, or try to punish it in fact, you can still do this only so far as you first endow it, or assume it to be endowed, with personal qualities for the purpose. You assume self-conscious identity, you assume continuous memory, you assume a power of moral discrimination. It is not of course to my present purpose to ask how far the assumption may be true, or what is the relation of animal consciousness to personality; but I repeat that the word punishment as applied to an animal only has meaning just so far as you tacitly assume certain personal characteristics; and the lower you go in the scale of animal life, the more totally unmeaning would the word become. It will be felt perhaps that it is possible for man to punish any animal that is capable, and so far as it is capable, of really caring for man. No doubt. But this is only to repeat the same principle in other words. Perhaps the root of personality is capacity of affection. At all events, to say that punishment is possible in proportion to capacity of affection is to make it correlative to a personal possibility.

Now directly we set all this in the forefront of our thought about punishment, the question begins to present itself more forcibly than ever, whether we can simply acquiesce in the statement with which we began. If punishment is, in its real truth, an operation of righteousness, which is personal, dealing with moral personality, can it be anything like an adequate statement of the truth to say that punishment has exclusive reference to the past? or that pain, as pain, is in itself

an object? or that there is any real equation between the pain, as pain, and the evil to which it relates?

There is always a certain verbal inexactness whenever we speak of the punishment of sin. It is the sinner who is punished, not the sin. So long as men think chiefly of punishment as the punishment of sin, the simply retributive and equational aspect may seem to be the prominent one. The amount of hurt inflicted is the simple expression, and measure, of the necessary antithesis of righteousness against unrighteousness. An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, is a maxim which explains itself, with mathematical precision and clearness. But directly you begin to substitute the idea of punishing the sinner, the equation aspect ceases to be the dominant one. It gives place more and more to the thought of that moral purpose towards the sinner, of which the severity of punishment, the severity of the manifested antithesis against unrighteousness, is itself a necessary stage and part.

It is true that punishment still takes the form of pain. But if pain is in any sense an immediate object, must it not be—in an operation of personal righteousness upon moral personality,—that the pain is of the nature of a means to an end?—a moral means working to a moral end? And must not the true character and meaning of the punishment be found in the moral end to which it is a means?

We are going now some way from Dr Dale; and may perhaps easily be tempted to state, with too much breadth, the opposing view. But to say the very least, has not room—full room—to be made for this conception of punishment? Turn for a few minutes to the thought exclusively of human punishment—the punishment of man by man. Is it not plain that we should have to exclude from the word "punishment" a very large

percentage—nay almost the whole—of what is ordinarily administered as punishment,—if we did not expressly include the idea of pain inflicted by righteousness upon the potentially righteous, with a view to making their potential righteousness actual? In the case of a parent punishing a little child, or the master punishing an ordinary schoolboy, this comes near to being the whole account of the matter. Of course the master or the parent may lose his temper, and become himself quite unideal. But so far as he represents truly the ideal action of righteousness, his action in punishing may itself be called the necessary mode of the operation, under the existing conditions, of love. It is the love—itself another aspect of righteousness—the love which, fixing its eyes upon the unseen possibilities of the child's true nature, discerns through what passage of pain he, though now marred by identification with unrighteousness, can be weaned and won from what he is to what he ought to be.

But what is true so broadly of the parent, and true to a large extent of the ideal schoolmaster, by no means ceases to be true when we think of the relation of the judge to the prisoner standing in the dock for sentence. Even here it is true that punishment is rarely inflicted without the hope, at least, and desire, and purpose, that the punishment may be a means of moral good.

It may be said, perhaps, that, at least in the case of the magistrate, any purpose such as this is only subsidiary and incidental: that here at least, punishment, in its primary significance, is directly retributive; and, what is more, that the principles of retributive punishment, as judicially administered, imply the conception of what may fairly be called an equation between the quantum of past guilt and the quantum of inflicted pain.

It may therefore be worth while to insist that both these

aspects, the retributive aspect, and the equation aspect, of human justice, belong indeed in fact to human justice; but belong to it not as it is justice, but as it is human; belong, that is, and can be seen directly to belong, to the necessary imperfectness of such corporate and social justice as is possible on earth. Thus it is true even of a schoolmaster's justice, and much more of that administered by magistrates under the letter of statute law, that discipline must be administered by even-handed rule. What is the practical meaning of even-handed rule? It means that cases which themselves may be ever so diverse, if you look below the surface, must be treated in classes, as substantially alike. It means in a word that the individual must be sacrificed to the community. Within narrow limits no doubt there is a modifying power. But speaking broadly it means that again and again a punishment must be inflicted upon an individual with a view to surrounding society,—that is to its general effect upon other people,—which would certainly not be the wisest, the best, or the justest,—if there were nothing whatever to be considered but the inner truth of the personality of the offender himself. Divine justice is exactly just to the individual. But then Divine justice presupposes omniscience. The attempt to conduct human justice on Divine principles, but with human faculties, would end simply in the overthrow of all justice whatever. Human justice, to be justice at all, must necessarily under human conditions, be rough, inexact,—that is (too often) unjust. And yet human justice broadly represents, even when, in close detail, it travesties, the Divine. It is one of those instances in which a Divine reality is represented by a human counterpart; but only on condition that the human counterpart maintains keen consciousness of its distinction from, in the last resort even its fundamental contrast with, that Divine which indeed it represents, but represents only

in rough figure, through incompetent material. Now it is exactly this inherent impossibility of being perfectly just, which fastens upon human justice the retributive as its most characteristic aspect. In justice that was ideal, because Divine, retribution would not (to say the least) be the one simple differentia of punishment.

And the equation theory is only a further adaptation of the retributive. It is only when our thought is dealing with guilt or punishment as counters—that is, as imaginary existences abstracted from the personalities of the guilty or the punished, that the equation theory even appears to explain anything. Remember that sin means a condition of a personality, and that punishment is a treatment of a personality; and at once it is felt that equivalence between sin and punishment, even if it were possible to establish any measure of equivalence, would have no meaning and lead to no conclusion at all. No one, indeed, who views these things from the point of view of personality and personal character, even professes to believe in such an equivalence. No schoolmaster really supposes that the bad boy, however adequately punished, is a good boy, or even is, by virtue of the mere quantum of punishment, any whit the less bad than he was. It may be quite right and wise to treat what may be called his "school account" as closed. But this only brings into relief the really obvious fact that this "school account" is a very external thing, and is far from wholly coinciding with that inward reality which it outwardly, no doubt, represents. We may say of it, as we said of human justice, that it is a sort of symbol or parable of something which it only symbolizes truly, so long as it does *not* claim identity with it.

From this point of view we may recognize that all human punishment, the sentence passed by the judge upon the prisoner, no less than the treatment of the refractory schoolboy, aims at, and at least outwardly re-

presents and symbolizes, a certain change in the culprit's own personality. Whether the culprit is at all inwardly changed by it, is another question. But outwardly at least and symbolically, the prisoner standing for sentence is made to occupy the attitude of a penitent accepting discipline. If his punishment really effects its proper object—its only proper object, so far as the prisoner personally is concerned—it does so not by the quantum of pain endured by him, but by the extent to which that pain is in him taken up into the change of self which we call penitence.

Now the object, for several pages past, has been to try and break down the verbal antithesis, quoted just now, between discipline and punishment. I hold that we must emphatically claim that punishment, inflicted as discipline, *is punishment.* To rule out from the word "punishment" all suffering inflicted or accepted, in the name of righteousness, and unto righteousness as an end—to rule out all personal discipline meant for personal holiness—would be to rule out at least the far larger part of all that any of us has, in fact, ever known or meant by punishment.

May we, then, go at once to the other extreme? May we say that we know no punishment which is not discipline? May we say broadly that the suffering in punishment is always, and only, a means? and that its whole real essence is restorative? It is precisely the premature tendency to embrace such an overstatement as this, which is in all probability the chief justification for the overstatement on the opposite side.

To say that there is no punishment which is not restorative will not account even for all the facts familiar in human experience. It is plain that if we begin to punish with a moral intention in respect of the punished, hoping for his amendment; our hopes may utterly fail. More and more, it may be, the depraved man becomes a human tiger.

Then we punish, if we have the power, not the less but the more. If all hope should die down utterly, it is then that punishment would reach its supreme culmination. It would be the final mark and seal of the consummated impossibility of forgiveness. Even indeed from the very first we punish—if it is ours to punish,—alike the hopeful and the unhopeful criminals: and certainly do not punish those who seem obdurate *less than* those of whom we have good hope. And human experience herein is in analogy with the revelation of God. We dare not explain away the awful word "Hell," as meaning only a purgatory. We dare not, until the possibility of Hell has been authoritatively explained away, deny the ultimate possibility of the idea of a punishment which is *not* restorative.

How, then, do we now stand? It may be agreed, perhaps, First, that all punishment is of necessity exercised upon a moral personality, a personality, that is, which either is, or has been, capable of righteousness: which either still is to be won to righteousness, or has only become incompatible with righteousness through its own resolutely immoral will. Secondly, that all punishment takes the form of distress and pain, whether chiefly of body or of mind. Thirdly, that this penal distress is correlated with wrongdoing, which is in the wrongdoer, and of which the wrongdoer is, or is capable of being, personally conscious. Fourthly, that this correlation of pain, in a conscious moral personality, with wrong, is itself an operation or effect of righteousness, which it manifests and vindicates.

But even when we agree upon these four points, we are met with a distinction, of crucial importance, between two contrasted ways in which such righteousness may be manifested, in an erring personality, as pain. It may be manifested within the personality, in the direction of a gradual re-identifying of the personality with righteousness.

Or it may be manifested upon, and at the expense of, the personality;—the personality being regarded as something which righteousness can only be righteous by condemning with inexorable condemnation. The point at present chiefly urged is that of these two contrasted alternatives, neither may be excluded from our thought of possibility, and neither may be excluded from our use of the word "punishment." The *word* is applicable alike in the one case and the other, however different its import may become. And we may venture to suggest that attempts to conceive of punishment have too often broken down, because the conceptions really applied only to the one, or only to the other, of the two diverse characters of which punishment is capable.

But there is something more to be said about the distinction. Let us begin by asking what it is upon which the distinction turns. The answer is that it altogether turns upon the reception of punishment by the person punished. But this suggests another point about the character of the distinction. We have put the two senses of punishment as sharply contrasted. A process of love is indeed very different from a process of damnation. But it may not unreasonably be asked—How should the one word mean two such different things? And then, in another form, the same answer comes back; that different as they are in their result, in origin and inception they are not different. They begin as one thing. As far as the chastising righteousness is concerned, they would also continue as one. The difference comes in, not so much from the different action of the punisher, as from the difference in the personality that receives the punishment.

In other words, all punishment begins as discipline. In so far as my disciplinary suffering educates me towards penitence, it is itself a mode of my progressive capacity of righteousness. It is a process—as inchoate and imperfect

as you please; but still it is a process, the ultimate climax of which, supposing that it could ever reach its ultimate climax, would be the real and consummated triumph of righteousness within myself.

The antithesis of righteousness against unrighteousness is, of course and always, absolute and irreparable. And one aspect of punishment, from its most rudimentary up to its gravest stages, may be said to be the manifestation of this antithesis. But the very manifestation of this antithesis, in the way of punishment, in whatever intermediate sense it may be viewed as retributive, has, for its ultimate object, the welfare, not the hurt, of the sinner who is punished. Its latent retributive character (if the word may be used legitimately for the moment) is yet latent and secondary in reference to the primary purpose of punishment, which is a purpose of beneficent love. Only in proportion as this fades out of sight, through the sinner's determined impenitence, does the punishment begin to be characterized at all primarily as retributive pain.

This purpose of beneficent love is, we may venture to suggest, the proper character and purpose of punishment.

But this purpose, or process, may be defeated, by the obdurate wickedness of the person punished. Then the punishment, whose purpose was discipline, has failed of its purpose. The punishment, which has failed in its purpose as discipline, remains as vengeance. There always was this aspect, or possibility, about punishment. From the first it was true that, just in proportion as punishment was not, as discipline, effective:—just in proportion as it was not taken up into the character as penitence:—just in proportion (in other words) as it was not transmuted, within the personality, from an outward infliction of pain into an inward correspondence with righteousness:—just in that proportion it stood,—or was ready to stand,—as retribution pure and simple. And if the personality

should become, at last, the final antithesis to all capacity of penitence or righteousness, then the awful climax of punishment would be reached, when it is the inexorable manifestation of righteousness,—no longer, less or more, within the personal character, but at the expense of the personality, proved finally incompatible with righteousness. Righteousness, inexorably righteous, at the cost,—to the ruin,—of all that the very word "I" means, or can ever mean; this is indeed the extreme damnation of hell.

Hitherto we have been content to make use of such phrases as the "infliction" of punishment, by a "chastising" righteousness. It is obvious, of course, that in all the lower analogues of punishment with which human experience is familiar, a punishment implies a punisher, exercising, with effect, the will to punish. But it is well to remember that infliction from without, by another, so far from being an essential element in all thought of punishment, tends more and more completely to disappear, as having no longer even an accidental place, in those deeper realities of punishment, which human punishings do but outwardly symbolize. The more we discern their process and character, the more profoundly do we recognize that the punishments of God are what we should call self-acting. There is nothing in them that is arbitrary, imposed, or, in any strict propriety of the word, inflicted. As death is the natural consummation of mortal disease, not as an arbitrary consequence inflicted by one who resented the mortal disease, but as its own inherent and inevitable climax; so what is called the judgment of God upon sin is but the gradual necessary development, in the consistent sinner, of what sin inherently is. The whole progress of sin is a progressive alienation from God; and the climax of such a progressive alienation is that essential incompatibleness with God which we call hell. "The lust, when it hath conceived, beareth sin; and the sin, when it is

full-grown, bringeth forth death."[1] Nothing is further necessary for man's damnation, than that man, being in himself identified with sin, should be left by God altogether to himself.

It is of considerable importance to insist upon this spontaneous or inherent character of the consequence of sin, in face of a tendency to emphazise the idea of the infliction, and the inflicter, as part of the ultimate analysis of punishment; and still more, whenever practical corollaries are drawn, representing God in the character of a merciless avenger, who has once pronounced, and will not be persuaded to withdraw, the sentence of His arbitrary doom. But apart from false imaginations such as these, the wrath of God, and the judgment of God, are themselves emphatically scriptural phrases. And if it is an aspect of the nature and being of God, as indeed it is, that (since righteousness is life, and life is righteousness) therefore sin must work out its own inevitable consummation as death; it is plain that there is a sense in which the doom of sin may be truly called the judgment, because it is a corollary of the being, of God. But however legitimate, in their own way, such phrases may be, it is clear, on the practical side, that they can easily be pressed to the point of very serious error; and clear that, if examined theologically, they have (to say the least) to be qualified by conceptions in which the intervention of an external punisher has, from first to last, no place. The chastising, or avenging, of righteousness, may still be legitimate, or, indeed, indispensable, phrases; but in the use of them it is certainly necessary to bear jealously in mind the very considerable qualification of meaning, without which they would still be liable to mislead.

But if the word punishment is capable of these two—so widely diverging—developments and interpretations, it

[1] Jas. i. 15 (R.V.)

is well to consider, a little further, the character of the contrast between the two. Let us take a case of conspicuous wrongdoing. A man is guilty of a cowardly murder. What are the penal consequences of his guilt? No doubt in various ways the proper consequences may be averted or delayed. But (perversions apart) there are at least these two streams of proper consequence; on the one hand, the police and the magistrate, pursuit, arrest, judgment, the gallows, all which might naturally be summed up as vengeance: and on the other hand, wholly apart from anything of this kind, the sting of inward guilt, the penal misery, inherent, progressive,—in the end (it may be) stifling even to life,—the penal misery of a murderer's consciousness.

These two things, of course, are perfectly separable. Indeed we naturally think of them as separate. Consider, then, first, the vengeance of the gallows by itself. Of all such vengeful punishment it must be observed that, however righteous (in many aspects) the infliction of the vengeance may be, it does not, of itself, the least affect, or tend to affect, the criminal's character. There is indeed, in the public infliction of disgrace and punishment, a certain sense of homage rendered to righteousness. This homage to righteousness which the personal endurance (of whatever kind) represents, would be realized perfectly in the perfect contrition of the criminal. Where there is no such contrition, the true homage to righteousness in his external disgrace, is, so far as he is concerned, only symbolized, not attained. But only when all idea of his penitence is eliminated, does the punishment become purely and simply the retaliation of vengeance, inflicted from without by another: and the homage to righteousness is in no sense within, but at the expense of, the personality of the criminal.

The murderer, because duly hanged, is not the less

a murderer. Vengeance as such, whatever its degree, does not make, or tend to make, an equation with guilt. No conceivable equality between wrong done and pain suffered, could in itself so compensate as to cancel, or atone for, wrong. Regard the wrong done as debt, and it may be compensated. Regard it as a crime of which human law takes cognizance; and the hold which human law has, or ought to have, upon it, may by a certain endurance be exhausted. But regard it as moral taint, a perversion of the self of the sinner; and it is plain that no endurance of punishment can, in itself, change the fact of moral perversion. Of vengeful punishment, as such, it is strictly true, that "whatever moral element there is" in it, is in the punisher only, not in the punished. As far as the person of the sufferer goes, there is in it no moral effect, or even tendency: there is no affinity with righteousness: need we add that what is neither moral nor righteous can have no shadow of atoning capacity either? We have said that the murderer is not, merely because he is hanged, the less a murderer. It may have been right to inflict the extreme penalty upon him; but the essence of the "he" is not, thereby, necessarily touched. Vengeance, as such, hell, as such, has nothing of satisfaction or atonement about it.

But, we shall ask, was he *not* touched? Did not something come home to his heart? Did not the spirit within begin, however dimly, to soften and change, in the lonely cell or on the scaffold? If so, in however feeble or faint a degree, that is a thing, at once, essentially and altogether different in kind. We distinguished just now outward infliction from inward misery of conscience. Of course they are distinguishable. But, it is to be observed, that there is no element of outward infliction which may not minister to sorrow of conscience. Short of hell itself, we may say that all inflicted pain is, or may be, a contribution, though

coming from without, and rough as yet and unshaped, towards what properly belongs to the sphere of remorseful penitence. All vengeful punishment in this life may be translated, as it were, by the fulness of its acceptance, from the side of vengeance to the side of penitence. It may be transmuted into penitence; it may become the way of forgiveness. But in itself, as infliction from without, it symbolizes not forgiveness but vengeance. The gallows can in no sense be called a form of absolution. In themselves, so far from being an expression of forgiveness, they are the express antithesis to forgiveness. They are the final setting of the seal to the fact that the transgression is *not* forgiven. Yet even the gallows may minister, if indirectly, to contrition, and only just so far as they do so, have they any—even the smallest—tendency to diminish guilt, or to satisfy or to educate righteousness within.

But the possibilities of penitence are inexhaustible. Consider, for a moment, the possible thought of a murderer for once ideally penitent. Now directly disgrace and punishment from without begin to be no longer inflictions merely from without; directly they begin to be taken up and assimilated within; the man has begun to go over (as it were) from the side of his sin to the side of the condemnation of his sin. And if his penitence should be all that we are able in imagination to conceive its being; behold! the punishment which he suffers,—no longer now as merely passive suffering, but as a subjective homage, as a willing sacrifice within the soul,—is transfigured, and touched with something of the light of what we may dare to call atoning satisfaction. Not the suffering in itself, but the inward acceptance of the suffering; the homage to righteousness which is offered as suffering; the self-consecration to sacrifice; this, so far as it is true, is a real approach towards re-identification of self, in sacrifice, with righteousness.

In vengeful punishment, as such, there was, so far as the person of the sufferer was concerned, no moral meaning or tendency. For this very reason, all vengeful punishment of sin, all determined infliction, by the will of another, of suffering just in order to make suffer, all, that is to say, which is not an element or ingredient in the discipline of human penitence,—being, as it is, not a condition of, but the final antithesis to, forgiveness, — would, upon the hypothesis, and in proportion to the possibility, of a penitence really adequate, really perfect, become not merely unnecessary or dispensable, but, in the sight of Him in whom truth and righteousness and love are inseparably one, not only unloving, but unrighteous, and untrue.

Is the man, then, still punished? That may be. In human justice probably he is. But this is partly at least because human justice contemplates not so much the individual as the society, and must think primarily of the effect of its action, not on the criminal but on other men; and partly the infliction, even upon the penitent, of that full penalty which symbolizes the utter refusal of forgiveness, would find justification in the fact that humanity knows no standard by which to try, and has no proper right to accept, perfection of penitence. Moreover it may be that the penitence could not as penitence reach its own consummation without this outward infliction of discipline; an infliction which at the very moment in which, in the outward sphere to which it belongs, it seems symbolically to contradict forgiveness, does also, in the inner sphere of spiritual consciousness, inwardly serve to consummate the conditions which make a real forgiveness possible. In this regard the very gallows can become the consecration of a consummated penitence. Otherwise, except in this aspect as consummating penitence, and so far as the penitence could, as penitence,

be perfected completely without them, the very gallows, however humanly necessary, would have become, in inner truth, unjust.

We cannot but observe that, the more ideally complete his penitence; the more he accepts the penalty, renouncing it with full purpose of righteous will against himself as a murderer; the less is he in reality a murderer now. It would be another thing to say that human judgment could ever test, or ever be warranted in accepting, the full completeness of a murderer's penitence. Nay, we may still doubt whether it is within the capacity of human penitence to be within measurable distance of such completeness. We need not say that even on the—perhaps impossible—hypothesis of a penitence absolutely perfect, the man ought, in human justice, not to be hanged. It may be still men's duty, on other grounds, to hang him, as it is certainly his righteousness to accept being hanged. But we do say that, if he still is hanged even upon that hypothesis—extreme, or, if you will, impossible—the hypothesis of a penitence quite absolutely perfect and complete; this would, upon the hypothesis, only belong to the fact that human justice necessarily is a most external and unideal thing. It might be, in the rough ways of human justice, right to inflict the vengeful punishment still. But those who did so would, even in doing it, know that vengeance without mercy had already become, in the Diviner sphere of perfect justice and truth, a thing untrue and unjust; that, in the unerring exactness of the truth of God, vengeance is *not* the due meed of a soul in which past sin has no longer any part, of a soul by grace really made one with holiness.

Is he, the most penitent of penitents, still sent to his doom? It may be; but at least in such a case, observe how largely it is true that, what was punishment, is itself now so far transfigured, that we stand in some doubt

whether still to call it punishment. He suffers still? yes, but he blesses suffering; he chooses suffering: suffering now is the very expression of the effort of goodness in him. He is indeed the person who suffers. But he is, even more, the person who condemns sin, by passing sentence upon it even in himself: himself in inexorable contradiction against it, inexorable therefore towards himself, in that himself is identified with sin. This penal suffering in him can no longer be described as a retaliatory infliction by the will of another; for it has now become absolutely his own, the expression of his own extreme contradiction against any shadow of presence of wrong in himself; and just because it is his own will, rather than another's, therefore it is in him the very identification of himself with righteousness, the consummation, in himself, of an absolute antithesis against sin.

Are we talking only of ideals, which no one has realized? We shall indeed be obliged, with each one of our first three topics, to talk of ideals, if we wish really to see, in punishment, or in penitence, or in forgiveness, what the thing itself really is, and not merely what our imperfect realization of it has attained. What then, in this ideal case, is found to be the nature of the punishment? Observe how more and more absolutely it tends to lose its aspect as vengeance inflicted by another from without. Its rationale cannot be found in this. So far as it *was* distinctively from without, it is now all taken up, and translated into the expression, from within, of detestation of sin. It is the man's own inward homage to righteousness. As such, it ceases to find its character as inflicted pain.

In addition, then, to the considerations already formulated, we may claim perhaps to have reached these further positions now; first, that it is only so far as it is *not* transfigured into a personal self-identification with

righteousness, that punishment remains in the aspect of retribution; secondly, that it is just in proportion as it *is* a process of self-identity with righteousness, that there is atoning capacity in the bearing of punishment; but thirdly, that precisely so far as it retains its character as inflicted retaliation, it has no atoning or restorative tendency whatever. The power of punishment to discipline, to sanctify, or to atone, is in it just in proportion as punishment, according to our ordinary language, ceases to be punishment, and becomes a mode of penitence instead; for, if penitence were all perfect, there would be no penal suffering which was not, in the fullest sense, self-chosen. Either the suffering of punishment is more and more absolutely identified with penitential painfulness; or it has nothing atoning or restorative about it.

If things like these are true at all, the conclusion must certainly be suggested, that it is only with the greatest caution, and exactitude of definition, that the word "punishment" can be safely applied to the atoning sufferings of Christ. We need not indeed deny that it may be verbally possible to use the word "punishment" *either* of penitential *or* of retributive suffering; either therefore of the inconceivable painfulness of an infinite contrition, or (so far indeed as the thought is conceivable at all) of the infliction, in anger, of an infinite vengeance. But wherever the word is verbally identified with this latter sense, the sense of retributive vengeance inflicted by another; there, and so far, we should certainly be justified in protesting against its use in connection with the doctrine of atonement, or the Person of Jesus Christ.

For ourselves, in the meanwhile, it is sufficiently clear, (1) that all our punishment presents itself at first to our unreflecting thought under the aspect of retribution, objective and external; (2) that, on reflection, we recognize that all our punishment has really the disciplinary motive

and meaning; that is, it is really a means, so to change personalities which are now potentially righteous but actually sinful, as to make them, in consummated antithesis against sin, actually righteous: (3) that in proportion as our punishment realizes its own meaning, its outward hardness tends to fade into an inner severity of will; retribution more and more is merged in contrition; penal suffering comes ever increasingly to mean the suffering of penance rather than of penalty: but (4) that in proportion as it fails in that essential purpose which made it what it was, it does acquire more and more that simply retributive character, whose climax is not Calvary but Hell.

This is the great alternative for ourselves. Either the sense and touch of penal suffering becomes more and more, within the spirit of the punished, a bracing of strength, a deepening of the personal homage to God, a progressive expression of contradiction against sin, a progressive identification of the real self with righteousness; or else it is, as mere pain, futile and helpless, having in it no satisfying or restorative element, but destined only, in the last resort to become the extreme opposite—the precise alternative and antithesis—to any possibility of forgiveness.

If we believe that the value and glory of punishment is in proportion as it becomes self-chosen,—taken up into personal abhorrence of sin; it is possible that our own instinctive attitude may be modified towards all that familiar penal discomfort which we now have, or are likely to have, to bear. The leading instinct may by degrees be rather—not to shrink, to avoid, to beg off, to groan with self-pity; but rather to accept, to use, and to make the most of it, as indispensable—as invaluable—means of beauty and of power. It is the punishment which the

will wholly accepts, which is really, in quality, purifying. It is possible that, with such a fixed conviction, men might be really the readier to receive punishment,—that is, the pain and sorrow which may serve as discipline; and more eager, by acceptance, to translate—or rather, dutifully, to allow and accept the translation of—the pains and sorrows which do fall upon them, into the salutary sorrow and pain of the sacrifice of penitence.

CHAPTER II

PENITENCE

WHAT shall we say that we mean by Penitence? It is something, no doubt, the germ of which lies deep within the universal experience of the human heart. Yet it is something which is, to natural experience, so incomplete, so unexplained and so inexplicable,—until it finds in Christianity its appropriate place, its divine explanation, and (we may add) its divine beauty and sweetness; that we may with more exact truth describe it as a characteristic experience of the *Christian* consciousness. And its place in the Christian consciousness can hardly be exaggerated. Wherever the Christian consciousness is at all come, or coming, to itself, there penitence is at home. It is hardly too much to say that penitence is itself an inalienable aspect of the Christian consciousness.

It was impossible, while speaking of punishment, to make any serious attempt to examine the ideas which were involved in it, without implying a good deal also as to the content of the word penitence. Yet there remains very much more to be said.

The first thing to be said is very important, and would bear minute analysis, though it must be said shortly here. It is that we must necessarily conceive of penitence as a condition *of a personality;* a personality which has affinity with, and is capable of, righteousness; a personality which at the same time has self-consciousness of sin. So much is presupposed as a foundation for the possibility of penitence.

Penitence is an aspect, a climax, of conscience of sin. But conscience of sin would not be exactly conscience of sin, save in a personality which was capable of righteousness; nay more, a personality of which righteousness was, in some way, the proper nature and necessity. Capacities of personal character, made in, and for, yet fallen beneath, God's image; only on the assumption of these can the word penitence have its distinctive meaning at all.

Now wherever there is underlying Divine capacity, marred by the consciousness of moral evil, with which the personality is self-identified; the first and simplest result is wretchedness. And even while our thought is at this stage, we may perhaps legitimately look out upon the whole vast sea of human wretchedness, and claim it all as something which in itself is directly correlative to possibilities that are only Divine. Wretchedness, indeed, as mere wretchedness, is not penitence. How dumb it often is, and pitiful, and perplexed, and ignorant of its own nature, and less than germinal! There is nothing, with which, if we try to look out upon life from the Christian point of view, we should find ourselves more intimately familiar, than the wide, seething, restless discomfort and discontent of spiritual nature, which is not indeed, but which might be, and is to be, penitence. And we know how small a change,—nay, no change at all in outward circumstance—may transform the whole scene. A little turning of the face to the east, a little melting of the stiffness of heart, a little kindling of a new desire, a little lighting of the flame of the spirit,—and behold! a new tinge faintly begins to flush upon, and to light up, what was nothing but gloom. The waves and the clouds are the same; but they *were* mere leaden darkness, and they *are* the very material of the sunset glory. Mere sorrow has much to learn. But even in the sorrowing heart, as sorrowing, there is at least an implicit noble-

ness. We might say indeed much more than this. The sorrowing heart, as sorrowing, contains implicitly the whole mystery of penitence, which is the mystery of human personality, and its inherent possibility of divinely spiritual life. Sorrow of heart is the signal prerogative of man; and it marks his origin and his destiny, as, in real truth, divine.

Again, to keep still to phenomena which are familiar, we recognize that penitence, in proportion as it is penitent, must be an emotion of love. If penitence expresses itself in sorrow, the spring and the cause of penitent sorrow is love. And not the spring and cause only. Love does not only make the tears first to begin. But, all through, they are love. Love is their essence. Love is their character. The first tear, and the last, is a sign, is an utterance, is an act, of love. "Behold a woman in the city which was a sinner, when she knew that Jesus sat at meat in the Pharisee's house, brought an alabaster box of ointment, and stood at His feet behind Him weeping, and began to wash His feet with her tears, and did wipe them with the hairs of her head, and kissed His feet, and anointed them with the ointment."[1] What is the explanation? "For she loved much." The sorrow is no mere accompaniment: it is the form which such love must necessarily take. If penitence is sorrow, it is so far like the lover's sorrow; the lover who is in love with one whom he feels to be hopelessly far above him, perhaps in station, at least in goodness and love. It is not to him love *and* pain. But the love *is* the pain. And the pain,—he would not for worlds be free from it; for it is the necessary condition, it is the evidence, under present conditions at least it is of the essence, of his love. An anodyne which would kill the pain, would benumb the love: slackened pain would be love's decaying: only living pain is living love. So

[1] Luke vii. 37, 38.

penitent sorrow is a sorrow that is blended with, and proceeds out of, love: sorrow that is the sign, the act, the utterance, and the relief, of love. Sorrow has become love's instinct, love's necessity. It is love which itself is heartbroken because of its own outrage against love. Here too, it is not love *and* sorrow: but sorrow which can be recognized as love, love which, just because it still loves, cannot but be sorrow.

Again, we recognize sorrowing love, on another side, as itself a manifestation of vivifying belief. "Jesus, remember me when Thou comest in Thy kingdom."[1] These are the words of grace in one who will bear, as long as this world lasts, the undying title of "the *penitent* thief." And nothing in his penitence appeals to our imagination with such extraordinary force as the limitless power of faith which it involves. In spite of conditions physically the most cogent and most crushing, out of the midst of the terrible realities of literal crucifixion, he can look up and see, in one who to the merely outward eye is but another criminal in his death agony, the LORD of death and of life. This is no dream dreamed softly in moments of ease. It is faith, without any help of outward sense, transcending and transforming the most appalling realities of outward sense. It is faith which sees at last, and (in spite of extremest disabilities) embraces as wholly real, the very thing which is most essential reality. It is a supreme triumph and marvel of belief. Belief, it may be said, should come before love: for love implies a basis, first, of belief. Yes, in logic perhaps it does; but does it so always in life? Often perhaps it is love which draws, towards goodness and towards God, those who, till they love, hardly believe; and who now feel that they believe because they love.

But after all, it is rather that we may not seem to have omitted them, that we glance now at these familiar aspects

[1] Luke xxiii. 42.

of a deepening Penitence. These are full indeed of their own deathless interest. Yet these are not the lines of thought about penitence, which it most concerns our purpose at present to pursue. We want now to ask not so much of this or that aspect of penitence, however significant in itself, or however touching, as of the whole, and the meaning of the whole as whole. What we want to consider is the fullest import of the word *μετάνοια*,—containing sorrow, love, faith, and whatever besides,—as a real changedness of the life and the mind: nor indeed of the life and mind only—or anything else which can be even abstractly detached and considered apart from the unifying self; as a real changedness, then, not only of life or mind, but of the very self that lives and wills.

In speaking of punishment we endeavoured to distinguish, as following naturally upon sin, two distinct trains of penal consequence; on the one hand the whole system of external punishment; on the other the whole history and process of inner anguish of soul. And we ended by asking for the acceptance of these two principles;—first that the whole content of the former is capable of being transferred, by dutiful acceptance, so as to become the mere material of the latter; that is, all incurred pain may be transfused into penitence; and secondly that except only just so far as it is in this way transfused, and ministers to, or reappears as, penitence, penal pain is of no moral value to the punished personality at all. Righteousness may indeed be vindicated in the mere fact that I am severely punished. But except just so far as my punishment becomes, in me, the expression and voluntary sacrifice of my penitence, it is not within *me*, but without, that righteousness is vindicated and becomes triumphant.

On the other hand just so far as my punishment does really become my penitence, so far does righteousness win in my punishment a fuller triumph; for so far is it true

that,—within my very self, as well as without,—punishment, translated into penitence, is in the highest sense, the victory of righteousness.

We are familiar with many, very varying, degrees of penitence; many of them indeed most real, but none wholly perfect. It is of considerable importance moreover for the truth of our conceptions about penitence that we should bear clearly in mind this fact, which as fact, is surely indisputable: the fact that we know every degree of penitence except that one which alone would realize the true meaning of the word. It is of course from experience that we are to judge. But much as experience teaches us about penitence, it is important to remember that all the penitence realized within our experience, is of necessity imperfect penitence. If then we desire to know not what imperfect penitence is by reason of its imperfectness: but what penitence, apart from its imperfectness, really would mean: we must be explicitly prepared not indeed to contradict but at least to transcend experience, and contemplate something which we have never seen.

Bearing in mind this truth,—which will become perhaps increasingly prominent,—we return to the thought that the penitent, just so far as his penitence is sincere, if he is, undeniably, himself the same man who sinned, yet, in a sense subordinate, but hardly less important, is really—is even essentially—different.

Consider our instinct,—an instinct with only too much of reasonable basis—of the indelibleness of the effect of sin. When a man has sinned, and knows that he has sinned; when the eyes of his spirit are opened, even in part yet really, to see sin as it is; the fatal misery is that the sin which he so sees has become a very integral part of himself. From an external plague, a suffering, a load, a debt, he might be delivered. How can he be delivered from that which he himself is?

A man is deeply in debt. Find him means to pay the debt off,—or pay it for him; and he will be free. A man is grievously ill. Treat the illness aright, find the proper means of cure; and he will be perfectly well. There is, we observe, no contradiction here, for in fact, in spite of the form of our common phrase, it never was the real "he" who was ill. Ill or well, it was, so far, the same unaltered "he." The sickness, or the recovery, were as such, external to the real self. He was externally affected by the sickness: he was externally affected by the recovery. But in sickness or in health it was the same "he."

But it is not so when in perverse will, he has accepted and identified himself with sin. Sin in him is more than a load to be borne, more than a debt to be discharged, more than a slavery to be annulled, more than a sickness to be healed: nor will any one of these metaphors, or the scenery which belongs to these metaphors, symbolize adequately the whole truth of his case. For in all these metaphors, suggestive though they be as far as they go, the essential self remains untouched. So far as these metaphors go, the man loaded or freed from load,—the man in hopeless debt or with the debt paid,—the man enslaved or redeemed from slavery,—the man in sickness or recovered from sickness,—is the same man. On either side of each proposition the quality of the subject is unchanged. But sin enters *within*. Sin affects and perverts the central subject, the essential self. Delivery therefore from accomplished sin must mean not only a change of the circumstances or settings or conditions of the central subject; but such essential alteration in the subject himself, that he himself shall both be what he is not, and shall not be what he really is.

It is necessary for our purpose to try and realize in thought what a real deliverance from sin would mean. The true consciousness of the awakened sinner is

indeed naturally overwhelming. He has sinned. He is sinful. The sin is so in him that he cannot but continue to sin. His past, his present, his future, all are caught and ensnared. How *can* he, who truly is sinful, become before God, truly sinless? A real deliverance, to be possible at all, must embrace at once and transform past, present, and future. The least of these seems an impossibility. But indeed to leave out any one of the three is in fact to vitiate all.

But on further thought we may perhaps perceive that the three are not so distinct as they had seemed to be. Thus the future is not really separable from the present. Except as an abstraction, ideally regarded, the future in practice means the continuance of the present,—the present carried on from moment to moment. Power to live sinlessly in and for the future means not something distinct or severed from the present, but a present power continuing continuously onwards,—a perpetual and unbroken present. The present, then, really contains the future. The future is an aspect of the present. Real possibility, or impossibility, of present holiness—so it be not ended or altered,—carries with it the future too.

Again there is a sense, much more real than we sometimes had thought, in which the past also is really an aspect of the present. For the past, as mere past, would not concern me now. But it concerns me as it affects what I now am, as it remains in me still, an abiding, alas! and inalienable present. This may perhaps find illustration in the bodily life. If so many years ago I caught a cold, and so recovered from it that it left no trace, no effect at all on my bodily record, that cold, as mere history, is no part of what I am. But in so far as it, however imperceptibly, contributed to my physical sensitiveness or left any other continuity of result, just so far the past fact remains ingrained as an element in my present bodily self. So the

act and the wish long ago, in so far as it made its contribution, however small, to my character, remains. Only if it made none, it is gone. Now it is characteristic of real moral evil, as of real moral good, that it cannot but affect the character of the self; and our point at present is to urge that it is precisely in this way that the past sin so really touches me still. Because it is part of the character of the very self, and the self remains, therefore the past sin remains, for me and in me, still. It concerns me not as merely historical past, but as abiding in me, as present, still. It is this abiding presentness of the past in me, which is to me the real meaning—and terror—of the past. A past which was past merely, a past which had nothing in me as present at all, could have nothing in me as past.

So the sin of the past is an abiding present; and this we are conscious that it is in two distinguishable ways. It is in us both as present guilt and as present power. Closely allied as these are, we do not think of them as simply identical. The most complete removal of past sin as present guilt—which is what is often meant by the phrase forgiveness of sins—would not of itself remove, might perhaps hardly even touch, the hopelessness of its yoke as present power. Tell the passionate man that he is forgiven every outburst of which he ever has been guilty: forgiven freely, absolutely, from this moment: remove all shadow or suspicion of guilt; yet will he not thereby have acquired a perfect mastery of temper; when the provocation comes, he—the same he—will break into fever again. On the other hand, the completest removal of the tyranny of the past as present power, the completest imaginable capacity, for present and for future, of temperance or holiness, does not seem to go far towards undoing the passionate deed that is done, *i.e.* towards cancelling the past as present guilt. The guilt of that which has been guiltily done seems to be abidingly contained in the fact of my self-

identity with the past. It is part of that continuity which personality means. How is it possible to be rid of this—this necessary self-identity with the past, which seems to be still present in me as guilt, as inveterately as I am I?

It has been, then, constantly felt that a real deliverance from sin must necessarily have each of these two aspects. It must mean a real removal of the conscience of *guilt*, which is the inherent presence of past sin in the soul. And it must mean such undoing of the *power* of sin, such effectual conquest of evil tendency and evil taste, as to make present and future holiness possible. It is one thing to be forgiven, to this moment, every touch of what has been wrong; it seems like quite another to have the possibility—nay to have even the hope,—of living from henceforth the divine life of holiness.

If, of these two, any real cancelling of the past is the harder logically to conceive; there are moods in which, sweeping past logical difficulties into something of instinctive moral light, the penitent conscience can believe, without a qualm, that a reality of most true forgiveness, a cancelling of the uttermost past, is not possible only, but (as it were) under certain contingencies almost natural; while it shrinks back, daunted and despairing, from any real faith, or hope, of abiding holiness.

The problem how the really unholy can be made to become really holy,—the actually sinful to be in the verity of Divine truth, actually righteous; is not yet solved, until both these difficulties are dealt with, and both are satisfied.

Of course the two are not really so distinct as they seem. The more deeply either is examined, the more is it found to be impossible, nay ultimately even unthinkable, in distinction from the other. But still it is with the one aspect rather than the other that our thought is immediately concerned. Of what nature is the possibility of a

real redemption from the past? How can I, if I have lied, be not a liar? How can I, if I have murdered, be not a murderer? How can I, if I have sinned, be not a sinner?

We endeavoured in speaking of punishment, to insist, as emphatically as possible, that penalty, regarded as inflicted suffering, had no tendency whatever to cancel, or attenuate, guilt. But penalty is capable of translation into penitence. And behold, there is no degree of remorseful penitence, from the lowest to the highest, which has not in it some dim element of this transforming possibility.

The very moment we turn from the thought of inflicted penalty—be it what it may,—to the penal suffering of the remorseful conscience, we feel instinctively that there is a mighty change. It is not that remorse, in itself, is anything but misery. Remorse that begins and ends with being remorse, is a fruitless endurance, not a moral quality or progress. Remorse is not necessarily penitence. But however clearly we may see, in their fuller developments, the contrast between what is meant by remorse and by penitence, no eye can trace, in fact, the imperceptible degrees by which remorse, without conscious alteration of content, with hardly the faintest breath of some new meaning upon it, may become itself the material, and beginning, of penitence. Remorse is a thing which seems to us to begin very naturally. And since — whether explicably or not—remorse does in our experience deepen towards penitence, as simply, as silently, as if penitence were a possibility of the natural life, we may for the present moment, without asking whence or how this possibility has come into human nature, regard remorse as the germ of penitence, and penitence as that completeness which gives its true character and meaning to remorse. And if so, we cannot but recognize that remorse, in a low degree

even at first, and more and more as it is disciplined and ripened towards penitence,—incomplete and unsatisfying though it may be; yet has, in marked contrast with vengeful infliction of punishment, this innate, progressive, and most characteristic tendency,—to bring change in to the essential character of the sinner's very self.

If I have murdered a man, how can I not be a murderer? Within a world made up of before and after —within, that is, the conditions of our own experience— it is indeed not possible that the past deed which is done should be ever undone. So far as the word "murderer" has a strictly historical meaning—"one who did murder"; so far, in a world of before and after like ours, it can never, being once true, cease to be true. But, in so far as the word "murderer" has any present meaning or implication, in so far as it makes any assertion at all about the present character or being; we *can* see, even within the conditions of our own experience, that there is that in penitence—(in punishment therefore too so far as punishment is transfigured into and reappears as penitence)— there is that in penitence which, just in proportion as the penitence approaches nearer and nearer towards its own perfection, has a tendency, to say the least, towards making the present assertion more and more unmeaning.

One has lied, or one has stolen. Is he indeed, for ever, liar or thief? look at him—as his penitence deepens with more and more of insight and of beauty. Is he untrue? Why his whole soul loathes untruth, loathes it everywhere and always—loathes it most of all in himself, and therefore loathes himself as liar. Visibly he is learning to loathe it, —with no shallow sentiment, but even as eternal truth and righteousness loathe it. He is transferred as it were to the side of eternal truth and righteousness. Call him liar: taunt him as liar: it may be that he does not resent or refuse. It is part of the loathing of the sin in himself that

he does not refuse for himself either pain or shame. It may be that penitence is so far incomplete which would shrink back from any shame of suffering. But beware! his meekness under taunt, his acceptance of suffering, is now itself the expression of the man's growing self-identity of spirit with righteousness. Beware lest that which is righteousness in him be in you not only the most dastardly form of spiritual cruelty, but also the most awful outrage against truth:—while you dare to blaspheme, as the spirit of a liar, what you ought to be able to recognize, in awe, as the very light of the sovereignty of the spirit of truth! Yes, just in proportion as, in his self-surrender, he accepts shame as the penalty of lying,—he is in fact further and further from having anything in him of a liar. He is more and more personally identical with the righteousness and truth to which every form of untruth is intolerable. Call him false? Why he is the very antithesis to falsehood. The past act has no place, as falsehood, in the present self. As falsehood at least the past is literally and absolutely dead. So far as it lives, it lives only as the very opposite, —as consummated victory over falsehood.

We are trying to think, at this moment, not of an imperfect, but of a perfect penitence. A man has been in the depths, under the slavery of passion, or of drink. Imagine, if only for hypothesis' sake, not so much of penitence as you think you may probably hope for, but a penitence for once quite perfect. Think then of the clearness of his insight into the terribleness of that degradation which has become the very condition of his life. Think of the pain of the struggle against sin, and the anguish of shame because to abstain is so fierce a struggle and pain. He is impotent, even to anguish: and it is anguish of spirit to be impotent. Every step, every consciousness is a pain. Think of the pain of the disciplinary processes (which, even though pain, are his

hope, his strength, his joy!), the pain of the sorrow, the depth of the shame, the resoluteness of the self-accusing, self-condemning, self-identifying with the holiness outraged, the self-surrender to suffering and penalty, the more than willing acceptance, and development in the self of the processes of scourging and of dying. Though every step be shame and pain, he flinches not nor falters, for moment by moment, more and more, his whole soul loathes the sin and cleaves to the chastisement; he will bear the whole misery of the discipline of penitence, that, at all cost of agony, even within the dominion and power of sin, he may yet be absolutely one with the Spirit of Holiness, in unreserved condemnation and detestation of sin.

The transformation of the thorough penitent is marvellous indeed—even to thought. The personality which had revolted from righteousness, and identified itself with the will of sin, is now re-identified with righteousness in its condemnation of sin,—in its condemnation, therefore, of himself. Though others condone, he adjudges himself to shame. Self-disgraced, self-condemned, self-sentenced, he offers himself to voluntary punishment. He had outraged righteousness. But now, the true self is wholly ranged and identified, not with the revolting will, but with the righteousness, outraged, pleading, and condemning;—at the conscious cost of all shame, all suffering, even death, to the self, because it is the self that has sinned.

It will be felt, of course, that all this is ideal? There is no penitence that reaches this? Yes, it is ideal. Such penitence our experience does not know. And yet after all we are only pointing to something, the process and the tendency of which we do know well. We may not think that, within our present experience, that tendency can ever reach its climax. But however incomplete it may remain within experience, the tendency at least

is unmistakably there. The past guilt can, and does, even in the case of such penitence as our experience has seen and known, have manifestly less and less of present reality in the man.

All penitence, no doubt, that we ever have known is imperfect. But to what does this innate, and progressive, tendency of even imperfect penitence bear witness? Does it not testify to the ideal, if unattained, possibility of a penitence so unreserved, so perfect, so Divine, as—not to constitute indeed a breach in personal self-identity, but to make a contrast of such vital moment between the past and present truth of the self, that the self would really be no longer identified with that with which it really was identified; that the dead past would, as present, really not be, or be only as the living antithesis to what it was?

It is to ideal penitence that our thought points. But it is ideal penitence that we desire to think of: for we desire to know what penitence really is,—not penitence as it is imperfect, but penitence as it is penitence: that is, to discern what penitence would be, if only it did ever reach the proper culmination of that which we do already know in process.

Need we ask whether, in the case of such a consummated penitence, it could still be right to inflict punishment on the penitent? We might well ask what sort of punishment could be inflicted? For, in one sense of that word, the penal discipline is even now, fully complete. And, in the other sense, it would now be a sacrilege to talk of penal vengeance.

Is it not true that such a penitence as we have tried to imagine would be itself, from end to end, truly suffering, truly penal? Is it not the case that the inmost secret of the meaning of that penal discipline would be found to be—not a remorseless infliction of external vengeance,

but the glory shining outwards from within, the glory —within the sphere and painfulness of evil—the glory of an inherently triumphant righteousness? And is it not therefore true that, in the presence of such a penitence in the spirit of one who had sinned, there would be in fact a change so profound, so essential, in the very nature of the self, as would be, in the sphere of divinely ideal truth, incompatible with vengeance,—because, through it, the past sin was already no part of the present at all; the present had, however wonderfully, come to be itself the supreme antithesis of the past?

I have wished to be able to touch a point of view from which, under circumstances not unimaginable, that sentence upon the past, as part of the self, which we might call the sentence of absolving love, would be no less also the sentence of absolute righteousness and divine truth: and I seem to myself to discern it not by imagining conditions wholly unrelated with experience, but by imagining rather a completed development of tendencies which, even within experience, I do recognize amongst the wonders of the penitent life.

In the light of these thoughts it is not too much to say that penitence, if only it were quite perfect, would mean something more like, at least, than we could, apart from experience of penitence, even conceive intellectually to be possible or thinkable, to a real undoing of the past; —a real killing out and eliminating of the past from the present "me." Penitence is really restorative. Its tendency is towards what might truly be called "redeeming" or "atoning." It would really mean in me, if only it could be consummated quite perfectly, a real re-identification with the Law and the Life of righteousness.

Unfortunately, a penitence such as this will be felt to be, after all, more ideal than actual; an imagination not a possibility. It is a *reasonable* imagination because

it is in accordance with—not against—what experience bears witness to; but it is none the less not a practical possibility. Nay—the *more* clearly I discern what would be the supreme reality of penitence, the more does my very insight compel me to recognize the inherent impossibility of its consummation.

That penitence—that transformation of moral character—should be possible *at all*, is a marvel, requiring to be accounted for. But a penitence so ideal, a change of character so absolute, as we have imagined, a severance from the past so complete, that the past would leave no scar, and have no place, of guilt or of power, in the present personality at all; if it is on the one hand an element, and a necessary element, in spiritual aspiration and belief, is, on the other hand, definitely beyond the limit of this world's completed experience. No one, in this life, having sinned, is ever altogether as if he had not.

And why is it inherently impossible? Just because the sin is already within the conscience: and the presence of sin in the conscience, if on one side it constitutes the need, and may incite to the desire, of penitence, on the other is itself a bar to the possibility of repenting. The sinfulness, being of the self, has blunted the self's capacity for entire hatred of sin, and has blunted it once for all. I can be frightened at my sin; I can cry out passionately against it. But not the tyranny only, or the terror, or the loathing, but also the love of it and the power of it are *within me*. The reality of sin in the self blunts the self's power of utter antithesis against sin. Just because it now is part of what I am, I cannot, even though I would, wholly detest it. It is I who chose and enjoyed the thing that was evil: and I, as long as I live, retain not the memory only but the capacity, the personal affinity, for the evil taste still; as the penitent drunkard or gambler is conscious in himself, as long as he lives, of the

latent possibility within himself—not of drinking only or of gambling, but alas! of passionately enjoying the evil thing. And this is true in a measure of all sin. The more I have been habituated to sinning, the feebler is my capacity of contrition. But even once to have sinned is to have lost once for all its ideal perfectness. It is sin, as sin, which blunts the edge, and dims the power, of penitence.

But if the perfect identification of being with righteousness which perfect consummation of penitence would necessarily mean, is *ipso facto* impossible to one who has sinned, just because the sin is really his own: what is this but to say—hardly even in other words—that the personal identity with righteousness in condemnation and detestation of sin, which penitence in ideal perfection would mean and be,—is possible only to One who is personally Himself without sin? The consummation of penitential holiness,—itself, by inherent character, the one conceivable atonement for sin,—would be possible only to the absolutely sinless.

We are not concerned, here and now, with the other side of the question—How it is possible for the absolutely sinless, to have, or to take, such personal relation to sin that His inherent holiness could really be, and really suffer as being, *penitential* holiness. We are discussing at present no further problems beyond the one single question—what it is, on scrutiny, that penitence, as penitence, requires and is. And the more we try to run back to the root of the matter, the more we shall find our thought tied up to this irresistible—if paradoxical—truth: that a true penitence is as much the inherent impossibility, as it is the inherent necessity, of every man that has sinned.

Need we go on to ask, under pressure of our own logic, why it does not follow forthwith—as, first, that adequate penitence is impossible, fundamentally, for every one: so, secondly, that the more each man has sinned, the less he

need dream of penitence; for that penitence, hopeless from the first, is more and more progressively impossible, just in precise proportion as it is more necessary?

The fact is, we have said already too much—or too little. It is easy, perhaps, to prove our impossibility of penitence. There is no marvel in that. Those who find spiritual analogies in natural things are nowhere apt to be baffled so much as here. Penitence seems like a reversal of all analogies. It is a standing miracle in human life. But be the marvel what it may of its origin or possibility, it is at least undeniable among the experiences of the spiritual life. The proof of its impossibility, however logically simple, would find its disproof in every personal consciousness. It would not only darken the brightness of our sky. It would stultify almost everything that we have ever known to be true. It would cross out not only future hope; but all the deepest realities of experience. The logical proof would really prove too much. It would really cut us off—not only from the ideal consummation, but from any reality, of penitence at all!

Considering, indeed, of what quality penitence is, it is perhaps the greatest miracle of experience that any reality of penitence should be possible at all. And yet, possible or impossible, there it is—the most familiar, as well as the most profound, and transcendent, of spiritual experiences. Are not all the annals of Christian consciousness full, from end to end, of penitence? And this penitence, this marvellous possibility, which so transcends, yet interprets, we might almost say constitutes, Christian experience; this penitence which is almost another word for spiritual consciousness, do we not recognize it at once as more than humanly profound and tranquillizing? as beautiful almost beyond all experience of beauty? as powerful, even to the shattering of the most terrible of powers?

Inversion of natural history, — moral recovery, — re-

identifying of the sinner's spirit with holiness; so that he can at all really hate what really was the old self, and cling, through voluntary pain, to a real contradiction of the self: the touching beauty, which as beauty is unsurpassed, the tremendous spiritual and spiritually uplifting force, of the penitence of countless souls—men and women, boys and girls,—since the Kingdom of Christ began: what is it? or whence is it?—this impossibility in them, which is nevertheless a fact? This humiliation, which is so exquisite a grace? This weakness confessed, which is so paradoxically sovereign in power? This upon earth, which is so incommensurate with earth?

This at least we may say about it: that it is no natural possibility,—it is not of themselves. There was that within themselves which witnessed for it, which needed it, which could correspond with it: but it was not, and could not have been originated, within themselves. Necessary as it was for themselves, it was yet, from the side of themselves, an unqualified impossibility.

And yet again, though not of themselves, it is by far the deepest truth of themselves. If not *of*, it is *in*, them: and when in them, it is the very reality of what they are,—the central core and essence of their own effective personality. Though it cries aloud in them that it is not of them; though it utterly transcends and transfigures them; yet is it more, after all, the very central truth of themselves than all else that they have themselves ever done or been.

In saying this, we are in part anticipating thoughts which lie beyond the range of our present subjects.

But it is well to say at once that it is precisely the impossible which has been, and is, and is to be, the real. What is precisely impossible in respect of ourselves, is exactly real in the Church—the breath of whose life is the Spirit of Jesus Christ.

Men do not always understand the depth of what

penitence means, because their conceptions of penitence are based so often upon its imperfectness or its failure. So they have been content to feel that they felt sorry; content if their sorrow had carried them to some little touch of shame or suffering. They have hardly perhaps even aimed at an attitude towards sin—towards themselves as wilfully characterized by sin,—which would be nothing less than that inexorable condemnation which must be the attitude towards sin of the eternal Righteousness. Perhaps the least glimpse of the real meaning of penitence is at once confounding and inspiring. The true penitent condemns and loathes sin, even in himself, not with a foolish, shallow, half-insincere regret, but as God loathes and condemns it.

After all, then, this penitence in the hearts of the penitent, of which we cannot but say things so paradoxical,—what is it, or from whence? It is the real echo,—the real presence—in their spirit, of Spirit; Spirit, not their own, as if of themselves; yet their very own, for more and more that Spirit dominates them and constitutes them what they are. It is, in them, the Spirit of human contrition, of human atonement; the Spirit of Holiness triumphing over sin, and breaking it, within the kingdom of sin; the Spirit at once of Calvary and of Pentecost; the Spirit, if not of the Cross yet of the Crucified, who conquered and lived through dying.

It is only thus, only from hence, that the least reality of penitence is possible at all. But this we may add in conclusion,—that the reality of the penitence which is so familiar in Christian experience (if it may not be said to constitute Christian experience) is itself a guarantee of the possibility—nay more, of the certain realization,—of perfectly consummated penitence. For, after all, this penitence which is so familiar in Christian experience, may truly perhaps be called,—wonder for wonder—an even

greater miracle, than, in comparison with it, the most ideal perfection of penitence would be.

Is it not the Spirit of the Crucified which is the reality of the penitence of the really penitent? Only there remains to the end this one immovable distinction. What was, in Him, the triumph of His own inherent and unchanging righteousness, is in them the consummation of a gradual process of change from sin to abhorrence and contradiction of sin. They are changed. But the fact of changedness remains. Unaided, of themselves, they did not conquer, and could not have conquered, sin. Nor do they so grow into oneness of Spirit with Him as to cease to be themselves, who had sinned and are redeemed from sin. That past, which would have made their own penitence an impossibility, though no longer a living present, as character or as power, within themselves, is yet present with them just so far as this,—that they are still, though sinless in the Spirit of the Sinless, yet not simply sinless, but brought to sinlessness out of sin; not simply pure but purified; not simply blessed but beatified; not simply holy but redeemed. The song of eternal praise is in their hearts, as of those who are eternally "the Redeemed,"—towards one who is none the less eternally their Redeemer, because—no longer without but within themselves,—He is their own capacity of responsive holiness; "for Thou wast slain, and didst purchase unto God with Thy blood men of every tribe and tongue and people and nation;"—"worthy is the Lamb that hath been slain to receive the power, and riches, and might, and glory, and blessing;"—"Unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, be the blessing, and the honour, and the glory, and the dominion, for ever and ever."

CHAPTER III

FORGIVENESS

THERE can be no question at all as to the exceeding prominence of the part, in the Christian religion, which belongs to forgiveness. For ourselves, as we look to Godward, it is the hope, and the faith, without which all else would be to us as nothing. The simplest form of the universal faith is incomplete without this,—"I believe in the forgiveness of sins." The primary type of the universal prayer lays exceptional emphasis upon this,—"Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us." In this form of prayer we have already passed from the thought of forgiveness as being, to Godward, our essential hope, to the thought of forgiveness as being, to manward, our indispensable duty. It is, characteristically, both. It is a duty towards men, which, almost more than any other duty, stamps those who realize and fulfil it best, with the distinctive seal of the Spirit of the Christ. And it is a hope which may be said —intelligibly, at least, if not with theological exactness— to sum up all the aspiration and desire of Christians. "I acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins" is, in its way, a description of the Christian calling as a whole. "Thy sins be forgiven thee," spoken unerringly by the voice of Divine truth and love, comes very near to the consummation of all human yearning. In either aspect, as primary moral duty, or as primary spiritual hope, it

stands plainly in the forefront of all that our Christianity means to us. In our creeds, in our prayers, in our teaching of others, in our hopes or fears for ourselves, few ideas, if any, are, or can be, more prominent than such as are represented to men's thought by that familiar and fundamental phrase, the "forgiveness of sins." Without it Christian morality would be destroyed. Without it Christian faith would be annulled. Directly or indirectly, by conscious effort or by conscious default, it is everywhere, upon our lips, in our thoughts, in our lives. And yet; is it so absolutely clear—I do not say whether forgiveness is to us, after all, an assured or familiar experience, but whether we even know what we mean by forgiveness?

What is forgiveness? Are we perfectly sure that, upon analysis, we shall be found to be attaching to that most familiar word, any defensible or adequate—or indeed any consistent or intelligible—meaning at all?

We begin with some obvious experiments, bearing not so immediately upon the grounds for the doctrine, as upon the meaning of the word. A child comes before parent or master for punishment, and the master lets him go free. The slave insults, or tries to strike, his lord; and the lord refrains from either penalty or reproach. In cases like these, if we speak (as we well may) of forgiveness, there is no doubt what we most immediately mean. We mean that a certain penalty is not inflicted. Is this, then, what forgiveness means? A remission of penalty? a forbearing to punish? This is, we may believe, quite genuinely, the first and simplest form in which forgiveness (whatever it may at last be found to mean) begins to make itself intelligible. It would be a great mistake to brush aside with contempt the idea of forgiveness as remission of penalty. It really is in this form that it first comes home to the consciousness of the child. It may fairly be presumed that it was in this form that it first came home to the child-like consciousness

of the race. It may even be doubted, perhaps, whether those who have not first felt something of it in this form are likely to get much further towards the understanding of it at all.

We shall notice indeed that forgiveness cannot be apprehended even in this form, until certain earlier conceptions have been obtained. I cannot really feel myself excused from punishment, until I first feel that I have deserved to be punished; until (that is) I have some idea both of wrong as wrong, and of the distress of punishment, and of that righteousness which is expressed in punishment of wrong. But we need hardly now go further back than the conception of forgiveness as remission of punishment.

Important, however, as it is to recognize this conception as a necessary stage, and true in its degree, in the process of gradually learning what forgiveness means; it will never do to rest here. The theology which allows itself to be entangled in a theory of forgiveness of which the leading character is remission of penalty, will by and by (as not a few attempts to explain the doctrine of the atonement have shown) be landed in insoluble perplexities. Indeed we may perhaps broadly say that forgiveness cannot really mean as much as this without meaning more. The mind cannot really grasp this explanation without becoming, more or less explicitly, conscious that what it really means by the word has already transcended the limits of this explanation. If, at a certain stage, the explanation was *true*; yet it dimly implied, even then, a good deal beyond itself. And what was once, in its own way, really true, becomes by degrees, to a maturer consciousness, so inadequate, that if pressed now as an adequate statement of truth, it carries with it all the effect—not merely of incompleteness but of untruth.

The explanation does not say enough. Whatever place remission of penalty may have in forgiveness, we

all feel that reality of forgiveness contains a great deal beyond this. "I will not punish you,—but I can never forgive," may be an immoral, but is not, on the face of it, a self-contradictory, position. I at least *can* hate the man whom I would not hurt. Again the explanation says too much. There may be such a thing as infliction of penalty which does not contradict—which may be even said to express—forgiveness. But in any case, the simple idea of not punishing is too negative and external to touch the real core of the matter.

But there is another reason, more directly to our purpose, why forgiveness cannot be defined as remission of penalty. Such a definition would blur all distinction of right and wrong. Remission of penalty, as such, requires an explanation and a justification: and according to the explanation which justifies it, the character of not punishing varies infinitely. Now if I speak of forgiveness as a property of God, or a duty for man, I am speaking of something essentially virtuous and good: not of something which may be either good or the extreme antithesis of goodness. I cannot admit either that forgiveness is an immoral action, or that an immoral action can be forgiveness. Remission of penalty must have a justification. If it has no justification, it is simply immoral. I cannot, for the forgiveness of the creed, or of the Lord's prayer, accept a definition which leaves the question still open, whether forgiveness is not the exact contradiction of righteousness. If this man is guilty of a heartless betrayal, and another of a dastardly murder, and a third it may be of an outrage more dastardly than murder; and I, having absolute power, use that power only to remit the punishments wholesale, without other purpose or ground except remission regarded as an end in itself: I am so far from illustrating the righteous forgiveness of God, that I do but commit a fresh outrage against

righteousness, in itself as cowardly as it is immoral. Thought is only misled by a use of the word which includes at once its truth and its caricature. The so-called forgiveness which is itself an infamy,—which, in condoning sin, gives the lie to righteousness,—has nothing in common, except mere delusiveness of outward appearance, with the truth of forgiveness. It may look like it in the negative fact of not-punishing, or in the outward gesture and appearance of embracing; but its whole reality of meaning is different. There may be travesties, or imitations, more or less resembling forgiveness. But there is only one true meaning of the word: and that is the forgiveness not of ignorance or of levity, but of righteousness and truth. The only real forgiveness is the forgiveness of God,—reproduced in man just so far as man, in God's Spirit, righteously forgives; but caricatured by man, so far as man, otherwise than righteously, does the things which travesty and dishonour forgiveness, sparing penalty and foregoing displeasure—*when righteousness does not.* "Neither doth he abhor anything that is evil" is a terrible condemnation of the man who is ready to forgive everything alike. Forgiveness does not equally mean the truth and the travesty. Its definition cannot be found in terms merely of remission of pain or of anger, irrespective of the verdict of righteousness. When, and so far as, it is remission at all, it is remission *because remission is righteous.* It is the Divine reality—in God or in man.

We are hampered no doubt by words. But just as with the word "love," while we cannot altogether help verbally using it for that yearning of person towards person which hideously travesties the true spirit of love, we yet educate ourselves towards true insight of soul by protesting that this is the libel not the truth, nor part of the truth, of what love really means; so also with the word forgiveness. If we cannot wholly avoid the use

of the word of those who "forgive" unrighteously, yet must we maintain that clear insight of spirit into truth can only be won by refusing to let such caricature of forgiveness colour our central conception of what real forgiveness is.

But if, on such grounds, we pass beyond the thought of forgiveness as not-punishing,—does it mend matters to try and increase (as it were) the content of the word, and say that it means a complete ignoring of guilt; a sort of make-believe that those who are guilty are not guilty? Such a view will have, no doubt, its relation to truth. To treat those who have done wrong as they would have been treated if they had not done wrong, is often a real element in the restorative character of forgiveness. But it will not do as an account of what forgiveness means. On the one side, it too does not yet say enough. On the other, it too depends for its moral justifiableness, on something as yet unexpressed. Forgiveness that is at all completely realized is something much deeper in character,—something altogether unlike, a mere treating *as if*. To treat a culprit as if he were better than he is, however important it may be experimentally, is in any case a means to an end. And its provisional character is enough to show that it is at best incomplete as an account of what forgiveness means. Moreover, even as a provisional experiment it needs to be justified. To treat a culprit as if he were innocent may sometimes be an intolerable wrong. To treat a culprit as if he were innocent, may sometimes be as an inspiration of the wisdom—the surpassing wisdom—of love like the love of God. What makes the difference between the one case and the other? Is it not plain that the righteousness of such treatment has relation to something in the personality of the culprit himself. It may not depend on the magnitude of his past fault; but it

certainly depends upon something in his personal character now; something in him (whether we say of present fact or of future possibility) which makes it what it is. Such treatment in him has an eye to his restoration to righteousness, and whatever restoration to righteousness in him would mean. It is relative to that in him which may be described as his possibility, or the reasonable hope of his possibility, of a real restoration. Such a hope may be remote. But however remote it may be, its reality is an absolutely essential ingredient in the meaning of treating him as guiltless, if such treatment is to deserve, for an instant, the name of forgiveness. Apart from this it would be not forgiveness but sin.

This becomes, I think, plainer still, if we carry our thoughts of the contents of forgiveness one step further; and say that in its fulness it would mean not only that we treated the culprit as if he were innocent in our outward behaviour, but that we really thought and felt towards him with all that undimmed fulness of reverent love which would have belonged to him as righteous and loving. For such a conception of forgiveness, while it does, for the first time, get rid of the sense of inadequacy which attached to all that was suggested before; does also bring out into sharp relief that moral confusedness which must inhere in every attempted definition of forgiveness—must inhere in it even in proportion to its adequacy—as long as we attempt to explain forgiveness abstractly or externally; to explain it, that is, by the action or the sentiment of the forgiver, otherwise than in direct relation to that, in the personality of the forgiven, which gives to the act of the forgiver all its character and meaning. Forgiveness is not a transaction which can be taken by itself and stated as it were in terms of arithmetic. It is an attitude of a person to a person. It can only be understood in terms of personality. I cannot forgive a river or a tree. I cannot forgive

an animal except just so far as I do (whether rightly or wrongly) recognise in it the attributes of a rational soul; if I forgive a man, it is in relation to the meaning of that man's personality—its complex present, its immense possible future—that all which I do in the act of forgiving finds at once its justification and its explanation.

But the more we deepen the content of the word forgiveness; the more we realize that forgiveness, however otherwise guarded or conditioned, is going to contain, on any terms at all, such elements as personal reverence or love; the more does the question begin to press upon us, whether we can, or dare, at all largely forgive. If a man treats me and mine with outrageous wickedness: it is possible perhaps to imagine that I may be right in not trying to bring punishment upon him, but on what possible warrant can I look on him with reverence or love? If I pronounce such actions and character good, nay if I do not unfalteringly condemn them as with the eternal sentence of God against evil: I do but, in wanton self-identification with his sin, make myself a renegade to righteousness.

The more we think over it, the more we realize that when we talk of human forgiveness as a duty, or Divine forgiveness as our faith and hope; the forgiveness which we mean is so intimately bound up with, so essentially dependent upon, those grounds within the personality of the forgiven which justify it; that we cannot, apart from them, even apprehend aright what the nature of the thing itself is. Forgiveness is, in part, a remitting of punishment. It is in part a treating, nay even a recognising, of the person forgiven as good: and yet it is no one of these things *simpliciter*, by itself. It is no one of them apart from that justifying cause, within the personality of the forgiven, which makes this treatment, and recognition, not unrighteous but righteous. God does not, in fact, remit penalty: He does not in fact justify, or pronounce righteous, except in relation

to something, on the part of the forgiven, which both vindicates the righteousness of His act, and explains the meaning of it. God's forgiveness is never simply unconditional.

And as God's is not, so we recognise after all that man's is not to be. In one direction it is true that it is to be infinite "I say not unto thee until seven times but until seventy times seven."[1] Yet even this must be read in the light of that proviso which our Lord's words no less explicitly contain; "If thy brother sin, rebuke him; and if he repent, forgive him. And if he sin against thee seven times in the day, and seven times turn again to thee saying I repent; thou shalt forgive him."[2] Forgiveness, then, if it is to be the truth and not the imitation of forgiveness (for even the imitation of forgiveness has its place in the complexities of human life) but if it is to be not the imitation but the truth; if it is to be that real forgiveness which is the spontaneous action of righteousness, and not that indifference to sin which is itself a new sin; is strictly and absolutely correlative to what may be called the "forgiveableness" of the person forgiven.

Now whatever forgiveableness in him may turn out to mean: there are one or two conclusions which will follow at once from the proposition that forgiveness is correlative to forgiveableness. Thus: true forgiveness is never capricious: it is never arbitrary: we may even say it is never properly optional. True forgiveness is an act—or rather an attitude—not more of love than it is of righteousness and of truth. Truth and righteousness are not in contradiction against love. They are love. God who is Love, is Righteousness and Truth. God who is Righteousness and Truth, is Love. Truth, Righteousness, Love, cannot be capricious or arbitrary.

There is no arbitrary variation in the forgiveness of God. Whether He forgives a man, or not, depends wholly and only upon whether the man is or is not forgiveable. He

[1] Mat. xviii. 22. [2] Luke xvii. 4.

who *can* be forgiven by Love and Truth, *is* forgiven by Love and Truth—instantly, absolutely, without failure or doubt. And as, in God, forgiveness, upon the necessary conditions, so acts as if it were self-acting; so would it also in me, in proportion to my perfectness of knowledge and character; for Righteousness, Truth and Love, are not capricious. I indeed may fall short of them, retaining my anger after they have forgiven: or I may run too fast for them, forgiving (as I call it) while they still are displeased; but they are sure and exact and unfailing and immutable; for they *are* Righteousness and Love and Truth. Again, I may often be puzzled as to how far I ought, or ought not, to forgive. But this is only because I do not know. I am not able, in my ignorance, to discern whether such an one is rightly forgiveable, or no. But if my knowledge were adequate, there would be no residuum of mere option. Either he is forgiveable, or he is not. So far as he is not I ought not to forgive. But so far as he is, I ought. There is no stage really in which, at my option, he both may, and yet may not, be forgiven. If I *may* forgive, I must. A man does me terrible wrong. Suppose for one moment, that he is absolutely perfect in penitence. Yet I will not forgive. Then the sin, which was on his side, has gone over to mine. So far as I was identified with righteousness and truth, I should—not perhaps but inevitably—have forgiven. My non-forgiveness is my deflection from righteousness and truth. Or, on the other hand, one for whom I am responsible, defies all right, and exults in his defiance. And I, refusing to punish, receive him with open arms as righteous and good. Then, in still more directness of sense, the sin, without ceasing to be on his side, has come over to mine. I have but identified myself with his wickedness. In proportion as he is identified with wickedness, truth and righteousness pronounce him wicked; and my acceptance of the wicked as righteous is my deflection from righteousness and truth. If, then, there is no true forgiveness but

the forgiveness of righteousness and truth; and if this forgiveness is sure, invariable, even (as it were) self-acting,—in God, and in man too, just so far as man is identified with righteousness and truth; we are thrown back more than ever, in desiring to understand what forgiveness means, upon that condition in the personality of the forgiven, upon which the righteousness of his forgiveness depends.

But when we venture to give to the word forgiveness any meaning of this character at all, we are met, no doubt, by one or two very real difficulties of thought. Thus the question suggests itself, if forgiveness (with whatever provisoes) is made to be simply correlative to forgiveableness; and if to say that a man is forgiveable means not merely that he may be, but therefore *ipso facto* that he ought to be, nay *must be*, forgiven: if forgiveness, that is, is a sort of automatic and necessary consequence of a certain condition of the culprit's personality; are you not exactly taking out of forgiveness all that it ever had distinctively meant? Are you not precisely and completely explaining it away? When you say you forgive, you are merely recognizing the growth towards righteousness of those who are already becoming righteous. You may call it forgiving only those who deserve to be forgiven. Is it really more than this, that you acknowledge the goodness of the good; or, at all events, the imperfect goodness of the incompletely good? You merely do not continue to condemn those who no longer ought to be condemned? So far as they are still wicked, you refuse to forgive them. So far as they are becoming righteous, they do not need any act of yours to forgive them. In other words, there is no place left for forgiveness. Either, in accordance with truth, you still condemn. Or else, in accordance with truth, you acquit and accept. Where does forgiveness come in? Justice this may be.

But has not forgiveness, as forgiveness, dropped out altogether? Either there is nothing that can be called forgiveness at all; or, if there is, it is a forgiveness which can be said to have been, by deserving, "earned": and is not forgiveness that is earned exactly not forgiveness?

We must be content to make, for the present, suggestions towards the answer to this question, in two somewhat different ways. This first: that words like "earning" or "deserving" are, in any case, unfair words. They are unfair because they imply that the condition of the personality which can be said, in any sense, to deserve forgiveness, is a condition which is originated by, and for which the credit is primarily due to, the person in whom it is found. But if that condition of the personality of the culprit, which is capable of responding to forgiveness, and to which forgiveness is correlative; if the germinal possibilities of penitence in him, should be found, after all, to be due, in their first origins, to the loving righteousness,—not his nor of himself,—which is working for him to produce in him that forgiveableness which it will forthwith meet with the embrace of forgiveness: then it may be that this not unnatural attempt to show that a forgiveness which is perfectly righteous involves a contradiction in terms, will be found to break down after all. We do not, in our view of forgiveness, undervalue the freedom and completeness of the action of God's love, or overvalue the power of man's initiative, in the mystery of atoning redemption. That at least is a charge to which we have no occasion to plead guilty. Had we laid down that human capacity of penitence, even in its faintest and most germinal beginnings, began from man's self, or belonged to his natural powers, such a charge might conceivably lie. But any such suggestion is incompatible with the whole scope of our argument. Meanwhile, whatever we may have further to suggest in relation to the

possibilities of penitence, we can hardly be wrong in insisting on the mutual relation between penitence and pardon: penitence, so far as it is penitence, never, by any possibility, failing of pardon; pardon being essentially that Divine acceptance,—nay anticipation, in acceptance, of the first divinely enabled identification of the personality with any movement towards penitence, in the light and warmth whereof alone the plant of penitence can grow or bear fruit.

And secondly, leaving for the moment the abstract difficulty, we must ask whether, after all, it does not, for whatever it is worth, attach on any shewing, to any explanation of forgiveness which we can by any possibility accept: to any forgiveness, that is, which is not self-condemned as arbitrary and unrighteous, but is, or can possibly be, the act of God, who is unchanging righteousness and truth. If there are times when it seems that forgiveness would lose all its meaning if it could be called the necessary act of righteousness as righteousness; it is certain, on the other hand, that we cannot really save the idea of forgiveness, by making it either not the act of righteousness, or the act of righteousness not as it is righteous, but as it is something else, not ultimately identical with righteousness.

Yet even this instinct against which we are arguing represents a truth. That truth is exhibited to us, with a terrible emphasis, in the parable of the unforgiving servant. The most obvious teaching of that parable is that the fullest forgiveness of God towards man, in the conditions of the present life, is provisional, and may be revoked and reversed. This is one characteristic of forgiveness, as we have known it, upon which it is well to lay stress. As there is, upon earth, no consummated penitence, so neither is there any forgiveness consummated.

The forgiveness which we receive in the Church upon

earth,—in baptism, in absolution, and so forth,—takes for granted, and is dependent on, certain conditions. It is the recognition, by anticipation, of something which is to be, something towards which it is itself a mighty quickening of possibilities; but something which is not, or at least is not perfectly, yet. Present forgiveness is inchoate, is educational: it is the recognition indeed of something in the present,—but a something whose real significance lies in the undeveloped possibilities of the future; a something which is foreseen, and is to be realized, but which, in the actual personality, is not realized as yet.

Earthly forgiveness—real in the present, but real as inchoate and provisional—only reaches its final and perfect consummation then, when the forgiven penitent—largely through the softening and enabling grace of progressively realized forgiveness—has become at last personally and completely righteous. It is not consummated perfectly till the culprit *is* righteous: and love does but pour itself out to welcome and to crown what is already the verdict of righteousness and truth.

Meanwhile the living power of God's forgiveness in the present life grows more and more towards that consummation. But,—if the consummation be never reached; if the growth towards it be broken, and the conditions necessary for it rebelled against, and the personal progress turned into a progress in and towards unrighteousness: then that which had been forgiveness, inchoate, provisional, educational,—is forfeited and is reversed. It is not that it was unreal from the first. It was forgiveness, received and, in a measure, realized as such. But this is just the point of the catastrophe. The very realization of the provisional forgiveness, in proportion as it was realized, turns into the material of the condemnation. "Thou wicked servant, I forgave thee," that is the point of guilt —the forfeited forgiveness *is* the fatal wickedness—"and

his lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors till he should pay all that was due. So shall also my heavenly Father do unto you, if ye forgive not every one his brother from your hearts."[1]

The forgiveness, if its consummation be rebelled against, becomes, in itself, condemnation. On the other hand, if and when its consummation is perfectly reached —"Well done, good and faithful servant, enter thou into the joy of thy lord"—the forgiveness may be said to be wholly merged in the glad welcome of an undimmed love. It is, then, of forgiveness not yet consummated, but inchoate and provisional: perhaps we should rather say it is of Love in its provisional and anticipatory stage,— recognising possibilities not yet realized, and by this anticipatory recognition marvellously quickening them; it is of Divine Love at this stage, and under these conditions, that we do characteristically use the word "forgiveness." There is no difference at all between Divine forgiveness and Divine love; save in the atmosphere of conditions around and through which it is for the present working. Forgiveness *is* love, in its relation to a personality which, having sinned, is learning, and to learn, what the sin-consciousness of penitence means.

In this sense the instinct which would shrink from regarding forgiveness as a necessity of righteousness may, in part, be justified. *Love* is a necessity of righteousness; and forgiveness only is an aspect of love. But love wears the form, and carries the name, of forgiveness—in its anticipatory and provisional relation to the penitent. We do *call* love forgiveness just when, and just because, the penitent, whose very life it is, yet makes and can make no claim to deserving it. In this sense it may still perhaps even be true that forgiveness is correlative to non-deserving. But love, under the conditions, could not *not* have forgiven.

[1] Mat. xviii. 32-35.

The love forgives simply because it is love. And that forgiving love is the recognition, and becomes the possibility, of a personal righteousness in the penitent which still only is possible in him, in proportion as it is quite completely, and sincerely, disclaimed.

But it is to be remembered that the parable of the unforgiving servant, if it teaches on one side that the forgiveness of God is provisional, and thereby contributes not a little to our understanding of the nature of Divine forgiveness; is also, in its outcome, directed to the lesson of the human duty of forgiving. It emphasizes, with most peremptory insistence, the indispensable necessity of learning, on earth, to forgive. Now it is true that what has hitherto been said has been far away from all the scenery, and the problems, of human forgiveness. But it is necessary, not only that the forgiveness of man by man, as a primary duty of the Christian life, should be understood, if the life is really to illustrate it; but that it should be understood in its relation to the thought of the forgiveness of man by God. Human forgiveness is to find its inspiration in man's experience of the forgiveness of God. God's forgiveness must find an expression of itself in man's forgiveness of man.

The first thing which we have to do, in turning from divine to human forgiveness, is to draw certain distinctions. The exact lineaments of divine forgiveness could only be reproduced in human life quite perfectly, where the conditions were analogous. They are never quite perfectly analogous between man and man. Nevertheless, the analogy is so immeasurably more complete in some cases than in others, that it is well to distinguish, and to consider first the instances in which that analogy most approaches to being perfect. The nearest approach is to be found in the relation between a parent and a very young child. Only through the thought of what forgive-

ness in the parent means can we quite grasp what it ought to be as towards the criminal who has brutally injured us.

Think, then, of the attitude of a parent, patient, loving, and wise, in dealing with the naughtiness of a little child. The first thing which is obvious is that the parent loves the child anyhow. His whole treatment of the child, from the beginning of the matter to the end, may be described, not unaptly, as the process of the wise diplomacy of love. The second point to notice is that, to the view of this love, the child is never wholly identified with his naughtiness. Love thinks of the child quite apart from his evil-doing, and has for its aim throughout the effective distinction between the child's evil, and the child. Thirdly, the very love which sees most clearly the possibility, and aims most directly at the realizing, of this distinction; though waiting and longing every moment to forgive, yet cannot wear the aspect of forgiveness while the child is wholly self-identified with its passion. So long as this self-identification is complete, and the child rebels against every concession to goodness; so long the love, just because it is love, cannot but continue to manifest itself as displeasure. But fourthly, with the first dim touch or gleam of child-like regret and sorrow, the love which was waiting, opens its arms as love. It may still be grave, it may admonish, it may discipline, or it may simply embrace; but whatever it does that is wisely and truly done, is felt as the action not of anger, but of love. And observe that these different attitudes are not optional, but necessary. Love dare not, can not—being love—forgive in the height of the passion. Love dare not, can not—being love—fail to forgive, from the moment when forgiveness is possible. He who affects to forgive, when love does not; or he who lags behind, when love has forgiven, transgresses at once against both love and truth. It is hard no doubt to be always loving and true. It is

hard to discern, and not misread, the heart of the child. A child sent away for disobedience, offers shyly to come back. Is that shyness the wistful shyness of desire? or is it the awkward shyness of defiance? Those who stand in the parent's place, being foolish, may mistake. But upon the discernment of its true character, the parental duty depends. Is it wistfulness? In that wistfulness, dim, child-like, half-unconscious as it is, may be the true germ of what, in its perfected blossom, would be the outpouring of the confession of the penitent. It may be that that mere wistfulness, if met with the open-armed embrace of forgiving love, will produce forthwith the faltering word of regret, or the tears without words, which are, so far, the little self's true effort of repudiation of sin, and of personal allegiance to righteousness.

This is, on earth, the nearest analogy by which we can read the working of Divine love. For the parent who is loving and wise, is in many respects in the place of God to the child. Yet even the nearest analogy falls short. For the most loving and the wisest of parents can never be to his child what God is to man. Parent and child after all, are inexorably distinct. The child may bear the likeness of the parent, in expression, in touch, in tone. By teaching, by example, by infection of love, the parent may so influence the child that we may say, not unaptly, that the parent has shaped the character of the child,—that the child has caught and reflects the spirit of the parent. But press such words; and after all we are speaking in metaphor. In the last resort it remains that the child is not the parent; and the parent is not the child. The spirit of the child, be the likeness what it may, is distinct at last from the spirit of the parent. Or, if not hopelessly distinct, they begin to be one,—not because the child grows really into the spirit of the parent; but in so far as both, child and parent alike, are in their several personalities really growing into that

oneness of the Spirit of God, which is the true κοινωνία of the saints.

But to return. What, in the case supposed, does the parent's forgiveness mean? It is worth while to notice that the very meaning of the word forgiveness in such a case vitally depends upon the fact that the parent has complete command over the child, and has a proportionate responsibility for the training of the child's moral character. The parent's forgiveness is something which only is possible to one who is absolutely ruler and judge and teacher and example all in one. It is only upon the basis of all these things that his forgiveness can be exactly what it is. But, on this basis, the forgiveness deally means a loving recognition and embrace, on the part of authoritative righteousness, of the first beginning or desire, within the child, towards that condemnation of sin in the self, which is the form through which a personality in which sin is inherent, can become at all again identified with righteousness. And such forgiveness is the sunshine in which character grows. Even in the case of the parent and the child there is a sense, though a limited one, in which that earliest movement of desire within the child may be itself a result of what the parent is; an effect, or echo, of dimly felt love, not its own. We do not quite know how far it may be sometimes literally true, that it was really the goodness and love of the parent which, in the child who reflects the parent's character and influence (as his features and tone) constitutes the child's own primal possibility of yearning or repentant love. And so far the forgiveness of a parent, may in God's Spirit reflect, with wonderful nearness, the meaning of God's forgiveness of sinful man.

But if this, among human analogies, is the nearest to the Divine original, it is well to make this a standard of comparison, and interpret others in the light of this.

Granted that if a child comes crying to its mother, the

mother has a duty of forgiving: what if wicked men, without conscience or pity, combine to do all conceivable violence and wrong to both child and mother? Have the victims of violence, as such, no duty of forgiveness?

Undoubtedly they have. And yet it is plain at a glance that the word forgiveness cannot simply be taken over, without variation of meaning, from the one case to the other. I observed just now that the ideal nature of a parent's forgiveness could only be explained on the basis of certain assumptions involved in the truth that he stands in the place of God to his child. But every one of these assumptions must be set aside, or reversed, when I explain my forgiveness, as a victim, towards the man who treats me with outrageous wickedness. I do not stand to him in the place of God. I have, materially, no power to control his wickedness. I have no responsibility for his moral character. I am not his judge. Nor have I any right—right, that is, ultimately before God,—to claim as of right, immunity from being persecuted. What then, if I forgive him, does forgiving him mean?

In the first instance it means, I conceive, simply this: that I, being what I know myself before God to be, disclaim for myself any right not to suffer. It is not, as yet, that I am recognizing something forgiveable in my tormentor; it is not that I am blind for a moment to the horror of his wickedness; or that I should not, if I had the power, severely condemn and chastise it; but rather that I turn my face from the thought of it, declining to enter at all upon a judgment in which I disclaim all right and all concern. He is not responsible to me. And therefore I turn from him, as if he were an irresponsible agent,—a dumb animal, or a rock, or a tree, which God had allowed to be to me an instrument of discipline. In the first instance I shut my eyes to him; and turn simply to the thought of God and myself;

dedicating myself in submission to the will of God. "As for me, I was like a deaf man, and heard not: and as one that is dumb, who doth not open his mouth. I became even as a man that heareth not: and in whose mouth are no reproofs. For in thee, O Lord, have I put my trust: Thou shalt answer for me, O Lord my God."[1] "They stoned Stephen, calling upon the Lord and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit."[2]

This first. But this, no doubt, is only immediate and preliminary. There will follow then, secondly, on this the one other thing which is possible, so long as he is obstinate in his wickedness still. This is the recognition that he is, after all, not a thing but a man; and that as a man, though self-identified with wickedness now, he is capable of identity with goodness. To insist on distinguishing, in the thought of him, between what he now is and what he might become: to go out, in thought, in desire, in aspiration, in prayer, on his behalf, towards that restoration, in him, of the true self, for which he himself never dreams of praying nor hoping; to recognize what conceivably might be, even before it has at all begun to be: this so long as the man does not yet relent or falter in his wickedness, is all that is possible.

This is all that is possible. But only think how much this means! "He kneeled down and cried with a loud voice, Lord, lay not this sin to their charge. And when he had said this, he fell asleep." Already, in these words, the thought of St Stephen is fixed upon the real human selves of his persecutors, with all their possibility of things divine, in utter contrast with that rebellion against light with which their act, in his death, was then identifying them: already in prayer he yearns forward towards the idea of such a contrast consummated and actual; and he who does this, does, by anticipation, all. The man

[1] Ps. xxxviii. 13-16. [2] Acts vii. 59.

who dies then and there under their wickedness, cannot, save in desire of faith, see the after possibilities. For the present that desire of faith exhausts what forgiveness can mean.

And so in respect of those who have wronged us in other ways, not unto death; while their wickedness still is rampant and impenitent, and we are wholly without power to influence them, our forgiveness takes the form of the consecrating of our will, the uplifting of our appeal, to God on their behalf. But how much this implicitly means becomes plainer as perhaps, in God's providence, the opportunities grow. The man is arrested, for instance, and sentenced—to death it may be, or to imprisonment; and it chances to be in our power to visit, and to talk to him; and it may be by and by to give him a hand towards fresh possibilities. Or the man is sick, and it is in our power to wait on him; and sickness—or sickness and sympathy—help wonderfully to open his eyes. Or, without prison or sickness, things are changed with him; and there are, or may be, touches of compunction, dim, far away, hard to catch, hard to help, yet suggestive still of possibilities in him rather smothered than dead. The forgiveness which was real from the first as prayer both realizes and manifests itself, as opportunities grow, in further acts, themselves necessary corollaries of the prayer. If indeed it should chance, in greater degree or in less, that the question of the punishment of the criminal should fall within our power; our forgiveness might indeed mean remission of punishment; but it is no less possible that it might mean infliction, not remission. For that is, in either case, a question of detail, a question of the more expedient method—regarded as a means to an end. Our forgiveness is found, neither in punishment nor remission as such; but in our clear view and unswerving aim, of thought and heart, towards the end.

And the end is the effectual realization at last of such absolute antithesis between the sinner and his sin, as only is perfectly realized when he, the real he, is no longer a sinner but righteous.

It seems, then, that, even for the purpose of studying the meaning and character of forgiveness between man and man, we are apt to be misled if we begin with the case of a victim suffering under triumphant wickedness. But if we begin with the relation of parent and child, because it is likest to the case of God with man, and study it in the light of God's forgiveness of man; and so, from it, pass on to the question of forgiveness between equals, we shall reach a truer conception of what, even in the most ordinary cases among brethren, true forgiveness does, or ought ideally to, mean.

It may be that our imagination can picture scenes—death-scenes, perhaps in the hospital or on the scaffold, when the forgiveness of one who once was cruelly persecuted in his holiness, which could *then* take only the form of silent prayer for his persecutor, has passed on, without change in itself, through changing conditions of outward opportunity, until it is visibly like the forgiveness of a tenderly loving parent; until, that is, it is the persecutor who is lying—very helpless at once and very sorrowful; while he who was the victim, having now on his side all material force, and reflecting in himself, as example and teacher and judge, the very light of the holiness of God—reflects God also in *this*, that his love, like the love of God which is in it, yearns with fatherly tenderness as towards an erring child, striving by love to awake an outcry of responsive desire, which it can—which it will—embrace as the real earnest of a personal self-identification with love.

All this is really implicit in the fact, itself as fact not at all unfamiliar, that forgiveness must always retain its underlying character as a provisional thing, unless and

until it is consummated in the holiness of the penitent, and in the perfect embrace, by love because it is love, of the holy penitent because of the holiness that is in him. Certainly we do not forget the extreme imperfectness of human achievement in this, as in all directions of spiritual life. But none the less it is true that, when penitence once has begun, in any soul of man, however much it may seem to fall short of its meaning, nothing less than this is what it ideally means. It is a beginning, whose entire consummation, should it ever be consummated, would mean, in the perfect penitent, nothing less than a real and living righteousness. If it stops short of real separation from sin; if it stops short of true allegiance to righteousness; (and we are under no sort of delusion as to the universal experience of failure;) but if it stops short of these things, in stopping short of them it stops short of itself; for these things are the consummation of what penitence means. And forgiveness, when it reaches its consummation, is love's embrace of such a penitence as this.

I cannot, then, understand less than this in the word forgiveness. And meanwhile I, or any man,—if through the life and death and life again, the accomplished work of the atonement of Jesus Christ, and our communion of spirit with it and with Him, we too look up in hope to be forgiven: what is the truth of the meaning, in us, of that hope? Is it a hope that we,—the content of that word "we" remaining as it now is, untransformed,—shall nevertheless be excused from punishment? or shall be called by the name, or treated, apart from truth, *as if we were* righteous: whilst all the time we are but what we know ourselves, in ourselves, to be?

Certainly this is not the true character of the Christian hope. If it were, the hope of forgiveness would carry with it no aspiration moral or spiritual. Forgiveness is no mere transaction outside the self, a mere arithmetical balance,

which leaves the self unchanged. Even the earliest touch, on the conscious moral life, of the most provisional forgiveness, must be a bracing touch, enhancing moral power, or (at the least) adding flame to moral desire. If it does neither, it is plainly foredoomed, as an experiment of love which already has failed. But if it does, or so far as it does; already the content and character of the I who am forgiven is to that extent changed. And the full forgiveness to which in faith I aspire is a forgiveness on the part—not of weak indulgence but of righteousness and truth, a forgiveness on the part of the infinite God. It is the righteous love, which seeing in me at last the very righteousness of Christ, and seeing me only as one with the Spirit of righteousness which is the Spirit of Christ, embraces in me the righteousness which really is there; the righteousness which, though not of me, is now the very truth of what I, in Him, am. This is the consummation of the triumph of Love.

Dare any one aspire to less than this? or mean less than this by his hope to be forgiven? The hope of forgiveness merely, which is not, of inherent necessity, the hope of a heart set upon personal righteousness,—is a pagan rather than a Christian hope. If I can have no heart for, and no belief in, the possibility, even within myself, of the righteousness of God; I know not with what consistency of meaning I can ask—of God—to be forgiven. It is not so much for lack of possibility as for lack of desire, that men are tempted to put such a hope as this on one side. Nothing is really too high, in the Person of Christ, for those who have the heart to desire it,—and Him.

Meanwhile, if our thought reverts to those who, to human eyes, have failed, and sunk: poor, lonely, drifting souls, with stunted capacities now, and shattered hopes, drawing in towards the shadow of dishonoured graves: the meaning of every hope that our love can frame for

their so late and faltering penitence,—for (if it be so now) their dying tears; is that even these, scanty, late, and feeble though they seem, may yet be, in them, a real beginning of capacity, seen in God's sight to be a beginning, and real,—of what, in its full development will become nothing less than a personal self-identification, in love, with the love, which is also the holiness, of God. For him, too,—for the lowest in human seeming, as for the highest, our real hope of forgiveness consummated is a hope of righteousness: a hope of God's love altogether loving at last—what, through the marvellous working of God's love, has become at last altogether lovable.

CHAPTER IV

THE PERSON OF THE MEDIATOR

THE Christian doctrine of the Atonement has been variously expounded. The Christian doctrine of the Atonement, however expounded, has been vehemently impugned. And indeed there is one objection, often made against it, which is vital. Expound the action, or nature, of the Mediator how you will, it is said that any idea of a Mediator is impossible. Not so much anything in the detail of His work, but the very core of the idea presents itself to some minds as being, fundamentally, an immorality and an untruth.

The problem, it will be said (legitimately enough) is this. Here is man. Here is one, that is, who is immoral and unholy in fact. By what conceivable action or process can the *de facto* unholy become actually holy? And if the Christian answer begins to speak of a Redeemer, how is it conceivable (the mind asks) that any Redeemer's work, or endurance, or goodness, be it what it may, seeing that it is outside the personalities of men, should touch the point of pressing necessity, which is an essential alteration of what men are? What is wanted is not that there should be a wonderful exhibition somewhere of obedience, or that somebody should be holy: not even that the amount or the value of holiness in the world should balance, and perhaps outweigh, the huge volume of unholiness. What is wanted is that these particular personalities should be holy, which are in fact the reverse.

How can the particular thing which is required be touched by the introduction of "another"? Here, if anywhere in the world, there can be no question of a fictitious transaction, or an unreal imagining; here, if anywhere, whatever is not vitally and personally real is both mockery and despair.

Now it may be that this is a case in which logic, by its very abstraction from experience, over-reaches itself. At all events, as a sort of preliminary reply, let us begin with a case which comes from the side of experience, rather than of logic. Consider, then, the case of a man in whose character we may happen to be interested very closely, and whose character is unmistakably bad. The daily hope and prayer in respect of him is that he may not be that which he is, and may become what he is not. But what is to be done? One thing is plain from the first. He must not be simply left alone. To leave him wholly to himself is to abandon hope. Instinctively you rather ask, who is there about him? has he a mother? a sister? a high-principled companion? a really good friend? If he has; *there*, you say at once, is the point of hope. Everything will probably turn upon that friend. And then comes the second thought; yes, but if parent, sister, friend, is to be his salvation, to be the living lever whereby he is himself really to become the very thing he is not, it will be no light task, no light pain, for the saving friend. What heaviness of heart there must first be, what anxious thought and care, what hoping against hope, what sense of effort disappointed, and love (as it seems) thrown away, what unwearying prayer to God, what patient bearing with folly, perverseness, and sin! If he who is the cause of all the trouble is himself without anguish, and without contrition, and will endure no discipline, and cannot entreat in prayer: how much of all the burden of all these things must the friend

bear first, in order that, and until, the man himself, who has seen and gradually felt these things in his friend, may be able, and willing, to bear them a little for himself. If the friend will not do this; if no one will enter into the grief and sin, sharing it as if it were his own; you have comparatively little hope. It is not a friend who will lecture, so much as a friend who will bear: not a friend who is ready to separate himself from, but a friend who is willing himself to enter into, the shadow of the cloud of misery and sin; who has become already, in that willingness, a hope and an earnest of the penitent character, even of the man who does not, as yet, himself, repent, or amend, or (hardly even) desire.

But this, of course, carries us but a little way. It stops very far short of the meaning of Atonement. Yet it may serve perhaps to make logic a little more cautious. The intervention of "another" is by no means so obviously irrelevant as it appeared to be. Whatever else it is, the case just supposed is at all events a most familiar experience in life. And it so far illustrates the real moral and spiritual effectiveness which may be the outcome of the voluntary suffering of another, as to make it impossible to reject beforehand any theory of moral recovery, merely because it can be said to hinge upon the idea of another's suffering.

But it will be felt that, even if it be not fundamentally impossible, the idea of an atoning mediator is, and must be, incompatible with any profound reality of justice. If A be the judge or king, and B the culprit, under what conceivable circumstances, or upon what conceivable principle of justice, can A fail to punish B, or allow C to intervene at all?

It will perhaps be observed that our sense of the incompatibleness of any such intervention with justice

becomes rigid and absolute, the moment we begin to use the terms, or conjure up the associations, of a system of judicial administration. The fact is that tribunals of human justice mislead our thought on this subject almost as much as they inform it. Human justice is necessarily both clumsy and rigid. The judge must administer general rules. General rules involve the sacrifice of the particular, to the average, interest. Continually the judge must do, for the sake of law, that is, for the sake of the general community, what is not really the wisest, or the justest, for the merely individual case. It is almost impossible to imagine the judicial circumstances, on earth, under which either judge or king would be perfectly free to decide, in reference to the requirements of moral goodness only, what would really be the wisest and the best for the ultimate welfare of a single wrong-doer. Moreover, even if the surrounding circumstances did not make this impossible, no human insight of wisdom would be adequate for it. Human justice that attempted to be divinely just, would break to pieces altogether.

If indeed such freedom could be imagined, and wisdom withal that was adequate to wield it; we should recognise by and by that the extreme rigidity of the practical assumption that every man is, absolutely and equally, distinct from every one but himself, would begin to be at least a little less rigid. We should not indeed be in the habit of seeing guilty people let off, and others suffering in their stead: far from it: but we should perhaps be aware, of the possibility, in two different directions, of certain exceedingly dim and distant approaches towards what would look like this.

On the one side, we should recognize at least that there might be cases, in which, if no one could exactly be a substitute for the guilty, yet at least some could more nearly approach to being so than others. It is something to

recognize that the impossibility is not, in all cases, absolute and equal: that there are at least degrees of impossibility. Degrees of impossibility imply, at least ideally, degrees of possibility also. A stranger, hired for money to undergo a loss of limb or liberty, would always be an insult to true equity. But one who was very closely identified with the wrong-doer in condition, or blood, or affection; a tribesman dedicating himself for a tribal wrong; the willing representative of a conquered nation, or army; the father, on behalf of his own child; the husband, for the sake of his wife; is it impossible to conceive circumstances under which a willing acceptance of penalty on the part of some one of these, would as truly be the deepest hope of the transformation of the guilty, as it would be the crown of his own nobleness? Imagine, ideally, these three conditions: first that he who so intervened to bear did so at his own most earnest desire, of love; secondly that he was so near to the guilty accused that he might claim a wholly exceptional right to represent him,—near as (under conceivable circumstances) husband might be to wife, or parent to child, or son to father; and thirdly that this sacrifice of vicarious endurance was indeed the truest and the deepest way to produce the contrition and sanctification of the guilty; and what follows? We need not go so far as to say that any judge or lord on earth could accept the sacrifice. But we may possibly recognize that the impossibility which remains, depends not so much on any essential lack of ideal righteousness in that which might ideally be the consummation of righteousness in them all; but rather in the many human limitations which would make any imaginable instance upon earth a mere resemblance or approximation to the ideal conditions, not a full attainment of them. It may be said, perhaps, that of the last two conditions asked for, neither could ever be quite absolutely realized. Between man and man, on

earth, they probably could not. But what we may recognize, even between man and man, is some faint approximation towards—even if never, or even nearly, a realization of—the conditions under which vicarious penalty would be not intelligible only, but the supremest manifestation of righteousness as well as of love.

There is another side also to the thought. If, in proportion to the just conceivable possibility of the legitimate identification of some other with the culprit we can conceive moral character in vicarious penalty; on the other hand, in proportion to the identification between the lord who judges and the person who has been wronged, we can understand the righteousness of a judging lord who should forego any kind of compensation or penalty; that is, in effect, should bear all the burden of the harm himself. If it is the king's own son who has been maltreated and robbed; and if the king, in a mood of divine insight, truly sees that his free acceptance of this injury in the person of his son, will be the turning-point of the conversion to goodness of the robber, and it may be of a whole district of brigandage; the very closeness of the identification between himself and his son makes possible an equity which, had the son been a stranger, would have been unrighteous.

But, after all, such suggestions as these are most precarious. It is difficult to omit them; for they represent some real truth. Yet they are by themselves so little convincing that, as matter of mere policy, it might have been more persuasive to leave them unsaid. Though men are not so absolutely distinct from one another as modern thought and life assume them to be; though the father is in the child, and the child is a real representative of the father; though as there are family likenesses and national characters, so there are family and national responsibilities and consubstantialities; yet,

after all, no one man quite can be another; if, in a flash, for a moment, we seemed to see them becoming almost as one, yet we fall back; the essential distinction remains; no one is another; the injustice of vicarious penalty is not done away.

And in any case the language of human jurisprudence is confusing. The rough imperfectness, which is the best possibility of human judgment, cannot really light up the mystery of the perfectness of the judgement of God. We shall be carried somewhat further by another sort of instance, which at least is free from all the misleading rigidity of legal conceptions. Let A, then, be not the judge, but the father,—loving, wise, and true; and B the child, who has gone very far wrong; and C—the mother. And let her be thought of, not as in any respect either weak or cowardly, but as a wise and brave, as well as tender-hearted, woman. There is here no question of a legal obligation on the father to impose formal punishment; but the problem is the real transformation of the character of the child. Do we not recognize at once that the profoundest hope for the child's real change lies in the reality with which the parents enter into his grief and shame; so enter into it, on his behalf, as to win it to be in him where in fact it was not, until it was first in them, and in him only from them? Do we not recognize, in particular, the place, in his discipline and his purifying, which may belong to the voluntary distress and endurance of the mother? This is no question, it is to be observed, of a penalty which the father insists on inflicting upon somebody, and which the mother intervenes to bear. Nothing whatever is inflicted by the father on the mother. Indeed, nothing is, speaking strictly, inflicted on any one by any one. The penalty which the mother bears is the penalty of contrition: it is rather an effort of discipline than a price of satisfaction; it corresponds in idea not to

punishment so much, regarded externally as a squaring of accounts, as to the moral discipline which, through self-abasement, self-condemnation, and self-surrender to penalty, wins its painful way to victorious goodness and peace. And she bears it—not as an inflicted sentence, but as the spontaneous instinct and outflow of her own intensity of love. And finally, so far is it from being imposed by the relentlessness of an unforgiving father, that whatever she bears in this way, he too bears in her and with her; for in mind, in this matter, and in will, they are one. Whatever he may seem to exact, she exacts as completely as he. Whatever she is willing to endure, his sympathy too, and his will, and his yearning desire, are with her to the full in enduring.

It is probable that this analogy carries us much further towards truth than any that can be borrowed from forensic justice. Nevertheless this too is an imperfect analogy. It carries us further, but it fails at the pinch. It is suggestive of much: but it certainly is not a parallel to atonement. For even here, after all, much as the parents' goodness may influence the child, yet they are distinct. The father is not the mother; and the mother is not the child.

Now it is precisely here, in the light, that is to say, at once of the suggestiveness of these analogies, and also of the hopeless inadequacy which we find to be inherent in them, that we are confronted by those great affirmations of fundamental doctrine, which lie at the basis of the "Atonement" of Christian revelation. It is at the very root of the Christian doctrine that He, who made atonement between God and man, Himself, in the fullest sense, was God and was Man. If He were man only, however perfectly, and not God: the whole idea of any reality of effectual mediation or atonement — without which Christianity, beautiful though it might be in idea, would not be Christianity—falls in a moment absolutely to the

ground. If He were not God, the statement that He was a good man could be only an inexact and relative truth. Absolutely, on close analysis, it would not, and could not possibly, be true. Moreover if He were not God, the fact that He was good (in whatever sense it may be imagined to be true) would be a fact of no more moment to me, than the fact that Samson was strong, or Solomon wise, or S. Paul intrepid, or S. John beloved. They were, but I am not; and that is the difference between them and me; and that is all. The more, indeed, they were these things, the greater the difference. And the more transcendently good He was, the more hopelessly unapproachable would He be to me,—if He were only another man, and not God.

From the point of view, however, of the Christian faith, this is the one absolutely cardinal and primary truth; that, in the words of the Athanasian Creed, "Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and man; God of the substance of the Father, begotten before the world; and man, of the substance of His Mother, born in the world; perfect God and perfect Man." These are the familiar words, the authority of which is not likely to be challenged.

But perhaps it may not be wrong to suggest that that which is understood and meant, even in the assertion of these familiar words, is apt to be ambiguous, and may very often be inadequate. My meaning may be very unsatisfactory when I say that the Father is God, and that Jesus Christ *also* is God; or that I am man, and that Jesus Christ *also* is man. Such language sounds far too much as if we were thinking first of A and of B, and then C was subsequently introduced, who was like B in being also human, and like A in being also Divine. The word "also" and the word "like" are both of them instantly liable to misinterpretation. They seem to introduce the generic conception; as though the word "God" could

represent a genus or class, and there were more members of the genus than one. The truth is of course not so. To the thoughtful Christian the word God is an absolute and singular,—it cannot possibly be a generic—word. By a sort of economy or condescension of phrase, when we speak towards those who are without, we may use it generically "as there be lords many and gods many," or as when under the general heading "Theism" we include true and false conceptions of God alike. But whatever be the just ground for thus in speech classifying together the true and the imperfect and the false, to ourselves at least, when face to face with real truth, God is, and can be, but One. "Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord, is One"[1] is a word not only not abrogated, but expressly re-enacted, in the Christian faith. The Alpha and Omega, the beginning, and end, and sum, and meaning of Being is but One. We who believe in a Personal God, do not mean a limited God. We do not mean one more, a bigger specimen of existence, amongst existences. Rather we mean that the reality of existence itself is Personal. We mean that all the different abstracts, pushed back far enough, are personal, and the One same Personal: that Power, that Law, that Life, that Thought, that Love, are ultimately, in their very reality, identified in one supreme, and that necessarily a Personal, existence. Now such Supreme Being cannot be multiplied: it is incapable of a plural: it cannot be a generic term. There cannot be more than one all inclusive, more than one ultimate, more than one God. Nor has Christian thought at any point, for any moment, dared, or endured, the least approach to such a thought or phrase as "Two Gods." If the Father is God, and the Son God, they are both the same God wholly, unreservedly. God is a particular, an unique

[1] Mark xii. 29. R.V.

not a general term. Each is not only God, but is the very same "singularis unicus et totus Deus." They are not both *generically* God, as though "God" could be an attribute or a predicate; but both *identically* God, the God, the One, all inclusive, indivisible, God.[1]

Considerations like these, fundamental though they may be, are by no means unnecessary; for there is, among Christians, not a little popular thought, which, meaning to be orthodox, is, in fact, more or less, Tri-theistic; and which, just because it so far tends towards plurality of God, goes some way to provoke, and account for, the correlative popular tendency, and tenderness, towards Unitarianism. Just so far as Christian thought tends, in fact, towards making God a generic predicate; the

[1] "And sith they all are but one God in number, one indivisible essence or substance, their distinction cannot possibly admit separation. For how should that subsist *solitarily* by itself which hath no substance but *individually* the very same whereby others subsist with it; seeing that the multiplication of substances *in particular* is necessarily required to make those things subsist apart which have the same general nature, and the Persons of that Trinity are not three particular substances to whom one *general* nature is common, but three that subsist by one substance *which itself is particular*, yet they all three have it, and their several ways of having it are that which maketh their personal distinction?" Hooker, E.P.V. lvi. 2. p. 246.

"The schoolmen are known to have insisted with great earnestness on the numerical unity of the Divine Being; each of the three Divine Persons being one and the same God, unicus, singularis, et totus Deus. [But see Aquinas, Summa, p. I. Qu. xxxi. art. 2. Vol. xx. p. 153.] In this, however, they did but follow the recorded doctrine of the Western theologians of the 5th century, as I suppose will be allowed by critics generally. So forcible is St Austin upon the strict unity of God, that he even thinks it necessary to caution his readers lest they should suppose that he could allow them to speak of One Person as well as of Three in the Divine Nature, *de Trin.* vii. 11. Again, in the (so-called) Athanasian Creed, the same elementary truth is emphatically insisted on. The neuter *unum* of former divines is changed into the masculine, in enunciating the mystery. "Non tres æterni, sed unus æternus." I suppose this means that Each Divine Person is to be received as the one God as entirely and absolutely as He would be held to be, if we had never heard of the other Two, and that He is not in any respect less than the one and only God, because They are each the same one God also; or in other words, that as each human individual being has one personality, the Divine Being has three."

Newman's *Arians*, appendix, note iv. p. 447. 3rd edn.

necessary protest on behalf of the unity of God (necessary perhaps from the scientific and philosophical not less than from the theological side) will naturally begin to assert itself as a correction, rather than as a corroboration, of orthodox theology. If the thought that wishes to be orthodox had less tendency to become Tri-theistic, the thought that claims to be free would be less Unitarian.

For centuries upon centuries, it is to be remembered, the essential unity of God had been, as it were, burnt and branded in upon the consciousness of Israel. It had to be completely established first, as a basal element of thought, indispensable, unalterable, before there really could begin the disclosure to man of the reality of eternal relations within the one indivisible Being of God. And when the disclosure came, it came not as modifying,—far less as denying,—but as further interpreting and illumining that unity which it absolutely presupposed.

Probably, however, there will be many minds which, if they put into words their instinctive feeling in respect of such thoughts as these, would express themselves somewhat in this way: they would say, we are afraid of saying too much: we are afraid, in such an assertion of unity, of explaining away the threefold distinction of Personality: we are afraid of reducing it to a threefoldness merely of phrase, or merely of aspect: in a word, we are afraid of Sabellianism. It might possibly be enough to reply that if two truths, which intellect imperfectly correlates, are nevertheless to be really held together, they are best held not by a refusal to affirm either positively, for fear of interfering with the other, but by a fearless assertion, in its turn, of each. But indeed these two truths are not simply held together, without any attempt at correlation. They do not come to us exactly, as it were, on the same level. The one

comes to us as more fundamental and primary than the other. The second is an element in, or method of, the first. And our direct answer is that we cannot possibly incur any Sabellian peril, whilst we firmly understand and maintain (what is fatal to Sabellianism) that that which is revealed within Divine Unity is not only a distinction of aspects or of names, but a real reciprocity of *mutual* relation. One "aspect" cannot contemplate, or be loved by another. If we recognize that revelation discloses, within the one being of God, both subject and object at once, a mutuality of eternal contemplation, a mutuality of eternal love, no language that we can use about unity can be really Sabellian; for any thought of mutual relationship between aspects of one, which differ only as aspects, would be wholly impossible. We may dismiss then any fear of affirming the unity too much, and repeat that it must needs be inadequate thought, which would think of the Son as only being, generically, *like* to the Father, in being also, yet distinctly, God. What the Father is, that is the Son, not similarly but identically, for He and the Father are One.

From this we turn to the human side. "Perfect God and perfect Man." Now if the generic sense, as applied to God, is impossible: as applied to man it is at least inadequate and untrue. If He might have been, yet He certainly was not, a man only, amongst men. His relation to the human race is not that He was another specimen, differing, by being another, from everyone except Himself. His relation to the race was not a differentiating but a consummating relation. He was not generically, but inclusively, man.

The fact, indeed, even of our own distinctness one from another, is not (as has been already urged) so bald or so ultimate as we sometimes make it. The father *is* reproduced in the son: we know not how deep may be

the community between brother and brother. If "we" defeated the Armada or Napoleon,—we who had no more hand in it than the French or Spanish infants yet unborn: if the felon's dishonour brands the whole family name: if Israel fled and died because Achan sinned; or (more awfully still) if "Israel" put to death the Son of Man: then connections like these are no merely artificial make-believe, no idle form of fashion in phrase. Even the wider phrase "solidarity of humanity," is one which, as it has probably more meaning now than ever it could have had in the world before, so perhaps every day, and from every side at once, (the practical side, and the scientific, as well as the philosophical and the religious) is growing in directness and depth of significance. Whatever we do, we do not for ourselves alone. The attempt to make an isolated life is an impossible attempt. It is not as an individual that I can be measured or judged. What I am is what I am in relation to an environment. As child in the family, as school-fellow, as comrade, as citizen, as householder, to those around, rich or poor, good or evil, bright or sad,—I am determined more and more, by my relations. From the very lowest form of boon-companionship, or partnership in crime, to the life of perpetual service to man, and to God in man, this dependence and relativity of the individual life is in one way or other perpetually being realized.

But once more, as between man and man, these things are a parable, an aspiration, a glimpse: they still always fall short. It is precisely here that the relation of Jesus Christ to humanity is unique. What others do but faintly suggest is realized in him. Other cases, if they illustrate it at all, must illustrate it at least as emphatically by what they are not, as by anything that they are. To think of Him merely in the light of the ordinary possibilities of

others, to think of the significance, or power, of His humanity as limited to His sole individual self-hood, is incompatible with the very existence and meaning of the Church. He alone was not generically but inclusively man.

The only relation which can at all directly compare with it, is that of Adam; who, in a real—though a primarily external, and therefore inadequate—sense, was Humanity; so that every succeeding instance of humanity is human by direct derivation from him, as very part and parcel of what he was. The reality and directness of our relation with Adam we feel only too cogently. It is useless to argue about it; it is there. It is part of what we begin with. It belongs to that consciousness of the self which is anterior to any analysis or argument. Every pulsation of the blood in our veins, every limitation, or temptation, or disorder, or decay, which, through the avenue of the body has come home to ourselves, and registered itself as part of our own private history and consciousness, is witness only too incontrovertible to the necessity and the absoluteness of our relationship with Adam. The nature, in and through which we live, is the nature which we have received by transmission from him. It is in us what it was in him first. We cannot separate ourselves from him. No indignation, no bewailing, no strenuousness of effort or resolve will avail to alter the underlying fact that our humanity is his humanity. From him it was derived to us; and in us it retains all those natural qualities and tendencies, in which and through which our personality grows to self-consciousness and self-expression; but which themselves, long before any personality of ours, for good or for evil took their stamp, as being what they were, in him.

This is the only instance, actual or possible, with which the relation of Jesus Christ to humanity has been in scripture, or can be, compared. But even in this one case the

comparison is not completely adequate. It is valid as an illustration, but remains on a different, and dissimilar, level. The one is a fleshly relation, the other a spiritual. The one works automatically, materially, mechanically. The other is realized in a different sphere, and depends upon other than material conditions. The one is a natural property of bodily life, and follows, as it were blindly, from the fact that Adam was the original parent. The other is a Spiritual property, so sovereign, so transcendent, that it could only be a property of a Humanity which was not merely the Humanity of a finite creature, but the Humanity of the infinite God.

Not that there is any absolute antithesis between spirit and body. Neither is body without spirit, nor spirit without body. What Adam is to the flesh, and, through the flesh, indirectly to the spirit also; that is Christ to the spirit, and, through the spirit, indirectly also to the flesh, of all those who, as they are partakers, in flesh, of Adam, are made capable of becoming partakers, in Spirit, of Christ. We talk, indeed, ourselves, in a limited sense, of one man speaking or acting in the spirit of another; and so far as it goes the phrase is not untrue; yet it goes but a very little way. That complete indwelling and possessing of even one other, which the yearnings of man towards man imperfectly approach, is only possible, in any fulness of the words, to that Spirit of Man which is the Spirit of God: to the Spirit of God, become, through Incarnation, the Spirit of Man. No mere man indwells, in Spirit, in, or as, the Spirit of another. Whatever near approach there may be seen to be towards this, is really mediated through the Spirit of Christ. If I grow at last towards unity of spirit with my friend: it is not really that I am in him, or he in me; but rather that the grace of indwelling Spirit which indwelt in him, and made him, in his own way, what he was, is not denied even to me. Experience of man with

man, here as elsewhere, gives but a faint analogy of the meaning of the Divine. But, here as elsewhere, it would be a fatal mistake to interpret the meaning of the Divine only in terms of man's experience with man. After all, we do not fully attain to the meaning of anything here. We do but point towards, we do not realize, even that which we first and most claim to possess—self-conscious personality: we do not realize the conditions without which we ourselves should be unthinkable: what wonder if we can but point dimly towards, and cannot realize, the reciprocity of true intercommunion of spirits? But what our limited being points towards, is real in God. If Christ's Humanity were not the Humanity of Deity, it could not stand in the wide, inclusive, consummating relation, in which it stands in fact, to the humanity of all other men. But as it is, the very essence of the Christian religion is the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ. "The first man Adam became a living soul. The last Adam became a life-giving Spirit."[1] "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His."[2]

No attempt will be made, in the present context at least, to enlarge further upon the methods or meanings of this mutual inherence, this spiritual indwelling, whereby humankind is summed anew, and included, in Christ.[3] Nor need we at this moment attempt to enter into a discussion as to the meaning of the prerogative of free will, or that awful possibility which is inherent in it, whereby we may revolt, and reject, and put ourselves outside the life of Christ. Be that possibility what it may, it is not that that can interpret—for it is utter revolt and contradiction against—the meaning of the atoning work of Christ. The meaning of that work must be found, not in the mystery of the possibility of its being contradicted,

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 45. [2] Romans viii. 9.

[3] These subjects are further discussed in chapters viii. and ix.

but in the beauty of its unmarred effectiveness. And apart from man's power to revolt from it, which we do not now discuss, it certainly means inclusion within the Body of the Spirit of Christ.

If there be those to whom such language sounds in the least degree either figurative or overstrained, it may, at the present stage, be sufficient to remind them of these three things. First, that its truth, as literal and vital, is absolutely assumed in all that St Paul has to say about the first, and the second, Adam. Secondly that not in one place only, but from end to end, language expressive of this truth is so reiterated and insisted on in the New Testament, that it may fairly be called the characteristic truth of the apostolic Church. If there is one corollary from the Deity of Christ, which, more than another, we may defy any man to eradicate from New Testament theology, without shivering the whole into fragments, it is the truth of the recapitulation and inclusion of the Church, which is, ideally at least, as wide as humanity, *in Christ*. And thirdly, that this truth is the obvious basis of the entire sacramental system and doctrine, that is, of the divinely distinctive worship, which is the divine expression of the faith and life, of the Church of Christ. What is Baptism, in its truest realization, but our incorporation, as members, into the Body of Christ? What is Holy Communion, but a feeding and living upon the Body and Blood of Christ? The beginning of life in Christ's Church is the free gift of membership in Christ. The crown of the most ideal and unfaltering life of communion is the consummation of personal union with Christ. The whole sacramental system symbolizes, expounds, represents, yes, and conveys—not mechanically nor magically, but intelligently, morally and spiritually, —this far more than merely human reality of inclusion with and in Christ.

No doubt all this may be said to be merely preliminary. Nothing has yet been offered in the way of explanation of the nature, or meaning, of the atoning action of our Lord. But perhaps it is not in vain to try and take account even of the more external and pedantic barriers by which the, often unconscious, perverseness of the natural intellect tries to shut out our moral and spiritual consciousness from that assimilation of the basal truth of atonement, which is, in fact, its deepest necessity. And if perplexities of arithmetical character are to be met in terms of arithmetic; at least, when pressed by the charge of moral injustice in the fact of the vicarious intervention of any mediating third term between God and man, we may point out that there is a necessary, and a very grave, misconception in the terms of the charge: for He can be no intervening "third," who is Himself —not similarly, not generically, but wholly, individually, identically—the "first," and wholly, individually, identically the "second" also; who is Himself, on the one side absolutely, on the other (if we will but have it so), at least with a Divine potentiality, "singularis, unicus, et totus"—et Deus et Homo.

CHAPTER V

THE OBEDIENCE OF CHRIST

WE now pass from the thought of the Person of Jesus Christ as, like Adam, and more even than Adam, the representative and inclusive summary of all mankind: and consider rather, in respect of Himself, what His self-expression in humanity meant; and what is manifested in it as to the true relation of the human self to God.

It has no doubt been often felt as a difficulty to conceive quite adequately of the reality of His being, as human, without going in thought too far, and conceiving of Him at once as two distinct Persons, a human person as well as a Divine. And so Christian thought has learned to shrink from speaking, or thinking, of Him as "a human personality," and has sometimes even made a sort of principle of speaking of the impersonal character of the humanity of Christ. But if there is error at hand in the one direction, there is certainly also error in the other. If there is a sense in which the assertion of a human personality runs easily into Nestorianism; at least those who first asserted a human personality meant something, which the simple denial of the phrase may unduly disparage. To deny the human personality, however in some contexts necessary, is not without its own risks. There is, and there can be, no such thing as impersonal humanity. The phrase involves a contradiction in terms. Human nature which is not personal, is not human nature. Human nature can only be the nature of a person: not exactly, of

necessity, of a human person: but of a person who being in himself at least human—perhaps more than human—is so far as his assumption of humanity goes,—adequately self-expressed in terms, and through conditions, of humanity. Of necessity, He is a Person: and He, the Person, is human. The root and origin of His Personality may not be human. But in so far as He is a Person now humanly incarnate, the word human has become a true attribute, truly predicable of His Personality. Of necessity He is a Person, and a Person who now expresses His very self, through human conditions and capacities, as man. The human acts, and human character, are the acts and the character, the expression and the revelation, of Himself.

Christ is, in fact, a Divine Person: but a Divine Person not merely wearing manhood as a robe, or playing upon it as an instrument; but really expressing *Himself* in terms of Humanity: and thereby making Humanity—to the utmost extent to which the conditions of mortal disability under which He took it were capable—a real and true reflection and utterance of Deity. There was in Him no impersonal Humanity (which is impossible); but a human nature and character which were personal because they were now the method and condition of His own Personality: Himself become Human, and thinking, speaking, acting, and suffering, as man.

It would indeed never be true to say of Him, during the time of His humiliation, that He was nothing more than the Human expression of Himself. For He was, all through, the Infinite and Eternal, God the Word, "upholding all things by the word of His power"[1]—"God only begotten, which is in the bosom of the Father."[2] But however impossible it might be that the infinite God should wholly be, in all aspects and attributes of Deity, expressed in Humanity: yet at least

[1] Hebr. i. 3. [2] John i. 18. R.V. margin.

the Incarnate, as Incarnate,—God, in flesh, as man,—was never Himself *otherwise than* as He could be, and was, expressed through attributes and capacities of manhood. The Incarnate did not oscillate between being God and being man. He was indeed *always* God; and yet never otherwise God than as expressed within the possibilities of human consciousness and character. It was not indeed obscure to His consciousness that He, the Incarnate, was all the while something more than He was as Incarnate. "Before Abraham was, I am."[1] "I and the Father are one."[2] "And now, O Father, glorify Thou Me with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was."[3] These are not the words of One to whom His own essential being, or the origin, or the goal, of Incarnation are, in any sense, obscured. But this continued self-consciousness, in Himself, of inherent Deity; this steady view, before and after, in the way of what we should call memory towards the past, and anticipation towards the future; is not incompatible with the principle that, in respect of the experience of Incarnation itself, its tasks and its sufferings, its works and its self-restraints, its mind and its character, He was God always and only in the way in which the human conditions which He had chosen were capable of being an expression of God. We do not gain, but greatly lose, in respect of the true impressiveness of the Incarnate life, if we imagine Him, at fitful intervals, as jumping away (so to speak) from the disabilities of the chosen condition of His self-expression, in order to make a display,—outside the limits of the Humanity in which He purported to be speaking and acting,—of non-human Deity. We greatly obscure the significance of His works of power unless we regard them as the works which properly belonged to the perfect human self-expression

[1] John ix. 58. [2] John x. 32. [3] John xvii. 5.

of God: and not as works of God intruding, so to speak, across human conditions,—of God quite apart from all realities of human propriety, or human power. Whatever He said with human lips, whatever He did, acting amongst men in the place and figure of man, (though, no doubt, said and done by One who had not lost, in Himself, self-consciousness of Deity,) was nevertheless always said or done—not by Deity, as it were, acting barely as Deity, but by Deity conditioned by Humanity; by Human capacity, and Human character, according as these had become, and therefore were shown to be capable of becoming, the real expression and method and living utterance, of Deity.

It is really of considerable importance to rid our imaginations of a certain dualism (in its way somewhat parallel to the Nestorian dualism, though issuing from a very different side, and with a very different history and motive) according to which the Person of Christ is currently conceived as being in such sense both God and man, that He is, in point of fact, two. There is Deity there, and there is also Humanity. He can speak, think, and act, sometimes under the conditions of one nature, sometimes under the conditions of the other. As God He does this; and as man He does that, and another thing partly as God, and partly as man. This distinction has been very prevalent indeed in the language of Christians. Assuredly no kind of irreverence was intended, nor any reality of dualism. Yet the language, on cross-examination, will be found to be largely dualistic. The phrase "God and man" is of course perfectly true. But it is easy to lay undue emphasis on the "and." And when this is done,—as it is done every day,—the truth is better expressed by varying the phrase. "He is not two, but one, Christ." He is, then, not so much God *and* man, as God in, and through, and as, man. He is one

indivisible, personality throughout. In His human life on earth, as Incarnate, He is not sometimes, but consistently, always, in every act and every detail, Human. The Incarnate never leaves His Incarnation. God, as man, is always, in all things, God *as man*. He no more ceases, at any point, to be God under methods and conditions essentially human; than, under these essentially human methods and conditions, He at any point ceases to be God. Whatever the reverence of their motive may be, men do harm to consistency and to truth, by keeping open, as it were, a sort of non-human sphere, or aspect, of the Incarnation. This opening we should unreservedly desire to close. There are not two existences either of, or within, the Incarnate, side by side with one another. If it is all Divine, it is all human too. We are to study the Divine, in and through the human. By looking for the Divine side by side with the human, instead of discerning the Divine within the human, we miss the significance of them both.

We are not, then, to be in the least degree afraid of the fullest realization of the humanness of Christ: for the human experience, in its directest reality as human experience, is first itself the revelation of the character of God: and secondly, in revealing God, it is a revelation also of what human character and capacity, even under conditions of extremest disability, really are and mean. We quite miss the revelation of Humanity in Jesus Christ, if we insist on denying that its highest manifestations are predicable of Humanity at all. And even the revelation of Deity in Him we degrade and depreciate, if we insist on finding it only, or even as much, in certain (as it seems to us) abnormal effects; and not rather in the even daily tenour of a character, which just because it was quite perfect as human,—perfect in reference to the everyday difficulties of perfectness,—was therefore not

so much by virtue of material miracles (which might possibly be otherwise accounted for) as in the achievement of moral perfectness, (which could have but one interpretation only) an unmistakable manifestation, in the central essence and meaning of human nature, of the character and power of God.

We look, then, at the picture of the Incarnate Christ,—not at some elements in it, but at the whole as a whole; and feel that in the whole of it there is manifested to us —as, on the one hand, the inner character of God, so, on the other hand, the true inner character, or, in other words, the true Godward relation, of man. The more unreservedly we are able to think of Him, the Incarnate, as, in His Incarnation, really human, in feeling and act, in consciousness and character; (even though that very human character and consciousness are all the while—and He, in them, is not unconscious that they are—the direct image and utterance of God;) the more possible will it be to us to enter, with real sympathy and intelligence, into the teaching of His Humanity, and to see in it alike what humanity needed, and what humanity achieved, for perfect acceptance with God.

For our present purpose we may conveniently distinguish two primary needs, and achievements, in the work of the Mediator. There is on the one hand, the sanctification of the present: on the other, the cancelling of the past. There is the rendering to Godward (which is also, in another aspect, the exhibition before men) of the offering of a living Holiness, in human conditions and character: and there is the awful sacrifice, in humanity, of a perfect contrition. For practical purposes we may speak of these respectively, as—the one the offering of Obedience, and the other the offering of Atonement: or again as the one the offering of the life, and the other the offering of the death. These last are not, of course, accurate distinctions.

For obedience is not really separable from atonement. Obedience is atoning; and the atonement itself can be exhibited as one great consummation of obedience. Again the life and the death are not really in contrast. Whatever is true of either, is in some degree true of the other. The death is the true and proper climax of the life. Only in death is the climax of obedience reached; while the life is a sacrifice from end to end.

Nevertheless the distinction is true in the main, and is convenient. The life, as apart from the death, is characterized more immediately by the homage of perfect obedience than by the agony of extreme penitence. The death, viewed apart from the life, is characterized even more by the anguish which was requisite to perfect contrition, than by the normal homage to the character of God which consists in being holy. And of these two, if the sacrifice of atonement, the effectual cancelling of accomplished sin, is the more directly our subject in these pages as a whole; yet it will be indispensable, before turning exclusively to that, to think first a little of the other side.

Primarily, then, for the present, our thought is of the life of consummate obedience, as a perfect manifestation, and offering, of holiness: holiness in terms of human condition and character; yet a perfectly adequate holiness; a response worthy of the holiness of God. How, in this aspect, shall we chiefly characterize the picture of the life as a whole? The essential point of the truth, the truth which sums up all other and more partial truths, would seem to be this. It is a life of unreserved, unremitting, absolute, and clearly conscious, dependence. The centre of His life is never in Himself. He is always, explicitly, the manifestation, the reflection, the obedient son and servant, of another. There is no purpose of self; no element of self-will; no possibility, even for a moment, of the imagination of separateness; no such thing, we may even say, as a

consciousness alone and apart. He is the representative agent of another, the Son of the Father, the Image of God. This is the entire description of His life and consciousness. "I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me . . . ye know neither Me nor My Father; if ye knew Me, ye would know My Father also."[1] "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father."[2] "I am come in My Father's name, and ye receive Me not; if another shall come in his own name, him ye will receive."[3] "Many good works have I shewed you from the Father; for which of those works do ye stone Me?"[4] And it is in this context that we should probably do the fullest justice to the exact significance of those great words "I and the Father are one"[5]—words, it is to be remembered, which are spoken actually by the Incarnate, the Christ, the Son of Man, in time, and in place, and through human brains and lips,—not simply, across infinities, by the Eternal Logos.

This relation then of absolute dependence upon Another —the Father, that is, God; is the essential reality, never at any point relaxed or impaired. He can be indeed assailed by suggestions from without—the liability to this insult He has deliberately taken upon Himself—suggestions of the world, and of the flesh, and of the devil: but such suggestions, though they may torture and insult by presenting themselves with human intelligibleness, present themselves only to be absolutely repelled—repelled, as of course, for the sake, repelled in the fulness of the strength, of His unreserved union of dependence upon His God.

There are two directions, both thoroughly intelligible to us, in which this essential dependence upon God expresses itself: and the two are in mutual correspondence with each other. The one is active and outward. The other is inward and contemplative. The one is the shaping of the

[1] John viii. 16, 19. [2] John xiv. 9. [3] John v. 43.
[4] John x. 32. [5] John x. 30.

life. The other is the feeding of the mind. The one is obedience, made manifest in all that is, or is not, either said or done; the other is communion of spirit, maintained in the way of secret meditation and prayer.

Nothing really is more characteristic of the life than its continual prayerfulness. A general attitude or atmosphere of relation towards God does not for a moment take the place, or dispense with the need, of explicit prayer. The explicit prayer is direct, habitual, and of long continuance. It is not by mere passivity, but by active uplifting, by deliberate and strenuous effort, that the spirit within is kept serene and strong. "Jesus also having been baptized, and praying, the Heaven was opened, and the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily form as a dove upon Him."[1] "Great multitudes came together to hear, and to be healed of their infirmities. But He withdrew Himself in the deserts and prayed."[2] "And it came to pass in these days that He went out into the mountain to pray; and He continued all night in prayer to God."[3] "And after He had sent the multitudes away, He went up into the mountain apart to pray; and when even was come, He was there alone."[4] "And it came to pass about eight days after these sayings, He took with Him Peter and John and James, and went up into the mountain to pray. And as He was praying, the fashion of His countenance was altered," etc.[5] "And it came to pass, as He was praying in a certain place, that when He ceased, one of His disciples said unto Him, 'Lord teach us to pray,'" etc.[6] "And He spake a parable unto them to the end that they ought always to pray and not to faint."[7] "And every day He was teaching in the temple; and every night He went out, and lodged in the mount that is called the mount of Olives, and all the people came

[1] Luke iii. 21. [2] Luke v. 16.
[3] ἦν διανυκτερεύων ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ. Luke vi. 12.
[4] Matt. xiv. 23. [5] Luke ix. 28, 29. [6] Luke xi. 1.
[7] Luke xviii. 1.

67646

early in the morning to Him in the temple, to hear Him."[1] "And being in an agony He prayed more earnestly; and His sweat became as it were great drops of blood falling down upon the ground."[2] There is a correspondence between the quiet majesty of the day, and the earnest communing of the night. Whether it be in the way of the tranquil wisdom of His doctrine, penetrating at once and uplifting and confounding; or whether it be in the exercise of the prerogative of power which belongs to the unexplored truth of human nature whose relation is perfected with God;—whether it be for teaching or for what we call miracle;—what He is amongst men is the counterpart of what He is towards God: He is Sovereign in majesty over man and over nature, by day, because His nights are spent in the communing of prayer with His God.

Correlative to this is the perfect obedience on the side of the active life. It cannot be too much insisted on that the life of Christ is so characteristically obedience, that in it, and in it alone, is the complete revelation of what obedience means. It is clear also, upon reflection, that the obedience which is so characteristic of His life is rendered always to God, His true Father, not to any man. There is obedience, of a kind,—submission, that is to say, and conformity, within strictly defined limits—to some human beings under some conditions,—the conformity of love to a loving mother and to her husband; the conformity of silent endurance to the madness of Jewish priests or of Roman soldiers. But this, even at its highest, is something not merely less complete, but different in kind from the obedience, at every moment, to His God. "He went down with them, and came to Nazareth; and He was subject unto them"[3] does not mean that He was wholly dependent on them for the inspiration of His every emotion and thought. It means that He conformed to their wishes

[1] Luke xxi. 37, 38. [2] Luke xxii. 44. [3] Luke ii. 51.

in outward things, in which it was right that He should conform to their wishes. They had, up to a certain point, a claim: and the claim was frankly and fully recognised. But that the claim had absolute limitations, He had just shown them, with emphasis, amongst the doctors in the Temple at Jerusalem. So different indeed is this relation towards them from the real meaning of obedience, as the meaning of obedience is revealed in His Godward life, that the difference would be conveniently expressed if we drew a contrast between being not disobedient, and being obedient. He was, to them, not disobedient. He traversed no wish of theirs to which He could conform, consistently with the Divine principle of His life. On the contrary, it was part of the Divine principle of His life that He should, as far as possible, so conform. But His dependence on God itself constituted the very essence of His life and consciousness. It was no negative abstinence from disobeying. It was the one positive principle which included all He did, and all He thought. There was nothing in Him which was not constituted what it was, by His unceasing continuity and completeness of dependence. He did nothing, said nothing, willed nothing, apart from God: nothing which was in such sense His, that it was not, *ipso facto*, as fully God's in Him. His own phrases about Himself are full of this disclosure. "Jesus answered him, My Father worketh even until now, and I work."[1] . . . "Jesus therefore answered and said unto them, Verily, verily I say unto you, the Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing; for what things soever He doeth, these the Son also doeth in like manner. For the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth Him all things that Himself doeth."[2] . . . "I can of Myself do nothing; as I hear, I judge: and My judgment is righteous;

[1] John v. 17. [2] John v. 19, 20.

because I seek not Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me."[1] . . . "The works which the Father hath given Me to accomplish, the very works that I do, bear witness of Me that the Father hath sent Me."[2] . . . "As the living Father sent Me, and I live because of the Father; so he that eateth Me, he also shall live because of Me."[3] . . . "They said therefore unto Him, Where is Thy Father? Jesus answered, Ye know neither Me nor My Father; if ye knew Me, ye would know My Father also."[4] . . . "Jesus therefore said, When ye have lifted up the Son of Man, then shall ye know that I am He, and that I do nothing of Myself, but as the Father hath taught Me, I speak these things. And He that sent Me is with Me; He hath not left Me alone; for I do always the things that are pleasing to Him."[5] . . . "I speak the things which I have seen with My Father; and ye also do the things which ye heard from your father."[6] "We must work the works of Him that sent Me, while it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work."[7] . . . "If I do not the works of My Father, believe Me not. But if I do them, though ye believe not Me, believe the works; that ye may know and understand that the Father is in Me, and I in the Father."[8] . . . "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? The words that I say unto you, I speak not from Myself; but the Father abiding in Me doeth His works."[9]

Phrases like these reiterate for us, with great emphasis, the central truth, that the focus or centre of His being as man, was not in Himself as man, but in His Father, that is, God. Considering indeed who the self is who speaks, there is something most remarkable, and strangely suggestive, in the reiterated emphasis with which He

[1] John v. 30. [2] John v. 36. [3] John vi. 57.
[4] John viii. 19. [5] John viii. 28, 29. [6] John viii. 38.
[7] John ix. 4. [8] John x. 37, 38. [9] John xiv. 10.

repeats the negative, disclaiming either initiative, or capacity, as belonging to Himself. "I can of Myself do nothing." "The Son can do nothing of Himself." "The words that I speak unto you I speak not of Myself." There is no evading the directness of the phrases. "Not of Myself" is not only a form of assertion which is capable of being applied to the Son of God incarnate; but it is plain that we shall miss a truth which is specially emphasized for us, if we do not allow the very fullest weight to the negative which it asserts.

It becomes, then, a matter of importance to insist that, in expressing Himself in reality of manhood, and the feelings, emotions, and conditions of manhood, He deliberately put on—not indeed the personal capacity of sinning, but at least (if we may use the expression) the hypothetical capacity of sinning, the nature through which sin could naturally approach and suggest itself: and therefore, that the statement just made, that the centre of His being as man was not in Himself but in God, is not so much a tautological truism, as a most important truth. There was, so far, in His human nature, the natural machinery for, or capability of, rebelling, that the reiterated negative, "not My own," "not Myself," does deny something. To say that He was dependent upon God does not say simply and merely, though it does say by implication, that He was dependent upon Himself. To be clothed with human flesh, and to be accessible to human emotions, though it does not mean the actual setting up of a human self in antithesis to His divine self; does at least mean a providing with the natural capacities for separation and rebellion; it does mean that the pressure towards rebellion could be felt, and that there could be stern repression and effort in obedience, so that the consummation of obedience could be, and was, learned, through inward, as well as outward, suffering. If there was not an actualized, there

was (so to speak) an imaginary and hypothetical possibility of a distinct self, willing otherwise than in accordance with God's will; a possibility which is not really possible, for it would have meant literally chaos, the very self-contradiction of the Being of God; but which, nevertheless, dimly images itself at some supreme moments, to the imagination, and gives at least some meaning to the refusal of separateness. There would be no meaning in the assertion made of God as God, that He "spoke not from Himself" or that "He did nothing of Himself." The solemnity of such assertions, as made of the Incarnate, depends upon this; that He had taken to Himself the external capacity, and as it were machinery, for selfishness. There was a hypothetical or conceivable selfishness,—the possible imagination of a rebellious self,—not actual indeed, nor actually possible without chaos: yet something to be, by moral strain, controlled and denied; something which made self-denial in the Incarnate, not an empty phrase, but a stupendous act or energy of victorious moral goodness. Of Himself He uses the phrase self, in this manner, in order to deny it. He uses it, not of His Eternal Being, as God, but of that human possibility which, if it could have been realized, would have been rebellion. And it is this strange, dim, vision or idea of a possibility—which nevertheless is not possible,—which gives their deepest dread and mystery to some of the most mysterious—and most appalling—moments of all: such as "now is My soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father save Me from this hour. But for this cause came I unto this hour. Father glorify Thy name."[1] And above all, the awful cry of Gethsemane "O my Father, if it be possible let this cup pass away from me."[2]—which yet passes on at once, in the same cry, into "nevertheless not My will but Thine, be done!"[3] "Not as I will, but as Thou": "not My will, but Thine":

[1] John xii. 27. [2] Matt. xxvi. 39. [3] Luke xxii. 42.

this, it may be, is the nearest approach to the impossible possibility of separation. But even in this form it is unspeakably terrible to contemplate. And meanwhile this whole thought is a commentary, full of the most mysterious significance, upon His Human obedience. Some glimpse at least it gives us into the truth that His unceasing dependence, of moral and spiritual being, upon His God, is not an idle assertion as of a mere necessity which could not be otherwise; it is not mere inert passiveness (as it were) of unmoved self-identity, but a real energy, and revelation, of active and most stupendous obedience.

The secret then of His exhibition of obedience, His revelation of the true rationale of human life, is here: He was absolutely loyal in dependence; He was absolutely without any self-reservation, any nursing of separateness of self: He was the exposition, by willing reflection, of Another. So it was that He was the perfect exhibition, (under conditions not only of human nature in its glory, but of most limited and suffering mortality) of the Being and character of God.

There is one other consideration which follows from what has been said. It will be felt that the things said, in their own character, and with them the passages of S. John's gospel with which they are chiefly connected, belong primarily to the exposition of the essential relation, between God, regarded as Incarnate, between Jesus Christ, the Human expression of Deity, and the God on whom it was His human perfectness altogether to depend. They are not primarily words of revelation as to the timeless relations between the First and the Second Persons of the Eternal Trinity. There may indeed be a very deep connection between the one of these relations and the other. The tracing of such a connection would belong chiefly to the explanation of

the causes, so far as they are in any way cognizable by us, why it was in the Person of the Eternal Logos that God was Incarnated. But whatever there may be to be said on such a subject, the passages themselves ought not to be cited, at least so directly or primarily, as theological statements about the Persons, as such, of the Eternal Trinity: as rather about the essential truth of the relation of the Incarnate, as Incarnate, to the Eternal; the relation of Jesus Christ, the Son of Man, to His God and Father, —obedient dependence on whom was the Breath of His Life.

CHAPTER VI

THE ATONING DEATH OF CHRIST

THE relation of Christ to sin, as the Atoner, is more mysterious than that of His relation, in obedient life, to holiness. But nothing can exceed the directness with which the relation to sin is emphasized in scripture, or the cardinal place of this relation in the Christian creed. The relation to sin is absolute, unreserved, personal—though the sin is not in Himself. "Him who knew no sin, He made to be sin on our behalf."[1]

Elsewhere the relation to sin is stated in a different way, "God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and as an offering for sin, condemned sin in the flesh."[2]

The central point in these two forms of statement is by no means obviously the same. In either case indeed the act is the act of God—God the Eternal, the Essential, the One God. In either case the act is the act of God, wrought in and through Jesus Christ; through Him, that is, who is the perfect expression of God in terms of human conditions, and consciousness, and character; through God the Incarnate, God the Son of Man; through the Son of Man who, because He is Son of Man, is therefore, of necessity, Son of God. But this act of God through Christ, this act of the Incarnate, which is the act of the Eternal, is described in two varying forms. The one says that He "was made sin," the other that He, in flesh and for flesh, "condemned sin."

[1] 2 Cor. v. 21. [2] Rom. viii. 3.

The considerations which are before us in the present chapter are such, it is to be hoped, as will naturally tend to bring the two modes of thought, from apparent contrast, more and more towards real coincidence.

He condemned sin—that is, there is an aspect of the Atonement according to which it can be summed up as a pronouncing, by Jesus Christ, of the judgement and sentence of eternal Righteousness against all human sin. It is He who is the judging and condemning Righteousness. *He was made sin*—that is, He the eternal Righteousness, in judging sin, judged it not in another, but judged it rather, as a penitent judges it, within Himself; He surrendered Himself for the judgement that He pronounced; He took, in His own Person, the whole responsibility and burthen of its penance; He stood, that is, in the place, not of a judge simply, nor of a mere victim, but of a voluntary penitent—wholly one with the righteousness of God in the sacrifice of Himself.

Remember what it is that the idea of Atonement requires. The idea of effectual atonement for sin requires at once a perfect penitence and a power of perfect holiness. Man has sinned. Man is unrighteous. If I am unrighteous, what could make me absolutely righteous again? If indeed my repentance, in reference to the past, could be quite perfect, such penitence would mean that my personality was once more absolutely one with Righteousness in condemning sin even in, and at the cost of, myself. Such personal re-identity with Righteousness, if it were possible, would be a real contradiction of my past. It would be atonement, and I should, in it, be once more actually righteous.

If such relation to the past were possible, it would by the same possibility be possible also that my life, now and henceforth, should be, in outward activity and

in inward spirit, perfect,—the flawless homage of a Divine obedience. In relation to the past, the present, and the future, I should have become quite perfectly and continuously and Divinely righteous.

For atoning and living Righteousness there are necessary a condemnation which would perfectly obliterate from the spirit the presence of past sin; and the present and unceasing homage of perfect righteousness. But if these two things are necessary, it is just these two things which are, in universal human experience, alike ideal and alike impossible.

Both these things were attained, in literal perfection of full fact, in the life and in its climax, which is the death, of the Son of Man, Jesus Christ.

It is worth while to say with some emphasis that we, in the present chapter, have nothing, properly, to do with the relation of Him, or of these things in Him, *to us;* with the question how, what He was, or what He did, really alters or really characterizes, in any one of us, our own personality. That is a large part indeed of any intelligible statement of the doctrine of Atonement. But, quite apart from us, it is our object for the present to recall and consider what these things were *in Himself.*

Now nothing is more familiar than the thought of Jesus Christ on earth as being, within the conditions of mortality, the perfect reflection of the will, the perfect expression of the character, of the Eternal God. For He *was* the Eternal God, expressing Himself in, and as, human character, within those penal disabilities of humanity, of which death is at once the symbol and the climax.

In two ways we think of Him as a revelation, within humanity, of God. First, in the mutual relations of human life, we think of Him as revealing the moral character, the goodness and love, of God. "Have I been so long

time with you, and yet dost thou not know me, Philip? He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father."[1] And secondly, in the relation of man to God—the absolute dependence of unbroken communion between the limited and mortal and the Eternal—He reveals the true secret, and the possible glory, of mortal humanity. It is of Him, the disabled, the limited, the mortal, that S. John can say, "We beheld His glory, glory as of the only-begotten from the Father:"[2] "We have seen, and bear witness, and declare unto you the life, the eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us."[3] This Godward relation of man, wholly dependent, and reflecting flawlessly that whereupon he depends, expresses itself within mortal conditions, inwardly and outwardly: in outward action it is manifested as obedience that never wavers; in inward consciousness it realizes itself as the uninterrupted communion of meditation and prayer. Besides, then, the moral revelation of God as Love, which is in every contact of Christ with other men, the Divine Righteousness is visibly reflected in His perfect obedience, and consciously realized in the effort of His perfect prayer. The prayerfulness of spirit is not a thing wholly separate from the active obedience; it is but another aspect of that same reality, the mirrored reflection of the Divine glory, in the Godward relations of human character.

It is no part of the present purpose to try to draw this thought out, or illustrate in detail its manifestations in the human life. Consider rather how, even in this aspect, the death is the necessary climax of the life. We are as yet thinking of the life of Christ not as atonement but as obedience; not as in reference to the past, or the undoing of accomplished sin, but as in reference to the present, as being the homage of a living holiness,

[1] John xiv. 9. [2] John i. 14. [3] 1 John i. 2.

the mirroring of Divine character in mortal obedience,—human will as the adequate response to, and expression of, infinite Righteousness. Even in this aspect, that the conscious identity of will with God (expressed on one side in unceasing prayer, on another in unceasing obedience) might stand triumphant over the utmost straining of all counter-influences which could possibly be brought to bear against it, it was necessary that the drama of Bethlehem and Nazareth should find its culmination on Calvary. For what did He who was God express Himself in and as man, under the disabilities of humanity suffering and mortal, but that this homage of obedient righteousness, this will-identity of man with God, might shine out through, and in, precisely the conditions of mortal suffering? He would serve God as man, He would perfect obedience in fallen human nature; and therefore He must be liable to feel, that He might triumph through and over, the uttermost solicitation to which His human consciousness could make His Person accessible, towards the possibility of deflection, if but for a moment, of His suffering will from God. "Lo, I am come to do Thy will, O God"—"a body didst Thou prepare for me."[1] The body was the avenue of access of suffering, and, through suffering, of temptation. Whatever may be true of angels or devils, the body is the avenue of consciousness to men. The body, then, was to be, in Him, at once the scene, and the instrument, of that absolutely victorious crushing of temptation which is the offering to the Father of a mortal will perfectly identical with the absolute righteousness of God.

But it could not be but that the body itself would be wrung to death in the process. In a sense indeed this is true—and it is a truth not of terror so much as of hope—about every single child of man who shall die.

[1] Hebrews x. 5-7.

We do not yet know the possibilities of humbling or of purifying discipline which may lie hid within the experience of dying. But this is another thought, which we do but glance at in passing. For the climax of temptation, for the climax of solicitation addressed through the body to the will, it was necessary that the body should be pressed to the point of its own destruction: to the point, that is, at which the stress of temptation should literally have exhausted its whole possibility.

We do well in this connection to remember that sin is deadening to sensitiveness, both of body and spirit; that to consciousness of guilt there is a sense of actual righteousness in suffering; and that increasing infirmities make death itself (as it were) more and more natural.

Remember, in the light of familiar experience such as this, that in the Person of Jesus of Nazareth,—as the whole harmony of bodily life was unique in its perfectness, so the sensitiveness to pain, and the humiliation of weakness, were unique: and as the right to life, and the dignity of life, were unparalleled, so the outrage—the utter contradiction—involved in dying was immeasurable.

Again, remember, that the death of Jesus Christ was wholly unlike the death of any martyr,—not only in the fact (vast as that is!) that the martyr is always only strong with and in Jesus Christ; but also in proportion as the power of Jesus over His torments and His tormentors was unique. It is true that every martyr's suffering is, in a sense, self-chosen. Every martyr's prison is necessarily locked, as men have sometimes said with a strange blindness of scorn, "upon the inside"; that is, every martyr properly so-called could have avoided his suffering by an act of will,—and only by a certain strain of will he has come to be where he is. But this, after all, is only true of him within limits,—and it is becoming every moment less true, as his sufferings

intensify. Once, at a certain point in the past, it was true; but every pang carries him further from the possibility of not suffering; he cannot foil the power of pain in mid-course, neither can he repair any damage that is done. But here,—in Jesus Christ,—all the power of all His murderers is His own, and in His own hand. Very slowly He is passing through the anguish which kills by inches. Voluntarily, from moment to moment, He is choosing the pain; voluntarily He is being crushed under the deadly pressure of the effort of evil against Him. Only try to imagine the unimaginable pressure of this last concentrated temptation upon His human will. For none apart from Himself can put one pang upon Him. One moment's unwillingness to suffer—and He can wholly be free! Every separate item in the anguish is allowed by Himself. One moment's reluctance on His part, one moment's impulse to draw back, even one moment's hesitation of will, might instantly have ended it all. But that moment never came. He who but now healed the severed ear with a touch, He who might wield when He would (He said it last night of Himself) the might of twelve legions of angels, is not shorn now of His power. "Let the Christ, the King of Israel, now come down from the cross, that we may see and believe"[1] —so they shouted in their mockery—"He saved others; Himself He cannot save."[2] It was not the power that was lacking, but the will. "Therefore doth My Father love Me, because I lay down My life, that I may take it again. No man taketh it away from Me; but I lay it down of Myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again."[3]

The power was not lacking if there had been—if there could have been—the will to exert the power! But the power, if used—the power with the will to use it—would

[1] Mark xv. 32. [2] Matt. xxvii. 42. [3] John x. 17, 18.

have proved the very opposite to what they supposed. It was the power, with the will to hold it unused, which proved Him to be what He was. And the fact of the power, with the pressure of every element of His human consciousness to use it, are the measure of the majesty of the restraining will, the perfecting of obedience in man to God. Do we not recognize thus how the tearing of the body inch by inch to its own destruction is necessary for the climax, not only of what we distinguish as bodily suffering, but of that supreme strain on the flawless identity of the will,[1] in suffering human nature, with God, which is the guileless offering of a perfect obedience?

But in all this there is no direct thought of the death of Christ, as reparation or atonement, in reference to consummated sin. I know indeed that no aspect of that death can really be viewed completely in isolation. Much of what has been said already only finds its full meaning in the light of aspects which have been kept out of sight. But we know that when a man has fatally sinned it is not enough, even if it were possible, that he should be now, and from now, however good and obedient. There must be something in the direction of undoing of the past, without which indeed the present obedience would not be in its true sense really possible, but which certainly cannot be expressed only in terms of present obedience.

Now we, so far, have been trying to express the necessity and the meaning of Calvary, as it were, in terms of present obedience. And for this very reason what has hitherto been said must be felt to be only a part—to many minds or moods the lesser part only—of the meaning of the Cross. Assuredly the death of Jesus Christ had another relation. It was not obedience only, but atonement; not only perfect, in the present, as homage; but sovereign, in relation to accomplished sin, as undoing.

[1] Hebrews x. 10.

He had taken upon Him, as the living expression of Himself, a nature which was weighed down—not merely by present incapacities, but by present incapacities as part of the judicial necessary result of accepted and inherent sinfulness. Human nature was not only disabled but guilty; and the disabilities were themselves a consequence, and aspect, of the guilt. In respect of this guilt of sin, consummated and inhering, human nature could only be purified by all that is involved in the impossible demand of a perfect penitence. Except it had also the character of perfect penitence atoning for the past, even the splendid perfectness of His present will-offering of obedience would be less than what was required for the re-identifying of human character with God.

Remember what perfect penitence would involve. It would involve nothing less than a perfect re-identification of the character and the will—in a word, of the whole personality—with righteousness: an identification with righteousness immediately in the form of inexorable condemnation of every shadow of unrighteousness even in, and at the cost of, the self. Now the absolute perfectness of such a personal self-identifying with righteousness is made once for all impossible by any act of personal identity with sin. The least real affinity of the self with sin impairs the possibility of that perfect self-identity with righteousness which is necessary for the consummation of perfect penitence. Penitence, in the perfectness of its full meaning, is not even conceivably possible, except it be to the personally sinless.

Is penitence possible in the personally sinless? I should perhaps be entitled to emphasize in reply each of these two thoughts: the first, that if the perfection of atoning penitence cannot be achieved by the personally sinless, it will become on reflection more and more manifest that it cannot be either achieved or even conceived at all; and the

second, that it is just this—the voluntary sin-bearing of the sinless, the self-identity with righteousness in condemnation of sin of One whose self-identity, though sinless, could take the form of surrender of the self in the very attitude of the ideal penitent, which is, if anything is, vital to the whole history and being of the Gospel, or the Church, of Jesus Christ. But I do not wish to urge anything at this moment from the side of dogmatic authority.

Is reality of penitence for personal sin really possible in what is not the self-identical personality that sinned? We might answer perhaps by saying that, in greater degree or in less, it is a fact of everyday experience. The law of vicarious suffering or vicarious energy, as a principle running everywhere throughout human life, is not suspended when we pass within the region of consciousness of sin. Others do in fact suffer and sorrow on their reprobate's behalf, not only with their reprobate, but more deeply and keenly than he does or can for himself. Not only the pain is in their lives, but the shame is in their hearts—in proportion, it may be, to his shamelessness and their love. Nay, more, this reality of shame in them, the product of the nearness of their love, is your strongest element of hope for him. If there are those, near and dear, who with undimmed purity of heart and undiscouraged love will not weary of entering into the burden of his shame—thank God! you feel that, in the atmosphere of that vicarious penitence wrapping him round, and stealing, almost as it were imperceptibly, as the breath of love, into his life and soul, you would almost dare to pledge the certainty of his coming salvation. In that intense reality of a penitence which is vicarious lies the heart of your hope for him of a personal penitence. Do we give full weight to the truths which lie in this direction?

We have done well, no doubt, to learn both to understand and to emphasize the distinctive value of each several

personality, regarded as apart by itself. Individual responsibility, individual value, individual meaning and destiny—it is vital that we should learn this lesson to the full. But even this, vital though it be, is a truth which can be pressed beyond the proportion of truth. Is it not true that we have in many ways overdone our lesson, and exaggerated, in common thought and theory, the mutual exclusiveness of human personality? Are we not all, after all, much more of one piece than we are willing to recognize? We cannot either do or suffer, cannot lose or win, cannot, however secretly, either sin or repent, to ourselves alone. Whatever is really personal to, or a part of, ourselves tends to become, in greater degree or in less, by processes gradual but sure, personal to and a part of many selves besides.

If we take our stand on the truth that no man can be, or can stand for, another, we may at least recognize that even this truth, even in this form, is not equally true in all cases. It is capable, at least, of degrees. Even the naked thought of the substitution of one person for another is not, under all conditions, equally unimaginable. "One Englishman for another" is more reasonable as a principle of equity among the South Sea islanders than in the police-courts of London. It is not very profitable to try to construct illustrations, not one of which can possibly be adequate; but yet—a brother for a brother, a wife for a husband, a father for a child—there may be more potency of meaning behind such phrases than our off-hand logic or our mechanical systems can allow. True, we never reach the climax quite. But if each remains separate still, we can at least see real degrees of approach towards something more than a superficial or imaginary unity. If those who sometimes, in stature and tone and eye, seem most really to reproduce one another's image, have added to

this outward (itself more than an outward) resemblance, a real affinity of mental capacity and conviction, the same intellectual affinities, the same tone and temper as well of character as of thought; and further than this, are joined together in one spirit of mutually devoted affection, each finding his joy in the life, and more than ready to share all the trial and death, of the other, you do not indeed transcend their inexorable distinctness; but you do see glimpses at least of a truth more ultimate about them than the distinctness—a truth of which their distinctness is no longer so much the contradiction as the necessary condition; so that the very distinctness needs and claims to be, if not annulled, yet merged at last in a reality of unity more ultimate and more essential than itself.

If we do not, most of us, go far in fact towards this transcending unity, this may only too possibly be because, intrenched in the circle of our own self-regard, we are only too well content not to go out into the vital experiences of another—far less of those who need us throughout the world: we shrink from the self-expenditure of sympathy, and prefer the sundered to the corporate life, hiding away ourselves, for ourselves, within ourselves. But we can hardly blind ourselves to the fact that the Christian Spirit, as such, is always making towards such a transcending of the barriers of sundered personalities —such a living of each not only for but in others; and that those who have possessed it most eminently are those whose spirit has had the most eminent power of reproducing itself in the spirits of others. This rather is the crown—than the breaking down—of personality. Never perhaps is the good man so completely, so royally, himself as when the inherent force of what he is, is becoming the vital principle of what others are also with him. Need I plead that sympathy is a Christian ideal in a sense far higher than that which we are mostly

content to allow to the word? Or that, if there is one region more than another from which that sympathy cannot be excluded, because it is there most vitally at home, it is the region of the suffering and shame which are the outcome of consciousness of sin.

But it will perhaps be felt that, real and potent though sympathy in penitence may be, at least the penitence of the sympathetic friend cannot be as penitence so real or personal as that of the culprit himself. On the contrary, even this, so far as it is true at all, is true only by reason of the extreme limitations of our power or will to sympathize. It is true in proportion to our incapacity of unselfishness. But wherever the power of unselfishness begins to approximate at all towards its ideal there we shall be able to find, even within experience, that the penitence of the good man, on behalf of his reprobate, not only anticipates and leads the way and shapes the possibility towards the penitence of the reprobate himself, but also that it is far keener, far deeper, far more real as penitence than anything of which as yet the reprobate is personally capable. It is the presence of sin within the personality which blunts the edge of detestation of sin. I long to hate, and I do hate in a measure, the sin which tyrannizes over my free will. But just because it is my own, because it still has place and power within my own consciousness of sin, therefore I cannot hate it with the full single-hearted intensity of hatred with which another might hate it whose self was untainted by it; with which I should hate it if all its disabling power were wholly melted, and I were personally one again with the righteousness of God.

Is the penitence of the sinful self the deepest reality of penitence? I will ask you to think of a father, or a mother—pure, holy, tender, loving-hearted—whose own beloved only child, son or daughter, is branded with the

deep reality of irretrievable disgrace. I will ask you first to compare the grief of such a mother over the shame of a stranger, and over the shame of her own, her best-beloved. Even towards the stranger there might be the deepest concern, the tenderest, truest, most winning and restorative sympathy. But the shame, which is her own child's, is her own. *For herself*, the light is gone out of her life. Her heart is not merely, as in the other case, tenderly concerned. Her heart is broken.

And then, secondly, compare this grief of the mother with the grief of the child, whose own the shame is. Her own the shame is, because the sin is her own—it is part of her very self. But this very fact that the sinful will is her own, while it may fill her penitence with wildness and alarm, blunts its edge, and dims its truth. The wild alarm, whose climax would be despair, the conscious haunting presence of the sin, is a paralyzing, not an intensifying, of the power of penitence. The penitence of the child may be fiercer and wilder; but it is, in comparison, shallow, mixed, impotent, unreal. But the mother's anguish is not less anguish, but more, because it is without that confusing presence of the sin. If it is less despairing, it is more profound. Even now the sorrow of the child is checked, steadied, solemnized, uplifted, by the felt sanctity of the mother's sorrow—a sorrow at once more heartbroken and more calm of heart: a sorrow more sorrowful truly, yet, even in sorrow, more identified, somewhere far back even now, with a trust which cannot die. Yes, it is the mother's heart which is broken for sin; broken even, it may be, unto death. The child's heart is less likely to break. The true realization of shame, the true steady insight into sin, is dulled, not sharpened, by the indwelling of sin. The heart of the child is not able to break—at least yet. Only long afterwards, if at all, when penitence has at

last done its slow, penetrating, tranquillizing work, will sin, as sin, be felt and seen as it is. Meanwhile the penitent anguish of the mother who is holy is, even in proportion to her reality of holiness, more undimmed, keener of edge, deeper in truth,—in the shame of the child with whom, in nature and in love, she is wholly self-identified—than it is, than it can be, in the child of whose mind and will the sin itself is still part.

It is sometimes hastily assumed that the possibility of anything, in such a mother, which can really be called penitence, depends upon the fact that the mother is herself at least partly responsible for the sin. How much more might she have done, which she has not done, to guard her child against it? At the least, is it not through her, in measure, that the child is partaker of the nature in which Adam sinned, and all mankind is sinful?

Such thoughts, if brought forward to set the illustration aside, strangely misconceive the truth. It is quite true, in fact, that there may be a sense in the mother of a responsibility which is partly her own. Indeed no human mother can wholly be without this. But this, so far from constituting, in her, the possibility of a genuine penitence, is the one thing which really spoils the perfectness of it. In proportion as the fault of the mother is graver, her capacity of true penitence vanishes. If the child's sin is mainly the mother's fault, to look for any deep realities of penitence to the mother would be a contradiction and absurdity. She must needs be callous more or less; she may even be exultant. It would be quite impossible that her heart should break. The conditions, in fact, which we find in the holy mother are precisely the opposite of what they would be if her power of penitence corresponded with her share in the sin. Her power of penitence, that is penitence indeed, depends not upon the extent to which the guilt is her own,

but rather upon the extent to which it is not. It depends upon two things; and will be found to vary in depth, in precise proportion as these two things are real in her. The first is the extent of her own self-identification—not with guilt but with holiness. This does not, of course, reach absolute identity with holiness. But the nearer her approach to perfect holiness, the greater, not the less, will be the depth of her capacity of anguish of heart. And the other is the completeness of her capacity of identifying her very self with the being of her child. The smallest touch of selfishness blunts the edge of this. Its perfectness would be the very triumph of love. Here again, it is true in fact that no earthly mother has reached the absolute perfectness of love, any more than the absolute perfectness of holiness. But in each case the tendency and the character are clear. It is in proportion as she approximates towards perfectness of love on the one side, as towards perfectness of holiness on the other, that the capacity deepens in her, more and more, of penitence absolutely heartbroken for sins which are not—and because they are not—her own. So far as the holiness alone is concerned, we might find other cases as illustrative as that of a mother. But perhaps there is no other relation, in human experience, which enables us equally to realize how far unselfishness can go towards the self-identifying of one person with another in the unity of nature and of love.

Of nature and of love! The unity is primarily in nature. Its foundation is a physical reality. But notice how much more this may mean in one case than another: how much more, for example, it does mean of a true mother to her child than of an English traveller to a fugitive African. Bone of her bone, and flesh of her flesh, her child was to her as a very expression of herself. In her child she lived. In her child's growth and goodness she expanded. In her child's fall she fell. If unity

of nature is predicable not only of these, but also of such as seem furthest away from each other, the highest and the lowest in humanity, do not let us therefore be deceived into levelling down the proper idea of the phrase (even, so to say, upon its physical side) to the least which it is capable of meaning. Rather, the most which it is capable of meaning in familiar experience is as a hint to suggest how very much more, than our experience, lies within the true ideal possibilities of the phrase.

But whatever be its unexplored possibilities, no doubt one aspect of the unity of nature is an equality of status, a sharing of common conditions both of faculty and of disability. The one shares the nature of the other. That is, the modes of consciousness, the avenues of pain and ease, sorrow and joy, are broadly in the one what they are in the other. And if under stress of temptation the one has fallen, the other does not view the meaning of the temptation, or the fall, as a spectator merely from without. The same sense of temptation can, through avenues of the same nature, have intelligible access to the consciousness of the other. What has happened is not merely apprehended from without. It can, with whatever shock of horror, be felt from within. The power of entering into the consciousness of the sinful requires—not indeed a will that has actually sinned, but at least a conscious presence, in the nature, of the instruments, as it were, and capacities for sinning—an avenue for the appeal of sin to the consciousness—if only the will could conceivably be to sin! The underlying conditions for sin-consciousness are there; and with them a certain capacity of being degraded in the degradation of those in whom the same nature is a mode of sin. But it must be enough to have indicated thus what possibilities do really underlie the meaning even of what often seems to us to mean so little as the union of a common human nature.

Meanwhile, whatever is true fundamentally or potentially in nature springs into its full and vivid realization in the rich self-expenditure of conscious love. It is here that we recognize most of all what the depth may be of a mother's identification with her child: we recognize that in the power of love it is what it is; and recognize also thereby that if the love were but greater and more perfect still, the unity also could mean what now it can not. If its obvious limit is the limitation of love, what would the capacities be of union, with the living experience of another, of one whose love was absolutely without limit? If the sorrowing mother serves best to illustrate what human union may mean, in nature and in love, she illustrates it by what she is, rather as whetting the imagination than as sating it: she illustrates it by what she is, only as a sort of preliminary to suggesting it by what she fails to be. We look at infinite things in the light of most finite experience. Our human illustrations do approximate: they are strikingly real. Yet they are more striking still in the silent witness which they ever bear to that beyond themselves, whose reality they postulate, of whose nature they are eloquent, by whose breath they are; but which transcends them still.

So we pass on, at times perhaps hardly even knowing how far our words are more immediately spoken of that human mother, or of Him whose Spirit finds an echo in her love. But remember, in either case (for the one includes the other), in reference to what it is that we have dwelt on the thought of this possibility, between human beings, of unity—in nature and in love. It is in reference to consummated sin. It is that we may see the better what is involved if a person, whose own the sin is not, is thus really, in nature and in love, united with the experience of sin. What is that experience of sin in one of whose person the actual sin is not part?

There are some two or three thoughts which are vital

to the conception of it. Let us put first this capacity of self-identity with the sinful, which we see—not consummated, indeed, but much more than suggested, in the case of the holy mother. Remember that it is true of her just in proportion as she makes real these possibilities of nature and of love. So far as she at all falls short, or shrinks back, from what her direct union of nature might mean, or so far as there is a limit, somewhere, to the self-expending effort of her love, so far, behold! after all she is not personally touched—or not touched to the quick: she can look on—and let her culprit go: her heart need not break—for the shame is not in *it!*

But if on one side her shame, unto death, can only be the result of a rare completeness of unity of nature realized in love, on the other hand it depends also upon a completeness, no less rare, of realization of sin. And again, if the absolute perfectness of sympathetic self-identity with others, in the full truth of the words, is possible only when the union of nature is unlimited, because the love is literally infinite; it is at least as plain that a full realization of the character and consequence of sin is possible only in the light of a full realization of the character of holiness — the undimmed vision of the Being of God. That mother of whom we spoke, if she is herself evil-minded, escapes scot-free from the burden of penitence for her child. But the holier she is in her own spirit, the keener is her sense of the intolerable anguish of unholiness: the holier she is, the more deeply, the more personally, is she stricken. The sinner confused with sin, which dims and paralyzes every personal power, cannot see or feel sin as it is. He cannot fully know what its nature is; he cannot really understand the consequences which it contains: these things are to him in great part words without meaning: and even so far as he does understand and is trying to hate, his very hatred for his

sin is qualified by a liking which is still within himself. It is only Another, wholly self-identified with him in all that can be meant by natural union, quickened and realized in the fire of an infinite love; and yet, without impulse of sin, gazing full on the undimmed vision of the holiness of God; who can be stricken on his behalf with the full sense of the infinite horror of sin.

To know God as He is, to measure with full insight all the Beauty of Holiness, to be conscious of its infinite goodness and power; this is, in One self-expressed within a nature to which the capacities and disabilities of unholiness belong—to One self-brought within the instruments of sin, the galling insult of temptation, the conditions of mortal consciousness and mortal anguish; this is to realize with a personal consciousness which stands wholly unique and alone, without a parallel, without a comparison, the whole depth that is in sin. To the spirit of such an one sin as it is—all its origin and history, its horrible development, its inherent hideousness, its appalling consummation, the agony of its despair, its alienation from goodness and from God, its banishment from light, or beauty, or hope, its inherent spiritual death: all these things which sin contains, and without the knowledge of which sin is not known, are absolutely open and clear — in the light of the infinite contrast of the realized glory of God.

If these things cannot but be known to God the Omniscient; yet God, as self-expressed in human consciousness, God Incarnate in Jesus Christ, deliberately took to Himself, in the nature which had sinned, the consciousness of these things *from the point of view of sin*. It was then, in Him, no mere vision—however appalling, or however true; no mere spectacular insight into truth. He had deliberately made Himself one with man, one in nature, one in love: one with an absoluteness of unity, such as the union of the perfectest mother with her

child does, after all, but dimly and distantly shadow: one with man, Himself man, Himself Humanity:—that the consciousness of man herein, that consciousness of sin which sin made impossible to man, but without which man could not consummate his atoning penitence for sin: that the full consciousness of sin, in the full light of holiness, might be His own personal consciousness; and the condemnation of sin—no longer only from without, but from within—through the power of self-identity with holiness in the act of self-surrender as penitent, might be consummated in Himself.

Is not consummation of penitence, that penitence whose consummation sin makes impossible, the real, though impossible, atonement for sin? And are not these just the things which would consummate penitence,—first, a real personal self-identity with the consciousness of sin, in its unmeasured fulness, as seen by God; secondly, a real personal self-identity with the absolute righteousness of God; and thirdly, by inevitable consequence, a manifestation of the power of inherent self-identity with righteousness in the form of voluntary acceptance of all that belongs to the consciousness of sin,—a realization, not of holiness merely, but of *penitential* holiness? For this is penitence; perfect re-establishment of the absolute personal identity with righteousness, in the form of unreserved embrace of whatever is necessary to consummate the perfect condemnation of sin—within the self-consciousness and at the cost of the self.

He, then, on the Cross, offered, as man to God, not only the sacrifice of utter obedience, under conditions (themselves the consequence of human transgression) which made the effort of such perfect will-obedience more tremendous than we can conceive; but also the sacrifice of supreme penitence, that is, of perfect will-identity with God in condemnation of sin, Himself being

so self-identified with sinners, that this could take the form of the offering of Himself for sin. He voluntarily stood in the place of the utterly contrite—accepting insult, shame, anguish, death—death possible only by His own assent, yet outwardly inflicted as penal; nay, more, in His own inner consciousness, accepting the ideal consciousness of the contrite—which is the one form of the penitent's righteousness: desolate, yet still, in whatever He was, voluntary; and in that very voluntariness of desolation, sovereign. He did, in fact and in full, that which would in the sinner constitute perfect atonement, but which has for ever become impossible to the sinner, just in proportion as it is true that he has sinned.

The perfect sacrifice of penitence in the sinless Christ is the true atoning sacrifice for sin. Only He, who knew in Himself the measure of the holiness of God could realize also, in the human nature which He had made His own, the full depth of the alienation of sin from God, the real character of the penal averting of God's face. Only He, who sounded the depth of human consciousness in regard to sin, could, in the power of His own inherent righteousness, condemn and crush sin in the flesh. The suffering involved in this is not, in Him, punishment, or the terror of punishment; but it is the full realizing, in the personal consciousness, of the truth of sin, and the disciplinary pain of the conquest of sin; it is that full self-identification of human nature, within range of sin's challenge and sin's scourge, with holiness as the Divine condemnation of sin, which was at once the necessity—and the impossibility—of human penitence. The nearest—and yet how distant!—an approach to it in our experience we recognize not in the wild sin-terrified cry of the guilty, but rather in those whose profound self-identification with the guilty overshadows them with a darkness and a shame, vital indeed to their being, yet at heart tranquil,

because it is not confused with the blurring consciousness of a personal sin. That mother whom we imagined—if the sin is indeed in her child—she would not, for all the world, choose rather to have the sin without the horror of the shame of sin. It is the shame, as shame, which is also the hope. The anguish itself is the pledge, is the living movement, of spiritual life. Her own broken heart—it is the very expression of God in her. It is God in her, even if, and even whilst, it is also the bowing of her head, in anguish of spirit, unto death. In its measure it has caught some echo of the awful paradox of that mysterious, that two-sided, that incompatible cry—so spiritually desolate, yet so tranquil in spirit—"My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" [1]

If, from our point of view, the point of view of the imperfectly penitent, penitence must include meek acceptance of punishment, remember that punishment, so far as it ministers to righteousness, is only itself an element in penitence. What would have been punishment *till it became penitence*, is, in the perfectly contrite, only as penitence. It is true that penitence is a condition of suffering. The suffering of penitence may quite fairly be termed penal suffering. But whatever suffering is involved in penitence is part of the true penitent's freewill offering of heartwhole condemnation of sin. To the penitent, in proportion as he is perfected, there is no punishment *outside* his penitence.

And so, in the great mysterious sacrifice of Calvary, there is (save indeed in the action, outward merely and symbolic, of Roman soldiers or of Jewish priests) no question really at all of retribution, inflicted, as by another, from without. There is no external equating of sin with pain. That dying on Calvary—so unthinkable in its injustice, if inflicted as retributive penalty—so Divine,

[1] *See* Note at the end of the Chapter, p. 134.

beyond all imagination of beauty or power, as the crushing, in flesh, of sin; it is, indeed, from *within* that we must look to see what it meant, and was. It was the property, the power, of inherent righteousness, self-identified for consummation of penitence, with sinful man. There is no element here—either on the one hand, of the infliction, or, on the other hand, of the endurance, of vengeance. This death of pain, physical and spiritual—it is the spontaneous action of inherent righteousness, the glory and triumph of inherent righteousness under conditions under which righteousness itself could only be triumphant as righteousness thus!

He did not—of course He did not—endure the vengeance of God. We do not deny this only because, in every instinct of our being, we feel that it would be—as indeed it would—too shocking and too blasphemous even for thought; but because we are able positively to recognize that, whilst it would, by implication, deny both the Divine character of the Eternal Father, and the Divine Being of the Incarnate Son, it would also, not by implication only but directly, contradict the entire conception of the atonement. The vengeance of God is not anyhow conceivable as a method—on the contrary it is the direct negation—of atonement. The vengeance of God is the final consummation of sin unrepented, unatoned, unforgiven, unforgiveable. The Cross is not the symbol of unforgiveness! No, but with undimmed insight into sin, such insight as no spirit of man could bear, He offered Himself to consummate that reality of penitence by which alone real consciousness of sin (the universal property of humanity) could be righteously transformed and dissolved into—could grow into and become and be found to be, after all, more essentially, more abidingly,—a real identity with the absolute righteousness of God.

He did not—of course He did not—endure the damnation of sin. But in the bitter humiliation of a self-adopted consciousness of what sin—and therefore of what the damnation of sin—really is, He bowed His head to that which, as far as mortal experience can go, is so far, at least, the counterpart on earth of damnation that it is the extreme possibility of contradiction and destruction of self. He to whom, as the Life of life, all dying, all weakness, were an outrage to us inconceivable, bowed Himself to Death—Death in its outward form inflicted with all the contumely as of penal vengeance—Death inwardly accepted as the necessary climax of an experience of spiritual desolation, which, but to the inherently holy, would have been not only material but spiritual death. In mortal agony of body, in strain inconceivable, through the body, on the mind and the will, in isolation of spirit (man's true consciousness towards sin)—*He died.*

The consummation of penitence carried with it the straining, to their breaking, of the vital faculties, the dissolution of the mortal instrument. But that dissolution *was* the consummation of penitence; and the consummation of penitence is the consummation of righteousness by inherent power finally victorious through and over the utmost possibilities of sin.

Sin, when in its final struggle it had slain by inches that through which alone it could ever draw near to Him, in slaying what was mortal of Him had slain wholly itself. Where penitence has been consummated quite perfectly, that very consciousness, which was heaviness of spirit for sin, has become the consciousness of sin crushed, and dead. Sin slain, sin dead: this is in the sacrifice of penitence; this is in the death of the Cross. "Behold! the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world!"

NOTE TO PAGE 131.

On the Cry upon the Cross.

I have received some very friendly censure for making this reference to the cry on the Cross, in so far as the reference implies a certain interpretation of that cry, which is thought to conflict with its deeper significance.

The suggestion, if I rightly understand it, is that the cry both in its own actual words, and still more when interpreted in context either with the 22nd psalm as a whole, or with the expostulatory tone which is characteristic (in a certain aspect) of the Old Testament prophets who prefigured the Messiah, is mainly a pleading to God against failure, and the sense of wrong in failure. That is to say that it is the cry as of a self-sacrificing righteousness which has *not* succeeded in that which was the very animating purpose of its sacrifice; that it is the cry of a protest, such as is familiar in Jeremiah, against unmerited failure,—the sense not of suffering only, but (as it were) of the demonstrated uselessness of suffering. In this view it would be emblematically represented not simply by the blended penitence, and withal tranquillity, of the mother dying of a broken heart; but rather by her additional consciousness (if so it were) in dying, that even this last surrender of herself had been in vain: for that the child, unmoved and un-won, had but fled contumaciously into further evil, so that the mother's very death seemed manifestly to have been for nothing.

It is further suggested that it may perhaps be conceived to be an inherent necessity of human consciousness of extreme self-sacrifice, before it can reach its own perfectness of consummation, that the vision of the mind should be clouded from seeing or feeling its own inalienable victory. It is true, no doubt, that, in the moral sphere at least, such sacrifice must, in its own essential nature, be triumphant. Yet it is conceivable that it may belong to the very climax of the trial in which such righteousness finally consummates its triumph, that the sense of victory should be obscured to the consciousness; that the sense of failure, and expostulation against failure, the sense of sacrifice thrown away, and suffering uselessly borne, may be a necessary ingredient in the bitterness of the cup of sacrifice.

And if it be objected that this, however conceivable as the very climax of trial in sinful and ignorant man, is not conceivable in the human consciousness which was the very expression of the Person of God: it may perhaps be answered that it is conceivable that it was

just for this that He divested Himself of the very qualities which were most His own; taking upon Him, by deliberate condescension, that very limitedness of imagination and knowledge which would constitute the supreme bitterness of His suffering in sacrifice: that, in a word, He most showed in this the sovereignty of His own character as God—by the extent to which He became, as it were, other than God, by the limitation even of His own clear insight and consciousness of self, for the purpose of making the cup of sacrifice full.

On all this I desire to make no other comment than that I do not feel called upon, because of it, to alter what is written in the text. It may all be true. I certainly am not disputing it. In some measure at least an interpretation which distinguishes infinity from finiteness, and insists upon the limitation of mortal faculties, must needs be in the direction of truth. But at the most it seems to me only to add a further thought to those which I had suggested before. It may make them incomplete, but it does not make them untrue; and if they are true, it is certainly not incompatible with them. It is obvious moreover to add that there are not any words, in the history of the world, whose meaning it would be so little reasonable to attempt, or expect, to exhaust, by any single strain of interpretation whatever.

CHAPTER VII

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE

AMONG the earliest, and among the most beautiful, of the pictures of the Risen Lord in the Gospel history is that in which He pleads with the warm-hearted but over-confident disciple, who had so misconceived, at the crisis, His purpose and character, and who had been—all good intentions notwithstanding—so easily beguiled into denying Him.

The question with which the Risen Christ challenges St Peter,—and many a faint-hearted follower from the days of St Peter onwards,—is a question which turns wholly upon the reality of personal affection for Himself. "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?"

And in truth there is illumination, as well as pathos, in the question. There is something in it which goes far beyond the touching associations, or the transitory accidents, of a merely personal piece of reminiscence. It has a world-wide reference. It touches an eternal principle. As the question which pierced to the depth of the contrite conscience of St Peter; as the question which set before him, in a moment, the challenge of the truly Christian life; as the test of his restoration to dutifulness and to apostleship; we feel that its words contain, or are capable, at the least, of representing, the inner secret of the life of the Church.

But there are times when we wander far enough from the simplicity of a relation to the Person and Cross of

Christ, which can be simply expressed as the dependence of a personal love. And even if the personal love were clearer and more devoted than it is, there are times when we should be perplexed to determine upon what exactly the personal love was based; or in what way the work of Christ —even if we dared be certain that we loved Him—made essential difference in ourselves. This then is the question which we approach in the present chapter. In what way does the atoning victory of Christ become an effective reality in ourselves? No Christian doubts that the Atonement is central, and vital, to the Christian creed. In the life, and in the death, of Jesus Christ, is the real heart's hope of every child of man. Yet we are perplexed oftentimes by conflicting theories, developed as interpretations of the Atonement; so perplexed, in some cases even so wronged, nay outraged, by the things that are said to us, that we stand some of us in doubt, not only whether we can possibly make it intelligible to our consciences, but even whether, after all, we ought to tolerate or receive it at all.

One primary difficulty to our thought is the conviction, naturally immovable, that, whatever happened on Calvary, did not happen to us. With what justice, with what reality, we inevitably ask, can we claim its attributes, or character, for our own? If in any sense it is true that Calvary, with all that Calvary involved,—Calvary, and the consummation of the sacrifice of the Crucified,—is the central fact in the history of the world: what, after all, putting make-believe aside, is the real relation of Calvary to *me?*

Whether we go to more ancient, or to more modern, forms of current explanation,—whether the paying of a ransom, or the cancelling of a debt, or the substitution of a victim, is our leading metaphor,—there is one thing which seems, at first sight, to belong alike to all views which start from the great historical event, and find their explanation

within that: namely that, characterize it how they may, they seem to make atonement a transaction, historical, final, consummated long ago:—a transaction (I do not ask at this moment between whom; but at all events) far anterior to, and wholly outside of, the reality of ourselves. And so, partly in protest against every possible form of conception of what is felt to be so artificial, as *a transaction*, dramatically completed, and essentially outside ourselves: and partly in obedience to the correlative instinct that the only conceivably effective atonement must be somehow, where the seat of the necessity lies, within the personality that has sinned; human consciences rise in revolt against the entire doctrine of an accomplished atonement. It may be that neither of these two instinctive principles is based altogether on truth. Yet there is enough of popular truth in both of them, to make the protest which is based upon them a reality, needing to be taken into rational and serious account. And the *positive* meaning of the protest is itself truer than the statement of the principles on which it is based. It *is* true, even if the truth is too often urged without balance, that any atonement which is to be ultimately effectual for me, must find its ultimate reality within what I am. It *is* true that an atonement which is, to the absolute end, external only: which finds no echo, no place, as moral characterization, within the individual personality; can be to him, at last, no more than a possibility of atonement which now has failed, and is past.

It is through consciousness of the truth which is true on this side, that we in this generation have become familiar with two contrasted sets of theories of atonement,—set over against one another under titles whose theological history is (to say the least) singularly unfortunate, as respectively "objective" and "subjective" theories.

These words have been made to be badges of contradictory views. On the one side it is pleaded that if

the need lies in the sin which is, personally, the sinner's very own, nothing can touch the real point of the need, which is not, like the sin, within the sinner. And so, when the question is asked as to the real and permanent import of Calvary, the emphasis is apt to be laid upon the moral effect, the touching example, the eternal appeal which the picture of Calvary must for ever make upon the thoughts, and hearts, and lives of men. It is a marvellous incident—or marvellous suggestion—of history. Whether it be exactly incident, or suggestion, is not, it is sometimes insinuated, from this point of view, the question of most moment. For it is not as a transaction that it is either appealed to, or conceived. It is rather the idea than the fact: rather the inspiration which comes from it than its own achievement: rather the outflowing force of moral motive, than the external completeness of a consummated work, which constitutes both its reality and its power.

But if we adopt this language, and say that the truth of the atonement must be chiefly moral: and that its true reality is to be looked for subjectively within the conscience, rather than objectively on Calvary and the Mount of the Ascension; and if we would so correct, or explain away, the point of view of the historic Church; (a position to which, in all ages, one vein of mystical thought has tended to approximate;) we are met, on the other hand, by arguments, trenchant and confounding, which would shew, both from human experience the imperative need, and from Scripture the most reiterated and solemn assertion, of a redemption wrought effectually, once for all, through the Blood of Jesus Christ. There are few modern writings on the atonement so widely read or so influential as that of Dr Dale. It will be remembered how the leading motive of his volume, and perhaps it may also be said his chief power, lie in this,—

in his accumulated proof that, without tearing the New Testament to pieces, you cannot separate from it its cardinal belief in the effective reality of a historical and objective atonement. It will be remembered also that the same faith, often in its most crudely objective form, itself constitutes the living religious force of a vast proportion of the conviction and practice that are, at least amongst Protestant communities, most vitally and effectively Christian.

But in truth the very antithesis itself is, on examination, artificial and unreal. For here, as elsewhere, the words subjective and objective are only relatively, not really, opposed. So far is either of them from really denying, that each in fact implies and presupposes the other; nor can either of the two, in complete isolation from the other, be itself ultimately real.

The word objective is used, by those who make a point of using it, to mark their insistence that the sacrifice of Christ was in itself real and adequate, "a full perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world;" and that it is so, whether I, or another, apprehend it as such or no. Of course it is so. What they so far contend for is altogether necessary and true. It is not upon the power of apprehension in one man, or in another, that the righteousness of God in Christ depends for being righteous, or for crushing sin. It was anyhow Divine righteousness, which, in and as man, broke down the power of sin.

But if it is to be—as in purpose and in capacity it assuredly is—*my* righteousness, crushing sin for and in *me*; it is clear that it is not so, irrespectively of all that I can still either do, or be. It is of necessity that I should be in a certain relation with it: and upon my relation to it, its relation to me will ultimately depend. In *some* form every one recognizes that this is true. In itself, and to

others whose life it has become, it is what it is, irrespectively of me. But to me, if I have *no* relation to it, it is as though it were not. An objective fact that is not apprehended in any sense subjectively, is to those who have no subjective relation to it, as if it were non-existent. A fact objectively existing, in itself, without relation to any apprehending mind, is an impossibility to thought. Light may have indeed other qualities or effects; but it is not *light* save to a capacity of seeing. What is the light of noonday to a man born blind? To others, who know what sight is, it is real: but as far as he is concerned it does not, as light, exist. It is identical with its contradictory. To say that white, as white, is precisely identical with black, is to deny its existence as white altogether. The sunlight, apprehended by no creature, would yet be real to the apprehension and will of the Creative mind; but outside the apprehension of God or man, outside all relation to mind, it could have neither meaning nor reality at all. It is in its aspect as spiritually realized that it is, in fact, real. Thus those who plead for an objective atonement are right;—but would not be right, if its objective reality could be irrespective of realization subjectively.

What those, then, really demand on the other hand who plead for an atonement which would not be atonement after all, if its ultimate meaning were not a moral or subjective reality, is itself no less vitally necessary and true. But perhaps the word "subjective" is not used in this context so much as a term selected for defence by those who defend it: but rather as a term imputed for reproach by those who repudiate it. And as such the term is mixed up with associations which obscure and belie its meaning. Men use the word to stigmatise what is unreal as unreal. Men speak of the appearance of a nightmare or a ghost as subjective, meaning that it is

the mere creature of illusory imagination, which mistakes non-existence for reality. Now so long as the word is in familiar use to denote the hallucinations of a brain diseased, misconceiving untruth as truth: so long will it serve in theological discussion, whether upon the Atonement or the Eucharist, largely to caricature thought which it is incapable of representing truly. We need to get rid of the unworthy and false associations of the word. Subjective does not mean imaginary, or unauthorized. It does not suggest something unrelated to eternal truth; real only to the individual—in proportion as he, with no reason beyond himself, imagines it to be real. Subjective truth rather is that which is true in and to the apprehending capacity of the individual, because the individual has learnt aright to apprehend and see a truth, whose reality is not dependent on himself. What is real in and to my mind is therefore subjective to me. It is subjectively that the objective is realized. For its reality to me, for its reality to anyone, the objective waits for, and depends on, its correlative subjective. What is not subjectively real to any mind at all cannot be real objectively—just as light could not be light if no faculties of seeing existed: nor could matter be κόσμος save to mind. The two, then, are really inseparable, as convex and concave. Objective, that is wholly without subjective realization, is the same as non-existent. Subjective, that is not objective also, is hallucination.

So with the Cross and its atoning sacrifice. The subjective or moral theory that finds all its meaning within us men and our individual consciences, and makes but little of the act external, objective, historical, consummated adequately and once for all:—this, in trying to realize for itself the meaning of atonement, is really cutting off (as it were) the blossom which should become fruit, from the root

by which it lives. On the other hand the simply objective theory which forgets the place of the Cross within Christian life, which says, "Go your way: be content: the atonement was once a transaction, with such and such meaning between God and Christ: but *you* have nothing in it, except to believe that it is a fact, finished and done:"—this goes far to deprive the root of that fruit-bearing capacity which is its own inherent and proper meaning.

The ultimate realization is indeed to be within us—the very transfiguration of ourselves. The sacrifice of Christ, as merely external to us, does indeed include all possibility, but as yet it only is as possibility; it is potential, it is preliminary,—and it is provisional. The sacrifice is to be, in its final consummation, the real transformation of us all. But it is to be so in us because it was first the historical sacrifice, consecrated on Calvary, unique, all-sufficing; real between God and man in the Person of Jesus Christ,—and to each of us, as individuals, seen and believed in external objective history. It is, so far as each one of us is concerned, objective first, that it may become subjective. It was real to God-ward in Christ, that it might become the reality, in Christ, of men. It is real in others that it may be real in us. It is first a historical, that it may come to be a personal, fact. Calvary, and the Ascension, precede any thought or apprehension of ours. But Calvary, and the Ascension, are none the less to become an integral part of the experience and reality of our personal consciousness. If Calvary and the Ascension were anything less than the most real of historical realities, there would be in fact no possibility of their translation into our personal characters. But if even Calvary and the Ascension were past history merely, they would not after all have saved, or have touched, *us*.

An atonement, then, moral or spiritual, ought never to

have been suggested as an alternative to the historical sacrifice of the Creed, or as a correction of it; for it is itself an element necessary and integral, in the meaning of the historical sacrifice. Nor ought any question to have been raised between an objective and a subjective atonement: nor ought either to have been maintained in the way of antagonism against the other. The real question should have been not whether the Christian atonement is a fact, wrought without us, *or* a moral and spiritual alteration within: but rather, seeing that it must be both, and that either of these two is to mean the other, we should ask, *How* does it happen, by what power and by what means, that what is primarily an external fact consummated in history, can and does become the essential reality in the characterization of the personalities of men? *How* can the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, consecrated on Calvary for eternal presentation, become in me—not a personal reality only, but the main constitutive reality of my own individual personal being?

If we have been content to be long in working back to this question, it is the result of a belief that upon this question—upon its answer no doubt in the fullest sense, but even upon the framing of the question aright,—depends in large measure the insight of our generation into that supreme reality of the atonement, which just because it is deeper at once and simpler and wider than human experience, has been seen by different generations of Christians so differently, and yet has been vital, and has been true, to them all.

This then is the form of our question—how can, in this matter, the objective *be* the subjective? The deed enacted, once for all, without, *be* the quality of the consciousness, within, of ten thousand times ten thousand of the children of men? The question is not whether it is so, but *How?*

Now, no attempt will be made to reach the full answer to this question in the present chapter. For the present we must be content with an answer which is preparatory rather than adequate: suggestive, perhaps, of more than it attempts to explore: and possibly even, as it stands, superficially at least and verbally, (though not really, to those who discern what lies beneath simple experiences,) capable of being made use of to confuse, as well as to establish, the faith of the Church.

Speaking practically then, rather than abstractly, we may say that the first preliminary to the real translation of all that is signified by Calvary into a constitutive fact of my own inner being is that, looking externally upon it as a fact of history, I should *apprehend* it, *believe* it, *contemplate* it, and *love* it.

It is worth while to observe that I cannot begin, unless, to me at least, the history is truth. Even upon the extreme hypothesis that the sort of unqualified moral allegiance, of which we are speaking now, would be possible towards what was, in fact, a beautiful allegory: it would certainly not be possible save to one who mistook the allegory for fact. I do not analyze now the paradox of the position which could suggest that the highest education of human character ever dreamed of might be based upon a lie, or a phantasy; but I note that the thought of possible untruth must be absolutely shut out from the consciousness which is to be really educated by it. From the beginning, the reality of Calvary as objective history is a postulate, without which nothing really can follow at all.

The first point, then, is to apprehend and believe it as true. This is faith in the lower and barer sense of the word:—to recognize that the fact indeed is so; and to have some insight into the meaning of the fact. All our teaching, as teaching, historical or doctrinal, goes to make this foundation sure.

But, secondly, it is something far beyond this primary apprehension or belief, when we say that our moral advancement further depends upon our contemplation of what we believe. Those do not grow into the likeness of the Cross who merely believe in their hearts, however sincerely, that the Cross was, in fact, once borne for them by their Lord. We speak now of a concentration of faculties by intellectual and moral effort. We speak of study, careful and minute,—a tracing of meanings and purposes, of connections and corollaries,—an insight into the relations and significance of details,—a vivid recalling, as into present life, through the powers of imagination taught carefully and disciplined, of all the wonder of those unique scenes, and all the mystery of that central Personality, in whose uniqueness only they have their meaning, or were, or are, what they are! In a word we speak of that sort of framework of intimacy of knowledge, which is the direct correlative of love.

Our third point, then, is love. The most diligent study would be nugatory: nay the most genuine intimacy would tend rather to severance and contrast than moral union: unless the intimacy were but an aspect of love. "Lovest thou Me?" Real, personal love, uplifted and uplifting, love for the Crucified because of the Cross, love even for the Cross because of the Crucified: this is perhaps the most obvious, and the most indispensable, of practical conditions, for the real translation of the scene without into the material of the character within. I do not stay to analyze the possibility in us, of such love. We know of what sort it is as a practical duty, and we know something of its transforming power, long before we can realize whence, or how, it is possible. But this phrase "to love," after all, is a phrase which has been used for so many purposes, that it is shorn, for us, of a large part of its proper power. Quite apart from positively degraded uses, we use it for the

feeblest kinds of affection, not touching the real truth of love. Partly it is for this reason that we have reserved another special form of phrase for cases in which we can recognize the real informing and constraining force of love. If you say of a man not only that he loves, but that he *is in love with*, either a person or a cause, you intend to emphasize, by that phrase, a distinction between on the one hand an emotion quiescent if not passive,—one of the many shifting judgments of approval to which in turn man's mind and feeling give assent; and on the other hand a passion, dominant and sweeping, which carries all else before it with torrent force, filling all the mind and shaping all the actions, giving new zest, new power, possibly even new capacity and new character to the whole life of the spirit which has felt at last what is to be "in love."

"Lovest thou Me?" It is difficult for our imagination to emphasize too strongly what the meaning would be of "being in love with" Christ, crucified and risen; or to how much it would be the practical key in the way of the translation of the spirit of Calvary into the animating spirit of individual Christian life. What engrossing of faculties, what absorption of desire, what depth of thought, what wistfulness of kindness, what strength of will, what inspiration of power,—to endeavour or to endure,—would forthwith follow, with spontaneous, silent, irresistible sequence, if once we were "in love"!

So all-inclusive indeed is the meaning of love, that it is needless to distinguish from love, as though it were a separable point, the effort of personal imitation and approach. Consciously or unconsciously, love is imitative. What I am really in love with I must in part be endeavouring to grow like: and shall be growing like, if the love is really on fire, even more than I consciously endeavour. What I am really in love with characterizes

me. It is that which I, so far, am becoming. *In* love then, at least, though perhaps not separably from love, there is much imitation, conscious and unconscious, of the Spirit which revealed itself to the world on Calvary. There may be no inherent beauty in asceticism. There may be no form of asceticism which is not, sometimes, the product of mean and selfish impulses; which does not, sometimes, draw justly upon itself the condemnation and even contempt, of healthy consciences. But alas! for us if we cannot also, in this context, see how directly the ascetic spirit may be the irresistible outcome of pure love. The daily unselfishness—more and more smiling and spontaneous—the quiet stringency and gladness of detailed self-discipline; do we not see how this, as the unconscious, or the conscious, imitation of the Cross, by one who is in love with the Crucified, may be just the natural homage, the relief which *will* not be denied, of a devoted love, welling up and bubbling over in act? Be it what it may as cold self-conscious rule, at least as the expression and relief of over-flowing love, asceticism, even the exactest, is not only blameless but beautiful. It is also, in very large measure, a practical token of the thing we are looking for: a secret of the process of the real translation of Calvary, contemplated *and loved*, into the inmost characterizing reality of the spirit of the loving worshipper.

But in dwelling so long on contemplation and love, as if within these lay the secret of the answer to the question asked just now, we lay ourselves open, no doubt, to more questions than one. Thus it may be asked whether, on this interpretation, the only real value of Calvary and the Ascension, as historically objective realities, is to supply a basis for my emotions to work upon? They constitute, no doubt, a marvellous revelation; an over-mastering appeal; a perfect example; a supreme

object and motive for love. Is this all? Is this, and this only, their part in my redemption? And, if so, are they really indispensable at all? Would not the appeal and motive be the same, if I really believed in them as appeal and motive, even if they never actually happened? It might be strange, perhaps, that the deepest of all effects should follow upon a mistaken estimate of fact. But, strange or not strange, would not the same effects after all really follow in fact from an *erroneous* belief in Calvary and the Ascension, as from a true one, if only the erroneous belief were sufficiently protected from every suspicion of doubt? And if so again, then is not the whole thing a reappearance, in very thin disguise, of what we always understood by a subjective theory of the atonement,—rather than, what it seemed to promise to be, any real reconciliation or synthesis of subjective with objective?

There is one form of question—with branching consequences. And here is another. If contemplation, imitation, love, are adequate as the keynotes of explanation, it may well be asked—is such a contemplation or such a love as is required, itself within the possibilities of the human character? Are my conditions such, that this process of emotional transformation, *can* be by me maintained, or even begun? And the answer must certainly be that, consistently with the conditions of human experience, on the basis of human initiative or human accomplishment,—*no*, it is not a possibility! To offer to me, being what I know myself to be, the sacrifice of Christ as an incitement, or an example, is not useless only—but worse than useless. It is, you urge, the most beautiful of ideals. But—the loftier the ideal, the more absolutely is it, to me, unapproachable. It is, you urge, the most moving, the most constraining, object of affection. I can see that it is so—or that it ought to be.

But even while I assent with part of my mind, there is that in me by which I feel and know that *I* cannot altogether be in love with an object of love so inaccessible to me,—just because it is more supremely lovable than I can conceive or desire. No; on its side—even *I* can see that everything is indeed complete: but—on my side—it is the "I" which is incapable. To appeal to me for what is impossible to me, is only to convict and to crush. I need something first which will not merely make appeal to, or draw out, the best that is in me; but which will change and transform the very meaning and possibility of that fatal word "I."

The word "I" is the point at which all such theory breaks down. Surely discussions of atonement,—of its relation to me or mine to it—have often been in vain, because they have tried to explain it apart from any examination of the meaning of the fatal word "I,"—as though the word "I" were a word of obvious meaning, and as though from first to last, throughout the process, the word retained its one obvious meaning unchanged. Its meaning is far from remaining either simple, or unqualified. On the contrary, the whole clue to my apprehension of Atonement lies, it may be, in the changing content and significance of that one keyword "I."

This is the answer to the second question. And from the second we go back to the first. And here again we have to answer No! It is not all, nor anything approaching to all, the part borne in my redemption by Calvary and the Ascension that they should offer *to me* a model, or a motive, or an object of love. But what is far more, and is an integral part in any understanding or explanation of the Atonement,—the life of Christ, consecrated upon the Cross, consummated in the Ascension, itself constitutes the very basis of the possibility, nay more, of the vital and present and experienced reality,

of that change in the meaning of the "I" and its capacities, without which any motive or model or ideal object for affection, would serve only to condemn and destroy.

We, then, have not reached—we have hardly as yet even touched upon—the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter would lie in the exposition, and realization, of Pentecost. The atonement as a transaction without ourselves—expound it how you will—is not yet consummated *for us*. In terms simply of a transaction without ourselves, the mystery of the atonement cannot be expounded. This is why so many expositions of the atonement are, to us, justly inconclusive, or worse. They have tried to explain the method, or justice, of its relation to us. And they stop short at a point at which its relation to us is not yet properly real. What Jesus in Himself suffered, or did, on Calvary, you may perhaps explain in terms of Calvary. The meaning of His Ascension into Heaven, you may in some part at least explain without looking onwards to its further effects. But the relation of what He did to us, its working, its reality for and in us, you can only explain at all in terms of Pentecost. An exposition of atonement which leaves out Pentecost, leaves the atonement unintelligible—in relation to us. For what is the real consummation of the atonement to be? It is to be—the very Spirit of the Crucified become our spirit—ourselves translated into the Spirit of the Crucified. The Spirit of the Crucified, the Spirit of Him who died and is alive, may be, and please God shall be, the very constituting reality of ourselves. Here as always when we come to the deeper truths of Christian exposition, all is found to turn, not on explaining away, but on making vital and real, that membership, unity, identification with Christ, which is so familiar a feature of Scriptural language. He who could say with the most unaffected sincerity, "I determined not to know anything

among you, save Jesus Christ, and Him crucified,"[1] said also "far be it from me to glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world hath been crucified unto me, and I unto the world,"[2] and "I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer I but Christ liveth in me."[3] I am appealing only to our own language, familiar indeed as language at every turn, which yet we find it too often almost impossible to assimilate or to conceive. "Grant us therefore, gracious Lord, so to eat the flesh of Thy dear Son Jesus Christ, and to drink His Blood, that our sinful bodies may be made clean by His Body, and our souls washed through His most precious Blood, and that we may evermore dwell in Him, and He in us."

Now we have made no attempt at all hitherto to enter upon the exposition of Pentecost, the crucial doctrine—professed so often, and, so often without a meaning!—of the Holy Spirit, as constituting the Church. But at least the things which we have tried to say may serve to illustrate the cardinal principle, that Calvary is the condition, precedent and enabling, to Pentecost. The objective reality is completed first, that it may be indeed subjectively realized. Christ is crucified first and risen before our eyes; that Christ crucified and risen may be the secret love and power of our hearts. Calvary without Pentecost, would not be an atonement *to us*. But Pentecost could not be without Calvary. Calvary is the possibility of Pentecost: and Pentecost is the realization, in human spirits, of Calvary.

The Spirit of the crucified Christ could not become our spirit, nor we live on, and by, Him, till Christ was crucified, and ascended, and enthroned. The Spirit of human penitence could not be ours, till penitence had been realized in humanity. The Spirit of human

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 2. [2] Gal. vi. 14. [3] Gal. ii. 20.

righteousness could not be ours, till humanity, in the consummation of penitence, had become perfectly one with the righteousness of God.

Human penitence, human atonement, human righteousness,—all are first before our eyes, as external objects, that they may be the secret of our hearts, that they may be the very truth of ourselves. But the transforming power, the power of real reflection and effective allegiance, is not to be found in ourselves. Or, at least, the question has to be seriously raised,—What do we mean by ourselves? What is the true account of human personality? And the answer to this question can only be given in the light, if not in the language, of Pentecostal doctrine, the doctrine of the Holy Ghost. It is Pentecost, it is the gift progressively transforming, it is the indwelling of the Spirit of Holiness, the Spirit of the Crucified, which is the transfiguring of human personality: a transfiguring in which at last, for the first time, self has become fully self, and the meaning of human personality is consummated and realized.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN RELATION TO THE BEING OF GOD

WE need then some study of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, in order that we may understand the meaning of human personality. But before we apply this doctrine to the elucidation of human personality, it is necessary first to make some attempt to measure what we mean by the doctrine itself. What are we really able to understand about the Holy Spirit, in reference, first, to the Personal Being of God?

The first condition for understanding (in any sense of the word) the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity, is to begin by giving the utmost possible emphasis to the truth, which is as essential to the theologian as to the philosopher, —of the unity of God. God cannot be multiplied. "God" is a word which defies the possibility of a plural. To dally for a moment with any doubt or qualification of the absoluteness of the truth of the unity of God, is to empty the word itself of its essential significance. "The Lord our God, the Lord is One:" is a principle which necessarily underlies every thought and every phrase of the Athanasian creed. If the Son is God, He is absolutely, and identically God—*singularis, unicus, et totus Deus.*[1] And the same is true also of the Holy Ghost. The Three Persons are neither Three Gods, nor Three parts of God. Rather they are God Threefoldly, God Tri-personally. Of course no human phrases are positively adequate. But nega-

[1] *See* above, page 84.

tively at least we must get rid, so far as we may, of positive misconceptions. It is God, not "a" God, nor a "part of" God,—it is God who eternally is, who thinks, who wills, who designs, who creates, who ordains: it is God who eternally is, who loves, who condescends, who "deviseth means," who takes hold of man, who reveals, who redeems: it is God who eternally is, who attracts, who informs, who inspires, who animates,—it is God who, in Himself, and God who, even in His creatures, physical or spiritual, makes from all sides Divine response to Himself. The personal distinction in Godhead is a distinction within, and of, unity: not a distinction which qualifies unity, or usurps the place of it, or destroys it.

Historically, the unity of the Godhead, was impressed on the consciousness of Israel, as the religious representative of man, for some two thousand years, before the stage in religious evolution was reached, at which any further revelation was possible of what was meant or contained within the unity. And as the further conception of God Incarnate,—God revealed within, and as, the moral and spiritual perfectness of man,—dawned by degrees, slowly, imperiously, compellingly, upon the consciousness of men of special moral and spiritual capacity of insight; it was most assuredly not as the revelation of another God, or of another than God, but as the express image and actual revelation of God Himself, the One, the All-in-all, the Eternal, that the disciples learned to believe in, and to worship, Jesus Christ our Lord.

And certainly in what He said Himself about the "other Paraclete," the "Spirit of Truth," Jesus Christ is not for a moment unteaching the fundamental verity that God is One. The teaching when it comes takes hardly the form of a new revelation at all. It is not ushered in with the dignity or the surprise of a new and amazing declaration as to the essential Being of Deity. Rather

it comes in a quiet, practical way, as explaining the meaning of His own bodily absence; and how that absence could be, after all, a nearer and truer presence of Himself, and therefore of God, than could possibly be represented or expressed by bodily nearness in a material order of things. It *is* of course, in its own truth, a new revelation. It is the beginning of a new epoch—mysterious indeed, from the standpoint of everything that had been either attained or conceived before—in the revelation of the meaning of life, and specially the relation of created Life to God. It is the opening of new vistas of conception, such as we can only realize in part, about the essential Being of God Himself.

But such a revelation, however in fact august or far-reaching, is in form made almost incidentally, as a necessary sequel, an element implied, and necessary to be discerned, for a full grasp of the conception of what Incarnation itself properly meant. The one thing which it emphatically is *not*, is any correction or unsaying of the age-long truth of the essential unity of God.

It is the more necessary to begin by insisting on this fundamental principle, because, though there are few who would have the temerity to deny it in words, it has not really an adequate place in general or popular Christian thought. It can hardly be doubted that, among those who wish to make a point of being orthodox, there is a great deal of practical Di- or Tri- theism. The word Person, as applied to the distinctions within the Divine unity,—though it is by far the best word, and, for us, the only word possible: and though, contrary to what is sometimes supposed, we may venture to think that it represents (or rather that it is capable of) a considerable advance even upon the suggestive Greek word Ὑπόστασις: has nevertheless its drawbacks. We are profoundly accustomed to human persons, and perhaps to take for

granted, moreover, a somewhat shallow philosophical conception as to where the essence of human personality lies. We are accustomed too much to conceive of personality primarily as distinctness. A and B and C are separate personalities: that is to say A is not B, and B is not C. When we are asked what we mean by "personalities," we are too apt to reply by underlining the word "separate." The fact that A is distinct, as a separate centre of being; the fact that A *is not* any other than A; this lies very near the heart of what we popularly conceive personality to mean.

Now I believe that this is not the ultimate truth even of human personality: but it is not human personality that I am discussing now. It is in any case certainly not a key to the truth or meaning of the Threefoldness of Personality in God. And so long as we carry it with us into Theology from our (supposed) human experience, we are carrying with us an idea which is sure to work some confusion. Supposing for a moment that this "*is not*" lies at the heart of the distinction of one human person from another; in any case "*is not*" is not the heart of the distinction of the Three Persons of Deity. I am borrowing a phrase which has become happily familiar to very many, if I say that whereas "mutual exclusiveness" may seem indispensable for the understanding of the distinction of human persons: for the understanding of the distinction of Divine Persons it is no less indispensable that we should grasp,—or at least should see that it would be necessary to grasp,—the opposite conception of "mutual inclusiveness." "I am not you"—"I, in respect of being I, am quite independent of you"—these are statements, which even if they be not ultimate truth, at all events run very far back, on earth. But, in God, no Person is, or can be, at all without the other. The Father is inseparable from

the Son, and the Son from the Father: and the Spirit, inseparable from either, is the bond of the Union of Both.

The word Person is the true word in itself. But the word Person, seen in the light of certain human assumptions, leads human minds, if not to what is really a practical Tritheism, at all events to an undue and dangerous separation between the Persons, and the operations—I had almost said the characters—of the Eternal Father, and the Eternal Word, and the Eternal Spirit, which are One God. Historically perhaps this separation has assumed its most terrible proportions in some monstrous theories of the atonement, according to which, at least in their popular form, the Persons of Deity have been not only distinguished, but separated,—not only separated but very sharply contrasted;—and that, not in operation only but in moral attributes,—in the will of Goodness and Love. But even among those who would utterly repudiate such awful travesties of theological truth as these, are there not many who practically regard the Divine Persons as if they were separate—in being and in operation; shrinking with a sort of orthodox horror from seeming to introduce any One into the sphere which belongs —not to Him, but to Another Person? The Father is regarded as apart from the Son: and the Son as apart from the Father; and the Spirit as to be clearly sundered from Both. And then each must have a separate sphere of operation assigned to Him; and His sphere must be kept apart from the spheres of the Others; and scruples and perplexities begin to arise as to the relation of the sphere or work respectively—say of the ascended Son to that of the Spirit; as if God were divided, and in parts. And perhaps the question presents itself to scrupulous minds, whether really they do,—or can,—believe the Holy Spirit to be Personal, without *ipso facto* making Him distinct

from God,—the God who "is Spirit," and whose Spirit He is!

Again, as a result that partly follows from undue separation, there are those who practically omit from their lives the third part of the Creed altogether. They believe in God: and in the life and death of Jesus Christ. But though of course they repeat the Creed as a whole, belief in the Spirit finds no place in their lives: they have really no adequately intelligent conception to attach to the words. Or if, without such adequate conception, they nevertheless make much of the use of the words, then the words themselves, becoming unduly familiarized, are, through familiarity, debased: they speak lightly of the Spirit, or the gifts of the Spirit, not knowing at what a cost they misuse the name, and lower in themselves the power of the thought, of the presence of the Eternal God.

But if perils like these are easily incurred through the common associations of the human word person: it may be asked, perhaps, whether, when these are removed, the word Person really carries, for us, any positive illumination of thought about the Being of God? Above all it may be asked, whether the word Person itself, however inevitable in Latin or English, does not represent a retrogression of thought, in comparison with the Greek of the early Councils? Τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, Μία οὐσία, or even Τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, Μία ὑπόστασις—there is something in the very bravery of the paradox which is fascinating. Three Subsistences, of One Substance: Three Existences of One Essence: or even Three Subsistences of One Subsistence; Three Existences of One Existence; this seems at first sight to be nearer in expression to that mystery for which we strive to find an utterance; and not even to suggest the perilous completeness of separation which begins to creep in at once with the phrase—"Tres Personæ Unius Substantiæ." Yet however valuable these expressions may be *to us*, as

correcting our misapprehensions of the word Person; they are really inadequate substitutes for that word. This is none the less true to modern thought, even if it be supposed that historically, in the first instance, as new words, the words Πρόσωπα or Personæ may have carried with them some intellectual loss. There is something essentially lacking in the word Ὑπόστασις. And just for this very reason; that, with all its subtle suggestiveness, it is still, so largely, an *impersonal* word. It is abstract rather than actual, a conception rather than a living whole. When St Augustine says, in often quoted words "Tamen cum quæritur Quid tres? magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen Tres Personæ non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur;"[1] unspeakably valuable though the caution is, and has always been felt to be, yet he really has said too much. There was after all something positive which was needed; and something which, with whatever lack of full completeness, only the word "Person" really supplied; or had, at least, the capacity of supplying. The word Person has a fulness and totality of meaning of its own, and certainly nothing short of the inclusive completeness of personal being can be predicated, at any moment, of God—whether Father, Son, or Holy Ghost. If, negatively, we can be rid of the associations privative and exclusive which are supposed to be inherent in the word: we shall recognize, on the positive side, that the word expresses a truth which we must assert, and can assert with intelligence.

Our intelligence is, on the one side, positive and real, and on the other side, explicitly limited. And both consequences follow from the nature of our own knowledge of personality. It is urged that it is hard for us to understand a Trinity of Personality. Naturally it is so. The

[1] *De Trinitate*, V., cap. ix. 10, p. 838; *cp.* also VII. iv. 9, p. 860; VIII. i. p. 865, etc.

basis of our understanding of personality is experience. We can understand no personality at all, divine or human, in Trinity or in Unity, except so far as we have first realized something, in personal experience, of what it means. If we were not persons, with an experience of personality antecedent to either reflection in thought or expression in words, we could not either explain the meaning of the word, or receive explanation from others. Persons, analyzing their own consciousness of personality, to others who begin by sharing (as matter of experience) in the same consciousness, can give some account, intelligible to both, of the meaning of the experience which is anyhow common to both, before it is analyzed or understood at all. But as it is only upon the basis of this experience that any understanding is possible at all: so is it impossible that any understanding should really travel outside of what is contained, implicitly at least if not explicitly, within the experience.

Now in a sense we are travelling beyond our experience whenever we assert an Absolute or Supreme Personality at all,—whenever, therefore, we assert the Personality of God. We are passing outside our explicit experience; we are asserting something which transcends what we have realized. But we are not passing outside what is necessarily implied within our own experience. Our own consciousness of personality, when cross-examined, bears witness, as on the one hand to its own inherent character and demand: so, on the other, to its own universal and necessary incompleteness. That which our experience universally requires, for any possible account of itself, is nowhere, in our experience, realized. Our personality, though real as far as it goes, is a partial, tentative, and incomplete personality: and as such only explicable at all upon the hypothesis of a meaning of the word Personality, without which indeed even our

present experience would have neither sense nor significance, but which could only find its realization in God.

Up to this point we may fairly be said to "understand" Divine Personality. We can understand the idea of the completeness of those attributes of which we are conscious of the possession, and conscious of the incompleteness. And we can understand the proposition that that idea of their completeness is an absolute intellectual necessity to give rational meaning to our incomplete experience. A will partially free is only intelligible at all upon the assumption that, ideally at least, there is such a thing as freedom of will that is no longer partial. A character more or less advanced in loving is a phrase positively chaotic except in the light of an ideal conception of perfect love.

But if so much of the idea of Divine Personality is implicitly contained in our own personal consciousness: is there anything in the Christian revelation of Divine Personality, and particularly Divine Threefoldness in Personality, which is not so implicitly contained? Certainly I have no wish to answer such a question, at this point, in any dogmatic manner. I do not assume that we know all that is implicitly contained within ourselves. More may well be implied in our consciousness than as yet the greatest among us have explored. On the other hand I do not assume that any human analysis however perfect must ultimately of necessity cover all the ground. To put it in the most guarded and moderate way, I see no reason for assuming that what is implicit in human personality must exhaust the meaning of personality in God. And my point at the present moment is that if, or just so far as, there is in the revelation of the Triune Personality of God any element whatever which is not, on analysis, within the necessary implications of human

personality; just so far it necessarily follows, from the very terms on which alone we can understand any personality, human or divine, at all, that those elements cannot be, in any proper sense of the words, intellectually intelligible to us. There is a certain note of reverent agnosticism which it is well to strike with some emphasis here. It is wonderful indeed to what an extent the finite can express and reflect the infinite. But it is not natural, after all, to suppose that the infinite will be adequately measured by the finite. I would speak with reserve, seeing how much of capacity of the infinite is in the nature which has become, once for all, the expression of God. Yet I may safely protest against the assumption, made too lightly (even if unconsciously) on the other hand, that our faculties are adequate for an intellectual grasp on the whole of the revelation: or that scriptural truths about the Threefold Personality can only be saved from being rejected as irrational, by being brought into direct, and measurable, relation with the realized consciousness of man. I am certain that whatever is completely outside human consciousness in this matter, is also of necessity outside human intelligibleness. This is a thought to be urged not so much in the way of apology—as an excuse to hide or palliate failure. Rather it is a principle of most positive and illuminating importance. It is a principle to be pressed forward, with emphasis, into the utmost prominence, as indispensable for intelligence. And in the light of it, we certainly shall not be likely to set out with any antecedent expectation of being able to explain or to apprehend that supreme all-inclusive consciousness, which, being One, is mutually Three; and being mutually Three, is One.

But if we cannot realize as from within, the consciousness of God: and can see quite clearly beforehand that we so obviously and necessarily cannot realize it, that it

would *ipso facto* not be Divine consciousness if we could: there are nevertheless some propositions about it, which we can see, as from without, to be necessary truths. One such is of crucial importance for our present purpose. We can see that Personality of Supreme, or Absolute, or Eternal Being, cannot be without self-contained mutuality of relations. Wisdom in unique solitariness of existence, would have neither meaning nor content as wisdom. Will, existing absolutely alone, would not be will. Even yet more obviously, Love existing as a sole and single unit, could not possibly be Love.[1] If God is Personal at all: and if Will and Wisdom and Love are elements in the conception of Personality: it follows, from analysis of the necessary meaning and implications, even of the inchoate personality of which we ourselves are conscious in ourselves, that Divine Personality cannot mean a merely sole and unrelated unit. There must be in Itself both subject and object; and moreover a mutual relation of subject and object: that is to say a mutually personal relation. There must be mutuality of contemplation, mutuality of Love. What, as subject, finds its object within itself: must itself also, as object, be contemplated and loved, by that object, within itself, which becomes subject in contemplating and loving. Less than this does not constitute a real mutuality: and real mutuality is the one thing which I can see to be an intellectual necessity in my thought of Divine Personality,—so necessary that Divine Personality cannot even be thought without it. But the mutuality would not be real, unless the subject which becomes object, and

[1] A somewhat striking saying has been quoted from the Valentinians, in the midst of a context which is not valuable at all: see Hippolyt. Ref. omn. Hær., Lib. vi. 29. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν γόνιμος, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ποτε τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ τελεώτατον, ὃ εἶχεν ἐν αὑτῷ, γεννῆσαι καὶ προαγαγεῖν. Φιλέρημος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν. Ἀγάπη γὰρ, φησὶν, ἦν ὅλος, ἡ δὲ ἀγάπη οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγάπη, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ τὸ ἀγαπώμενον.

the object which becomes subject, were, on each side, alike and equally Personal.

I am not sure that this is not the one thing in respect of Divine Personality of which we can with most unfailing certainty be said to have a real intellectual grasp. We see not merely that an inherent mutuality is authoritatively implied or revealed. We can see that it is intellectually impossible that it should be otherwise. We can see that eternal Personality, without mutual relation in itself, could not be eternal Personality after all.

This position is of great importance to us in more directions than one. In the first place it is the final and absolute answer to all those who might have been inclined to suppose that our primary insistence on the Unity of Deity was too sweeping in tone; and therefore unorthodox in the direction of Sabellianism. But the tendency of Sabellian thought is something widely different. This would conceive of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as diverse manifestations or aspects of one single God. He reveals Himself now as Father, now as Son, and now as Spirit. All three manifestations are true. But He who so diversely manifests Himself, is still one indistinguishable He. Now this may have some character of truth about it, up to a certain point, which it is wholly beyond our power to define. But there is one crucial defect about it, a defect which, for us, condemns the language as impossible. For it degrades the Persons of Deity into aspects. Now there can be no mutual relation between aspects. The heat and the light of flame cannot severally contemplate, and be in love with, one another. Whereas real mutuality,—mutuality which involves *on both sides* personal capacities,—is the one thing which we most unflinchingly assert.

But while we insist, in the most uncompromising way, upon the essential unity of God, it is well to remember that the solitariness of the unit is not the only, or the

highest form, under which we are capable of conceiving unity. The unity of all-comprehensive inclusiveness is a higher mode of unity than the unity of singular distinctiveness. And the form or mode under which the highest unity is in fact revealed to our imagination is that living unity, which absolutely requires some kind of distinctness as a *conditio sine qua non* for its own possibility, —the unity of infinite love. The unity is not the unity of number, but the unity of the Spirit. And it is as "the bond of peace, which is love" that the unity of the Spirit is characterized.[1]

But again, when we try to think of the supreme unity of the Spirit, as love, it is necessary to repeat the caution against allowing our imagination to interpret the words too exclusively in the light of present human experience. It is probable that to many of us the unity of love sounds far less real as unity than the unit of number, and that it may seem little less than a quibble of words to rank it, seriously, as unity, higher. Why so? Because our present experience is mainly of love between persons, whose absolute distinctness from one another we assume (and exaggerate in assuming) as the basis of love. Such distinctness, amounting to severance, we read into our conceptions of love, and so transfer it, with our conceptions of love, to any sphere, or relation, of which love is predicable. But this assumption of severance is precisely the assumption against which we feel ourselves free most emphatically to protest. This is once more to make the negation "is not" cardinal to the very idea of personality; while the extent and range of the "is not" are tacitly pressed far beyond any point at which they can be asserted legitimately. If it is to be logically allowed that any kind of distinctness, in any sense, involves the correlative possibility of the use of some kind of negation:

[1] Eph. iv. 3 with Col. iii. 14.

yet for us it is probably almost, if not quite, impossible to assert such a negative without over-asserting it.

Thus to say that the Father is not the Son, and that the Son is not the Spirit, whatever element there may be in it of truth—and of course there is truth in it,—is yet to say, to our apprehensions, too much. For each is God, the One God ; and all are inseparable.

You may say, no doubt, that the Father was not Incarnate. But the Son who was Incarnate, was the complete expression, in humanity, of the Father. He was the actual, and adequate, revelation of the Father,—the brightness of His glory, the express image of His Person. In flesh He could say of Himself, remonstrating with the blindness of His disciples, "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known Me, Philip? He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father,"[1] and "I and the Father are one."[2] It is difficult to see how words could go further in the assertion of veritable oneness; which yet is other than mere (and so to say) mechanical identity, not because such identity would be a more perfect form of oneness ; but because such identity, by destroying the possibility of mutual relation, would destroy the very basis of that highest oneness which is oneness in the Spirit of Love. It would substitute verbal tautology for a living unity. The unity, such as it was, would become a truism: but, as truism, it would be no longer worth asserting ; it would be unity, indeed, but without either meaning or life.

Again you may say that the Son did not descend at Pentecost. But the indwelling of the Spirit *is* the one possibility,—is the vital reality,—of the Son's indwelling. To have the Spirit is to have the Son. No one can have the Spirit, and not thereby have the Father and the Son: neither is there any other conceivable possibility of having

[1] John xiv. 9. [2] John x. 30.

the Father and the Son, save in, and as, personally indwelling Spirit. "If a man love Me, he will keep My word: and My Father will love him, and We will come unto him, and make our abode with him."[1] How? And so, further; "He that abideth in the teaching, the same hath both the Father and the Son."[2] Again how? This is the answer; "Hereby know we that we abide in Him, and He in us, *because He hath given us of His Spirit.*"[3] "Hereby we know that He abideth in us, *by the Spirit which He gave us.*"[4] It is thus that the statement that His withdrawal from them was for their advantage is fully explained and justified. "Nevertheless I tell you the truth; It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I go, I will send Him unto you."[5] It is thus that the promise of His own return to them is abundantly verified. "A little while and ye behold Me no more: and again a little while and ye shall see Me.[6] . . . ye therefore now have sorrow: but I will see you again and your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no man taketh from you."[7] "I will pray the Father, and He shall give you another Comforter, that He may be with you for ever, even the Spirit of Truth: whom the world cannot receive; for it beholdeth Him not, neither knoweth Him: ye know Him; for He abideth with you, and shall be in you. I will not leave you desolate: I come unto you. Yet a little while, and the world beholdeth Me no more; but ye behold Me: because I live, ye shall live also. In that day ye shall know that I am in My Father, and ye in Me, and I in you."[8]

Observe, it is not for an instant that the disciples are to have the presence of the Spirit *instead of* having the

[1] John xiv. 23. [2] 2 John 9. [3] 1 John iv. 13.
[4] 1 John iii. 24. [5] John xvi. 7. [6] John xvi. 16, 19.
[7] John xvi. 22. [8] John xiv. 16-20.

presence of the Son. But to have the Spirit *is* to have the Son. Again it is not for an instant that this is a sort of indirect or secondary mode of having the presence of the Son; as we, in our bodily existence in space and time, are forced into current phrases which make "presence in the spirit" a sort of apology or substitute (and sometimes a very lame one) for "reality" of presence: quite the contrary: this is the only mode of presence which could be quite absolutely direct, and primary, and real. Any presence of the Son other than this; any presence of the Son other than as Spirit, within, and as, ourselves, characterizing and constituting the very reality of what we ourselves are; would be, by comparison, remote, ineffective, unreal: nay, it would be, after all, a form of absence, a substitute for the presence which alone can be called true or real.

There are not, then, three separate spheres of spiritual operation upon us, which the good theologian is to be careful to demarcate exactly, and not confound: the sphere of the operation of the Father, and the sphere of the operation of the Son, and the sphere of the operation of the Holy Ghost.[1] The operation is the operation of One God, Father at once and Son: and both, in and through Spirit.

All these are truths which our minds very quickly outrun and obscure, finding that they have already understood far too much, whenever they make the apparently

[1] "Whatsoever God doth work, the hands of all three Persons are jointly and equally in it according to *the order of that connexion*, whereby they each depend upon other. And therefore albeit in that respect the Father be first, the Son next, the Spirit last, and consequently nearest unto every effect which groweth from all three, nevertheless, they all being of one essence, are likewise all of one efficacy. Dare any man unless he be ignorant altogether how inseparable the Persons of the Trinity are, persuade himself that every one of them may have their sole and several possessions, or that we being not partakers of all, can have fellowship with any one? Hooker, V. lvi. 5, p. 248.

obvious assertion (which in some sense, that is hard for us to limit adequately, no doubt represents Divine truth) that the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Holy Ghost. Indeed, even while we admit that there is a place, and a cogent necessity, for the negative assertion, we may perhaps legitimately doubt whether even the contradictory affirmative, (not as a substitute for, but as supplementing, the negative,) might not also, in its own way, express to thoughtful minds as much, or almost as much, of the incomprehensible completeness of the Being of God.

But to go back a little. There is another line of thought along which we are greatly helped by a firm grasp of the intellectual position that Personality which is supreme, all-inclusive, and eternal, must contain mutuality of relation within itself. For in the light of this thought we can see, in a way which is practically useful, the limit of the suggestiveness of even the most suggestive analogies in human consciousness, which have been used to illustrate the Divine Threefoldness in unity. Such analogies are, up to a certain point, of very real value. They have often served to make minds really see that there is more complexity in existence than their *primâ facie* logic had been prepared to tolerate, or admit to be possible. They have often given real glimpses of profound meaning to statements which had once been thought really meaningless. When St Augustine, expounding the Apostles' Creed, explains that the spring, and the river, and the glass of water drawn from the river, are alike one and the same, "water,"[1]—though the glassful is not the river, and the river is not the spring: or that the root, and the trunk, and the branches, are all one "wood,"—though the branches are not the trunk, nor the trunk the root: he is really, so far, helping minds to mental insight beyond and behind a difficulty, originated in the mind,

[1] *De fide et symbolo*, 17, pp. 73, 74.

which, if the mind were not helped, would have made belief impossible. But though they help the mind beyond its first confidently dogmatic incredulity, such analogies really carry the mind but a little way towards understanding the Trinity ; and clearly break to pieces if pressed too far.

And so with the more serious analogies of his formal treatise *De Trinitate*. There is the "Trinity" in man of (1) his own rational capacity, (2) his reflexive contemplation of his reason and himself reasoning, (3) the love which he feels for himself and the reason that is in him. There is the "Trinity" of memory, and reason, and will. Or, in outward acts of sight, there is (1) the visible object, (2) the impression thereof upon the eye, and (3) the conscious attention, which is the unifying of the other two. Or there is, in imaginative memory (1) the recalled impression of things seen or heard, (2) the consideration of them, (3) the recalling and considering will.[1]

Again, from other sides we are familiar with the old analogy of the family—man made at last complete as father, and mother, and child. Again, man at once is body, soul, and spirit. Again man is emotion, and reason, and will. Again man is rational and moral and spiritual, and in these three, is one. The very multiplicity of these analogies, while it does not show that they have had no use, is at least a caution against assigning any very high value to any of them. Each in its way is a suggestion, and possibly for the moment a really illuminating one.

[1] "As the sense of human personality grew deeper, particularly, as we have seen, under Christian influence, its triune character was generally recognized. Augustine marks an epoch in the subject, and is its best exponent. 'I exist,' he says, 'and I am conscious that I exist, and I love the existence and the consciousness; and all this independently of any external influence.' And again, 'I exist, I am conscious, I will. I exist as conscious and willing, I am conscious of existing and willing, I will to exist and to be conscious ; and these three functions, though distinct, are inseparable and form one life, one mind, one essence.'" Illingworth, B. L. III., p. 71.

But neither any one of them, nor (still less) all together, go far towards enabling uni-personal man to enter into the consciousness of Tri-Personality.

Moreover there is always a considerable danger about a line of thought which depends upon emphasizing distinction of qualities. If I distinguish a Trinity of Righteousness, Wisdom, and Love, I am not only substituting abstract for personal terms; but I make it exceedingly difficult to predicate Righteousness of Wisdom, or Wisdom of Righteousness, or either of these of Love, or Love of either of these. I may find indeed a new dialectical reason for the inseparableness of the Persons of the Trinity, and say, as many have said with Athanasius, that the Son must be coæval with the Father, because the Eternal Father can never have been sundered from His own Eternal Wisdom; but to say this involves the perilous consequence that the Eternal Father, if, or in so far as, He can in thought be distinguished from the Eternal Son, or the Eternal Spirit, must *vi terminorum* be distinguished also from Wisdom, and from Love. I have then not only substituted a term which does not suggest personality; but I have destroyed the possibility of a personal interpretation of my term. The three terms cannot rightly be distinguished as being severally Righteousness, Wisdom, and Love; when Righteousness, Wisdom, and Love must of necessity be predicated of every one of the three terms severally. Perhaps no one can read the orations against the Arians without feeling the difficulty under which Athanasius laboured, in having to deal with thoughts of this character without the illuminating assistance of the word Personality.[1]

The suggestions then which have been quoted do not carry us more than a little way. In comparison with the vagueness of suggestions like these, we are touching firm

[1] *See* Note A, at the end of the chapter.

ground intellectually, when we assert the necessity of mutuality of relation in the Being of God; and certainly there is not one of these illustrations which adequately realizes what we mean by mutuality.

Then there is another illustration, which is put forward on somewhat different ground, as necessary to thought. "We shall see," writes Mr Illingworth, "that human personality is essentially triune, not because its chief functions are three—thought, desire, and will—for they might perhaps conceivably be more, but because it consists of a subject, an object, and their relation. A person is, as we have seen, a subject who can become an object to himself, and the relation of these two terms is necessarily a third term."[1] But even of this statement, however true it may be as far as it goes, I think we shall feel that it has carried us but a very little way towards realizing the conception of a threefoldness of personality, in which subject is also object, and object is also subject, and the logical relation between them is itself both. And yet, even at the very moment that our imagination necessarily stops short of it, we can see intellectually that (whether it be in Twofoldness or Threefoldness, or more) it is precisely this relation of personal mutuality, and nothing less than this, which our own intellectual necessity requires.

The difficulty no doubt, with all analogies is their limitedness; and all these fail alike in that they all give us aspects or relations which, however intelligible as aspects or relations, are not personal; and are not mutually subject and object to one another.

There is however one other analogy or illustration, on which I should like to dwell a little further. It does not transcend this inevitable limitation. It is not therefore adequate. It will not perform the impossible requirement of making Tri-Personality intelligible, as from within, to

[1] Bampton Lectures, III. p. 69.

uni-personal consciousness. And yet there are directions in which it appears to me to throw somewhat more light upon this mystery of thought, than the analogies which have been more familiarly used. This is the threefoldness which is involved whenever I describe or distinguish what a man is in the following relations. First, then, there is the man as he really is in himself, invisible, indeed, and inaccessible,—and yet, directly, the fountain, origin, and cause of everything that can be called in any sense himself. Secondly, there is himself as projected into conditions of visibleness,—the overt expression or utterance of himself. This, under the conditions of our actual experience, will mean for the most part his expression or image as body,—the touch of his hand, the tone of his voice, the shining of his eye, the utterance of his words: all, in a word, that makes up, to us, that outward expression of himself, which we call himself, and which he himself ordinarily recognizes as the very mirror and image and reality of himself. And thirdly, there is the reply of what we call external nature to him—his operation or effect. There is the painting, or the Cathedral, which expresses the very spirit of artist or architect,—the palpable realization of his secret vision within. There is the deathless poem of the poet: the regenerated people —which is the work of the noble politician's life of sacrifice: there is the sublime insight of the inspired theologian which has become the daily light of the life of tens of thousands: there is the devoted love in the hearts of others which has sprung up in them as inevitable response, kindled by the devotion of his love to them. In a word, there is the echo or image of himself, responsive to himself, which comes back to him, as from without: the response of outside objects to himself: or rather his own response which he has wrought out to himself, in, and out of, that which had been, or had seemed to be, beyond, and

apart from, himself. There is that effect, or extension, of himself, by which what had been distinguishable from himself, comes to be wholly informed by, and alive with, and therefore a real expression or method of, himself. It is he himself, by virtue of what he is within himself,—but by virtue of it as exerted, expressed, or uttered,—who has really had the power of so informing and wielding that which seemed outside himself, that it too has become a response to his utterance,—the response which he himself has wrought,—and, so far as its capacity extends, an image therefore also of what he himself is.

The music of the musician: the poetry of the poet: the work which the devoted pastor has wrought: there are times at least in which we feel that in these we come nearer to the man's very self than is, in any other way, even conceivable. At the least, no conception of himself, could be anything approaching to adequate or complete, of which such things did not form—not a part only but a very overshadowing and vital element. And meanwhile in the larger thought of himself which includes these things, and dwells with special emphasis on the thought of his operation, not as external effect which as such has ceased to be himself, but as his self-wrought work of response to himself, in which himself is the more perfected and magnified; there do seem to be at least suggestive glimpses such as give real help to the mind, if not towards grasping Tri-Personal consciousness, at least towards an intelligent conception of the Divine reality of the Holy Ghost.

It will be felt, however, with some justice, that apart from other criticisms to which this analogy (like others) may be liable: it is impossible that any analogy can be really adequate which would find a perfect mirror of the Trinity in any form of strictly uni-personal consciousness or work. No analysis of what is contained within a

solitary consciousness, however suggestive, can possibly be adequate. This is why the "family" analogy, rough and external as it is in itself, has yet a valuable place among analogies. For in fact no man's personality is complete in himself, or in anything that is solely regarded as an operation of himself. It is in the reflexive correspondence of other personalities that any man approaches his own completeness. The more truly he is echoed and reproduced in others, the more nearly does he approach to the complete possibility of himself. Perhaps for this very reason an analogy which introduces his operation and effect, especially when conceived in the form of the regeneration of others, is more hopeful than any analogy which avowedly consists in analysis of his solitary consciousness. But no analogy drawn from an imperfect personality can truly mirror the Trinity of God. And every personality *is* imperfect, which is not yet consummated (in a way we can but dimly foreshadow) in *mutual* relation; that is, as perfectly echoed and complemented in the personality of others.

I do not know, meanwhile, whether the attempt to make use of such suggestiveness as the word response may contain, will have been felt just now by any one to be open to objection, on the ground that it does not obviously lead us to the doctrine of the Personality of the Holy Ghost. It does in fact lead us further in this direction, a good deal, than many words which are in familiar and helpful use. But it seems worth while to enter some protest against allowing such a consideration as this to come in for the present, at all. The doctrine of the Personality of the Holy Ghost, however dutifully accepted, is in no case a doctrine that is easy to be intellectually understood. It is almost certainly a mistake to let a doctrine of this kind, which is certainly true, but which we can, at the best, but imperfectly apprehend,

come in to deter us from dwelling upon those aspects of the nature and work of the Spirit, which are also true, and which our intelligence can more definitely follow. Thus the Holy Spirit is not less "a gift," because a gift is not itself a personal term. We undoubtedly do well to make the most of the lower aspects of the truth, if only that we may go on from them to the higher. The truth that He is Personal, is certainly not to warn us off from such conceptions about Him as are to us most naturally intelligible. If we are ever to reach a higher understanding, we shall do well to give full scope and play to the lower first. Whatever would for us be true of the Spirit,—as gift, as inspiration, as empowerment,—if the Spirit were rightly spoken of always and only in the neuter gender as αὐτὸ, is certainly no less true, even if at many points it may be felt to be inadequate, when we advance further on towards realizing, as well as avowing, that He is indeed Αὐτός.

It may be worth while to emphasize this insistence by dwelling for a few moments upon a parallel instance of its importance. When minds are at work, not upon the mystery of Tri-Personality, but upon the primary Theistic truth of the Personal Being of God: there are stages at which an antithesis will present itself to the imagination between the comparative limitedness of the personal conception, and the grand immensity of the impersonal. Such a sense of contrast is perfectly natural to minds which approach the question of Theism from the region of abstract philosophical thought; and still more to those which approach it from the region of physical science. Either Existence, First cause, ultimate Unity, etc., on the one hand, or on the other Law, Energy, Harmony, perhaps even such pervading principles as ether, or electricity, seem indefinitely vaster than anything which experience of the word personality suggests. The fact is that we

have no direct experience of personality except as expressed by man—with and through a material stature and strength which we feel to be comparatively contemptible. And at a certain stage of imagination, it is almost impossible to get rid of the instinct of measuring personality by men's bodily stature, conceiving of it as if it necessarily existed in about six-foot lengths of matter. No wonder that the lightning should seem to be, as a conception, indefinitely larger than such a conception of personality as this.

Now it need hardly be said that at the stage at which such abstract words as Energy or Law seem immeasurably to transcend the limitedness of the personal conception, it would be most unwise to try to press any man's mind into nevertheless accepting such a misconception as would be involved, to him, in the unexplained proposition that God is Personal. It is precisely because the proposition has presented itself thus to their minds, that many men have felt that their intellectual self-respect absolutely required the rejection of the proposition. We do not rise to the true idea of God by clinging tight, at any and every stage, to a personal form of statement into which we can put no intelligible meaning.

On the contrary, it is often definitely helpful, even amongst people who have no doubt of the doctrine, and are, in intention and life, quite definitely religious, to drop for a time the personal, and substitute for it the abstract, form of phrase. We may do it a little even with such scientific abstractions as Force or Law. Much more do we help ourselves by doing it with the religious abstractions Omnipotence, Wisdom, Righteousness, Perfectness, Love. "Love is my shepherd:" "I believe in the Almightiness of Goodness:" "I am sure of the pardon of Righteousness:" "I commit myself to perfect Wisdom:" "I will try to feel

trust in the lovingness of Love itself:" the habit of dwelling upon such thoughts as these, substituting in each case an abstract term for the personal name of God, would on the one hand utterly make impossible some of the commonplaces of devout, but unintelligent, religion. No one would continue to say "There is One above"—as though in certain somewhat higher regions of space, amongst the tens of thousands, or millions, of existences, there was to be found "one" who did this, or willed that, or had to be, in one way or another, attended or submitted to. No one would ever say "It is our duty to submit"—as though to a tyrant will, which it was morally, as well as materially, prudent not to challenge. "Submit" to perfect Wisdom! "Be resigned" to perfect Love! No one would set himself, on imperfect and unworthy conceptions of prayer, to try and bend the will of God to his own: as though God needed information, or guidance, or urging, that He might know what was wise, or might become what was kind! On the other hand such a habit would itself be a stage towards the mental realization that these abstractions themselves, so far from really transcending personality, or being wider than it in range or inclusiveness, were but several elements within the ultimate meaning of personality itself. It is through accustoming itself to them, and to thought in terms of them, that the mind would gradually realize, with a more and more complete and instinctive fulness, that every one of these —Law, Power, Cause, ultimate Being, Reason, Wisdom, Holiness, Love,—and, others like these—of necessity is, in its ultimate climax of meaning, Personal: and moreover that as they all are severally Personal, so are they ultimately all the same one, identical, Personal: and that this is what we mean by the Personal God: not a limited alternative to unlimited abstracts: but the transcendent and inclusive completeness of them all.

Now just as in this case we prepare ourselves for a very much higher appreciation of Personality, by dropping for a time the personal language, and speaking not of He and Him, but of qualities or properties, which at least are not, as such, obviously personal: so in respect of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, it is at least more than possible that we may ultimately gain, not lose, in richness, by keeping the doctrine that He is Personal for a while, as doctrine, in the background; not using it to crush or d sallow our more rudimentary apprehensions of the work of the Spirit, whether regarded as gift or as response; but rather reserving it to be, in ways which we may, or may not, fully understand, their ultimate climax and crown.

No one then should ever refuse, or treat with suspicion, any meaning which he may seem to himself to attach to the "Spirit of God," on the ground that such meaning may appear to ignore His several Personality, and realize Him less as Person than as quality. Incomplete it is bound to be. But doubtless it is, so far as it goes, a perfectly true and significant line of thought. Let us give all the meaning that we possibly can to the presence of the Spirit of God as "It." Let us lose no item of the significance which we are capable of attaching to the thought of God's Spirit as gift, as influence, as quality, as echo, as effect. Let us freely pursue any such line of thought as is suggested by saying that to imagine God without the Holy Spirit is to imagine Him, *per impossibile*, as so contained within Himself as wholly to be without operation or effect. By and by, it may be, we shall rise beyond these things;—but we shall rise by and through these things, and not through evacuating or disallowing them,—to understand, with greater fulness, or with less, that the influence or quality, the operation or effect, the echo or response, is itself also Personal:

Personal as the Personal Presence of God,—in God Himself, for His Spirit is Himself, and He "is Spirit": Personal moreover, as the Personal Presence of God—in all creatures made by Himself responsive to Himself, as in the order or beauty of inanimate nature: Personal moreover, as the Personal Presence of God, more wonderfully still, in all created spirits, made capable by Himself of personal response to Himself; Personal in their possibility of spontaneous homage, their answer to God of Divine contemplation and love; Personal as the inmost constitutive reality of their God-echoing personalities.

When we present to ourselves, in any such manner as this, the thought of God the Holy Spirit: at all events when we think of Him at all thus in relation to man: it is clear that we are thinking of what is, in fact, a result of the Incarnation. It is thus indeed, as sequel and consummation of the accomplished completeness of the Incarnation, that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit begins to be unveiled to man's thought at all: as sequel, because the manifestation of the Holy Ghost must follow, and could not precede, the Incarnate Life of God: as consummation, because the significance and work of Incarnation and of atonement would be after all, without the Presence of the Holy Ghost, (that is, the Presence of God as Spirit within man's central self,) incomplete. And if it is in, and through, and for the necessary completeness of, *the Incarnation* (as it is), that the doctrine of the Holy Ghost first begins (and begins at first incidentally in manner enough) to be presented to human consciousness at all: the reflection that this is so may perhaps encourage us to consider, somewhat more fully, to what an extent it is true that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity altogether is revealed in connection with, and (if we may venture to say so) in terms of, the Incarnation. If it is thus that the doctrine of God the Holy Ghost first presents

itself as a sequel to, or element in, the full meaning of the mystery of Incarnation, still more, of course, is it in and through Incarnation that the Person of God, the Word, is revealed to man. It is of course a mere truism to say this. And yet we may hardly have recognized to what an extent this mere truism may justify the further suggestion, that the terminology under which the great Revelation of the Trinity is made, in its final and most authoritative form, is terminology which, as terminology, is conditioned by the fact of the Incarnation.

"Baptizing them into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." In context with our present thought, can we refrain from recognizing that it is through, and out of, rather than irrespectively of, the conditions and significance of Incarnation, that the Second Person of the adorable Trinity is revealed specifically under the title "Son": and the Third Person specifically under the title "Ghost" or "Spirit"? It is hardly necessary, I hope, in saying this, to guard beforehand against being supposed to suggest that it is only in the Incarnation, or as result from it, that God the Son, or God the Holy Ghost, have reality of Personal distinguishableness from God the Father. Not so. The Three Persons of Godhead are co-eternal. Nevertheless, whatever profoundly true relation to the eternal distinctions between the Persons of Godhead may have been represented—first by the historical facts of Incarnation, and secondly by the terms which are correlative to those facts: what is suggested is that the terms in which the truths are expressed (as distinguished from the ultimate reality of the truths which lie behind those terms) are terms which rise more immediately out of the temporal facts of the Incarnation, than out of the Eternal relations of Divine Being. The words "Father" and "Son" are, of course, mutually correlative words. Moreover it is plain that these words, as used in human

language, present themselves to human understanding, as a metaphor borrowed from human experience.

It is worth while to justify, for a moment, the use of the word metaphor, because the word has been abused and is justly suspected: and the use and abuse need to be carefully and accurately distinguished. If, for example, our Lord's words in the third or sixth of St John, are explained as "metaphor"; this often means that they are explained away, as having a certain resemblance or analogy to truth, *instead of* being really true themselves. This of course is wholly illegitimate. The mistake arises as a result of a tacit (but false) assumption that a metaphorical truth is *ipso facto* "less true" than what we call a literal one. The fact is that almost every word of deep spiritual import is a metaphor: that is to say, is expressed in terms of a likeness drawn immediately from material things. It is so with "sin"; it is so with "grace"; it is so with "justification." "Blessed are they that do hunger and thirst after righteousness" is a metaphor or analogy from material starvation. But it is a disastrous, though deeply ingrained error, to assume that the material experiences are absolutely, and the spiritual only relatively, and less really, true: or that the meaning of the words in a material context is the true gauge and measure of their meaning when spiritually applied. This instinct is nearly the precise reverse of truth. The material experience is as a sort of parable or hint which serves to suggest a term for describing the spiritual. But the term, as borrowed for spiritual use, means something not less, but far more, than ever it meant in the material sphere: the spiritual significance outruns the material, not only in width of content, but in profoundness of truth. Spiritual hunger may be rarer than material among men who are still largely animal: but spiritual hunger, where realized, is more

overwhelming, more intense, more real, *as hunger*, than physical decay for lack of food. And it would be obviously fatuous to measure the awful significance of such metaphorical words as sin, or judgment, or grace, or spirit, by the meaning which the words once bore in material experience; though the words were borrowed from material experience, and their material meaning served as the first suggestion by which some expression was given to the spiritual idea.

It is plain, then, that in the legitimate sense of the word, the correlative terms "Father" and "Son" are words of metaphor; that is to say, that the words, in human use, have their primary significance in the region of human experience: and that all other uses are based upon, and borrowed from, however completely they may transcend, this. And the same of course is obviously true of the *word* Πνεῦμα, Spirit, or Breath. It follows from this that however illuminating, on some sides, may be the revelation which the words contain: it is true also that men's minds have always to be on their guard against being misled by the words. They are clearly capable of being interpreted amiss. And it is notorious that, as a matter of fact, men's minds have found very considerable difficulty in guarding adequately against some misconceptions, which have been chiefly suggested by the words. It was an old problem to find illustrative instances which would show how an effect might be neither later, nor lesser, than its cause. But however complete may have been the success of theological teachers in this direction, it can hardly be doubted that the problem was caused by the extreme difficulty, to human thought, of using the terms "Father" and "Son" at all, without projecting too materially, across the conception of the Eternal Being of God, the shadow of the associations of these human words; without (that is to

say) carrying both the distinction which the words imply between the two, and the inferiority and posteriority of the one to the other, much further than they ought to be carried.

Now I cannot but suggest that this difficulty, which has been felt in all ages of the Church, is materially lightened, if we are willing to recognize that the terms themselves, as applied to the Persons of the Godhead, have their primary reference rather to the manifestation of God in the Incarnation and its outflowing consequences, than to the Eternal relations regarded in themselves. I say their primary reference; because it would seem impossible for a Christian to doubt that there must be that in the Eternal relations of the First and the Second Persons of the Trinity, with which the words "Father" and "Son" have a real and legitimate correspondence; even if it be true that these words, being primarily occasioned by the conditions which the fact of Incarnation established, might seem by themselves to overstate to our imaginations that Eternal relation with which they nevertheless profoundly correspond. For the most part it is difficult to test such a suggestion as this by the language of the New Testament; because the mighty fact of the Incarnation so absolutely dominates the entire revelation of the New Testament, and characterizes and shapes all its thought and language; that it is comparatively rarely that we can, in the New Testament, stand aside (so to speak) in thought or even in phrase, from that one dominating conception. But it is certainly very significant, that in the one passage which, more clearly than any other, goes back behind the fact of the Incarnation, or the consciousness of the Incarnate, to speak of the eternal relations, as such, within the eternal existence of Deity,—that is to say, the first fourteen verses of the Gospel of St John,—the word "Son" (and with it the correlative word "Father") does drop out altogether,

and another word takes its place. It will be recognized at once that the title Λόγος, or Word, while it is full indeed of its own mysterious significance, is wholly without the strong suggestions—of sharp distinction and emphatic subordination—which it is so hard to separate from the words Father and Son, so long as they are thought of as descriptive primarily of the Eternal, rather than of the Incarnate, relations.

But what is it that is practically meant, in the many familiar contexts of the New Testament which will occur to our minds, by emphasizing this prominence of the idea of Incarnation, as that to which the words primarily refer, and in which they find their directest and most unqualified fulness of significance? It is that the Fatherhood of God is, in the most unqualified directness and inclusiveness of that word, towards *man*; and that Sonship, as predicated of God, is predicated most absolutely and unreservedly of God *quâ Incarnate*. If then we should venture to paraphrase the great Name of God—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,—describing the Threefoldness thus; viz. God, the Eternal, the Infinite, in His Infinity, as Himself; God, as self-expressed within the nature and faculties of man, body, soul, and spirit,—the consummation, and interpretation, and revelation, of what true Manhood means and is, in its very truth, that is, in its true relation to God; God, as Spirit of Beauty and Holiness—the Beauty and Holiness which are Himself—present in things created animate and inanimate, and constituting in them their Divine response to God; constituting above all in created personalities, the full reality of their personal response: we should be expressing, not indeed the whole truth of the Being of God, which no words of ours can express, but at least a conception which is absolutely true as far as it goes; and moreover the sort of conception which is probably most intelligible to us,—and intelligible exactly

along the lines suggested by the Three Names selected, in human language, to constitute an intelligible revelation to human thought.[1]

The important thing to observe, for our present practical purpose, is that to speak, in one phrase, of God in His eternal self-existence, and of God Incarnate as man—a revelation to man at once of God's nature and of man's relation to God—is by no means altogether the same thing as to speak of the First Person in the eternal relation of Divine Being, and of the Second Person in the eternal relation of Divine Being: and moreover that the correlative phrases Father and Son, whatever analogy they may have with the eternal distinctions of Deity, do not correspond with, or give expression to, these eternal distinctions, quite so directly, or closely, or unreservedly, as to the relations between God the Eternal and God the Incarnate, between God as God, and God as Man.

And if this is true, or even partly true, of the terms in which the Divine Name is revealed to the Church, to be its formula, on earth, of Baptismal admission and distinctively Christian blessing: still more is this thought true, and emphasized as true, when the phrase used is not so much "from God the Father, and from God the Son," as rather "from God our Father and from the Lord Jesus Christ." Here it is unmistakably the Human designation,—with whatever august associations of awe and worship—upon which the emphasis is laid. And as a matter of fact, it is this form, which, with comparatively few exceptions, is the characteristic formula of the New Testament. This emphasis upon the Incarnation is sufficiently marked, when the formula is threefold, as in the familiar words of benediction—"The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be

[1] *See* Note B, at the end of the Chapter.

with you all."[1] It is really more marked still, in the still more familiar repetition of a twofold formula,—"Yet to us there is One God the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto Him; and One Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through Him."[2] "To offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God through Jesus Christ."[3] "To the only God our Saviour, through Jesus Christ our Lord, be glory, majesty, dominion, and power, before all time and now, and for ever more. Amen."[4] It is the new relation, in the Person of Jesus Christ, at once of God to Man, and of Man to God (not the Eternal relation between God and the Λόγος), which is before the thought throughout the Epistle to the Ephesians—"Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ."[5] . . . "having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto Himself,"[6] . . . "according to His good pleasure which He purposed in Him . . . to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens, and the things upon the earth."[7] . . . "God being rich in mercy . . . quickened us together with Christ, . . . made us to sit with Him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus . . . for we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God afore prepared. . . . Now in Christ Jesus ye that once were far off are made nigh in the blood of Christ."[8] . . . "according to the eternal purpose which He purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord."[9] . . . "to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye may be filled unto all the fulness of God."[10] . . . "unto Him be the glory in the Church and in Christ Jesus unto all generations for ever and ever."[11] "There is One Body and One Spirit, even as also ye were called in one hope of your

[1] 2 Cor. xiii. 14. [2] 1 Cor. viii. 6. [3] 1 Pet. ii. 5.
[4] Jude 25. [5] Eph. i. 3. [6] Eph. i. 5.
[7] Eph. i. 9-10. [8] Eph. ii. 4, 5, 6, 10, 13. [9] Eph. iii. 11.
[10] Eph. iii. 19. [11] Eph. iii. 21.

calling; One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all."[1] "Even as God also in Christ forgave you."[2] "Hath any inheritance in the Kingdom of Christ and God."[3] "Giving thanks always for all things in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ to God, even the Father"[4] . . . "as servants of Christ doing the will of God from the heart."[5]

In context with all these phrases there can be little doubt as to the exact significance of the salutations with which this epistle both opens and closes; "Grace to you and peace from God our Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ."[6] "Peace be to the brethren, and love with faith, from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ. Grace be with all them that love our Lord Jesus Christ in uncorruptness."[7] St Paul's thought is not upon the Eternal relations of Deity, as such. His thought is upon the master-fact of the Incarnation of God. It would not be nearly so correct to paraphrase his words as a blessing "from the First and from the Second Persons of the Eternal Trinity" as rather "from God the Eternal and from the Incarnate, both God and Man; in whom the Fatherhood of God and the Sonship of Man, were ideally consummated, and perfectly revealed." It is the expression of Deity in Humanity, it is the inconceivable glorification of Humanity, as a true and worthy expression of Deity, it is, in a word, the Incarnation, which absolutely dominates all these thoughts and all these phrases from one end of the epistle to the other. And the "Spirit" is the direct outcome of the Incarnation, the Spiritual relation which the Incarnation has made possible, the realization and presence of the Incarnate within the selves of men. "Christ in whom, having believed, ye were sealed with the

[1] Eph. iv. 4-6. [2] Eph. iv. 32. [3] Eph. v. 5.
[4] Eph. v. 20. [5] Eph. vi. 6. [6] Eph. i. 2.
[7] Eph. vi. 23-24.

Holy Spirit of promise which is an earnest of our inheritance";—[1] . . . "that the God, of our Lord Jesus Christ the Father of glory may give unto you a spirit (δώῃ ὑμῖν πνεῦμα) of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Him."[2] . . . "for through Him we both have our access in one Spirit unto the Father"[3] . . . "in whom ye also are builded together for a habitation of God in [the] Spirit"[4] (ἐν πνεύματι). . . . "that ye may be strengthened with power through His Spirit in the inward man, that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith,"[5] "giving diligence to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. There is One Body and One Spirit."[6] "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God in whom ye were sealed unto the day of redemption."[7] "Be filled with the Spirit."[8] "The sword of the Spirit which is the word of God."[9] . . . "with all prayer and supplication praying at all seasons in the Spirit."[10]

And if this sort of insistence be true in respect of the Epistle to the Ephesians, it will be true also in respect of the same forms of Christian salutation wherever they occur. But the connection of thought is itself established so inveterately and clearly, that we catch the echo of it, with more or less directness of expression, in the opening verses of almost every single epistle of the New Testament. "Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." These words occur, with hardly a variation, at the opening of the Epistles to the Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, 2 Thessalonians, Titus and Philemon. With the addition of mercy, "Grace *mercy* and peace," the same formula holds for 1 and 2 Timothy. 1 Thessalonians varies only by a change of order "unto the Church of the Thessalonians in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ: grace to you and peace." Of all

[1] Eph. i. 13, 14. [2] Eph. i. 17. [3] Eph. ii. 18.
[4] Eph. ii. 22. [5] Eph. iii. 16, 17. [6] Eph. iv. 3, 4.
[7] Eph. iv. 30. [8] Eph. v. 18. [9] Eph. vi. 17.
[10] Eph. vi. 18.

St Paul's epistles only that to the Colossians contains (in the revised text) as formula of salutation "Grace to you and peace from God our Father." But even there the very next verse proceeds "We give thanks to God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, praying always for you, having heard of your faith in Christ Jesus"; and throughout the epistle the doctrine is unmistakably the same as that of the Ephesians. The Epistle to the Hebrews contains no salutation: but the opening verses are a splendid statement of the doctrine of the revelation of the eternal God "at the end of the days" in the person of "a Son" (margin of R.V.) who is at once the perfect image of the glory of the Eternal, and also the atoning Man. St James writes as "the servant of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ." St Peter as an "apostle of Jesus Christ . . . according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, in sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ"; and again as "a servant and apostle of Jesus Christ, to them that have obtained a like precious faith with us in the righteousness of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ: grace to you and peace be multiplied in the knowledge of God and of Jesus our Lord." St John writes his general epistle because "our fellowship is with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ"; and sends greeting to the "elect lady," "grace, mercy, peace, shall be with us, from God the Father, and from Jesus Christ the Son of the Father." St Jude "a servant of Jesus Christ" writes "to them that are called, beloved in God the Father, and kept for Jesus Christ: mercy unto you, and peace and love be multiplied."

What is the meaning of the perpetual recurrence of these titles? Why is everything, from end to end of the Church life in the New Testament, and in the mouth of every single writer, consistently in the Name of "God our

Father and the Lord Jesus Christ"? Why is it always these two? why is it that in only one single instance, that of 1 Peter, is there any explicit mention of the Spirit in immediate juxtaposition with these two? Is it a maimed Trinitarian formula? The fact is that the thought which dominates the minds of the apostolic writers is not so much the thought of the Eternal Threefoldness of the Being of God: they are not thinking directly of the doctrine of the Trinity as such: they are not thinking of the Being of Godhead as such: but they are thinking of the transcendent fact of the Incarnation of Deity in flesh. The whole horizon of their thought is immediately occupied by the thought of God, in His Eternity, and God, in His Incarnation. They are not speaking of Two Persons of the Trinity, with the omission of the Third. They are not speaking of Persons of the Trinity, as such, at all. The second term of their thought is not God the Eternal Λόγος, but God incarnated as man: the flawless expression, *in Human nature*, of God. Now however much it may be said that the Eternal Word, and the Incarnate Christ, are personally One: it is quite clear that the two terms are not simply interchangeable. The Word was not Incarnate from Eternity. And though every attribute of the Eternal Word is predicable of the Incarnate personally; it is of course not true that every such attribute is predicable of Him *as Incarnate*. If the Infinite expresses Himself in conditions of finiteness; that finiteness does not itself bear the predicates of infinitude. It is, then, expressly of the infinite, as finitely expressed; it is of the Incarnate, as incarnate; it is of the Human revelation of God; it is of the transformation of the meaning of Humanity which results from the revelation of its capacity of expressing God, and is guaranteed to it in the fact, independent of age, of the actual consummation of that expression; it is of the Divine victory in Humanity,—the Divine con-

secration of Humanity for ever; it is of this, and not directly at all of the eternal relations within Divine Being, that their imagination is wholly full, when they write all their writings, and think all their thoughts, in the Name of "God our Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ."

Moreover there is another direction, in which we may venture to say that the term the Divine Logos, and the term Jesus Christ our Lord, are not, as terms, simply identical. The Logos indeed "became flesh." But having become flesh, He was man:—man to eternity, in the highest perfection—which is also the revelation and true measure—of what manhood ideally means: man, for a brief term of years, under all the extremest disabilities of material and mortal life. The central characteristic of His manhood, as revealed in mortal life, was the absoluteness of His relation of dependence upon God. Now it is not at all necessary to say, either on the one hand, that the Person of God Incarnate was wholly distinct from the Person of the Eternal Father and the Eternal Spirit—seeing that they are inseparably One: or, on the other hand, that the Son of Man, in His revelation of man's true relation of absolute dependence upon God, was dependent upon the First Person of the Blessed Trinity only, in a sort of imaginary separableness, and not also upon the Word and the Spirit.[1] It is no objection to this, and is proof of no confusion of thought, if it involves the explicit statement that He was, on earth, dependent upon Himself. For the statement that His dutiful dependence, in mortality, was dependence on Himself, is a statement which is any-

[1] My attention has been drawn to the following sentence, which might often, I believe, have an important application amongst ourselves:

"Cur æqualis et una Trinitas? *Responsio.* Quia et sempiterna est in ipsa Trinitate deitas. Rogo, non animadvertis omnes pæne hæreses in hoc titulo unitam deitatem Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti blasphemare, dum hæc quæ superius uniter in Trinitate sunt dicta ad unam Personam Patris illi tantummodo conferant?" *Vigilii Tapsensis de Trinitate*, Lib. i. 201, p. 239, Migne.

how undeniably true, with whatever intellectual mystery it may be thought to involve, from the moment at which it is said that He was, as man, dependent upon "God."

There is one thought more, which the subject of the present chapter requires. We had occasion to ask just now, Why is it that the formula which is so characteristic of Christian thought in the apostolic age, seems to be made up of Two terms rather than Three? Is it an imperfect formula which omits the doctrine of the Holy Spirit? On one side the question has been already answered. It is not an imperfect formula as to the Being of God, for it is not a formula as to the Being of God at all. But does it even, in fact, omit the doctrine of the Holy Spirit? On the contrary, it implies it. "Grace and peace, from the Eternal God, and particularly from His Revelation and victorious work as Man, in flesh,—*to you!*" This grace, this peace, no longer only in the Person of Jesus Christ;—but through the Person of Jesus Christ, *to you*, and *in you:* What is this but Christ in you? And how Christ in you,—save in, and as, Spirit? Christ in you, or the Spirit of Christ in you; these are not different realities; but the one is the method of the other. It is in the Person of Christ that the Eternal God is revealed in manhood, to man. It is in the Person of His Spirit that the Incarnate Christ is Personally present within the spirit of each several man. The Holy Ghost is mainly revealed to us as the Spirit *of the Incarnate.* If it once be conceded that the revelation of the Holy Ghost is a revelation of the new Testament, not of the Old: it will be obvious that that revelation in the New Testament is made, not as an independent or separate vista into truth, but as a sort of necessary sequel or climax to the meaning of Incarnation, at the moment when Incarnation proper, that is, the life lived by God the Son in flesh, upon earth, was immediately drawing to its close. The

meaning of Incarnation was not exhausted;—there is a sense in which it may be said to have hardly yet begun;—when Jesus Christ passed away from this visible scene of mortal life. That real significance of Incarnation, hardly then as yet begun, is to be recognized not more directly in the contemplation of the Presence of the Son of Man in Heaven—with all that that contemplation carries in its train;—than in the recognition of the Presence and working here on earth, of the Spirit of the Incarnation and of the Incarnate.

The Spirit of the Incarnate is the Spirit of God. But it is not so much the Spirit of God, regarded in His eternal existence, or relation, in the Being of Deity: it is the Spirit of God in Humanity, the Spirit of God become the Spirit of man in the Person of the Incarnate,—become thenceforward the true interpretation and secret of what true manhood really is,[1]—it is this which is the distinctive revelation of the New Testament, the distinctive significance and life of the Church of Christ. This is the truth, immense in its significance for practical Christianity, which the so-called doctrine of the "Double Procession" directly protects; and which the denial of that doctrine tends directly to impair. It may be that the removal of the "Filioque" from the Nicene creed, would not necessarily imply a denial of the doctrine: but there can at least be little doubt, historically speaking, that the "Filioque" has served, to the doctrine, as a bulwark of great importance.

It becomes, then, of considerable importance, to take full note of the passages in which the Spirit of God, become

[1] This is what Dr Milligan means when he says, in somewhat obscure and questionable phrases, that "the Spirit bestowed upon us by the glorified Lord is *not the Third Person of the Trinity in the soleness of the Personality* possessed by Him before the foundations of the world were laid," or again, "*not the Third Person of the Trinity in His absolute and metaphysical existence*, but that Person as He is mediated by the Son, who is human as well as divine." *The Ascension of our Lord*, pp. 172 and 189. (*The italics are mine.*)

the Spirit of the Christ, is spoken of directly as the Spirit of Christ. It is of course not necessary that this should be the only form of phrase. The Spirit of Christ *is* the Spirit of God. To speak of Him as the Spirit of God does not exclude in any way the interpretation that He is mediated by Christ: that He is the Spirit of God become the Spirit of man in the Person of Christ. But to speak of Him as the Spirit of Christ does interpret the phrases which speak of Him simply as the Spirit of God. As a prelude to such passages (which are well known) it may be desirable to call attention to the very remarkable words which serve as the climax and close of the great High Priestly prayer of the 17th of St John. "I" that is, the Incarnate, "made known unto them Thy name, and will make it known; that the love wherewith Thou lovedst Me may be in them, and I in them." What is this love wherewith the Father loved His own Son? How can the very love of the Father to the Son, be itself the animating love of the Son's disciples? And how is it that that indwelling presence of the very love of the Father towards the Son seems to be spoken of as so closely identified with,—perhaps we should say as itself actually being—the indwelling presence of the Person of the Incarnate? Nothing but extreme familiarity could blind us to the wonder, and exceeding awfulness, of words like these. I do not now go back again over the language of the 14th, 15th, and 16th chapters: but at least it is well to remember that all these chapters are the prelude which leads up to the 17th; and that the close of the 17th is the close of them all. Take with these His action on the night after the Resurrection, when the work of the Incarnation, in its first part on earth, is complete; and when He is therefore, by an act of significant symbolism, handing on or passing over to them, for continuance as their Spirit, the Spirit which had been His own. He breathed on them, and saith unto them,

"Receive ye [the] Holy Ghost"—(λάβετε πνεῦμα ἅγιον). This is not the action of one who, by prayer, would invoke upon them, a Spirit which is not of, or from, Himself: it is the symbolism rather of one who would transfer to them the very Spirit which animates—which may be said to *be* —Himself.

It is, then, in precise agreement with this that the later phrases of the New Testament speak. The Spirit of God is now the Spirit of Christ. The Presence of the Spirit is Christ. The Presence of the Christ is Spirit. "They assayed to go into Bithynia; *and the Spirit of Jesus* suffered them not."[1] "Now the Lord is the Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. But we all, with unveiled face reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit" (margin, "even as *from the Spirit which is the Lord*." καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος).[2] "Because ye are sons God sent forth *the Spirit of His Son* into our hearts, crying Abba Father."[3] "For I know that this shall turn to my salvation, through your supplication and the supply of *the Spirit of Jesus Christ*."[4] And St Peter looking back in retrospect upon the older prophecies, sees now how this had been a truth, in some sense, even of them, "who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you; searching what time or what manner of time *the Spirit of Christ which was in them* did point unto."[5]

There is one passage in St Paul's epistles which has been hitherto omitted; but which is really more significant than all these—as well from the general context in which it occurs, as from the things actually said. This is the 8th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. It is to be borne in mind that the 8th chapter is the conclusion and climax of the magnificent doctrinal argument of this great

[1] Acts xvi. 7. [2] 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18. [3] Gal. iv. 6.
[4] Phil. i. 19. [5] 1 Pet. i. 10, 11.

epistle; that its truths therefore are themselves the culmination of St Paul's conception of the doctrine of Atonement in the Person of Christ. What then is that atoning power in us, which is, for us, the consummation of the Atonement? It is spoken of in the first verse as "being in Christ Jesus." In the second verse it is described more fully as "the law of the Spirit of life in Jesus Christ." In the sixth verse it is "the mind of the Spirit." In the ninth verse it is the indwelling of "the Spirit of God." This and the two following verses make it absolutely clear that certain significant variations of phrase are not only, in fact, variations without a difference of meaning, but that their identity is so obvious to the writer and to his readers, that it does not even need to be explicitly stated, but may be taken as of course. The varying phrases are "The Spirit of God"—"the Spirit of Christ"—"Christ"—"The Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead"—"He that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead . . . through His Spirit that dwelleth in you."[1]

Could anything make clearer the absolute identity of the presence of Christ with the presence of the Spirit of Christ? or the identity of the presence of the Spirit of Christ with the presence of the Spirit of God who raised up Christ? The passage goes on to speak further of this presence of the Spirit of Christ, which is the Spirit of God, in three references; (1) it is the realization of Sonship—"whereby we cry Abba Father";—it is partnership in the Sonship and

[1] Compare Dr Sanday's article, in the Dictionary of the Bible, on the word "God," p. 215*a*.

The passage Rom. viii. 9-11 runs consecutively thus; "But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you. But if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. And if Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you, He that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies through His Spirit that dwelleth in you."

Compare also the transition (which is not a transition) in Eph. iii—from "His Spirit" to "Christ"; and again from "knowing the love of Christ" to

inheritance of Christ;[1] (2) it is an effectual succour to infirmity, which is in part spoken of as intercession for us, while it is even more completely entreaty within us, of the full measure of which only He is cognizant who "searcheth the hearts" and "knoweth the mind of the Spirit";[2] and (3) it is an inseparable union of our very selves with the "love of Christ," or, more fully, "the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."[3] The phrases of the passage will receive some further comment from the last seven verses of 1 Cor. ii., where (1) the Spirit is the Spirit of God, and is God; for the Spirit of God is to God as the spirit of a man to himself:[4] (2) this Spirit of God is the capacity, in men who are capable of it, of insight into all realities of spiritual truth:[5] (3) this spiritual condition of Christians is to "have the mind of Christ."[6]

It remains only to corroborate these conceptions of Pauline theology by glancing through the general epistle of St John. The very object with which this epistle is written is that its readers may quite fully realize what is realized with such wonderful vividness by St John himself, —that the meaning of life in Christ's Church is personal fellowship with the Incarnate Christ, and therefore, no less, with the Eternal God. "Yea and our fellowship is

being "filled with all the fulness of God." "For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father, from whom every fatherhood (R.V. margin) in heaven and on earth is named, that He would grant you, according to the riches of His glory, that ye may be strengthened with power through His Spirit in the inward man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith; to the end that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be strong to apprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye may be filled unto all the fulness of God. Now unto Him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us, unto Him be the glory in the Church and in Christ Jesus unto all generations for ever and ever. Amen." Eph. iii. 14-21.

[1] Rom. viii. 14-17. [2] Rom. viii. 26-27. [3] Rom. viii. 35-39.
[4] 1 Cor. ii. 10-11. [5] 1 Cor. ii. 12-15. [6] 1 Cor. ii. 16.

with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ."[1] The method of union with the Eternal, is union with the Incarnate. "We have beheld and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world"[2]—"Whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father; he that confesseth the Son hath the Father also."[3] "If that which ye heard from the beginning abide in you, ye also shall abide in the Son, and in the Father."[4] "He that hath the Son hath the life; he that hath not the Son of God hath not the life."[5] "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we know Him that is true, and we are in Him that is true, even in His Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life."[6] It is, then, in primary reference (in this sense) to the Incarnate, that St John speaks of the ideal Christian life as knowing Him ("hereby know we that we know Him, if we keep His commandments"[7]), being or abiding in Him ("hereby know we that we are in Him; he that saith he abideth in Him ought himself also to walk even as He walked."[8] . . . "And now, my little children, abide in Him"[9]): and insists upon the power of the indwelling One—"greater is He that is in you than he that is in the world,"[10] and upon the absolute antithesis between that indwelling and sin, "Whosoever abideth in Him sinneth not; whosoever sinneth hath not seen Him, neither knoweth Him"[11] . . . "whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin, because His seed abideth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is begotten of God."[12] Everything, then, turns upon the full recognition, in faith of mind and of heart, of the transcendent fact of Incarnation. "Who is he that overcometh the world but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of

[1] 1 John i. 3. [2] 1 John iv. 14. [3] 1 John ii. 23.
[4] 1 John ii. 24. [5] 1 John v. 12. [6] 1 John v. 20.
[7] 1 John ii. 3. [8] 1 John ii. 5-6. [9] 1 John ii. 28.
[10] 1 John iv. 4. [11] 1 John iii. 6. [12] 1 John iii. 9.

God?"[1] To have such a belief is to have the internal witness to truth,—and its end is eternal life. "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in him"[2] . . . "these things have I written unto you that ye may know that ye have eternal life, even unto you that believe on the Name of the Son of God."[3]

This life is the actual presence of the Son (as above, "He that hath the Son hath the life"). This presence is spoken of as "an anointing": "The anointing which ye received of Him abideth in you. . . . His anointing teacheth you concerning all things, and is true, and is no lie."[4] And the sure evidence of its reality is the animating influence of its Spirit. "Hereby we know that He abideth in us, by the Spirit which He gave us."[5] And this Spirit is known to be the true Spirit,—as on the one side by its recognition and embrace of the Incarnation as the master-fact,—"Hereby know ye the Spirit of God; every spirit which confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit which confesseth not Jesus is not of God:"[6] so, on the other, by its manifest identity with the God who Himself "is love." "He that loveth not knoweth not God, for God is love."[7] . . . "if we love one another, God abideth in us, and His love is perfected in us: hereby know we that we abide in Him, and He in us, because He hath given us of His Spirit."[8] This Spirit,—the certainty, nay the presence, of the Incarnation within us, is both truth, then, and love. "It is the Spirit that beareth witness, because the Spirit is the truth."[9] "He that saith I know Him and keepeth not His commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him: but whoso keepeth His word, in him verily hath the love of God been perfected."[10] The manifestation of life within

[1] 1 John v. 5. [2] 1 John v. 10. [3] 1 John v. 13.
[4] 1 John ii. 27. [5] 1 John iii. 24. [6] 1 John iv. 2, 3.
[7] 1 John iv. 8. [8] 1 John iv. 12, 13. [9] 1 John v. 7.
[10] 1 John ii. 4, 5.

is love. "We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren."[1] Reality of personal communion with the Eternal God, a result *ipso facto* necessarily following from reality of personal communion with Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Son: and this, a communion in, and as, Spirit: a communion whereof at once the manifest evidence, and also the inner and essential reality, consist of identity of Spirit—the presence being the Spirit, and the Spirit manifesting the presence;—a reality, then, of personal communion with the Spirit of the Incarnation,—the Spirit of Love, which is the Spirit of God revealed in Christ: this is the essential Creed of St John, the declaring of what, to his consciousness, Christian faith and life mean.

The inquiry of the present chapter has been wholly undertaken as an attempt towards understanding, so far as it is possible for us to understand, the doctrine of God the Holy Ghost, as part of the total revelation of the Being of God. The things which have seemed to emerge from the inquiry may perhaps be summed up, in conclusion, in the statement of the following general positions.

I. The revelation of the Holy Trinity is a revelation wholly within, and based upon, the essential and indissoluble unity of God. At the same time the eternal distinctions within the Unity of Divine Being involve such essential relation of mutuality, as cannot be adequately expressed by any word of less import than the word Personality or Person. Human analogies are important, and do serve, but serve only within narrow limits, towards the intellectual vindication and illustration of this doctrine. The analogy which will probably be most suggestive to many minds is that of (*a*) what a man is invisibly in himself, (*b*) his outward material projection or expression as body, and (*c*) the response which that which he is,

[1] 1 John iii. 14.

through its bodily utterance or operation, compels the things which are, or seem to be, outside him, to render back, as true echo or extension of himself. This response, even while we recognize it only as response, is not properly so much a fresh addition to himself, as a mirror of that which was really in himself before it found its expression from without as response. But however much we can, even intellectually, see that the doctrine is both true, and necessary to thought, yet nothing can make Tri-Personal mutuality fully or properly intelligible to uni-personal consciousness.

II. Whatever other, or further, revelation might conceivably have been made of Them, as within the eternal relations of Divine existence, both the Person of God the Eternal Son, and the Person of God the Eternal Spirit, were, in fact, originally, and are principally, revealed to us in proportion as their revelation was necessary for the unfolding of the work of Divine Atonement in human life; and are revealed moreover under titles which (whatever relation they may have to the more inaccessible mysteries of Divine Being) are at least most immediately suggestive of the actual character and operation of "God as Man" and of "God within Man" in the great complex fact (a fact at once historical and timeless) of Incarnation and Atonement.


III. The Holy Ghost in particular is, to us, immediately, the Spirit of the Incarnate Christ, made, through the Incarnation, the Spirit of Man. Because He is the Spirit of the Incarnate, He is also, of necessity, no less, the Spirit of God. Because He was the Spirit of God, He could not but be the Spirit of the Incarnate. But, to us, He is the Spirit of God through, and as, being first, for us, the Spirit of the Christ. He is the Spirit of God; but of God, in particular, as sin-conquering in, and as, man. He could not be indeed the indwelling Spirit of victorious Humanity

till Humanity had conquered. He could not be the indwelling Spirit of Human Holiness, till Humanity was veritably holy. But from the moment when Humanity triumphed in Holiness perfectly Divine, the Spirit of God was become, in the Person of Christ, the Spirit of Human Holiness victorious over sin. The Spirit of the Christ, then, is the Spirit, or Personal Character, or very Love, or real Spiritual Presence, of God,—expressed in creation, realized personally in man. And this Presence, in those who are capable of realising it personally, is the Presence of the Son and of the Father.

To these three positions it may be convenient to add, in this place, a fourth, which has been indeed suggested in the things already said, but which remains to be still somewhat more completely made good.

IV. The Spirit of the Incarnate in us is not only our personal association, but our personal union, with the Incarnate Christ. To clothe the phrase for a moment in other language, He is the subjective realization within, and as, ourselves, of the Christ who was first manifested objectively and externally, for our contemplation and love, in Galilee and on the Cross. He is more and more, as the Christian consummation is approached, the Spirit within ourselves of Righteousness and Truth, of Life and of Love. He is more, indeed, than within us. He is the ultimate consummation of ourselves. He is the response, from us, of goodness and love, to the goodness and love of God. He is, with quite unreserved truth, when all is consummated, our own personal response. He is so none the less because He is also (and was, at first, in the way of distinction and contrast,) the response which out of, and within, and as, ourselves, He Himself—not we—very gradually wrought. His presence in us is *His* response in us, become ultimately ourselves: He is Christ Himself in us, become the Spirit which constitutes us what we

are: and therefore, though in us,—though ultimately ourselves,—a response really worthy of God, really adequate to God; a mirror, an echo, nay even a living presentment and realization, of what Christ Himself is—who is the Eternal God.



NOTE A (*see page* 172.)

St Augustine on distinguishing the Persons of the Trinity in Terms of separate Qualities.

It is only with a caution of this kind that we should use such a sentence as Hooker's. [E.P. V. lvi. 5, p. 248.] "The Father as Goodness, the Son as Wisdom, the Holy Ghost as Power do all concur in every particular outwardly issuing from that one only glorious Deity which they all are. For that which moveth God to work is Goodness, and that which ordereth His work is Wisdom, and that which perfecteth His work is Power."

At the beginning of the sixth book of the *De Trinitate*, St Augustine discusses the difficulty involved in such phrases. He quotes the argument which had been used against the Arians—"If the Son of God is the power of God and the wisdom of God, and God was never without wisdom and power, it follows that the Son is co-eternal with the Father; for the apostle says 'Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God,' and since no one in his senses could say that God ever did not possess wisdom and power, therefore there was never a time when the Son was not." And he points out at once that this reasoning involves the admission that God the Father is not Wisdom in Himself, but is only wise by virtue of always having His begotten Wisdom. Can you then say that the Son is "Wisdom of Wisdom," as you say that He is "Light of Light," if God the Father is not actually Wisdom, but is only the "Father of Wisdom"? The question is argued, as a question of great difficulty, at considerable length, in the early part of the seventh book. The result may be represented by the following sentences, which explicitly recognize the Father as Wisdom, the Son as Wisdom, and the Holy Ghost as Wisdom; not as three Wisdoms, nor three instances of Wisdom; but as each severally the same, single and absolute, Wisdom. Such a conclusion would certainly require a restatement of the Athanasian argument.

"Quod si et Pater qui genuit sapientiam, ex ea fit sapiens, neque hoc est illi esse quod sapere, qualitas ejus est Filius, non proles ejus, et non ibi erit jam summa simplicitas. Sed absit ut ita sit: quia vere ibi est summe simplex essentia: hoc ergo est ibi esse quod sapere. Quod si hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, non per illam sapientiam quam genuit sapiens est Pater; alioquin non ipse illam sed illa eum genuit. Quid enim aliud dicimus, cum dicimus hoc illi est esse quod sapere, nisi eo est quo sapiens est? Quapropter quæ causa illi est ut sapiens sit, ipsa illi causa est ut sit; proinde si sapientia quam genuit, causa illi est ut sapiens sit, etiam ut

sit ipsa illi causa est. Quod fieri non potest. . . . Ergo et Pater ipse sapientia est; et ita dicitur Filius sapientia Patris, quomodo dicitur lumen Patris; id est, ut quemadmodum lumen de lumine, et utrumque unum lumen, sic intelligatur sapientia de sapientia, et utrumque una sapientia: ergo et una essentia; quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere. Quod enim est sapientiæ sapere, et potentiæ posse, et æternitati æternam esse, justitiæ justam esse, magnitudini magnam esse, hoc est essentiæ ipsum esse. Et quia in illa simplicitate non est aliud sapere quam esse, eadem ibi sapientia est quæ essentia." . . .

"Et ideo Christus virtus et sapientia Dei, quia de Patre virtute et sapientia etiam ipse virtus et sapientia est, sicut lumen de Patre lumine, et fons vitæ apud Deum Patrem utique fontem vitæ." . . . "Lumen ergo Pater, lumen Filius, lumen Spiritus Sanctus; simul autem non tria lumina, sed unum lumen. Et ideo sapientia Pater, sapientia Filius, sapientia Spiritus Sanctus; et simul non tres sapientiæ, sed una sapientia; et quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, una essentia Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Nec aliud est ibi esse quam Deum esse: unus ergo Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus."

A little later, after apologizing for the necessary inadequacy of the terms by which human language expresses this distinction in identity, (whether ὑποστάσεις and οὐσία, or personæ and essentia or substantia), terms adopted "loquendi causa de ineffabilibus, ut fari aliquo modo possemus quod effari nullo modo possumus," he finds some consolation in reflecting, "Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur."

NOTE B (*see page* 187.)

On the question how far the title "Son" is directly used of the Logos as pre-Incarnate; with special reference to Hippolytus against Noetus, and to Marcellus of Ancyra.

I am grateful for the suggestion that what is said in the text may be thought to resemble the argument of Marcellus of Ancyra, as exhibited by Eusebius; inasmuch as he claims "Son" as a title only of the Incarnate, and appeals to the Logos of St John as the one distinctively pre-Incarnate title.

The suggestion gives a natural opportunity for making clearer the meaning of what is said in the text, by emphasizing the contrast between it and the argument of Marcellus.

But I am referred also to the refutation of Noetus by Hippolytus. And before coming to Marcellus, it will be useful to consider the bearing of the passages in which Hippolytus refers to the subject. Noetus, over-emphasizing, or rather wrongly emphasizing, the fundamental unity of God, makes God uni-personal. He is therefore explicitly Patripassian. ἔφη τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Πατέρα γεγεννῆσθαι καὶ πεπονθέναι καὶ ἀποτεθνηκέναι. . . . εἰ οὖν Χριστὸν ὁμολογῶ Θεὸν, αὐτὸς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ Πατήρ· εἰ γάρ (*al.* εἴγε) ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς, ἔπαθεν δὲ Χριστὸς, αὐτὸς ὢν Θεὸς, ἄρα οὖν ἔπαθεν Πατὴρ, Πατὴρ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν. . . . ἀναισχύντως λέγοντες, αὐτός ἐστι Χριστὸς ὁ Πατὴρ, αὐτὸς Υἱὸς, αὐτὸς ἐγεννήθη, αὐτὸς ἔπαθεν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤγειρεν. Hippol. c. Hær. Noeti, ch. 1, 2, and 3. Hippolytus is equally clear, on his own side, about the unity of God, —but not at the expense of the Incarnation. Τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἐρεῖ ἕνα Θεὸν εἶναι; ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἀναιρήσει, ch. 3. Noetus would press such texts as "Surely God is in thee" and "O God of Israel, the Saviour" (σὺ γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ σωτήρ), Isaiah xlv. 14, 15, to mean the identity of the Incarnate with the Father. Against this Hippolytus, amongst other arguments, quotes John iii. 13, "No man hath ascended into Heaven, but He that descended out of Heaven, even the Son of Man, which is in Heaven," as an assertion by the Incarnate of His own pre-existence. But the pre-existence of whom? Not of the flesh, Hippolytus answers, for that was assumed, at the Incarnation, of the virgin and the Spirit, to make the perfect offering of the Son of God; and till then there was no "flesh" in Heaven. It was the pre-existence, then, of the Λόγος ἄσαρκος, the Logos not yet made flesh. It was the Logos who became Incarnate. He was flesh, was Spirit, was power; and He bore the gracious name of Son of Man by anticipation, because He

was to be man,—διὰ τὸ μέλλον, καίτοι μήπω ὢν ἄνθρωπος—as in the vision of Daniel vii. 13. It was right then to say that He, as pre-existent in Heaven, was called from the beginning by this name, the Logos of God. Ibid., ch. iv. p. 57.

In ch. xv. he anticipates that objection will be made to his using the word "Son" of the "Logos"; that is, apparently, to his using a personal title of the pre-existent, making Him, as "Son," a distinct personality. The title used by St John is Logos; and it seems to be argued (on the side of Noetus) that this title Logos is of the nature of a metaphor. It is, then, this metaphorical or impersonal interpretation of Logos that Hippolytus is concerned to deny. It is, he seems to argue, a personal name, as in the vision of Him that "sat on a white horse" in Rev. xix. 11, "and His eyes are a flame of fire, and upon His head are many diadems; and He hath a name written which no one knoweth but He Himself. And He is arrayed in a garment sprinkled with blood; and His name is called the Word of God." The garment sprinkled with blood is His flesh which He offered in the passion. Thus the Person is He of whom St Paul speaks in Rom. viii. 3. "God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and as an offering for sin, condemned sin in the flesh." Who was this "Son" but the "Word," whom He called "Son" because He was to be born—ὃν Υἱὸν προσηγόρευε διὰ τὸ μέλλειν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι? It was in love towards man that He bore this title, and was called the "Son." For the Logos, as Logos, not being yet Incarnate, was not in the full sense "Son," though He was, in the full sense, the "Logos only begotten"; nor had His flesh any subsistence in itself, apart from the Logos, because the flesh subsisted only in the Logos. It was thus, then, that He was manifested, in completeness, as the One Son of God. Οὔτε γὰρ ἄσαρκος καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὁ Λόγος τέλειος ἦν Υἱὸς, καίτοι τέλειος Λόγος ὢν μονογενὴς, οὔθ' ἡ σὰρξ καθ' ἑαυτὴν δίχα τοῦ Λόγου ὑποστῆναι ἠδύνατο, διὰ τὸ ἐν Λόγῳ τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν· οὕτως οὖν εἷς Υἱὸς τέλειος Θεοῦ ἐφανερώθη· ch. xv. p. 73.

Verbally, then, Hippolytus appears to assert that the word "Son," in the fullest sense, belongs only to the Incarnate, as born in the world: and though he says that the word was used before by anticipation, he does not apparently recognize *any* sense in which the word could be used rightly, except by anticipation, of the pre-Incarnate Logos. That he should take this position is the more remarkable, because he is, at the very moment, engaged in vindicating his own right to use the word "Son," in some way, of the Logos before Incarnation; and because he claims without reserve to call the Logos "only begotten," which would certainly seem to give *some* proper content of meaning to the word "Son."

But whatever may have been, in the case of Hippolytus, the motive or the significance of language like this, it is quite clear, if not what

Marcellus meant, yet at all events what he was understood by others to mean, by insisting on calling the pre-Incarnate exclusively Logos, and denying the title "Son."

It would be, indeed, beside the present purpose to raise any subtler question as to the meaning of Marcellus himself. If there is ground for doubting whether he has been truly interpreted, this is not the place to examine it. It is only with Marcellus as represented to us, that we are here concerned.

Marcellus, then, we are told, like Noetus, so emphasized the unity of God as to make Him uni-personal. It is precisely because he explains Logos impersonally, that he does not mind allowing the pre-existence of the Logos of God. He understands Logos in God exactly as he understands logos in man, that is, as in no way distinct from the man himself. It *is* the man,—in a certain aspect or activity. So then "God," before the creation, was solitary. *μήπω τοῦ κόσμου γεγονότος οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἦν πλὴν Θεοῦ μόνου.* The Logos was His utterance, inseparable, as such, from His personality. This can be readily understood from a little consideration of ourselves. *Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον δυνάμει καὶ ὑποστάσει χωρίσαι τινὶ δύνατον. Ἓν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ λόγος, καὶ οὐδενὶ χωριζόμενος ἑτέρῳ ἢ μόνῃ τῇ τῆς πράξεως ἐνεργείᾳ.* Euseb., de Eccl. Theol., I. xvii., p. 860.

This, as Eusebius urges, is flat Sabellianism. Sabellius and Marcellus equally, he says, make the Father and the Logos identical; the only difference being that Sabellius had not the audacity to measure Logos in God by logos in man, nor the folly to describe as "Son of God" a Logos who had no substantive existence,—*οὐδ' οὕτως ἠλίθιος ἦν ὡς τὸν μὴ ὑφεστῶτα λόγον υἱὸν Θεοῦ ἀνακαλεῖν.* According to this view the phrase "let us make man in our image, after our likeness," is only like the word of a man who should talk to, or encourage, himself. But all this Marcellus does in the name of unity; as though unity were not equally real to us (Catholic Christians) who affirm the eternal generation of the Son, and that He was "Son" and not "Logos" only, from all eternity—*ὡς οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμῶν τοῦτο λεγόντων, τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀληθῶς εἶναι Υἱὸν παραδεδε[ι]γμένων, παρ' αὐτοῦ τε μεμαθηκότων ἑνὰ γνωρίζειν Θεὸν, αὐτόν τε εἶναι Θεὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ Πατέρα Υἱοῦ τοῦ μονογενοῦς, ἑαυτοῦ δηλαδὴ ὄντος ἀληθῶς Υἱοῦ πρὸ πάντων αἰωνῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένου, καὶ οὐ μόνον Λόγου κεκλημένου πρὸ τῆς ἀναλήψεως τῆς σαρκός.* Ib., p. 861.

It is, then, in the interest of this denial of the Personality of the Son, that Marcellus insists that only the name Logos is predicable before the Incarnation, and "Son" only as a result of Incarnation. It is for this that he makes appeal to the opening verses of St John; and denies that the pre-incarnate Logos is ever called Son except prophetically, by anticipation. *οὐκοῦν πρὸ μὲν τοῦ κατελθεῖν καὶ διὰ*

τῆς παρθένου τεχθῆναι Λόγος ἦν μόνον. . . . πρότερον γὰρ, ὥσπερ πολλάκις ἔφην, οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἦν ἢ Λόγος. . . . ὁ μὲν γὰρ Λόγος ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν, μηδὲν ἕτερον ὢν ἢ Λόγος· ὁ δὲ τῷ Λόγῳ ἑνωθεὶς ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ὢν πρότερον γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, ὡς διδάσκει ἡμῶν Ἰωάννης, Καὶ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. Διὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν τοῦ Λόγου μνημονεύων φαίνεται μόνον. Εἴτε γὰρ Ἰησοῦ, εἴτε Χριστοῦ ὀνόματος μνημονεύοι ἡ θεία γραφή, τὸν μετὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνου ὄντα σαρκὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον ὀνομάζειν φαίνεται. Εἰ δέ τις καὶ πρὸ τῆς Νεᾶς Διαθήκης τοῦ Χριστοῦ [ἢ τοῦ] Υἱοῦ ὄνομα τῷ Λόγῳ μόνῳ δεικνύναι δύνασθαι ἐπαγγέλλοιτο, εὑρήσει τοῦτο προφητικῶς εἰρημένον. ch. xviii. p. 864.

It is plain, then, from these quotations (1) that Marcellus (if rightly represented) denied the title Son to the Incarnate quite absolutely, without reserve of any kind; and (2) that he intended, in this denial, to deny any personal pre-existence at all. Precisely because he understood it as impersonal, he desired to make exclusive use of the title Logos. And it is correspondingly plain that, to the mind of Eusebius, the assertion that the Λόγος was also from all eternity Υἱὸς, is the method of insisting, and is valued so earnestly just *because* it is the method of insisting, that the Λόγος was, before Incarnation, not only existent, but also existent *as a Person.* The real issue between them is the Personality of the Son; and therefore the doctrine of the Trinity of God.

But however remote, for these reasons, the position attributed to Marcellus may be from what any modern Christian, who intends to be orthodox, could hold; it may still not improbably be felt that the position stated by Eusebius is, if fully accepted, conclusive not only against the doctrine of Marcellus with whom he was arguing; but against a good deal besides, though it may have but little in common with Marcellus; against, for instance, the suggestion made in the text. For to him the "Eternal Generation" of the Son, the eternal existence of the Son as "Son," is in itself a positive and a fundamental principle. Is this consistent with the suggestion in the text? I must answer that I do not think it is inconsistent, so long as the Eusebian principle is itself urged with reverent reserve, that is, without an undue crudeness of emphasis upon those elements in it which we least understand.

Let me raise the question in this form. What is, so far as is revealed to us, the relation between the First, and Second, Persons of the Blessed Trinity? and how completely is it expressed by the mutual words "Father" and "Son"? Now the two most extreme answers to this question, in the opposite directions, would be, as I conceive, these. On the one side it would be answered,—These words "Father" and "Son" have no application at all to the eternal relation within Deity. It is only improperly, by a sort of liberty, or extension of speech, that they are used of pre-Incarnate existence. Properly speaking they belong to the Incarnation, and to that quite exclusively

and alone. The extreme answer on the other side would be,—The eternal relation within Deity is exactly, and properly, defined by the words "Father" and "Son." It was in order to reveal the eternal relations that the words were chosen. It is to the eternal relations that they are primarily applicable. Of the eternal relations they are (whether intelligible or not) the authoritative revelation. Any application to the Incarnation or its effects, though that also may be true, is at most quite secondary and subordinate as interpretation of the terms.

The first of these answers might be made in two, widely differing, forms. It might be made by those who denied the personal pre-existence of the Son (under whatever title) and the truth of the Trinitarian doctrine altogether. This is the unhesitating position of Marcellus, as Eusebius understands him. But it might also be made, more innocently, by those who, having no doubt of the eternal pre-existence of the Personal Logos, yet thought that He could be called by the title "Son" *only* in reference to His coming Incarnation. This is the position which is, at one point, to say the least, very nearly adopted by Hippolytus.

But the suggestion made in the text is wholly distinct from the first answer, in either of its two forms. Only, whilst explicitly repudiating either form of the first, it does suggest that the other answer goes too far in the opposite direction, and that there is a considerable region of intermediate ground between the two. It does suggest that the reserve which would shrink from adopting outright the phrases of the answer at the other extreme, would be a reverent and a wise reserve.

It is possible to accept the words "Father" and "Son" as being sufficiently, for us, in harmony with that truth of the eternal relation within Deity which we are little capable of understanding, without supposing that they were revealed, either exclusively, or even primarily, in reference to those eternal relations with which they so correspond. It is possible, on this view, to accept and to value as an approximation to truth, all that theologians have ever said about the eternal generation of the Son; and yet not to press it forward with dogmatic insistence, as though it belonged to a region in which we could either speak, or think, with confidence. It is reverent, after all, to remind ourselves of the necessary limitation of our thought; and to realize how little way we are capable of going towards putting a positive content of meaning into such a phrase as "eternal generation," however valuable, in some contexts, it may be both to use, and to explain, the phrase.

We are not at all concerned to make a point of denying that the word "Son" is predicated of the Pre-existent in His eternal relations; far less to deny that it is capable of being so predicated: though, as to the fact, we may be allowed to feel some doubt whether it is, in the

scripture, so predicated in any unequivocal manner. What we do suggest amounts rather to this, that, as far as nomenclature is concerned, the words "Father" and "Son" express most primarily and most unreservedly the relation between the Eternal and the Incarnate, between God as God and God as man; and analogously rather than primarily, in dim suggestion rather than directly, those eternal relations which are hardly capable of any other than an indirect and analogous expression. If ever, then, they are used expressly of the eternal relations between the Persons of the Trinity, their application is, at all events, so far less direct and more mysterious, that they have to be interpreted, with reservation, guardedly; because as applied to that existence, the words, though not inapplicable or untrue, are yet applicable only through reserves which are not easy to human thought, but without which they inevitably tend to convey, to human thought, what is other, and more, than the truth.

To put it in another way, it may be said that what we suggest is that the title "Son," as direct revelation of unreserved or intelligible truth, begins, so to speak, from the Incarnate side, though capable—more, or less—of being transferred therefrom to that eternal relation of which Incarnation was itself a consequence: rather than that it is primarily revealed of the eternal relation,—though transferable also from the Divine to the Human life.

As to the question of fact, it is very difficult to be certain how far the word "Son" is used directly in Scripture of the pre-Incarnate Logos as such. I have already suggested in the text what seem to me reasonable grounds for doubting whether, in the great Baptismal formula, which is supremely authoritative, "into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," the reference is so much to the pre-existent Logos, as to the Incarnate who had triumphed once for all in man.

So again in such a passage as the opening of the Hebrews, when we read "God having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets . . . hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in [His] Son," it is impossible to doubt, so far, that the word "Son" suggests primarily the Incarnate, *as Incarnate*. And when the writer goes on "whom He appointed heir of all things, through whom also He made the worlds: who being the effulgence of His glory, and the very image of His substance, and upholding all things by the word of His power," we shall hardly feel that these assertions alter the primary reference of the word "Son" as it stood in the verse before. All these things are true of Him, the Incarnate, though not true of Him primarily as Incarnate. If then they are all in this passage predicated of the Incarnate Son, it is difficult to lay down that they are, in this passage, predicated of Him primarily as Son, any more than they are of Him primarily as Incarnate.

The same is true of Col. i. 13, etc. "Who . . . . translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love; in whom we have our redemption, the forgiveness of our sins: who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation, for in Him were all things created," etc. Here the first two clauses so clearly refer to the victory wrought on earth by the Incarnate, that when the later clauses go on to predicate of Him eternal Deity, the work of Creation, etc., it seems impossible to say that these things are, as far as the passage is concerned, predicated of the Son, in any other sense than that in which they are predicated of the Incarnate. They are predicated indeed of Him the Incarnate, yet not primarily of His Incarnation; and therefore also of Him the Son, yet (it may be) not of Him most primarily or directly in respect of the title "Son."

As to any words uttered, of Himself, by the lips of the Incarnate,—"the Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing"—"I and the Father are one"—"the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into His hand"—"Believe Me that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me," etc. etc.—it is manifest that they cannot be so taken apart from what He was who uttered them, and when He uttered them, as to warrant our laying down that they, or any of them, ought to be interpreted primarily, without any reference to the Incarnation at all, of His eternal pre-existence.

But though, in one passage after another, it seems impossible to get rid of this uncertainty of exegesis; and though (in spite of any misuse which Marcellus may have tried to make of it) the fact remains that the only passage in the New Testament which goes wholly and obviously behind the fact of Incarnation, drops altogether the words "Father" and "Son"; I must repeat that it is not meant to be suggested that the words should in such sense be referred to the Incarnation only, as though there were, in the Eternal Being of Deity, no truth corresponding with them.

We are not capable of understanding much, in direct terms, about the eternal relations within the Being of Deity. Only if we were capable of this, should we really understand with any fulness, that essential relation borne by the Logos who "in the beginning was with God, and was God," "in whom were all things created," and "in whom all things consist," to creation, and in particular to humanity, which underlies the fact that it was the "Logos" who "became flesh" for the regeneration of man. And in understanding this it is possible that we might understand, a little more, what is that eternal relation between the Logos, who (being God) "was with God," and "God" with whom the Logos (who was God) was; that relation which is shadowed for us to some extent under the metaphor of eternal generation; and to which the "Filial" relation, which Incarnation made

to our earthly power of conceiving, absolute and literal, does, in some dimmer and more mysterious way, eternally correspond.

I have desired to make it plain that the suggestion made in the text does not really set aside, or deny, anything whatever which has been asserted, whether by Eusebius or others, as a part of the Catholic faith. Its point is not denying or setting aside at all. It does not contradict, it is not inconsistent with, anything which has been really held or taught on these subjects. Its real point is positive not negative: what it is anxious to assert, not what it might have been supposed to disallow. And I cannot but believe that that positive meaning is both true and important: that positive thought which would find—in the mode of the revelation to men of God "the Son," and God "the Holy Ghost," and in the terms and titles under which it has pleased God to designate to us the Father in relation to the Son, and the Son in relation to the Father, and the Holy Spirit in relation to both—a reference primary and dominant, though not therefore simply exclusive, to the One all-dominating fact of the Incarnation of God; God *above*, and *with*, and *as*, and more and more *within*, man.

CHAPTER IX

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN RELATION TO HUMAN PERSONALITY

THERE is now another side on which it is important for us to consider the meaning, to ourselves, of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost; in its relation, namely, to our own personal being. What is human personality? And what is the relation of the new Presence or Power, revealed within man at Pentecost, to the realization of man's own personality, the true consummation of himself?

It has been a natural and deep-rooted instinct, on the part of thinking man, not only to start all speculation, or apprehension, from himself,—which is his inevitable and only mode of access to wider truth: but in such wise to start from himself, as if he himself were, by himself, a complete and separate whole, a realization in full of what he meant, or needed to mean, by the word personality: and therefore also a measure by which to gauge the meaning of the word personality, wherever it was to be predicated of any other than himself. Whether he had, in fact, or how far he had, or had not, achieved the completeness of what personality meant, was a question which he hardly paused, or thought it necessary, to raise. That he at least was, anyhow, himself, was a natural assumption to make; and it was naturally made, without adequate scrutiny, as a basis of all further thought. The assumption that I am, anyhow, myself, passes almost

indistinguishably, into the assumption that whatever this "I" may do or suffer, on the right hand or the left, the "I" itself remains a fixed and permanent quantity, of one continuous and essential content and significance.

This assumption that human personality was already fully realized, and therefore remained as an unchanging entity in the midst of all that was done by it, round it, or for it, has conspicuously underlain the greater part of human speculation in respect of the doctrine of the Atonement. It is suggested by the familiar metaphors under which different aspects of the Atonement have been illustrated, from the time of the New Testament itself. Man with a load upon him, or released from his load: man captive or enslaved, or released from his slavery or captivity: man sick or recovered from sickness; is after all the same man. Through all propositions like these, he, the central subject, is unchanged. There is indeed, very much alteration in his conditions and well-being. But parables such as these, however suggestive in their way, certainly do not suggest that the essential heart of the great change is to be found, after all, in the altered content of the meaning of the man's central self. The assumption that the human "he" was unchanged and undeveloped, because he had been, as "he," complete from the first, has led speculative thought to try and find the very heart of the meaning of the great change wrought by atonement, in some direction external to, and independent of, the personality of the man redeemed. Hence it is that most Christian theories explanatory of atonement,—assuming on the one side that "man" was, through all, the same completed and unchanging entity, and that the work of atonement on the other hand, if explained at all, must be explained as a process complete in itself, before its completed process was brought into relation with the personalities of men; have in them, as explanations, a dangerous flaw. They all

tend to be different forms of what the thought of the present day would sum up as the "transactional" theory of the atonement: and (whatever spiritual value they may have had in their time) it is certainly true that no theories of atonement which try to explain the whole meaning of it as a transaction completed, as transaction, outside the personalities of the redeemed, can state, with any adequacy, that aspect of the truth to which the consciousness of the present day is most keenly—and rightly—alive.

It can hardly be denied that a fallacy of this sort is discernible—not indeed in apostolic or sub-apostolic references to atonement, which do not attempt to explain the transcendent fact in logical terms; but in the great majority of later attempts to give some philosophical definition of the method by which the consequences of atonement were reached. It was so in the curious suggestions which crop up in patristic expositions,—the payment to the devil, the outwitting of the devil, the justification of a Divine ruse, and so forth.

It was so, most eminently, through every line of the elaborate treatise of Anselm, which, with whatever softening of earlier repulsiveness of current and vulgar thought, still reduces everything to a strictly mathematical calculation, of the equation kind,—a calculation in which the human personality remains a fixed quantity throughout. And it is not too much to say that the same kind of fallacy is, in large measure, reproduced in most of the characteristic expositions of the rationale of atonement, which have been suggested from St Anselm's time to our own. Indeed it could hardly have been otherwise with theories of atonement which were formulated upon a conception of personality so inadequate as that which is common to the majority of writers on the subject. It is upon an inadequate conception of personality that they are based: and it is from a conception of personality more adequate to

the reality of experience, that they will receive their correction.

It would of course be unfair to imply that such a view of personality as is here demurred to was any peculiarity of theologians speculating upon the rationale of atonement. It was rather a sort of tacit assumption, a general common-place, with which thought in all directions began; and which philosophy had not so much invented, as failed to correct.

What then is personality? In what sense can we be said to be possessed of it? or what relation has that with which we start, and which we call personality, to what we ourselves all the while mean, and cannot but really mean, by personality? Or where, or how, would the reality of personality, according to its own inherent necessities of meaning, find its actual consummation at last? It is indeed within ourselves that we find our own witness to what personality means, and if we did not first feel it there, we could not recognize it anywhere. Nevertheless if we try to analyze the things which we ourselves, by the witness which is from ourselves, must mean by personality: we shall be compelled to own, on consideration, that though the idea, as idea, of every one of them is forced upon our consciousness by what we ourselves are, yet not one of them is actually realized within our consciousness.

It will be worth our while to examine this statement, in rather more detail, in respect of three conceptions, or prerogatives, of personal being: the three which probably occur with most directness to the minds of most of us, when we attempt, by any further analysis, either to vindicate our claim to the possession of real personality, or to explain what it is that we mean by it: in respect, that is to say, of our supposed possession—first of free will; secondly of reason or wisdom; and thirdly of the divine faculty of love.

What is free will? How far do we possess it? or when, or how, would it reach its true consummation within us? We are entirely accustomed to claims, on the one side, (based partly on speculative grounds, and still more on grounds of practical common sense,) to a complete reality of free will in man: and on the other side, to an array of proof, mainly theoretical, but at least of great logical strength, to show that man has no free will at all. Neither of these positions is absolutely true. There is always some truth represented in the other. Each begins to be positively false, when it tries to exclude the truth which the other represents; but in its positive effort, each sees a real aspect of truth.

We have got within us something which is akin to free will; and which we must both call, and treat as, free will. We have the germ or inchoate capacity of free will; we have the clear instinct of having it; we have the inherent assumption of it as the basis of moral life; we are ourselves a witness to the idea of it, and our own imperative demand for its realization in ourselves. Yet our will is not, in fact, free. So completely are we ourselves a witness to the idea of it, that we cannot but out of ourselves construct the ideal which nevertheless is not there. We cannot but conceive of free will, and believe in the ideal reality of it, and posit it as a necessary assumption, in any intelligent conception of Supreme Being; because, without it, the things which visibly are, the fundamental significance of ourselves, would fall into chaos.

But where did we find the conception of free will? Have we got free will in ourselves? Take the most homely of instances. Why does the slothful man not get up in the morning? Why does the intemperate man not give up his intemperance? Why does the ill-tempered man not make himself pleasanter, as to others, so to himself? In each case it is probable enough that the man has resolved

to do so. He wishes, perhaps with exceeding strength of desire, to fulfil his resolves. Yet he does not—nay he feels, with a sadness only too well justified, that he cannot—do so. Why can he not? Nothing in the world prevents him—but himself. Everything, everybody, would heartily welcome his resolve, and encourage him to keep it. Yet he does not and cannot act upon it. Why not? Nothing whatever interferes with him. He could do it in a moment,—nay, he would do it with infallible certainty,—the very moment that he really willed to do it. But he cannot will to do it. He cannot will to do even what he wishes to will. Nothing in the world constrains him but his own inherent incapacity of willing. Do we call this free will?

Take the case of the man who is just indolent and cowardly, and has shaped himself now into the inveterate habit, and has woven the inveterate habit into his character, of indolently not doing. The time comes when everything turns upon his power of intense concentration of purpose. He greatly desires to be strong; but he cannot. The concentration of will, which is the one thing required, is beyond the capacity of his will. And so with not a few of the most obvious resolutions, or experiences, which belong to the spiritual life. He longs, on this side, to do. He longs, on that side, to abstain from doing. In either case he is, as the world says, free. Nothing in the world interferes to overrule him. But what he would not do, he does. And when he would refrain, he can not. It was all mirrored for us, long ago, in the 7th chapter to the Romans. But once more, do we call this—our familiar experience—free will? St Paul called it rather "the body of this death."

It is clear that this will is not free. But what is our idea of free will? The first instinctive conception of free will, and one which has shaped too much of the current language about it, is probably this, that free will means

an inherent capacity of equal choice between two alternatives, the power to do equally either *a* or *b*. Now, great as the part undoubtedly is which has been played by such a conception as this, it is easy to see that this is quite fallacious. Unless *a* and *b* happen to be precisely equal in goodness, and also in wisdom, unless, that is to say, upon the improbable and unimportant hypothesis of an alternative which really is absolutely indifferent from every point of view whatever, no man of any growth in wisdom or character can *equally* do *a* or *b*.

The more moral he is, and the more wise, the less will a man be able to do *b*; perhaps the more immoral he is and unwise, the less will it be possible for him to do *a*. But in either case, his oscillation of purpose, if he oscillates, depends upon the fact that he is not, as yet, either absolutely of one kind, or absolutely of another. He is still, in some part, both. The real consummation of either moral or immoral character would exclude ambiguity,—the ambiguity which was offered as the criterion of free will. But the condition of double-mindedness is really characteristic of the sinner, rather than of the saint. It is to be observed moreover that if this conception of free will were true, then it would follow that of all that ever lived on this earth as man, absolutely the least free of will was the Lord Jesus Christ. If this were what free will meant, then there could be no element of free will, in the moral region at least, in the Person of Christ or of God. So plain does it become, on a very little thought, that this conception of free will is really suggested, not out of our experience of the reality, but rather out of our intimacy with the disease, or caricature, of free will. It is something, known indeed to us, but characteristic of will in a stage that is very far from free, from which so untenable a conception has been derived.

This is at least equally plain when *a* and *b* are avowedly

made to represent what is right, and what is wrong. Equal capacity of doing right or doing wrong, whatever else it may be is not free will. Full power to sin is not the key to freedom! On the contrary, all inherent power to do wrong is a direct infringement of the reality of free will. It is indeed too true that our exceedingly imperfect free will has landed us in sin: and it is not altogether strange if the connection between what we currently call freedom, and capacity of sinning, appeared to be so absolutely direct, that men took capacity of sinning as itself the differentia of freedom. But the thought of saints, and above all of Christ and of God, is enough to show in a moment, that there has been some fallacy: and that, whatever sort of relation there may possibly be between freedom and power to sin, to make the one mean the other must be utterly wrong. In point of fact, if our imperfect freedom is directly connected with experience of sin; that with which the experience of sin is so closely bound up, is not really (as men have thought) the prerogative of freedom, but the exceeding imperfectness of the prerogative as realized in us. A demi-semi-freedom may lead to consequences—themselves in such sort of perverse affinity with the nobleness of personality that they would be impossible to the wholly impersonal and unfree—which nevertheless are the extreme antithesis of the consequences properly belonging to perfect freedom. Freedom perverted is a more serious antithesis to the true meaning of freedom, than is that which has no element of freedom about it at all. An evil person is more opposite to a good person, than is that which is capable neither of evil nor good.

If, then, a definition of free will, which is so quickly exposed by its consequences, may be certainly dismissed: let us try an alternative definition, thus; Free will is the power of so doing the things which we do, whatever their

character, that when we do them they are really our own; and our own selves are really expressed in the doing of them. This is a conception very much nearer to the truth than the former one. It is at least beginning to look in the right direction. The essentia of free will is not at all to be found in the direction of a vacant uncertainty as to what we may happen to do: but it is to be found in the depth of the reality with which our acts when we do them,—our will movements when we really exercise will,—are personally our very own: at once the true outcome, and the true building-up, of ourselves. This does touch the heart of the real difference between animate and inanimate, between personal and impersonal, service. The impersonal and inanimate may indeed, and do, correspond with deliberate and conscious purpose. But the act of will, the rationale of action, is not in themselves. These are in a person indeed: for acts of will, and rationale of action are personal attributes: but they are not in the inanimate, which blindly obeys, and is not self-identified with them. But the freedom of a person is measured by the completeness of his own self-identification with his own acts and will; the completeness with which, howsoever or whencesoever they may have been presented to him, he has himself identified himself with them, he has become their direct and adequate cause, and they are the real effect, and outcome, of himself.

But can we leave the definition in this form, and make free will consist of this capacity of personal identification with our actions, whatever the character of these actions of will may be? Is it, in anything like its true completeness, really irrespective of the character of the things done or willed: or, to put it in another form, irrespective of the question whether the person, in whom it is, is corresponding with, or is contradicting, the proper conditions and

nature of his own capacities? Is the capacity of making personally my very own the things which belong to the highest ideal of my nature, and expanding both it and myself by growing on into them, and through them becoming more and more divinely myself: is this really on exactly the same level, as free will, with the perverse and disastrous possibility of so transgressing and profaning my nature, that I become more and more enslaved to the things which are the ruin of it, and see all its highest (which are also its truest) prerogatives and possibilities ebbing fatally away before my eyes? The one alternative is the gradual diminution and enslavement of the self, and all that the self was made, as a self, to become. The other is the gradual enlargement of the capacities of selfhood, the emancipation from disability, the perfecting of power, till, under conditions as transfiguring as the visible glory of the holy mountain, the self, in its own transcendent consummation, finds at last what it meant, in God's truth, to be a self. Are these two contrasted alternatives to be said to be, after all, on the very same level, regarded as expositions illustrative of the true significance of free will?

If not, we reach an amended definition of free will: which will now be described as man's power of becoming a veritable cause to himself, in making personally his own, and being wholly self-identified with, such acts of will as themselves are in perfect accordance with, and are therefore the true experience and development of, the nature which is essentially and properly his own.

The very faculty of free will, whatever its perversion may be, is itself Divine in quality, and man himself was made in the image of God. Only a true correspondence with the image of God is man's true nature, or can be the realization of his faculties in full. The free will, then, with which God has endowed me is my possibility of making

personally my very own, by a progressive consecration of will, the things which belong to the highest consummation of the divinest capacities in me,—my own best and truest self. In other words my free will means the capacity in me of a perfect response, of personal will and personal character, to God. So far as I have attained this, I have attained the real freedom of the will. So far as I have still any germ or possibility of this, I have the possibility and germ of free will. So far as I have lost the possibility of this, I have lost the possibility of free will. Free will is not the independence of the creature, but is rather his self-realization in perfect dependence. Freedom is self-identity with goodness. Both goodness and freedom are, in their perfectness, in God. Goodness in a creature is—not distinction from, but correspondence with, the goodness of God. Freedom in a creature is correspondence with God's own self-identity with goodness. If excellence, in an impersonal creature, is correspondence with God: in a personal creature it is still correspondence, but in a personal sense; that is, it is a conscious echo, or response, mirroring, in will and character, the very character and will of God. It does not hinge upon the retention in man of the power to do wrong, but is consummated, rather, in the power to do perfectly right; and not only to do what in fact is perfectly right; but therein to do perfectly as his own what is his own perfectness; to be a true cause, at last, of his own consummation; and therein to attain and to realize the divine meaning of manhood, the true essentia of created personality; in a word to realize and to find "himself." It is man's power to do perfectly, and perfectly as his own, that which is his own perfectness, in other words, that which reflects God, and is, in truth, God in him.

Does man possess, or can he have, such a power? It is only indeed in proportion as he has it, in greater degree

or in less, that he really has, in greater degree or in less, the real truth, as opposed to the caricature, of free will? But definition apart, has he got it, or can he have it? The answer is obvious. He has it just exactly in proportion as he is in Christ, and the Spirit of Christ is in him. He has it just in proportion—not to his independence but to his dependence: not to his sundered and lonely separation by himself, but to his communion with the Manhood which is perfected in Christ: not in proportion as he tries to realize his own personality by distinction from all others, but in proportion as he realizes it by surrender of his poor naked and several self to union with Another;—Another, who indeed both is, and must be, first seen, and loved, and worshipped, and clung to, as Another; but Another who is, after all, his own crown and perfectness; and who has wrought, and is come, not only to be either near, or even within,—but more and more perfectly to constitute, and actually to be, in the absolute unity of loving will, the very spirit and meaning of—himself.

This is what free will means. In its perfectness it is the self become another. It is Christ in the man. It is the man become One Spirit with Christ. It is the love of God reproduced in the man, till the man, in God's love, or God's love in the man, has become a Divine response, adequate to, because truly mirroring, God. And in all its lesser degrees, it is the germ or capacity of this consummation,—a process, more or less towards this.

And since it is a man's perfect correspondence with his own highest self, it will be found that the characteristic condition or method of it, while it remains unconsummated, is a constant subjection of his lower, to his higher, possibilities. But in all imperfect stages, especially in those who are only too pitifully conscious how far they have sinned against their higher nature, a steady subordinating of the lower to the higher is a process both stringent and

painful; it is a constant submission of what seems to be the very self to a law of perfectness, which, however much it may be in truth his own perfectness, has at present at least to be looked for outside himself. And thus it is that obedience as obedience, obedience essentially to God, obedience in an immediate sense to law, is in fact, whatever the paradox may seem to be, a direct note, and necessary method, of the growth of free will. *Cui servire regnare.* The perfect freedom is *His* service. It is clear in the Person of Christ, who is the only model of perfect freedom of will, that perfect freedom of will, and perfect obedience to God, are not really distinguishable save as two necessary aspects of one thing.

Perfect obedience, in a man, to God, is also perfect conformity with his own highest possibilities of wisdom and character; nor can he perfectly conform to his own highest self, without conforming thereby to the obedience of God. It is worth while to put this clearly, because this, and this only, is the true and direct meaning of obedience. This meaning has constantly been obscured, not illustrated, when the word obedience has been carried over, without any proper thoughtfulness, or consciousness of the necessary qualifications, directly from obedience to God to obedience to man. If free will necessarily takes the form of obedience, this means the obedience of the lower nature to the higher, which is the same thing as obedience to God. The very purpose of such an obedience as this, is to develop and strengthen individual freedom of will. But if obedience is to answer this purpose, of emancipating and strengthening the true personal will; it must have this purpose unswervingly before its eyes, as the purpose which gives it its own essential character. Obedience does not mean subjection of will except to God who is its own highest perfectness; and it means subjection to God, because subjection to God *is* individual perfectness,

the consummation of personal freedom in goodness. But obedience to man always may be, and constantly is, a very different thing.

Obedience to man in some forms is obedience to God. For men in some cases are the real embodiment of the moral standard of wisdom and goodness of others. Such for instance is the true relation of a wise Christian mother to a little child. Or again there are conditions of subjection in which my duty to God requires my meek acceptance of the rule "not only of the good and gentle, but also of the froward."[1] But this relation is not the proper meaning of obedience. It is tyranny on their part, and martyrdom on mine. My acceptance of martyrdom is indeed true obedience, but the obedience is to God, not to man. Obedience to men in fact is a mere means to an end. At best it never is an end in itself. At worst it becomes a sacrilege and an abhorrence. The true end of legitimate obedience is the freedom and the strengthening—not the crushing—of that sacred thing, the strong, divine, personal will. Any language that men have permitted themselves to use, whether of little children in the nursery, or of "religious" persons under monastic obligations, as though the "breaking of the will" were as such, an object to be aimed at, is already on the edge of sacrilege. A real effort to break the personal will is actual sacrilege. Man was not made to be a mere machine. The man who deliberately goes about to surrender the dignity of his own selfhood to the mere sway of another: or the man who endeavours to sway by his own judgment the selfhood of another: is really committing a sort of blasphemy against the majesty of the character of God. It is not the breaking of the will, in favour of a sort of mechanical surrender of a self, made for Deity, to be a mere human machine: it is the breaking

[1] 1 Pet. ii. 18.

only of the enslaving fetters of idle whim or false habits upon the will, in the interest of the deepening and the strengthening of the true self's freest exercise of will, till it is the very personal re-echoing of the perfectness of God: which is, and is alone, the legitimate outcome, or object, of any discipline of (so-called) obedience. But the minds are not always clear—even of good men; and men are not always good. There can be no practical doubt that, upon this point, both the monastic ideal, and the nursery ideal, have been, too often, grievously misconceived. Whether cloaking private obstinacy under the sanction of religious phrases, or through sheer intellectual incapacity to distinguish the true significance of obedience, men have very often upheld, perhaps too often even practised, a theory of obedience, which found its essential excellence in the crushing of the natural development of personal judgment and of personal will. The more the will was suppressed, the more the judgment was overruled,—not in obedience to an inner light, or a voice of command from God, but to the judgment and the will of other men,—so much the more perfect was the "obedience" conceived to be. Such a theory is in truth a terrible, and on analysis even a blasphemous, caricature.

The commentary upon this theory which is supplied by the life of Jesus Christ is most notable. He is, on all showing, the one and only perfect model of obedience. His life never swerved from absolute dependence upon God. In obedience to the will of God He submitted Himself, without a word, to the insolent outrage and cruelty of men. But some three or four times in His life we read of attempts that were made, and made (as we should have said) at least with kind purpose and in good faith, by those whom He loved, and who meant and tried to love Him,—to move Him to allow His judgment and will

to be overruled by the judgment and will of others deciding for Him. In every case the answer came back in words—not of rudeness, as the English version might in one case suggest, but of penetrating rebuke which admitted neither of question nor reply,—"Wist ye not that I must be about My Father's business?"[1] "Woman, what have I to do with thee?"[2] Both these to His own mother. And again of her, and her claim to intervene—"Who is My mother? and who are My brethren? . . . whosoever doeth the will of My Father which is in heaven, he is My brother, and sister, and mother."[3] And as to the instance that remains,—never lightning flash shot from the sky with more sudden or more scathing outburst of power than was in His rebuke to the leader of the Twelve, "Get thee behind Me, Satan: for thou mindest not the things of God, but the things of men."[4] His example is not encouraging to those, who would find the true essence of obedience in submission of the personal will and judgment to the judgment and the will of other men.

It was worth while to lay some stress upon this, not only for its own intrinsic importance in illustrating the relation of obedience to free will; but also because, when this has been strongly said, it becomes possible to emphasize, without fear of being misinterpreted, a different lesson from monastic obedience. If the theory has too often been held without due proportion, it does not follow that it has been so always. Moreover, even in cases where the theory may have been, as theory, misconceived: yet good men are so habitually better in their practice, than in their statement, of their own theories, that it would probably be simple truth of fact to say that many of the best and highest approaches towards the reality of freedom of will are to be found, as in former ages so in this, in the very directions

[1] St Luke ii. 49.
[2] St John ii. 4.
[3] St Mat. xii. 48-50.
[4] St Mark viii. 33.

which men off-hand would think to be the least natural and least free; that is to say within the walls of self-effacing communities, in the common life of brotherhoods or of sisterhoods. For terrible as is the perversion to which their theory, if mis-stated, is liable, (as "*corruptio optimi pessima*,") yet, after all, they are constantly endeavouring to practise the discipline of not letting their wills be shaped (a shaping which is inchoate slavery) by the ease or whim of the moment; they are constantly teaching themselves to will, and will effectively, exactly the thing which they believe that they ought to will, simply because they believe that they ought to will it: and therefore they are acquiring, through submission to law,—the law which does so far correspond with the nature of their true highest being,—an insight into the secret of what freedom of will would mean. For our will is not free, until we have in ourselves the power effectually to will what we desire to will; and to desire exactly what we ought; that is, what belongs to the true perfection of ourselves. To discern what we ought, and to desire what we discern; and then to be able, with unhindered and untrammelled freedom of spirit, effectively to will what we desire: to be able in a word, to give full effect, by the sovereign spontaneity of our own will, to the supremest reality of the possibilities of ourselves: nothing less than this can be the real freedom of will. Its sovereignty consists not in lack of correspondence with that which is without, (for it is in perfect correspondence with that which is without that the self is perfectly realized,) but in that perfect emancipation from all disabilities within, all the tyrannies of false habit or indolent whim, which held the divine image back from really being either divine or itself.

It is plain, then, if the conception of free will suggested in this chapter has been, even approximately, true; that, whilst our experience necessarily starts with the witness

to free will, the germ of free will, the capacity, and the necessary demand, for free will, yet we do not, in fact, possess that real freedom of will, which we cannot but, all the while, both imagine and claim. Something we possess which bears witness of it; which may be developed into it; but which, in its present imperfectness, is in many points even sharply contrasted with it.

It is plain also that we grow more and more towards it, in proportion as our dependence upon, and union of Spirit with, Christ, become more vitally real in us. So that it appears that free will itself,—the very first thing which we most fundamentally claimed as showing what we meant by our own personality, or proving that we were personal indeed,—can only then, at last, be consummated in us, when our union is consummated with Christ; and the very Spirit of the Incarnate (in penitence alike, or in holiness, annihilating sin,) is the Spirit, which has become the constitutive reality, of ourselves.

Another claim which our personality makes, and by which it vindicates and explains itself to itself, is the claim to reason or wisdom. We rest upon our capacity of reflection, in self-conscious thought, upon the universe and upon ourselves. "*Cogito, ergo sum*" is the famous phrase which sums up a vast region of conscious, or unconscious, argument as to the meaning of human personality.

If for the moment, we speak of this claim as the claim to rational faculty, we do so in order to ask a little further what this word rational—or reason—means. Probably we imagine it first as a continuing process, of question and answer, and comparison, and inference, and discovery. But question about what? and what does the answer convey? what is compared with what? and what is inferred or discovered? It is worth while to insist from the first that whatever difficulties of intellectual exercise, or

gradualness of process, or succession of surprises in discovery, may be in fact contained in our experience of rational capacity, these do not belong to the essence of what reason means. All these belong to the fact of its imperfection, not its essence. They belong to the fact that it is learning to develop, and is still at a very early stage of development. They may be compared to the unexpected puzzles, the comical surprises, and the delightful discoveries, which belong to infants in the earliest stage of acquiring the faculty of walking on their own legs. They are all part of the machinery, and part moreover of that grating and creaking of the machinery, which show that it is not really, as yet, in that proper symmetry of mutual relation, which is the ideal significance of even the clumsiest piece of actual machinery. We will decline, then, to mean by "rational faculty" anything in the least like the capacity of ingenious playing with logical processes for the sake of dialectical exercise or victory; or even (as in some cases it may be) for the sake of obscuring and avoiding truth. No; we mean reason, not in its infantine capacity of turning ridiculous intellectual somersaults; nor yet in the strugglings and creakings of its own, as yet, imperfectly adjusted machinery; but we mean that which is the real aim and end of all these things, in its most real and serious sense. We mean the capacity of personal insight into reality—of all kinds, and most of all into whatever is highest and most inclusive as reality: we mean personal capacity of beholding wisdom and truth. Truth of course is manifold and multiform. There are truths of material fact: truths of abstract statement: truths of historical occurrence: truths of moral experience: truths of spiritual existence: and that truth is deepest and truest, which most includes and unifies them all. Nothing whatever will be gained but mystification and error, from starting

with any conception of reason or "rational" which would make its essential meaning less, or other, than wisdom, personal discernment, the penetrative insight of the very self into truth, as true.

Approaching, then, reason or wisdom in this way, we may say, first of all, that there is one aspect in which it will be much easier in the case of this claim, than in the claim to free will, to see at once that the minds of individual persons realize truth, not in proportion as they are independent of, but rather as they perfectly correspond with and reflect, that larger truth of Mind, which is itself equally true whether reflected in individual apprehension or no. Obviously, in this case at least, the personal perfectness depends not on its diversity from, but on its identity with, a certain larger whole of which the personal perfectness is at most but a part. There is a truth, which is anterior to, and outside of, ourselves. It is in the universe; it is in all existence; it is the intelligibleness of everything; it is the principle of motion by which all things move, of life by which life exists, of order which differentiates the universe from chaos. It is in ourselves; and it is by schooling ourselves to its study and discipline; it is in proportion as we learn, with more perfect apprehension, to enter for ourselves into this Mind of truth, of which our existence, whether material or mental, is already in some sense a part, that we ourselves become, more and more, rational and wise. The claim to reach wisdom by some transcendental method of improving upon, instead of by simple subordination to, the apprehension of things which already are, would be felt, on all hands, to be a claim which must really characterize, not so much the exceptionally wise, as the hopelessly insane.

But if there is one obvious sense, from the first, in which it can be said that individual reason or wisdom only realizes itself, in proportion as it becomes a conscious part

of a much more inclusive whole, faithfully mirroring, because it has become so far self-identified with, what was from the first, and still is, beyond itself: this is but an aspect of a truth which needs further supplementing, in other ways.

This is, so far, an abstract statement, which is true of any finite mind as mind, in relation to anything which can be called truth at all. But it is important to observe that truth is of many kinds, and that different kinds of truth appeal to many different strands in the complex consciousness of man. The truths of infantine experience in material surroundings: the truths of arithmetic: the truths of physiology: the truths of metaphysical philosophy or of moral experience,—do not appeal to a single faculty in man. It is not so much true to say that they appeal to different parts of his personality, as that they appeal—partly to somewhat different combinations, and still more to somewhat different amounts, or degrees, of that complex completeness which is himself. A moral lesson about truth or falsehood, if really apprehended by a child, not as an interesting story only, but as part of that inner store, which is at once mental knowledge and moral resolve, and which we know as character; has in fact required for its apprehension, and has, in the act of apprehension, really touched and enlarged, a much wider range of experiences and capacities, than any lesson of simple arithmetic, or simple science. All knowledge is not equal as knowledge. There is a real hierarchy of truths; and though every truth has its value, yet a deeper and more abiding value belongs to those which affect and include the widest inclusiveness of human faculties. Now, man's moral consciousness is a wider and more inclusive thing, as consciousness, than what we often call, by an effort of logical abstraction (as if we could really eliminate the mental from the moral, or the moral from the mental), his

"merely" intellectual or rational power. And spiritual truth is that which gives its ultimate meaning to the moral, and alone really vivifies and unifies the entire consciousness of man. It is true that fire burns. It is true that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. The law of gravitation, the principle of the conservation of energy, are statements of truth. It is true that man is mortal. It is true that goodness is happiness. It is true that God is love. It is true that the perfectness of man's capacity is communion with God. But if these propositions are all true, it is manifest that the truth of some of them includes and affects the entire range, and the noblest consummation, of the capacities of man's personality, in a way in which the truth of others does not. It is manifest moreover that just in proportion as these different truths affect, if true, a wider range of man's being: so they require that wider range of man's being and experience, for the possibility of their apprehension as truths. It is a very small part of man's complex nature by which he fully understands that two and two make four. But communion with God, if ever he fully understands it at all, he will certainly not understand with anything less than the total range of all his capacities, mental, moral, and spiritual. And, moreover, in his understanding of it, he will recognize the hierarchical relation of his own faculties; those that are deepest and highest of capacity obviously transcending, and dominating,—even while they include,—those whose range, as more limited, is recognized as being really lower in level.[1]

[1] In connection with this section of the present chapter, I may perhaps be allowed to make reference to an essay on the mutual inter-dependence of "*Reason and Religion*," in which I endeavoured, a few years ago, to discuss, with somewhat more fulness, the true meaning, and the different manifestations, of reason. I refer to it in the main, simply as a more expanded statement of my present meaning. But whilst doing so I should like to take

It is a truth familiar to human experience that, for the apprehension of moral and spiritual truth, moral and spiritual experience is indispensable. You cannot apprehend spiritual truths by precisely and solely the same faculties with which you apprehend scientific facts. The apprehending mind must itself be moral and spiritual, if it is to have intelligence in the region of moral and spiritual things. But it is a familiar fallacy of human language, that just when man's power of rational intelligence is reaching its own highest forms and highest powers, to deal with its own highest subject matter, the terms intelligent and rational are too often withdrawn, as though they belonged, by a sort of exclusive right, to those lower regions of experience, of which they were first used, and in which they are most widely familiar. This is partly a consequence of the misleading attempt to abstract mental from moral, and moral from mental, as though they could be, at any stage, really sundered the one from the other: and it issues in the preposterous result, that human reason and wisdom, just when they are developing into their own highest consummation, that is to say, when they are becoming luminously spiritual, are supposed, just because they are becoming spiritual, to pass *ipso facto* away from what can be called human reason or intelligence at all. The truths which men are inclined to call distinctively rational, the truths in apprehending which the moral nature bears no part, are simply lower in plane than moral truths: while moral truths, so called, of which the key and clue, nay the whole ultimate life and meaning, are

the opportunity of saying expressly that in the opening pages of the last paper which that little volume contains there are a few phrases which I should certainly wish to modify now. The modification would be rather in pursuance, than in contradiction, of what was really the essential thought of that paper. But I should certainly now prefer to avoid, as misleading, any use, in reference to human personality, of any phrase, such as "a distinct centre of being," which might even seem to conceive of it at all otherwise than in its capacity of relation to, and dependence on, God.

not spiritual, are like buildings on the sand, which have, in time of stress, no sure foundation.

In all cases alike, mental, moral, and spiritual, man's capacity of reason or wisdom is really in fact his power of perception or insight into truth which is already actually true; it is his power of realizing, by conscious reflection, what are anyhow, with him or without him, the methods or principles of the Being of God. To see, in the white, worn, bleeding flesh of a crucified convict, the LORD of Life and of Death, was no exercise of ordinary, or scientific, reason in the mind of the penitent thief. But it was true insight, into truth, as true, not the less but the more, for that. To see God in every common sight: to see Christ above all in the daily experience of the Christian life;[1] to see the majesty of His presence in the person of the poor and sordid sufferer; to see the glory of His Spirit in little efforts for good which the world, if it saw them at all, would resent or despise: this requires indeed conditions and faculties of insight which we sometimes, by perverse antithesis, are ready even to contrast with "rational"; and yet it is, after all, a true insight into truth of Divine fact, in the highest conceivable plane of Divine truth.

It is true, no doubt, that the essential faculties for such insight as this may be wanting in many minds, in which many lower branches of rational apprehension are developed in even exceptional degrees. It is of course open to the world to deny that any such things are true at all: to deny alike the Person of Christ and the Being of God. But it is not open to any one to doubt the relative importance of these truths, if they be true. The insight which discerns the Spirit, and can see the Christ,—if it is a truth at all and not a lie—must needs be, by the universal confession of all rational minds, higher

[1] John xiv. 19, etc.

as insight into truth as true, higher that is as human reason or wisdom, than the most accurate apprehension of any truth, however inclusive, in the merely material sphere. Our current language, then, is apt both to narrow, and also to isolate, reason over much. Reason means much more than we are content to suppose; and it is, even from its very lowest beginning,—and is more and more as it rises in scope and significance,—inseparable from the rest of man's nature, with which we continue to contrast it, but with which its highest powers are increasingly interwoven. Its own highest ranges and powers, which current language more than half disowns, are found in fact to be more and more dependent upon, more and more identified with, that consummation of the self by its passing beyond itself, that self-realization in oneness with the Spirit of the Incarnate Christ, in which we have found already the crown and climax of the meaning of human free will.

There is one aspect more in reference to which it is well to add a few words before passing from the present subject. It has just been said that Intelligence in its higher ranges, is less and less distinct from the total man. As in God, Truth, Goodness, Love, Eternity, Almightiness, though different attributes, are perfected only in an ultimate unity, which is absolutely every one of them all — so that Truth is not really Truth, nor Holiness Holiness, apart from Love: nor can Love be ultimately Love, that is not Holiness and also Truth, and also infinite and Almighty Being: so, in measure, it is with the ideal consummation of man. The more, then, the human attribute of reason or wisdom approaches, as it does approach in its higher significance, to affecting and involving the whole man: the more obvious does the principle become that it will not lie outside of, but will fall within that law which is the law of the whole man's

development,—the law of perfection through sacrifice. As free will, that it may become free, has by what looks like a suicidal plunge, to sacrifice the only thing which seemed at first to constitute its freedom: as the capacity of joy, that it may become joy indeed, in the true and only real sense of what joy means, has to forego by strong effort of self-sacrificing will, not only the things which seemed at first to be the necessary conditions of joy, but almost (as it seems) if not quite, in many cases, what looked like the very capacity of joy itself: as, in each case, that is to say, there is an apparent, and a lower, form of excellence, the deliberate sacrifice of which is the condition of the development of the higher: so it is with reason or wisdom.

The faculty of reason appears to a man at first as if it were enthroned alone, in its pride: as if it were by itself, as he knows it,—that is, as he feels that it is, or is coming to be, in himself,—the sovereign judge and sole arbiter of everything, in every sphere, which offers itself to his consideration as true. He helps himself, indeed, and teaches himself, by the reason of other men. But the real judge and arbiter is, after all, in himself. Now even such a form of self-assertion as this is not wholly, in words, untrue—provided it first be learnt what the self is, and what the conditions are of its self-realization. There is indeed a gauge of wisdom in the transfigured self. But the self has first to be transfigured. There is a pride of what seems at first like wisdom to be cut sharply down, that the root of the true wisdom may begin to put out its shoots. It is not unlike free will, or self love, or the instinctive desire for joy, in this. It has to come down from its pedestal of glory, and to confess how near is the natural pride of human intellect to the consummation of folly. It has to recognize, through a cleansing process, which is none the less really an intellectual discipline, because it palpably belongs to the

sphere of moral causes and effects,—first how it is that the wisdom of the wise is outdone, even as wisdom, by what seemed as the merest foolishness to that which foolishly thought itself wisdom once: and secondly how it is that not the isolation of intellect as intellect, but the absolute surrender of personal allegiance, allegiance of spirit to the Spirit of the Incarnate,—that Spirit whose wisdom is not other than holiness, nor His holiness other than wisdom,—is the condition ultimately essential for seeing the whole, or the true proportion, of truth. It is not the poor, weak, unaided intellect of the isolated individual; it is not intellect in relation to a universe of which itself is regarded as centre or crown; it is rather the insight of character, the intellect of goodness, it is the personal intellect as illumined by the Spirit, which is the reflection of truth.

It is not indeed that the powers of human intellect are contemptible. The powers of human intellect are transcendent, beyond all capacity of utterance. But the condition of the development of the transcendent powers of human intellect is its self-surrender, and through self-surrender, transformation, from its first nakedness of separate self-sufficiency—to the humblest and most dutiful communion with God. By sacrifice of what seemed to it once to be its very self, its essential independence of prerogative, it arises purified: the scales dropped off; the mote and the beam alike gone: the eyes of the Spirit really opened; the vision of God unveiled. It had been trying to read the secret of wisdom through methods and under limitations which made any real apprehension thereof impossible. Vainly, to the end of time, will human wisdom that has passed through no regenerating process, —spirit-humbling at once, and eye-opening; vainly, that is, will philosophy, otherwise than in conscious and open dependence upon Christian theological truth, attempt to

read the riddle of existence, whether in external phenomena, or in man, or in God.

Beyond all question this is the claim,—as it is the experience,—of St Paul. Whatever difficulty there may be in stating accurately, in words, the nature of the change which natural reason undergoes before it can see the deeper reality, and right proportion, of truth; it is clear that there is a transformation, of a moral and spiritual order, without which intellect must still remain disordered and incompetent as intellect. It is expressly of philosophy apart from Christian truth, apart from a Christian's knowledge of the personality of God, and the personality of man—its utter incompleteness and the conditions of its self-realization,—that he says, "Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God's good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching" [the R.V. margin points out that it is, in the Greek, "the thing preached" τοῦ κηρύγματος,] "to save them that believe. . . . Christ crucified, unto Jews a stumbling-block, and unto Gentiles foolishness; but unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men."[1] The passage should be considered continuously to the end of the 3rd chapter, *e.g.* "Even so the things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God. But we received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us by God. Which things also we speak, not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Spirit teacheth: . . . the natural man receiveth not the things

[1] 1 Cor. i. 20, *sqq.*

of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things . . . we have the mind of Christ. . . . If any man thinketh that he is wise among you in this world, let him become a fool that he may become wise. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God . . . Wherefore let no one glory in men. For all things are yours; . . . all are yours; and ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's." Only as the property of Christ,—wholly dependent on Christ, as Christ is dependent on God,—can man, as a "reasonable" personality, realize the significance, or attain the consummation, of what "reason" in a personality really means.

We have spoken hitherto, first of man's claim to the possession of free will, and then of his claim to the possession of reason. These differ from each other, not so much as diverse parts or faculties of man, but rather as different aspects of his total self, for his total self is, in fact, implied and included in each. In either case, we found that though man's original claim was by no means without foundation, yet the germs which he actually possessed were something extremely remote from what the full idea, whether of free will or of reasonable wisdom, would be found, on analysis, necessarily to involve. In either case moreover we observed that man approximated towards the realization of his own inherently necessary idea, whether of reason or of free will, in proportion as he ceased to be, or even to seem to be, "merely" himself; in proportion as he was made one with the Spirit of the Christ, and, in fact, attained at last to the full realization of himself in the act of what had once looked like the inanition of self,—his frank and full surrender of all faculties to a life of self-identification with Another. In either case, finally, we saw indications that the consummation of one aspect of man's being

was the breaking down of its distinction from other aspects. However far from each other, in their rudimentary stages, inchoate freedom of will and inchoate reason may appear to us to be: the higher they rise in the scale of their own completeness, the less, it seemed, could either free will be conceived apart from insight of wisdom, or insight of wisdom apart from its necessary aspect as determination of character. We had reason more than to suspect that the final consummation of either would necessarily be the consummation of both: or rather that, in final consummation, they are not, and cannot be, distinguished any longer as two; they are but inseparable aspects of one identity.

In respect of the third instinctive claim which man makes to personality,—his capacity of love,—it will not be necessary to speak at great length. This is not, for a moment, because love is of less significance for the purpose than either reason, or free will. On the contrary it is, if possible, more significant still. But it is because the different considerations which were comparatively obscure in respect of free will and of reason, are so clear in the case of love, that at some points they almost approach to being self-evident. Following the analogy of the former cases, we should be prepared for such propositions as these. First, that man had, from the beginning of his consciousness, something which witnessed to the idea of love, which, through whatever perversions, had affinity with it, which constituted an instinctive claim to it, and was known by its name. Secondly, that, on examination, this love which he certainly had, was not only not the real completeness of that idea of love, of which it bore witness, and which was knowable through it; but was even, in many points, in extreme antithesis against what was, all the time, its own true ideal. Thirdly, that it was not by mere addition, but by very considerable subtraction; not by building on,

but by cutting away; by discipline, and refusal, and sacrifice, of a very great part of what had seemed to be the necessary conditions, if not the very capacity itself, of love; that the natural love, with which man starts, is emancipated from the slavery of its own imperfectness, and begins to acquire the capacity of corresponding to what love ideally means. Fourthly, that the nearer it approaches to its ideal consummation as love, the less is it capable of being practically separated, or at last even distinguished, from such other aspects of man's total being, as his reason, or his will; which are, in fact, implied and absorbed within love. And fifthly, that the process towards this consummation can be seen to coincide with the gradual realization of the self,—not by progressive distinction from all that seemed to be not self, but by progressive self-surrender to what at first offered itself for acceptance as "other";—by progressive self-identity with that Spirit of the Incarnate, which being the very Spirit of God in, and as, human character, is found to be the consummation of the perfectness of the self of every man.

After what has been said it hardly seems necessary to dwell upon these statements one by one. There is perhaps no word in human language which has had a wider range of significance, or, it must be added, a history of profounder degradation, than love. It has ranged from the depths of hell to the highest height of heaven. It has described the darkest perversions of which the godlike nature of man is capable. Yet in its true self it is more than Godlike: it is God.

Not only are there a thousand different forms of what can be openly convicted as perverse love of self, devotion to what is known, at bottom, to be evil, love really of the world, and the flesh, and the devil. There are also a thousand, and again a thousand, most intricate and deceptive combinations of the evil and the good, the hideous

and the beautiful. There is tainted love of country, ambitious love of office or industry or wisdom, selfish love of home, and of all the beautiful things that home might represent: nay, there is self-aggrandising philanthropy, selfish love of unselfishness, self-centred self-sacrifice;[1] until we sometimes fairly reel with the sense of the hopelessness of ever being free from the web of insidious perversions with which every apparent approach to real love is enmeshed. But does any one, in his moments of serious thought, really mistake all, or any one, of these, for that reality of Spirit, of which St John speaks; "God is love; and he that abideth in love abideth in God, and God abideth in him." . . . "We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren." "Hereby know we that we abide in Him, and He in us, because He hath given us of His Spirit"?[2]

On the other hand has any one once seen a face out of which all mocking unrealities of aggressive, or even of deceptive, selfishness had faded wholly at last; a face which was animated by the very purity of the flame of the Spirit which at last was love? Or, at the least, have we not all seen some moments, some glimpses, of this? Just so far we know that we too have seen real glimpses of the face of the love of God.

There is nothing, in fact, in the five statements which were made just now which is not covered by the glowing words of St John. Only on one aspect more a few words may be added. It is a commonplace in the doctrine of love,—that the root of opposition to love is self. There is of course an apparent love which is merely ministering to self. But the conquest of self is the true emancipation of love. Love *versus* self, then, and self *versus* love is the familiar antithesis: so that self-love is the contradiction

[1] 1 Cor. xiii. 3. [2] 1 John iv. 16; iii. 14; iv. 13.

of love's reality; and the total subjugation of the self is the finding of love. But if the subjugation of the self is the finding of love, it may be asked which self? for the total subjugation of the natural self as truly is the finding of the true self as it is the finding of love. "Whosoever shall lose his life for My sake shall find it." If the crowning of the natural self is the ruin of love; yet the crowning of love is the crowning of the true self. This is but another witness to the essential truth of the law of sacrifice. Whether it be free will, or reason, or love, the imperfect cannot be educated into the perfect by natural processes. The false cannot of itself grow into the true. The sour cannot become sweet, through grafting, without the knife.

The question with which this chapter began, and to which all its thought is really directed, is this; what is the relation of the Spirit of God, become through Incarnation the Spirit of Man; what is the relation (in a single word) of Pentecost, to the meaning of human personality? And the answer is, that it is only through Pentecost that the meaning of human personality is ever actually realized at all. It is only through absolute oneness with the Spirit of Human perfection that the perfect meaning of Humanity can ever be touched or seen. Only the man who is consummated in God has attained the fulness of what was, all through, from the very beginning, the inherent craving, and ideal significance, of personal self-hood in man.

It is the capital mistake of human thought to set out with the conception of human self-hood, as though it were already a completed verity, realizing within itself, as actual realities, the different attributes or necessities, the witness to which is indeed exhibited in itself. It has been the capital mistake of expositions of atonement in

particular, when they would explain how the Cross of Christ benefited *me*, to treat the word "I" as a single, indivisible term, of unchallenged and self-evident meaning, which did not, because it could not, vary throughout the whole process of its salvation; and outside of which, therefore, the process must be shown to be both complete and intelligible.

Not so. The "I" is only, in its early experience, a most tentative, inchoate, and imperfect, realization of what the word "I" needs to mean. In respect of each of the three main component aspects or elements of personality, as we analyze or explain it to ourselves, Freedom of Will, and Reason or Wisdom, and Love; we have some reason for saying that there is no man who really possesses them, or any one of them, in its own proper meaning, by himself. Something he possesses which corresponds to each one; but something which unless purified, and enlarged, and transformed,—through the method of suffering and sacrifice,—will be found not only to fall short of, but even ultimately to contradict, its own inherent significance. We have none of them, save with this fatal imperfectness, till our true selves are set free from their damning caricature; till we become our true selves, consummated and complete, through the indwelling completeness of the Spirit of the Incarnate Christ.

It will not be denied that this is cardinal to the teaching of the Gospel of Christ's Church. "Abide in Me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; so neither can ye, except ye abide in Me. I am the vine, ye are the branches; he that abideth in Me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit: for apart from Me ye can do nothing."[1] "Even as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be in Us . . . that they may

[1] John xv. 4, 5.

be one, even as We are one; I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be perfected into one."[1] "He that is joined to the Lord is one Spirit."[2] "But if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ he is none of His."[3] "Try your own selves, whether ye be in the faith; prove your own selves. Or know ye not as to your own selves, that Jesus Christ is in you? unless indeed ye be reprobate."[4] Even texts like these are but samples of a vast body of teaching that is vitally characteristic.

It is indeed most familiar to Christian thought, that the excellent glory of a man is only in personal union and communion with the Spirit of Jesus Christ. But even this thought has too often been conceived on the basis of a tacit assumption, that whatever excellency of beauty he, the man, might receive through the Spirit: yet he, the real he, was at least as "he" complete anyhow;—was, from the first, essentially and consummately himself. Though he, in the dutiful exercise of his freedom of will, his rational wisdom, and his love,—every one of which, he was conceived of as inherently realizing,—might be the recipient of divinely adorning gifts, or might enter into new and divine relations, leading him onwards to the glory of unimaginable beatitude: yet by the very terms of the thought, if strictly pressed, the divine gifts, as gifts, the beauty, as adornment, the beatitude, as joy (however unspeakable), were differentiated from the "he": were rather conditions outside of, than the inherent character which constituted, the central reality of the self. It is precisely this assumption that we have desired to correct. Our point is that it is only through the indwelling of the Spirit that the "he" begins to be realized in the true and proper sense of a "he" at all.

Is it seriously to be thought that a human personality,

[1] John xvii. 21-3.
[2] 1 Cor. vi. 17.
[3] Rom. viii. 9.
[4] 2 Cor. xiii. 5.

in whom all freedom of will, actual or possible, is more and more progressively enslaved to the most degrading and destructive of tyrannies; in whom what once was called reason or wisdom is more and more progressively incapable of the highest discernment of truth, the vision of God and of His Christ, forever; in whom love, so called, having long lost all real affinity with the true meaning of love, which is the essential and inherent presence of God, comes to be every day with merer and merer nakedness, the most blasphemous form of self-worship, and by consequence the very spite of impotent hatred against whatever is, in any way, godlike or good; in whom, in a word, every faculty, which even our instinctive thought connects with the barest conception of personality, is manifestly degenerating into ruin at least, if not into dissolution; is it seriously to be thought that such an one, nevertheless, from first to last, fully realizes in himself all that human personality, as such, can rightly be said to mean?

On the other hand, where the Spirit of the Incarnate is indwelling, He is present neither as a distinct or extraneous gift, nor as an overruling force in which the self is merged and lost, but as the consummation of the self. It is no doubt perfectly true to speak of the "Spirit" as the "gift" of God. But there is a point at which even this true phrase may rather obscure than illustrate the truth. For to speak of a gift given to me is so far to distinguish in thought between me and the gift: and just so far as I distinguish I begin to go wrong. Even indeed when I speak of a presence "within me," I do still, to a certain extent, by the very terms used, make the presence and the "me" not identical. And so far again I fall short, not indeed of any present experience, but of the ideal truth which I am fain to express. For the very meaning, at least of the ultimate reality of the Spirit in me, is that this

distinction is no longer real. The gift of the Spirit is a gift—an objective gift if you will—how different from the original "I" to whom He is given! yet this very gift is only real after all, in so far as He is in me subjectively realized. So that after all it is perhaps not so much, nor so distinctively, true to say an objective gift, as a subjective receiving and response; not so much, or at least not so ultimately, something that is conferred upon the "I," as what the "I" becomes in, and through, receiving. He is not a mere presence *in* me, overruling, controlling, displacing. What He in me does, I do. What He in me wills, I will. What He in me loves, I love. Nay, never is my will so really free: never is my power so worthy of being called power: never is my rational wisdom so rational or so wise; never is my love so really love; never moreover is any one of these things so royally my own; never am I, as I, so capable, so personal, so real; never am I, in a word, as really what the real "I" always tried to mean; as when by the true indwelling of the Spirit of God, I enter into the realization of myself; as when I at last correspond to, and fulfil, and expand in fulfilling, all the unexplored possibilities of my personal being, by a perfect mirroring of the Spirit of Christ; as when in Him and by Him I am, at last, a true, willing, personal response to the very Being of God.

The capacities are indeed unexplored. It is to be remembered that even Jesus Christ upon earth, while He was the perfect expression of Divine Personality in Humanity, yet was so only under conditions, deliberately self chosen, of mortal and penitential disability. But the essential conditions of personality, in its proper consummation, are neither penitential nor mortal. We must look beyond even Christ's manifestation on earth, beyond all penitential and mortal conditions, beyond all possibilities of realized experience, to discern anything of that trans-

cendent glory which was, after all, the true underlying meaning of our dim solitary struggling effort of personality, and of the freedom, the reason, and the love, which we dimly recognized as elements necessary to its fulness. "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed on us, that we should be called children of God: and such we are. . . . Beloved now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if He shall be manifested, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him even as He is."[1] "Now the Lord is the Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. But we all with unveiled face reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit."[2] Not that the Spirit, by constituting the personality of all, will make all alike. He will not overrule to uniformity, but develop the several possibilities of every one. They will differ, as much as and far more than, the difference,—in equal glory,—of the stars or the flowers. "There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star differeth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead."[3]

What then, once more, is our statement of human personality? It is no several or separate thing. Its *essentia* cannot be found in terms of distinctness. It does not, ideally or practically, signify a new, independent, centrality of being. On the contrary, it is altogether dependent and relative. It is not first self-realized in distinctness, that it may afterwards, for additional perfection of enjoyment, be brought into relations. In relation and dependence lies its very *essentia*. Wherever the least real germ of it exists, the true meaning of even that germinal and tentative life, as seen in what it is capable

[1] 1 John iii. 1, 2. [2] 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18. [3] 1 Cor. xv. 41, 42.

of becoming, is this. It is the capacity of thrilling, in living response, to the movement of the Spirit; it is the aspiration, through conscious affinity (in such hope as is the pledge of its own possibility) after the very beauty of holiness; it is the possibility of self-realization, and effective self-expression, as love; it is the prerogative of consciously reflecting, as a living mirror, the very character of the Being of God. This, and nothing less, is the true reality of personality, that reality which we claim so easily, and so very imperfectly attain. It is only by realizing this that we ever can realize the fulness of what is, in fact, demanded and implied in the very consciousness of being a person. Personality is the possibility of mirroring God; the faculty of being a living reflection of the very attributes and character of the Most High.

Whilst, then, it may be true that philosophical thought is more or less explicitly teaching us that created personality is not, and cannot be, a really distinct or self-subsistent centre of being; that all existence must be, in its ultimate reality, not multiplicity but unity; that the particular can only reach its own proper self-realization in the way of relation, as part of the universal and the absolute: it is plain that at least to Christian theology the corresponding language is not strange, but inveterately familiar and congenial. Here at least Christian theology speaks, with simplicity and confidence, of truths which have always been clear and certain to herself. To her at least, if, on the one hand, the several self, as several, is *true*—in a sense and with a capacity neither conceived nor conceivable elsewhere; on the other hand, human personality, just so far as it claims to be self-centred or self-contained, is personality, so far, in contradiction against all that personality ought to mean. To Christian theology at least, the loneliness of a personality single and sundered, is a condition that of necessity belongs—

not to life, but to death. If any one desires a Christian formula for the central conception of human personality, it may be gathered from the words of St Paul, "I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me."[1] I, yet not I. Not I, and therefore I, the full, real, consummated "I," at last! Here is the real inmost principle of life and immortality brought to light by the gospel of Christ. And the words of St John are a significant comment; "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we know Him that is true, and we are in Him that is true, even in His Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life."[2] And both phrases are but comments on those supreme words of the Incarnate to the Eternal, of the Christ to God; "I in them and Thou in Me, that they may be perfected into one" . . . "that the love wherewith Thou lovedst Me may be in them, and I in them."[3]

[1] Gal. ii. 20. [2] 1 John v. 20. [3] John xvii. 23-26.

CHAPTER X

THE CHURCH AND SACRAMENTS

IF we turn from the side of theory to the familiar experience of the Christian life, it is sufficiently manifest that the religious character, so far as it is realized, is a character which is at every point, and for everything that it is, not self-sufficing, but dependent on Another. "It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you"[1] is a pregnant saying, representing the very principle of the inwardness of the individual Christian life.

This essential religious reality, wherever it is a reality at all, is recognized all the world over in two most universal and necessary ways. First in the habit,—whether more formulated or less,—of meditation and prayer. The thoughts of a religious man, in their unconscious roaming, as well as in the efforts which they consciously pursue, turn upwards and Godwards. And such thoughts culminate in prayer;—the perfectly deliberate uplifting and effort of the self, as self, and all that it is or may be, in the way of yearning and request towards God. Such thought, and such prayer, (whether when measured by the clock they seem to occupy a longer or a shorter portion of his occupied time,) cannot be, to the religious man, a merely occasional exception, intervening in great contrast with the true inward tenor of his thought and life. On the contrary, it is they which

[1] Matt. x. 20.

are the real staple, the underlying background, of all his consciousness. Outwardly he may be a busy priest, or a busy statesman, or lawyer, or tradesman, or labourer, or what you will. But underneath these things, the form of which is comparatively accidental, (though in each case, at first sight, it seems to constitute the life,) runs that steady stream of thoughtfulness and of prayerfulness to Godward; which, though it may not determine the direction of professional duty, yet determines absolutely, and dominates in the detail of every particular, the temper and the method in which duty is done. To try to imagine a religious man without meditation in any form (it may be almost infinitely informal) and without any effort of prayer,—is to try to imagine what is little else than a contradiction in terms.

Correlative with this, the secret of the inward consciousness, is that shaping of the outward conduct, that deliberate obedience of the moral life, to which we have already partly referred, because it is so inseparable from prayerfulness, that it was difficult to express the meaning of prayerfulness without language which at once, in a measure, had trenched upon the region of the outward life. Such obedience, whether in the shape of discipline strongly restraining forbidden impulses, or of duty, insisting upon what is neither natural nor easy, is obviously a rudimentary form of what in its fulness would be a life wholly conformed to, and lived by, a standard of excellence, such as certainly had not been, by nature or at first, to be found within itself. It is an element in the necessary process of learning to find, outside the personal impulses, the true focus and centre of inspiration of the personal life. It is part of that uphill work of becoming a law to oneself, in which the "law," (called "law" because conceived of, and indeed experienced, as standing outside and in contrast with the self,) in proportion as it

bec mes internal and spo taneous to th self, loses all its aspect as coercive law, and is felt only as independent strength of moral self-command. Such effort, at least, towards obedience, is entirely characteristic of the religious life, not only in respect of its obviously graver and more responsible decisions, but in the imperceptible self-restraints and self-orderings which make up all the detail of every-day manners,—those morning and evening brightnesses and courtesies and sincere kindnesses of bearing and of purpose, of which "gentlemanly" and "ladylike" manners are a sort of superficial imitation or reflection on the surface.

Such things, in principle at least, have their place within the ideal of every life that is religiously ordered. But in the Christian life there is something else which,—whilst as a matter of course it includes and inspires these, using them to a point and with a meaning little dreamed of elsewhere,—is yet even more characteristic of the distinctive revelation and living power of the Christ. This is the whole range of the Church's sacramental system. The Christian sacraments are, in the outward sphere, a note or symbol of distinctively Christian life. And they are so just because their real significance is not in the outward sphere at all. The Christian sacraments, as mere pieces of formal observance, are nothing, or are less than nothing. They really are means, in themselves of the simplest kind that can be conceived, by the use of which, in humble and dutiful belief, that personal union in Spirit with the Personal Christ, towards which prayerfulness yearns and which obedience makes effort to practise, is by Christ's act and on the side of Christ, in response to approaches reverently made in the way precisely dictated by Himself, more and more progressively and effectively made real. Personal union with Christ, the early token and earnest of a consumma-

tion more than any words or thought of ours can compass, this is the one essential significance of sacramental ordinances.

It is to be particularly observed that in the process of uniting with Christ, and especially in the covenanted and supernatural side of it, the more distinctively divine side of the action, what is dealt with is not the individual primarily as individual, but the individual as enabled to participate, and as participating, in what is primarily a corporate privilege or estate. It is matter of little moment for the present purpose whether the Church is spoken of, under spatial figure, as the place or region of the Spirit; or whether it is spoken of more directly as the presence and working of the Spirit, as being expressly and actually the Spirit Himself. There is a "region of" the Spirit; and the form of phrase is too indispensable, for many purposes, to be set aside; but the region of the Spirit consists really not of local spaces but of living persons: it is within personal spirits, which as such are capable of Spiritual presence, that the Spirit is characteristically manifested as what He really is. The Church, then, is, in fact, the Spirit of Christ, communicated to the spirits of those who recognize, and believe in, His Person and work; it is the disciples of Christ, made Christian in very deed by participation in the Spirit of Christ. "I believe in the Holy Ghost," and "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church," are claims which, if fully enough understood, are in fact almost theologically conterminous, differing chiefly as different relations, or aspects, of one truth. Such a district or region, such a status or privilege, (call it which you will,) the spiritual extension, throughout Humanity, of the Incarnation,—itself a result which necessarily follows from the Incarnation,—is the Divine mode for the enlightening and purifying of individual personalities; and this is His Church; the Church

whose whole conception, meaning, and condition, is essentially and always "Spirit."

But while it is important to insist that the individual is dealt with in and through the corporate Life, which in the New Testament is spoken of as the Body of Christ, or as Christ;[1] it is the effect of participation in the corporate life upon the individual, with which we are now immediately concerned.

The actual relation, then, covenanted and Christian, of the individual personality with Christ, begins with Baptism. The primary conception of Baptism is admission or incorporation. It is possible to say a great deal in the way of exposition of Baptism, while it is mainly regarded as enrolment within the organization of a society. But it is obvious, to any theological mind, that this by itself, though true, is a superficial view of Baptism. In any case indeed, if it is enrolment within a society, the significance of the enrolment must naturally depend upon the meaning and scope of the society. And in this case, more than in any other, the character of the society is everything. Incorporation into the Church, regarded as a society, is in fact only the outward mode of expressing incorporation into the Church, regarded as a spiritual sphere and capacity of personal being; incorporation into the Church, which is the Spirit; and which, being the Spirit, is Christ,—the personal, spiritual, realization of Christ. It is this into which Baptism is the divinely commanded, and covenanted, initiation. Membership of Christ, with all that the word membership, in the fulness of its proper meaning, is capable of suggesting: membership of Christ, formally conferred by an act which is spoken of as representing, in divine significance, a rebirth; this has been the central idea by means of which, even to the minds of children and

[1] *Cp. e.g.* Eph. i. 22, 23 with Eph. iv. 13, and Rom. xii. 5 with 1 Cor. xii. 12 and John. xv. 5.

catechumens, the purpose and character of Baptism have been, from the beginning, explained.

The word rebirth is more than the accidental metaphor of a moment. It is rather a solemn challenge to spiritual intelligence, calling upon it to consider carefully what natural birth involves to the child that is born; and warning it not to expect, on any other basis, to understand what it is meant to understand in the profoundly simple outward experience of Baptism. The rebirth is the establishment of a relationship with Christ, which can only be understood in terms of the material relationship of flesh and blood with the limitations and disabilities of the nature of Adam. Each in its way is a first entrance upon possibilities of consciousness which may, and ought to, grow very far from their earliest forms of realization. As the one is the earliest initiation into the various possible experiences of this physical life, with its imperfect mental and quasi-spiritual corollaries,—all those pathetic witnesses and demands which it just dimly feels, but cannot possibly satisfy; so the other is the earliest initiation into all those developing spiritual possibilities which, in one word, are "Christ."

Even when Baptism comes to be thought and spoken of in conscious distinction from what we call Confirmation, this one great primary phrase "rebirth" is the one that is most characteristically attached to it,—along with the thought of symbolic cleansing, or remission, which the outward use of water immediately typifies. It is indeed the proper phrase for the earliest initiation into life; even though the meaning of the life is not yet realized,—the fulness therefore of what is ultimately implied in rebirth is not yet attained,—until that life is consummated in the vision of the glory of God. This is an ambiguity which few spiritual phrases can escape. Their meaning is never quite complete till the final consummation. And yet, from the first, their meaning, though in a sense

provisional, conditional, unconsummated, is itself clear and luminous.

In this case, however, there is a certain additional element of ambiguity, due to the fact that Baptism, as standing alone, does not constitute the whole initiation into the privileges and prerogatives of Christian life. This initiation, as we see in the New Testament, included also the laying on of Apostolic hands—the symbol of inclusion within the range of the mighty Pentecostal blessing; the consummation of the right to the *de facto* exercise of the prerogatives of the Christian franchise; the ordination, as it were, to the activity of the universal priesthood. Without this the initiation into Pentecostal privilege was not yet complete. In the early generations of the Church it is probable that Baptism was not conferred without this; or at least that such separation was rather the exception than the rule; and consequently that the word Baptism, in its normal use—apart from attention called to a special separation—implies and includes the "laying on of hands" as constituting, along with the "cleansing by water," a single unity of initiation. Whatever practical advantages may have been gained in other directions by the later usage, according to which confirmation is postponed for many years after baptism, it is plain that a certain degree of theological ambiguity is introduced whenever the two are regarded as completely apart from each other. For we then are called upon to give, and give with full completeness, in their separation, a rationale of the two ceremonies which in fact require and imply one another, because they are really parts of an initiation, which is, in theological idea, one whole.

This is hardly the place to attempt to enter, with minuteness, into the proper exposition of Baptism as contrasted with the Laying on of hands, or of Laying on of hands as contrasted with Baptism. There must always

be, for the reason just given, a certain element about it of practical, if not logical, inexactness. But meanwhile it will hardly be denied that just as, when the Baptism by water begins to be spoken of in patristic writings in contrast with unction and the laying on of hands, the word "regeneration" is the word which (along with cleansing or remission) is more and more reserved as the characteristic word for the exposition of it: even though such Baptism does not really exhaust, by itself, the conceptions inherent in "regeneration" as fully explained: so both in early patristic literature, and in scripture itself, the laying on of hands, when viewed in separation from Baptism, is characteristically identified with the gift, once for all, of the Pentecostal Spirit. Whatever margin there may be of practical inexactness in the sharp denial of the Pentecostal gift to anything but the Laying on of hands; (and indeed the sharp antitheses of logic are seldom at all points applicable to anything so complex and living as spiritual experience): it is plain that the true principle expressed in such denial is deeper and more significant than the dangers of inexactness; for the denial is expressed, with verbal emphasis, in the words of scripture itself.[1]

On the other hand, it may be said that—in whatever sense, or degree, the power of practically exercising spiritual rights (whether some or all) may remain, for a time, in abeyance,—the essential right to all rights is, from the moment of Baptism, already there. Whoever has been admitted into Christ has been admitted, implicitly at least, into all the fulness of the powers of the Spirit of Christ. This may be concretely expressed, on the practical side, by saying that every baptized person has *ipso facto*,—not so much the inherent right to dispense with confirmation, as the inherent right to be confirmed. And such in-

[1] "For as yet He was fallen upon none of them: only they had been baptized," Acts viii. 16; *cp.* also viii. 17, 18, and xix. 6.

herent right carries with it the inherent capacity, when the "Laying on of hands" *is, in the providence of God, withheld and impossible*, of all which the Laying on of hands, in the normal course, would have either symbolized or conferred.[1] To speak of the inherent right of the baptized to receive confirmation, is far more in accordance with scripture, as well as with all Church conception and practice, than to think that they may dispense with being confirmed.

For the present, however, we are concerned not with the precise definition of the contrast between the two, when they are, more or less abnormally (speaking from the point of view of the main theological idea) established in permanent separation from each other; so much as with the significance of both, when regarded together as constituting the total of the initiation into the powers of the Christian life. As we look at them so, it is more than ever clear that everything is in terms of Spirit, spiritual. Admission into Christ carries with it the indwelling presence of the Spirit of Christ: which presence is itself an admission into the full *de facto* exercise of spiritual rights, a capacity for the use, and for the intelligence, of spiritual powers. The Spirit is neither a substitute for, nor an addition to, Christ. The Spirit, in His fulness, is the fulness of the presence of Christ, which is the presence of God. The Spirit, in all the rudimentary stages of His realization, is the rudimentary realization, in the personal consciousness, of the presence of Christ, which is God. Given indeed in the beginning, and given once for all:—so that His gift or presence is rather a reality to be believed in than a possibility to be achieved; He is

[1] Thus, the *De rebaptismate* (printed with the works of St Cyprian), a treatise which exceedingly magnifies Confirmation, yet says, in reference to the interval between Baptism and the laying on of hands in Acts viii. 16, "Quod hodierna quoque die non potest dubitari esse usitatum, et evenire solitum, ut plerique post baptisma sine impositione manus episcopi de seculo exeant, *et tamen pro perfectis fidelibus habentur.*" *See* Dr Mason on *The relation of Confirmation to Baptism*, 123 *sqq.*

nevertheless, step by step, in slow process very gradually realized, as well in the consciousness of experience as in the aspiration of thought. But it is essential to Christian faith to believe that what is thus so gradually realized (and so very far, within our experience, from its consummation) is not something merely which may possibly some day come to be, but something which in underlying —if undeveloped—reality, already, before God, is. Incorporation into Christ, which (in its full sense) is the consummation, is (as gift, as right, and as inchoate fact,) the basis and the beginning of Christian life: and incorporation into Christ involves that indwelling presence of Christ's Spirit, of which all spiritual prerogatives and powers are but natural corollaries.

But if the initiation is once for all; and all that follows, up to the very throne of God, is but realization of what the initiation implicitly contained; the religious life of a Christian is also, and perhaps even more conspicuously, conditioned and supplied by the perpetually recurring sacrament of the Holy Communion. Baptism and the Laying on of hands are the conditions necessarily precedent to admission to the life of communion; not by an act of arbitrary Church discipline, imposing conditions of access where Christ imposed none; but because the Church so understands the scriptural and primitive doctrine of the initiation into Christ by these things, that she cannot but recognize that, where these are neglected, the spiritual conditions are not yet fulfilled, which would authorize her to impart, or enable the would-be recipients with due reverence and effect to receive, such further gifts as can only be what they are, within their own proper atmosphere of Spirit.

The first thing which strikes us, in our present context, in reference to the subject of the Holy Communion, is this; that its central thought and aim is (once more)

reality of personal union with Christ. The material experience in terms of which this reality is now presented, is quite different from that in the light of which Baptism was explained. But the central aim and ideal is the same. If Baptism corresponds to the birth which originates, the Holy Communion is the food which sustains and develops, life. As birth and as nurture, they represent between them the whole process, from the cradle to the fullest maturity of living power. And as the birth is initiation, once for all, into Christ, in effective right and possibility: so the nurture is meant to be development, more and more, into a fuller and fuller realization of voluntary self-identity, of character and spirit, with Christ.

The Holy Communion teaches this, with signal emphasis, in terms of food. And the food is expressly defined as the Flesh and Blood of Christ. Now while it is clearly beyond our present scope to enter upon any task so immense as the general exposition of Eucharistic doctrine, there are some two or three things which it may concern us to point out in respect of these terms. Our first point, then, is this: that the flesh and blood plainly express, and are meant to emphasize, His Humanity. Flesh and blood stand as the constituent elements, on the visible and palpable side, of that Humanity in which He was self-expressed. They stand as its outward and, so to say, measurable test; the pledge and guarantee of its reality. The gift of His flesh and blood is the gift of His Humanity. To share them is to share Humanity, as it was in Him. Into this context the comparison naturally fits between Christ and Adam;—between the meaning and consequences of being part and parcel of the flesh and blood of Adam, and the meaning and consequences of becoming genuine partakers of the flesh and blood of Christ. It is the infusion of the sap of a

new, because renewed, nature. "For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive."[1]

The second point is that the flesh and blood express the humanity, as, to some extent, in general, so particularly in one most significant reference. It is the Humanity of Christ especially in its atoning aspect, as the cancelling of the past, the perfection of penitence, the consummation of the sacrifice of holiness by which sin was conquered and destroyed. The gift of His flesh and blood is, then, the gift of participation in the very instruments and capacities of the sacrifice, sin-crushing and victorious. It is the internal reception and realization of that triumphant goodness, in Human nature, of which Calvary was the necessary condition and mode; and it is in terms which expressly recall and emphasize Calvary. It is part of the self-identification of the recipient with the Sacrifice, the growing assimilation of the self, in inwardness of character and will, with the victorious Spirit of the Atonement.

If this is, in the most general terms, the nature of the gifts received, the mode of receiving them is in itself extremely significant. They are received by eating and by drinking. They are fed upon: as the food which is taken up into the body is converted into the strength, and is the indispensable condition of the life, of the body into which it is taken. There is something most impressive in the reiterated use of the language of eating, in reference to spiritual reception and assimilation. There is nothing in the least accidental about the use of the language,—as though it were just a floating image which might serve for the illustration of the moment, and no more. On the contrary, its use is persistent and determined. As we dwell upon it, we are compelled to realize that the relation, in physical experience, between

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 22.

food and the life of the body,—a relation the proper mystery of which is veiled to us by the exceeding familiarity of the facts,—is not so much an ultimate truth of fact, as it were for its own sake, as it is an analogue or parable, suggesting, and meant to suggest, to the thoughts of men, a relation largely parallel with, and yet far transcending, itself. It is so from end to end of the Bible. The prohibition, the temptation, and the fall, are altogether in terms of this. It is as food that the knowledge of good and evil is assimilated. "And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat; and she gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat. And the eyes of them both were opened." . . . "And now lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever: therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden."[1] The manna in the wilderness is food of privileged and distinctive life, bread sent down from heaven to be the life of the people of God. The Passover lamb is still more definitely a food of sharply distinctive privilege. No alien or uncircumcised person might venture to come near to eat thereof.[2] On the other hand, to neglect it, not being disqualified, is to be cut off from the people of the Lord.[3] It is, within a certain area or atmosphere, imperative: even while, outside that range, it is impossible. The distinctive mark is partaking of an appointed food.[4] Whole volumes of prehistoric and extrahistoric instinct and usage, of a strictly religious kind, are summed up and sanctified in Levitical ordinances like these. The foulness of eating foulness; the strength of eating strength; the sanctity of eating sacrifice: inveterate

[1] Gen. iii. 6, 7, 22, 23. [2] Exod. xii. 43, 48.
[3] Num. ix. 13. [4] *Cp.* also Prov. ix. 1-5; Dan. i. 15.

instincts like these, in a thousand forms, lie behind all the legal distinctions of "clean" and "unclean" food, as well as such special types as the Passover and the Manna.

The idea of absolute distinctions between foods,—the materialistic interpretation of such usages as these,—was only for a time, and has been done away. But the instinct itself which lay behind the materialistic conceptions has not been done away, but has been taken up and consecrated anew by Christ for Christians for ever. Long before any special symbolic or ceremonial method was revealed of obeying a requirement so staggering, the requirement had been announced in words of sweeping strength by Jesus Christ;—words which almost literally broke His society to pieces;—"Verily, verily I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, ye have not life in yourselves. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life: and I will raise him up at the last day. For My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood abideth in Me, and I in him. As the living Father sent Me, and I live because of the Father; so he that eateth Me, he also shall live because of Me."[1] Christians, to be Christians, must absolutely "live upon" Christ. This is an essential requirement, which neither needs, nor admits of, qualification. It is *after* the enunciation of this essential principle that a special method is provided of a symbolic or ceremonial kind: which thenceforward, no doubt, represents the essential requirement, just exactly so far as a practice, in the ceremonial order of things, is capable of identification with a requirement itself essentially of the Spirit, spiritual. "Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake it; and He gave to the disciples, and said, Take eat; this is My body. And He took a cup, and gave thanks, and gave to them, saying,

[1] John vi. 53-57.

Drink ye all of it; for this is My blood of the covenant, which is shed for many unto remission of sins."[1]

Thenceforward, this bread and this cup represent, and even—just so far as that is possible for anything in the external and material order—constitute and are, the central symbol and the central realization of the Church's distinctive life. "The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not a communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not a communion of the body of Christ? seeing that we, who are many, are one bread, one body; for we all partake of the one bread."[2]

We notice, then, about all this, first, with what emphatic insistence the essential spiritual reality is expressed in terms of material imagery or metaphor. All this tremendous language about eating and drinking, about flesh and blood, while it emphasizes the reality of the identification of the human nature of the communicants with the human nature of the Christ; is itself a clear repudiation of any form of religion, which, in the name of spirit, and for the sake of a (supposed) higher standard of spiritualistic aspiration, would ignore the inseparable relation of body with spirit, or make any ultimate antithesis between spirit and body. God would not have taken humanity, if He had not taken body. The body, though not the whole, nor the inner meaning of humanity, is yet the symbol and guarantee of the reality of the humanity which it embodies. It is in the body that the inward self is expressed. The inner self is that which characterizes the body, and as body it is met, and known, and touched. It is expressly on the bodily side, and in terms of body,—that body which it was His humiliation to take, that body which was the avenue to Him of temptation and suffering and dying, and which was, for that very reason, the instrument of His victory over sin

[1] Matt. xxvi. 26-28. [2] 1 Cor. x. 16, 17.

and death; that He is ceaselessly giving to each one of us His Humanity, to be the food and nurture of our life, to be the effective sanctification and purifying of every impulse in us both of body and spirit. Our spirit cannot be sanctified without our body. The spirit that does not dominate body, making it, in every fibre and motion, the instrument and expression of spirit, is not effective or victorious spirit. So emphatic is the language of scripture on this, the bodily or material, side, that those who adhere closely to it are perhaps in more danger of an over-materialistic conception of sacramental life, than of explaining sacramental reality away as an encouragement merely, in the form of mental imagination or spiritual idea.

And yet the language contains within itself the most express warning against any interpretation which is primarily material. "It is the Spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I have spoken unto you are spirit, and are life."[1] Though the gifts imparted be in terms of flesh and of blood, yet true sacramental communion after all is communion, not of outward action, so much as of inward reality, not of flesh, so much as of spirit. Or, let us say, it is communion of flesh in the second instance, of flesh as, on the one hand, a means, and on the other, a result, of Spirit. Sacramental communion is vainly material after all, if it is not conceived of mainly as an aspiration and growing on towards oneness,—not mechanically, so much, of flesh, as inherently of character and of spirit, with the Crucified. It involves indeed the idea of true oneness of body, body spiritualized through Spirit. But this, so far from being the primary truth, is itself a consequence which outflows, as consequence, from the reflection of Christ in the will and character, from the identification with Christ of the spiritual self.

[1] John vi. 63.

Indeed, any interpretation which was primarily material, would really militate against the entire conception of the Pentecostal Church, which, through whatever details of experience or method, is itself essentially, everywhere and always, Spirit. *Ecclesia proprie et principaliter Ipse est Spiritus.* There is nothing in the Church whose proper meaning is not Spirit. Moreover, by taking a certain part (and fundamental part too) of Church experience away from the region of Spirit, such an interpretation would set up a distinction and antithesis, between "Christ" on the one hand, and on the other "Spirit": whereas the Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, and it is in Spirit that Christ is realized. The Spirit is the method of Christ's presence. Incarnate God is made real within as Spirit. If on the one hand we are accustomed to such language as "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ,"[1] "As many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ,"[2] "I do count them but dung that I may gain Christ,"[3] "For to me to live is Christ,"[4] "Christ, who is our life,"[5] "My little children of whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in *you*":[6] on the other hand, these things find—not their antithesis, nor yet a rival influence, but their echo and their interpretation in such passages as "Ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you. But if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. And if Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness."[7] "Hereby we know that He abideth in us, by the Spirit which He gave us."[8] "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost"[9] are not three distinct and separable things, but three relations or aspects

[1] Rom. xiii. 14. [2] Gal. iii. 27. [3] Phil. iii. 8.
[4] Phil. i. 21. [5] Col. iii. 4. [6] Gal. iv. 19.
[7] Rom. viii. 9-10. [8] 1 John iii. 24. [9] 2 Cor. xiii. 14.

of the one Christian blessing,—which is the presence, in the Spirit, of the Incarnate revelation of the Holiness of the Eternal God.

The Holy Communion is the perpetually fresh and fresh imparting, to the congregation, and to every qualified individual member of the congregation, of the Humanity of Christ; that is to say of that Humanity, divinely spiritual, which, perfect in its own inherent holiness, has through the consummation, unto death, of the sacrifice of contrition, felt and crushed the whole accumulated power of sin.

The sphere of the realization of all this is not primarily material but spiritual. It is of course possible to be over-materialistic in interpretation of these things. It is not only those sacramentalists, whose habit of practice and thought tends to emphasize over-much the fact of observance as observance, (as though all the invisible blessing must needs follow, materially, upon material actions duly performed,) who have failed to appreciate the spiritual atmosphere, in which, and through which alone, these things of the Spirit are realized. In theory, indeed, it may be hoped that this particular form of sacramental materialism is rare. But the tendencies towards it are very insidious. And it can hardly be doubted that, in practice, there is often still a very considerable element of this lack of spirituality in many even of those who would, in theory, most sincerely repudiate it, and who are really endeavouring, not without success, to rise in their sacramental worship, above it. But indeed there is something of the same mistake in all those who, however devout their communions, so conceive of the communicant life as if (on whatever theological exposition or theory) it could continue to be a thing of value, or a thing of joy, in itself—apart from its proper effect of so identifying Christ with the communicant and the

communicant with Christ, that the presence of Christ in the communicant would be progressively manifest in his temper and character and life. The communicant life is not either a privilege or a joy, if it is not a real seeking after, and finding, Christ Himself: if it is not a development of the process of translation which may be equally described as the "forming of Christ within,"[1] or (after "bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ"[2]) that attainment of fullgrownness which is "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ":[3] that is to say, in other words, as Christ within the self, or as the self within Christ. No consciousness of the exceedingly childlike imperfectness of our own communions ought to blind us to the true meaning of Communion with Christ, or persuade us to acquiesce in either interpretation, or aspiration, which is less than the very truth of God. The life of communion is a life of progressive identification,—of the personal consciousness and character,—with the character, and will, and being, of Christ, who is God.

It is perhaps another instance of the same forgetfulness that everything in the Pentecostal Church is in Spirit, spiritual: when theologians insist, as if it were a principle of theological exposition, that the gifts given in the Bread and Wine of the Sacrament, must be explained as the Body and Blood of Christ *as they were at the moment of Calvary*. What they were at the moment of Calvary they have not been again since the Resurrection, and are not, anyhow or anywhere, now. What is given in the Eucharist is what is, and not what is not. Calvary indeed is an inalienable element in what they are. The thought of Calvary is expressly recalled and emphasized in the terms in which they are given. But they are themselves not a material but a spiritual gift. The value of the material is not its material but its spiritual value. It

[1] Gal. iv. 19. [2] 2 Cor. x. 5. [3] Eph. iv. 13.

is the Body and Blood not as slain in death; but as, through the fact of death, victoriously alive. It is the Humanity triumphant, perfect, consummated in Spirit. It is no exception to the universal principle, that the Pentecostal Church *is* Πνεῦμα; and therefore that everything in the Church is what it is only within the region, and informing principle, of Spirit. "It is the Spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I have spoken unto you are spirit, and are life."

Enough has perhaps been said to show, for our present purpose, that everything which was said in the last chapter about the consummation of human personality only in and through personal union with the Spirit of the Incarnate, is itself sustained, to the utmost extent of its meaning, by the whole sacramental conception, which is the special characteristic of the Church of Christ. The sacramental system not merely agrees with, and corroborates, it: it is, in slightly varied language and relation, essentially the very same thing. The fundamental truth that the consummation of a created personality is his personal accord with, and true reflection of, the being of the all-inclusive God,—itself a truth as necessary to philosophical thought as it is cardinal to theology,—is embodied and consecrated in the Church in the most solemn and tremendous of ordinances.

And the bearing of all this upon the exposition of the doctrine of atonement will be obvious. The atonement is not to be conceived of as an external transaction, from which God returns, armed, by virtue of it, with a newly-acquired right or faculty of "not punishing" those whom He was "obliged" to punish before: the atonement is a real achievement of perfect sinlessness even in the perfectly sinful: it is a real transformation of the conditions and possibilities of Humanity, which, being consummated

first in the Person of Jesus Christ, becomes, through Him, a personal reality in all those whose personality is ultimately determined and constituted by the progressive realization, in them, of His Spirit,—which is, in its final consummation, their absolute identity, in Spirit, with Him.

> "Look, Father, look on His anointed face,
> And only look on us as found in Him:"

These are words which really touch, as they have, by very general instinct, been accepted as touching, the heart of the true theology of the Atonement. We are not, and never can be, our true very selves, save as we really come to be "in Him, and He in us." Everything turns, in the exposition of atonement, upon the reality of our personal identification with Him: just as everything, in the entire sacramental system of the Church, symbolizes and signifies, and works together to consummate, that same personal self-identity with Him,—of the Church, and of each several spirit within Her,—as the one central reality of faith, and aspiration, and living experience.

CHAPTER XI

RECAPITULATION

THE doctrine, then, of atonement through Jesus Christ, the doctrine of the redemption of sinful man, means a real change, not a fictitious one, in the man who is redeemed. It means a change no less portentous, in himself, than the change from being personally identified with sin, to being personally identified with the very Divine perfection of holiness.

All forms of theory which are content to explain the Atonement as a transaction, however pathetic or august in itself, which has its proper completeness altogether outside the personality of the redeemed, are found to be hopelessly inadequate, as well to the truth of theological doctrine, as to the truth of human experience and reason.

The inadequacy which is inherent in all such theories we have endeavoured to measure by tracing back to its roots, and examining the implications which are contained in, one of the most familiar, if not authoritative, of such forms of theory. To describe the atonement as a waiving, for a consideration, of punishment which, in justice, ought to have been inflicted, whilst it may serve as a sort of superficial first introduction of the infantine consciousness to the mutual relation of such conceptions as sin, punishment, and pardon; can, as a serious explication of God's dealing with man, issue only in intolerable untruth. And if the consideration for which punishment is unjustly remitted, is capable of being described as the unjust

punishment of some other, who has no connection with the guilt, no wonder that the transaction, so conceived or described, profoundly shocks the conscience of godlike men. If this is all that we have to say about the Christian doctrine of atonement, much that is deepest and best in human nature will continue to cry out against it with a cry which will certainly not be silenced or appeased.

But we passed beyond this first childish conception of atonement, not so much by treating the conception itself with contempt, as by finding, on analysis, to how much it really bore witness beyond its own first imperfect statement of itself. We recognized that a vindictive punisher, who will not be satisfied without punishing somebody, is no part of the diviner truth of punishment. If in cases in which punishment has failed of its proper object and character—cases which we dare not deny or exclude as impossible,—it is capable of acquiring a character with some superficial resemblance to this; at all events in its proper truth, when it has not morally failed, punishment is itself a method, or stage, towards penitence. The consummation of its proper work is not to be looked for so much either in the form of eternal damnation, on the one side, or of cancelling of penalty on the other; rather, in proportion to its true working, it is itself superseded and absorbed. It becomes an aspect or mode of something which is beyond, yet is characterized by, itself. The proper goal of penal pain is the consummation of penitence.

And penitence, when we examined it, we found to be an attitude towards sin,—on the part indeed necessarily of one whose nature was burdened with the disabilities, and was accessible to the insulting challenge, of sin;—which yet, in its true ideal completeness of meaning, was nothing less than the attitude of the absolute holiness of God. In its ideal significance, which alone is the measure of what it really signifies, we found it to be only a possibility of the

personally Sinless: even while it also was the only condition on which the sin of the sinful could be really dissolved and destroyed. It was the indispensable necessity of the personally sinful. It was only conceivable as a property of the personally sinless.

And meanwhile if, whether with logic or without it, we so far bowed to the universal voice of all Christian experience as to assume that there is some reality of penitence, we found that, on the assumption of reality of penitence, forgiveness ceased to wear its first aspect as either arbitrary, or purchased, favour; it became a spontaneous, inherent, necessary aspect of love: it was love's natural embrace of that which was, or was capable of being, really lovable; until, if it were conceivable that penitence should be ever consummated perfectly, forgiveness would more and more completely lose all its distinctive aspect as "forgiveness"; —it would more and more be merged and lost in the fulness of the love of God, embracing no longer sinners though they were sinful, but saints because they were sanctified, embracing the very living beauty of holiness in those who were really once more themselves holy and beautiful.

Then, turning aside to notice that Jesus Christ was no irrelevant third between God and man; not another God besides the God who was Holiness and was sinned against; nor another man besides the man who had sinned, and was bound in sin; but identical, potentially at least, with man, that is, with the whole range of humanity,—as He was absolutely identical with the whole content and meaning of the word "God"; we saw that in Him, that is, in human nature, become the expression of Deity, (yet, still expressing even Deity *humanly*, and remaining, none the less, human nature,) all the impossible conditions, which we had seen before to be necessary though impossible, were in fact satisfied to the full. The impossible burthen of all

that the ideal consummation of penitence had been seen to involve, was here completely realized, in a suffering, in a holiness, in a penitential consummation of holiness, which though Divinely perfect, were none the less perfectly human. How absolutely is the whole world's record transformed, by the righteousness of One, quite perfectly righteous, Man!

We saw, revealed in Him, the meaning of a life of perfectly obedient dependence on God, which is the realization of human holiness; the crown of the proper meaning of the life of man. And we saw, revealed in Him, the meaning of penal death: death which, by its very inherent contradiction of all that life means or demands, death which, in its awful surrender both of body and spirit, is itself the consummation of the sinner's contrition,—the final struggle with, the final victory over, the last and most tremendous grapple (because it is indeed the *death* grapple) of, sin. When the death is consummated, in that last terrible surrender inch by inch of all that sin could touch, or challenge, or hurt, sin itself was crushed, and was dead.

And all this, we insisted, was no merely past transaction, affecting, quite irrespectively of ourselves or our attitude towards it, the principles upon which God deals with us. No one could imagine this who keeps steadily in mind the truth that the word God means always Righteousness and Truth, and the Love which is the Love of Righteousness and Truth. Nothing can ever affect God's relation towards us, which does not affect the relation towards us of Righteousness and of Truth. If God loves us, they love us. If they love us not, neither does God. God deals with us, loves us, as is true, and as is righteous. Bethlehem and Nazareth, and the lake-side in Galilee, and the courts of the Temple in Jerusalem, and Gethsemane, and Calvary, all these and the awful scenes

which belong to these names, were indeed objective and historical realities first, before us, and without us: and yet the work of atonement through them is not yet consummated, until we too are ourselves in relation with it, and it is a living fact for, and in, ourselves.

This translation of the objective into the subjective, the realizing within our personal being of the things which were wrought without that they might be realized within, finds its most natural beginning and expression whenever the human thought sincerely contemplates, and the human heart is moved and drawn in sincere love towards, the work of Calvary, and the Person of Christ. Contemplation and love do wonderfully transform the very selves of those in whom they are real. Yet even contemplation and love, profoundly important though they are, are terms too superficial and precarious to express, with any real approach to accuracy, the nature of the personal relation of Christians to Christ. Or at all events contemplation and love, as we know or can conceive them in any other context, are inadequate. Their basis, their capacity, their very meaning, must be unique, before we can receive them as adequate expressions for that transcendent relation which is to overshadow and to transform the very meaning of what we ourselves are.

And so we passed on to consider, not as a glorious sequel to the atonement, but rather as an integral part of its meaning, a necessary condition without which it would remain unconsummated after all, the doctrine of the Holy Ghost; that perpetual extension, or Spiritual realization, of the Incarnation,—of Nazareth and of Calvary,—which is the breath and life, the meaning and the being, of the Pentecostal Church. The Church of Christ is much more than a sentimental emotion, a tribute of thought or affection, however sincere in itself, towards

the Person of Christ. It is the indwelling and overruling presence of the Person of Christ in the Person of the Spirit, characterizing and constituting the inmost reality of the personality of man.

Something we ventured to say in the direction of explaining, or making intelligible to our own imagination and reason, the great Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, revealed to the Church as the Divine mode of the continuance and consummation of the life and death of Jesus Christ, which continuance and consummation constitutes the Church. Even when we tried to think of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Being of God, we ventured (without transcending the modest limits of that true Christian agnosticism which most earnestly disclaims the attempt to know fully what it is manifest that we cannot, as men, fully know) to make, at least, an especial connection between the thought of the Divine Being, as emanating Spirit, and that Response to Himself which any real intelligence of His Being compels (as it were) His creatures to render back, as reflection or echo, to Himself; that response of which the poetry of the poet, the harmony of the musician, the symmetry of the architect, the peaceful triumphs of the statesman, the atmosphere of love and gratitude wrought out for itself by the love of the Christian worker, are a parable and earnest.

We ventured to suggest that the Spirit Himself is primarily revealed as the Spirit, or perpetuity of inward presence, of the Incarnate, who is the revelation of God: that it was the master-fact of the Incarnation of God which dominated all the theological language and thought of the Epistles and the New Testament throughout: that to think of the Spirit as the Spirit of the Incarnate is to see that He is the revelation of the true meaning and character, the destiny and goal, of humanity, just as truly

as He is the revelation, within man, of Deity: and that this real presence of the Incarnate as Spirit, constituting the inmost personality of man, is the reality in man of that consummated victory of the penitence, or righteousness, of the "Atonement," which was the culmination and end of Incarnation.

For the reality of our own relation to the atonement, which is its consummation in respect of each one of us, everything unreservedly turns upon the reality of our identification, in spirit, with the Spirit of Jesus Christ. In proportion to our essential distinctness, and remoteness, from Him, is our distinctness, and remoteness, from the consummation of Atonement. But in proportion as the aspiring language of the Christian Scripture and the Christian Liturgy is realized; in proportion as it approaches towards the truth to say, of ourselves, that "we may evermore dwell in Him, and He in us"; the fulness of that consummation of obedient and penitential holiness which constituted in Him a perfect atonement, is, by His Presence, consummated also in ourselves.

We are now hundreds of miles from the thought of vicarious punishment. Could anything be more grotesquely, or even blasphemously, irrelevant to our true meaning than the thought of an obstinate Punisher, who after venting His vengeance on an innocent substitute, should consent, because some one had suffered, to treat the wicked, untruly and unrighteously, as if they were what they are not? Even if, in a sense, we may consent to speak of vicarious *penitence;* yet it is not exactly vicarious. He indeed consummated penitence in Himself, before the eyes, and before the hearts, of men who were not penitent themselves. But He did so, not in the sense that they were not to repent, or that His penitence was a substitute for theirs. He did so, not as a substitute, not even as a delegated representative, but as that inclusive total of true

Humanity, of which they were potentially, and were to learn to become, a part. He consummated penitence, not that they might be excused from the need of repenting, but that they might learn, in Him, their own true possibility of penitence.

We were careful to avoid all semblance of the mistake of supposing that He was set up before men as a model mainly, or an object lesson; as an example chiefly or pattern, to be studied, and loved, and followed. Such phrases are not indeed untrue,—when the things of which they speak have first become possible. But the union with Him which is offered, and which is necessary, to men, is something far beyond the power of human admiration, or imitation, or even desire. It is not by becoming like Him that men will approach towards incorporation with Him: but by result of incorporation with Him, received in faith as a gift, and in faith adored, *and used*, that they will become like Him. It is by the imparted gift, itself far more than natural, of literal membership in Him; by the indwelling presence, the gradually disciplining and dominating influence, of His Spirit—which is His very Self within, and as, the inmost breath of our most secret being; that the power of His atoning life and death, which is the power of divinely victorious holiness, can grow to be the very deepest reality of ourselves.

Such identification with Christ of the very inmost personality of each several man, may sound at first, to man's confused thought about himself, as if it were the surrender of the sovereign instincts and capacities which he fancies that his own self-conscious personality means. We have endeavoured therefore to show, in some detail, that the very opposite to this is true. By some analysis of the meaning of the claim which our self-consciousness makes to free will, to reason, and to capacity of loving,—the three most prominent strands in our familiar thought

of personality,—we endeavoured to make clear that, whatever be the inherent witness to, or demand for, each of these three things in every human consciousness, there is not one of them which, as matter of fact, we properly possess. We only approximate towards the actual consummation of what we ourselves cannot but mean by each one of these three words, in proportion as we really are translated into Christ, and His Spirit is the ultimate reality of our own individual being. So far from surrendering the sovereignty of our proper personality by identification with Him; it is only in proportion to our reality of identification with Him, that we ever attain at all to that true sovereign freedom, and insight, and love, which are the essential truth of personality, the consummation of the meaning of ourselves.

And finally we felt that we were at least on ground altogether incontrovertible in insisting that this identification of the several self with Him, this sovereign and overruling presence of His Spirit within the hearts and lives of Christians, was at all events the doctrine and the claim which breathe through every line of the New Testament. It is the Spirit of Christ which constitutes the Pentecostal Church. The Church means nothing but this. It is the perpetuity of the Presence, it is the living Temple, of God Incarnate—no longer in the midst of, but within, men. And the whole sacramental system, that unique characteristic of the Church of Christ, wholly means, and is, this. It is only the materialistic misconceptions and misuse of sacraments by men, because their moods and minds, even on spiritual subjects, are so often other than spiritual, which could ever have given colour, for one moment, to that most paradoxical of accusations, that the sacraments are a screen, or substitute, for Christ; or could have obscured, to any spiritual eye, the obvious fact that the sacraments simply and directly both mean, and are, the

Divine methods of the Spirit of Christ,—constituting, as such, the progressive spiritual reality of those throughout the world, who are willing to have Christ for their life.

It is Christ then who, in the fullest sense, *is* our atonement, and our atonement is real in proportion to the reality of Christ in us. Our atonement is no merely past transaction: it is a perpetual presence; a present possibility, of the life and of the self, the consummation of which transcends thought and desire. It is a "power that worketh in us." And the power is the power through Spirit, in Jesus Christ, of God. "Now unto Him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us, unto Him be the glory in the Church and in Christ Jesus unto all generations for ever and ever. Amen."[1]

[1] Eph. iii. 20, 21.

CHAPTER XII

OUR PRESENT IMPERFECTION

THERE is one line of thought more in reference to which it seems to be desirable that something should still be said. In a sense our exposition is finished. But what is the relation between our exposition on the one hand, and, on the other, our familiar experience? If the lines are even approximately right on which the doctrine of the Atonement has been explained, then the real meaning of the life of a Christian man, redeemed in Christ, as a member of Christ's Body, is something of singular spiritual loftiness. He is a communicant, not ceremonially only, but vitally, and even visibly, living on Christ, and growing into the likeness and Spirit of Christ. Not in himself, but in Christ, is the focus of his life. He is himself the inspired reflection of Another. He is a Saint, in whose face, and in whose life, the very lineaments of Christ are manifestly seen.

This is the theory, as logical, indeed, and complete, and fascinating, as it is scriptural and true. But what relation has this to experience? What is the likeness between the ideal picture, and that which we know that we are? Whether we look to the general average of the so-called Christian life, which does not so much as attempt to enter at all upon the communicant obedience or the communicant consciousness: or whether we think of those who, communicants as they are in the outward sacrament of the sacrifice of Christ, with fervour indeed

and regularity but with very halting effort, and unsaintly consciousness, and utterly unperfected discipline, seem at first sight only to succeed in misrepresenting that glory towards which they intend to aspire, but which does not shine with any visible light in their daily actions or their daily smiles: we seem at first sight to be looking at an experience with which our doctrine has no relation at all. And we ask ourselves perhaps in sadness, or others insist on challenging us by asking, whether in fact we have ever seen any one at all,—whether we really believe in the possibility of seeing any one at all,—who has really got beyond this most imperfect condition of claiming, perhaps, and clinging on to, yet not really reflecting or illuminating, that idea which we say is the meaning of the cardinal doctrine of the Christian creed. Or if, among a thousand thousand, there are one or two or three, in whom it would be generally allowed that there is a light visibly shining, which, though not of themselves, is yet at once the very thing which they are, and is a true gleam, in them, of the light of Christ: what are they, in their almost imperceptible rarity, to fortify a conception of human redemption which still has no reality of relation whatever to far, far, more than ninety-nine out of every hundred human beings?

This then is the difficulty. The discrepancy seems to us to be too great between the Christian theory and the actual life. Or at the very best it seems to fail by omitting the vast majority of mankind, even if here or there it may prove magnificently true. If only, we are inclined to say, we were all like St Paul or St John, things might possibly pass into realities of experience, which are only visionary now! But as it is, the necessity of conforming to experience has taught us to re-shape our conception of Christianity, and of the relation of Christianity to actual life. The Christianity of experience

is a thing of soberer, and more commonplace, and more universal character than this.

It may be worth while to take note of the consciousness which is implied in such a thought, that the more commonplace standard of popular religion is a standard different in kind from that of St Paul or St John. It is well to be clear about this. For good or for evil, whether through failure in faith, or through growth in practical wisdom, the Christian standard which is less than Christ, is a standard which plainly differs from that of the Apostles in the New Testament. But it is not to such authority that we desire at this moment to appeal. It is the object of the present chapter to try and deal somewhat more fully with the temper of thought, whether expressly articulate or no, which feels a genuine hesitation, on the practical side, by reason of the transcendent greatness of the Christian ideal; and to show, if possible, that all such temper is in real truth as misleading as it is widely prevalent and instinctively natural.

The first, and the directest, answer to the objection, consists in challenging the truth of the facts on which it is based. We have in fact, in order to state it effectively, been obliged to borrow the spectacles, as it were, of the ordinary world: and the spectacles of the ordinary world are exactly those through which spiritual realities are not discerned. There are all degrees of insight; and the full insight into spiritual truth is indeed rarer than rare. Even any near approach towards it is exceptional, and is certainly reached by far other than the world's ordinary standard of common sense. Elisha's servant was not wanting in any ordinary sanity when he failed to see any glimpse of the horses and chariots of fire with which, in fact, the mountain was full round about Elisha.[1] Elijah himself judged, no doubt, upon visible data quite rationally, when he felt himself

[1] 2 Kings vi. 17.

alone, among all Israel, in allegiance to Israel's God.[1] It was not greater worldly wisdom, it was insight of another order, the transfigured insight of a spirit made one with the Spirit of God, which was needed to see common things as the truth of God saw them. The difference was a moral and spiritual difference between the many who saw in Jesus crucified, a detected and defeated impostor, and the one who there bowed his soul in homage, and in prayer, to the Lord and King[2] of the Life which is beyond death. And this is a principle of the Church of Christ. "Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God."[3] "Yet a little while and the world beholdeth Me no more; but ye behold Me: because I live, ye shall live also."[4]

It is not true that the leaven of the Kingdom, the working of the Spirit of the Christ, is a rare or a feeble thing, as in our more cynical moments we may be tempted to say. It is in no idle optimism, nor any blindness to the evil which still plays so large a part, even amongst those in whom the Christian Spirit is working in deed and in truth, that we denounce, as simple blindness to truth, that temper of either triumphant or despondent scepticism, to which the ideal faith of the Church of Christ seems manifestly to have failed. If the Spirit of Christ is working with power, as He manifestly is to those who have eyes to see, in many a ministerial and ecclesiastical circle, amongst religious houses, and pastoral helpers of very various kinds: His presence is certainly not less manifest in many a form of life which may hardly seem, at first sight, to be within the immediate circle of His altar. There are no doubt conspicuous—we should call them exceptional—instances, which the very world can see. Almost any one could quote an example, here or there, of the

[1] 1 Kings xix. 14.
[2] Luke xxiii. 42.
[3] Matt. v. 8.
[4] John xiv. 19.

soldier who, unsurpassed in bravery, in enterprise, nay even, in certain contexts, in unbending and relentless severity, yet lived, quite obviously, his whole reality of inner life, in conscious communion with God, and in the spirit of the tenderest sympathy and service; or of the lawyer, whose professional eminence was none the less conspicuous, because his whole bearing, his very eye and tone, bespoke one who was conscious at every moment of being the absolute servant and minister of the God whose Spirit was his life; or of the statesman, who was never quite so much a statesman, as a Christian, believing in, living upon, God, and His Christ,—through the Spirit of God, become (in a real sense) the very animating spirit of himself.

But whilst there are examples more or less conspicuous which will come into our thoughts on every side,—upon the farm, in the village shop, in the busy city, in the counting-house, in the exchange, in the great place of business, among leaders of society, among organizers of workmen, in the court, in the castle, in the ball-room, in the barracks, on the battlefield, in the cabin, on the forecastle, in the seaport lodgings, in the workhouse, in the cottages of the very poorest, the village hovel or the garret of the city court: it is not only these, (though there are these, and many more such as these, whom some eye at least manifestly recognizes, and to God's presence in whom some heart does homage,) of whom it concerns us to think. For there are countless more besides these, of whom these, just because they are comparatively conspicuous, are but partly representative; in whom the working of the Spirit is still more inchoate, and impenetrable to any insight that is less than Divine. Amongst the coarse, the ignorant, and the degraded, "the publicans and the harlots," the thieves and the murderers, there may be much more than meets the eye of any save the rarest and the most Christlike; dumb efforts after what is good; unrealized movements and

actions of pure kindness; genuine possibilities, whose real character and value nothing short of the omniscience of Divine love can appraise.

And altogether outside the range of such dim suggestions of Christlike possibility as these, are there not other possibilities, more remote, pathetic, and inscrutable still?—possibilities overlaid, yet asserting themselves sometimes, even beneath the horror of the drunken carouse, in the police cell, in the dock, or on the scaffold; nay, even on the very threshold,—or across the threshold,—of the house of wilful shame and sin? And if even these are not under all circumstances necessarily excluded from the possibility of Christ; what shall we say of the whole vast region that lies between? The struggles, the failures, the successes, of the young; the obstinacy, the breaking down, the repentance, and the confessions, of the middle-aged—in every rank of life, in every conceivable surrounding of temptation and difficulty: these things do not fill our newspapers, nor the pages of our volumes of history: but the record of these is the true record of the world. One experience of the real inner effort, the struggling, earnest, often disappointed yet chastened aspiration, of the lady in the intricacies of fashionable society: of the business man, of whatever kind, amidst the complications of false ideals of a commercial world, which if it is in a sense both commercial and Christian, is still far from being Christianly commercial; of the officer, civil or military, the lawyer, the doctor, who has striven, and striven in vain, to find the fulness, which his spirit always had needed, in the busy round of his own merely professional or social life: of the young man, or young woman, in service, or in the workshop, subjected to a regime in which the Christian Spirit found no place, and liable to all the perils and risks of actual poverty: one experience of personal insight into, and thorough personal sympathy with, any one of these, would do much to open our eyes to the

reality of the true drama of life, which is the working of the leaven of the Spirit of the Christ.

What is going on throughout the life, under normal conditions of health and work, is not unfrequently more conspicuous still, under what we call the abnormal conditions of sickness, and decay, and death. It is not generally characteristic of the consciousness of grave illness to be garrulous. He who feels in himself that his bodily powers are drawing towards their close is more often self-contained and silent. There are long silences, the silences often of enforced reflection, in the gathering either of age, or of such weakness as carries tacitly within it the sentence of death. They are silences which we, who stand by, feel to be characteristic. Often, for us, they go with the softer tone and the gentler eye, and the more chastened endurance, and the more child-like simplicity of temper. And we, as we stand by, take comparatively little notice of all these things, for it seems to us only natural that they should be so. The truth is that we have not measured, neither is there any man living who is capable of measuring, what those silent moments of pain, and growing weakness, and conscious ebbing away and dying, are capable of being,—even in those who have had infinitely little of explicitly religious knowledge, or sacramental privilege in the Church,—where the spirit is kindly, the acceptance of discipline genuine, and the aspiration towards goodness and God sincere. Such moments may seem to us long protracted, or they may seem to us very brief, as for instance in a fatal accident, or on the battlefield. It would be indeed the idlest self-flattery for any one to dare to imagine beforehand that he could become, in them, essentially other than he was before; the self, in them, is developed, not revolutionized; and yet, what their possibilities of developing discipline may be, we have no power of measuring,

or even of conceiving. May the blessing of God Himself, their Saviour, be with all those—whose lives He had fashioned for Himself, whom He had watched and yearned after through all their wanderings, and whom His grace can even now enthral and possess,—in those moments in which they are drawing very near to the immediate threshold of His Presence!

To say things like these, while it is absolutely necessary for anything like the real proportion of truth, is certainly neither to forget, nor to undervalue, the presence and power of evil in the world. After all, we have been speaking not of those who are content to accept the evil, and embrace it as their good; but of those who, with whatever imperfection or discouragement, in the midst of whatever disability, or ignorance, are struggling, in their way, because the germ of the movement of the Spirit is in them, with an effort and a yearning of desire, such as the eye of omniscience, who is also Love, can see to be in its true nature upward and Godward.

But if we begin by simply denying the truth of the facts assumed by the despondent or the cynical, we would go on to insist, in the next instance, upon the place which properly belongs, in the work of the Spirit of the Christ among men, to a conscious and strenuous upholding of the true ideal, as the necessary ideal, and as the necessary truth, of the meaning and life of Christians. Something there is to be said, first as to the power which belongs to belief in the ideal; secondly as to the lack, and the wide acquiescence in the lack, of the ideal; and thirdly as to the positive necessity of a resolute allegiance to it.

Few beliefs are more fundamentally untrue, than the belief often strangely prevalent, that an exalted ideal is an unpractical thing. It would be far nearer to the truth to say that there is nothing on earth which can compare, in practical effectiveness, with a great ideal genuinely

held. People who make a sort of pride of being practical, and who therefore insist upon looking at life always from the external or practical point of view, have little conception to how vast an extent human life, their own included, is really dominated by imagination. It is not half so much the outward conditions and accidents in the midst of which a man's life is lived;—it is rather the great dominant assumptions and beliefs, the fixed convictions and principles, with which he meets and moulds accidental conditions;—which really determine the character of his life. It is so with each individual: and it is so with the corporate life of societies and nations. One dominant idea, if it be dominant, will determine the whole current of national life. It will colour the whole administration of justice; it will determine the whole drift of discussion, of preaching, of politics; it will bring victorious armies back to peace, or drive whole peoples into war; with a sweep of current more pervading and more irresistible, than any material ambition or material wrongs. Material conditions indeed must be idealized, they must be fused and fired, must have something of the hidden glow of great imaginative ideas, before they will stir a people to practical sacrifice. But ideas, once held, are well-nigh omnipotent. There is no limit to the sacrifice, in active effort or in patient suffering, which they will at times impose. Exacting though they be, all exactions for their sake will be tranquilly, if not eagerly, endured. This is conspicuously a truth of fact, even when the ideas which have dominated popular imagination are themselves untrue, or even directly mischievous. In different spheres, economical, political, theological, such phrases or cries as the South Sea Bubble, or the railway madness, or "blasphemy" or "witchcraft" or "treason" or "no popery" or "death to the Jews" or "the honour of the army" are perpetual reminders with what irresistible

force ideas which are untrue, and in some cases even fatuous and wicked, can drive peoples madly onward, against every dictate of judgment, of interest, and of conscience, into the most disastrous practical results.

Now this, which is true of ideal convictions which are false and mischievous, is *à fortiori* more true of ideal convictions which are absolute truth. There may not be the same paradoxically glaring illustrations; there may be far less of disproportioned passion; the tide may swing with more silent and tranquil volume: but it is even more overwhelming and inexhaustible. There has been no more irresistible volume of power in human history, than that profound conviction, basing itself upon conscious identity with truth, which, in the course of three centuries, by the might of silent endurance under extreme and reiterated persecution, broke the obstinacy of imperial Rome, and compelled her to bow, in outward homage at least, to the faith of the Crucified Christ. In this particular instance the broad and corporate truth is, in the most direct and obvious sense, only shown to be true, because its truth was illustrated in a great number and variety of individual cases, taken actually apart, one by one. It demonstrates, if demonstration were needed, that the principle is as true of the several as of the corporate life; seeing that it could not be true, in fact, of the corporate, if it were not effective in the several.

Now the ideal of which we are thinking at this moment, is that which we reached as the meaning of the doctrine of atonement. It is the real recovery, to a real consummation of righteousness, of the Church, which is the Body, of Christ: and of every individual Christian, as a member of the Church, which is Christ. It is the actual, living, hope and belief, in each several Christian soul,—not so much of a "pardon" (whatever that would mean) while we remain on our level of helplessness and sin:

not of a fictitious righteousness, a sort of imperfectly relevant make-believe, in consequence of a transaction, outside ourselves, which, so far as we try to understand it, only morally confounds us; not even of a far away gift of righteousness, a mere dream of the future, having no direct reference or relevance to any present efforts, or capacities, or experience: but an actual living hope, and sure conviction, informing and controlling every present effort, determining and interpreting every present experience. It is hope, it is certain knowledge, of a power, by the grace of Christ, now at work within us, and within our power to approach and receive more and more, and to nurse and train and strengthen, and to live on and by; the power of the actual presence of the living Christ, given to us and renewed in us through His Church; whose culmination cannot but be our consummated oneness of Spirit with Christ, who is the very righteousness of the Eternal God.

Do we in fact, in our every-day experience, believe in this for ourselves? and is our every-day experience itself shaped and characterized by this belief? The question is asked at this moment, not so much with any homiletic purpose, to produce self-conviction, as with a view to suggest the further thought, what would every-day experience be like in fact, if it were in fact dominated by this belief? Our thought at this moment is the power which properly belongs to the mere fact of belief in the ideal, as such. There are tens and hundreds of thousands, to whom the simple reality of this belief, if they were able to receive it simply and truly, would absolutely revolutionize present experience. It would alter their interpretation of life; it would wholly colour the spirit with which they approached, to grapple with, the troubles and disabilities of life; it would give them courage where they were

faint-hearted, and effective strength where their purpose had been weak as water: and, through transforming them, in their use of the conditions, it would by degrees transform also the very character of the conditions themselves, through which their life was lived.

If our thought should go back for a moment over the immense variety of anxieties and struggles, in different circumstances of life, which were hinted at a few pages back, it could hardly fail to recognize, as it looked from one to another in their several detail, what an incalculable force would be possessed, and was intended to be possessed and wielded, by the ringing clearness of conviction and faith in such an ideal of Divine truth as this. What bracing to moral purpose, what capacity and depth of repentance in respect of actual sin, what power for dutiful ordering of Christian life as Christian, what strength to do and to endure, would be found in the mere conviction, if only the conviction were unhesitating and effectual, that this is, in truth, the very central core of the meaning and reality of our life! The truth is given to us that we may believe it: and our belief in it is meant to be a spring in us, for all practical purposes, of irresistible power. It is impossible to estimate too highly either the practical force of such a belief, or the practical loss which must inevitably follow, when lives which were meant to be animated by such a belief, are lived as it were in the cold and the dark without it. It is idle to depreciate the belief, as though it were only a decorative but unpractical ideal, with or without which the actual experience of life would necessarily remain itself one and the same. It is this which would characterize the experience of life: and it is part of the real Christian faith that the life should be characterized thus. We cannot dispense with that which is so essential to all our proper consciousness of power. The work of

the Spirit of Christ is indeed going on very wonderfully in the midst of us—more than any eye, save the eye of God, can discern. But can any one doubt that that work would be very wonderfully quickened and furthered, that the Kingdom of God would be at once widened in range and brought wonderfully nearer to its consummation, by whatever could make this magnificent conviction, which is also the simple truth of the Kingdom of God, and the very meaning of the Christian doctrine of atonement, to be (as it assuredly ought to be,) the familiar property, and characteristic, and informing and overruling experience, of every single Christian consciousness?

It is here that we come most immediately face to face with the characteristic failure of a Christianity that is content to be conventional. If under every variety of modern experience there are some in whom real life and struggle is going on; it is also true that under every variety of modern religionism that spirit of indifference can clothe (or conceal) itself, which is the paralysis of true religion. There is a great flood of civilized life, more or less comfortable, more or less respectable, which in its own eyes is religiously adequate, but which is, or at least is capable of becoming, more antithetical to the true life of the Spirit, than much of the coarser wilfulness and ignorance of those who at least have not taught themselves to explain away a call and a challenge they have never really understood. There are moments at least, from time to time, in which certain ringing phrases of the New Testament seem to us to direct the sternest sentence of the displeasure of Christ—not against those who are outcasts in the eyes of the world, but against those whose comfortable acquiescence in a false standard of religion, has made the ideals and enthusiasms, the capacities and the joys, of the life that is truly Christian, unintelligible to the world.

It is a terrible thing when those who might have had full access to the reality of Christian experience, do by their own choice so secularize all its meanings and ideals, as to make the nominal Christianity of society bear witness against the truth of the Christian creed. The widely prevalent form of life which calls itself Christian, yet goes rarely to Church, and makes no attempt at all to realize the power of communicant experience; which has its intellectual hesitations about prayer, and has never seriously tried to meditate; which has no room in its conception of practical life for the reality of the unseen or the supernatural; which deprecates evangelistic zeal, and is pained at all symptoms of a claim on the part of the Christian faith to any essential superiority over others, —much more if it should presume to think itself unique, the one true life and necessity for all mankind: this is the sort of creedless creed, the idle phantom or ghost of religious theory, through whose thick wreaths of fog and chill it becomes impossible for those of little learning and little opportunity to discern any lineaments of the Christ at all. It is a terrible responsibility,—the responsibility for debasing the Christian ideals, and making the Christian life, as practically preached to the world, a thing devoid of every trace of its characteristic significance and power. If I, the educated and instructed Churchman, exhibit to those whose direct advantages are far less than mine, a conception of Christianity in which there is no supernatural relation, no personal dependence and communion with Christ, I am doing what in me lies to make their true understanding of Christ impossible. I am testifying to the secularity of the spiritual, and the falsehood of the Church's creed. And in all this there is a guilt which comes dangerously near to the guilt of "poisoning" the very "springs" of the fountain of life.

Non-communicant Churchmanship itself involves a con-

tradiction in terms, and is a perpetual witness against Christ. The extraordinary prevalence of a life without communion—not on the part of those who are either, on the one hand, openly anti-Christian, or, on the other, bowed down with self-accusing penitence, but on the part of men who think themselves Christians, and deliberately prefer, as more practical and free from mysticism, a travesty of New Testament Christianity, is a terrible sign of the blindness from within which has come upon the eyes of a large part of what should be the living Church of Christ. This at least is a test fact of an overt kind. Whatever perplexity there may be about this or that individual, the broad significance of this fact can hardly be obscure. Churchmanship which so little seeks for Christ, and so little either believes or obeys His words, as to live, and acquiesce in living, in permanent remoteness from His communion, stands openly self-condemned. It is condemned, not so much for having failed to overcome the fierce impulses of passionate temptation, but for having refused, through indifference, to try. It is condemned—not for not having attained an ideal which nevertheless, in its own rough way, it loved; but for refusing to care to have, or to love, any real ideal at all. It has not only fallen short of, it has turned by deliberate preference aside from, so much as it clearly saw of the way of the Spirit of Christ.

It is necessary to say these things broadly, because they are, beyond question, broadly true. Yet even in saying them broadly, we disclaim, as of course, the judgment of any individual. A man may be living a life whose tenor is, in fact, a witness against the faith of Jesus Christ. We are right, not wrong, to recognize that the fact is so. Yet no human insight can measure how far this is, in him, a rebellion against light. Too often alas! the most inveterate and damaging prejudice against the orderliness of Church

life is itself an honest prejudice, the revolt of a genuine, and not ignoble, though an ill-considered, revolt against the glaring moral and spiritual unrealities of those who had stopped at the husk and missed the kernel, or (in other words) who both preached and practised the outwardness of Christian habit, without any real reflection of the Christian spirit in their personal character and life. It is impossible to pursue this thought in the present context, or do any justice to the extent to which the worldliness, or hypocrisy, of Churchmen is the real cause of the revolt of many a noble nature from Churchmanship. But it was necessary to say that this thought, however little it can be enlarged upon, is most certainly not overlooked,—in order that we may insist also, without being misunderstood, on the principle which remains after all none the less true in itself, that revolt from, or indifference to, the communion of the Church—whatever may be its excuse in the individual—is in its proper nature, revolt from, and indifference to, the Incarnation and Atonement of Christ.

In the same way, and with the same sort of guarding explanations, we must utterly demur to certain other symptoms, too familiar in conventional Christian life, as wholly antithetical to the Spirit of Christ. Thus under whatever provocation,—and the provocation often is great,—all consistent cynicism as to the real presence and working of goodness in the world, is, in fact, flat refusal of belief in Christ. Those who live in the midst of what is called "the world"; and who take, as their data, only the things which familiarly meet their eyes; are likely enough to be cynical. But had their data included their own sincere experiences of prayer and communion, and their sustained effort to serve, in the ways that were open to them, such as needed their service; the evidence before them would have been full of new facts which are not to them in evidence now; and it would have been moreover a quickened

power of discernment with which they would have viewed and judged the evidence: so that, in both ways, theirs would have been an insight into the very true proportion of things, at once more penetrating and more reverent than it is; and on these terms cynicism would not even have been felt as a temptation. The sense indeed of wrong in the world, and of the power of wrong, would have been not less but greater. And yet, more impressive even than the wrong, would have been the profound realization also of the hidden working of the Spirit which can never tolerate or make compromise with wrong.

This phrase strikes a further note. For another symptom of secularized religion, is its over-complacent toleration of wrong. There is indeed a large-heartedness which is wholly Christian: and it is easy to slip, imperceptibly, from the one to the other. Largeness of heart towards evil-doers is a Christlike sign. But such largeness of heart is in fact a working of love, which yearns over them, even in their evil, because it yearns to separate them from their evil. It will do all that love can do to deliver them, and in their dimmest approaches towards contrition it is near at once to succour and strengthen them. But this is a difficult goodness: and the world has an easier substitute for this. The world's substitute simply is,—to ignore or condone the evil: to treat the evil, with a large indifference, as if it were not evil but good. It is one thing to yearn towards the persons who have fallen into evil, and to be willing to do and bear for them. It is quite another thing to make light of the evil: or embrace, without a difference, those who, having identified themselves with evil, have hardened their foreheads without shadow of relenting. "To abhor the evil" is as necessary a sign of the spirit of holiness as is to love the good. "Neither doth he abhor anything that is evil"[1] is a sentence of condemnation which

[1] Psalm xxxvi. 4.

shows essential incapacity of any true enthusiasm for what is good. In those who cannot be stung into horror and hatred of evil the absolute antithesis between evil and good has been only too effectually melted away. They are all "more or less" this or that. Enthusiasm is dead. The whole ultimate drift is indifference. There is nothing at all like this in the new Testament. The publicans and the harlots who were drawn towards Christ were received with the gravest tenderness. But what of those who were not drawn at all? Or what of those—not harlots and publicans only but scribes and Pharisees,—to whom He and His searching tenderness, and His awful claims, were only an "offence." The *wrath* of Jesus of Nazareth was —and is—uncompromising and very terrible. "Every one that falleth on that stone shall be broken to pieces; but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will scatter him as dust."[1]

Another form of the tolerance which belies religion is the total lack of enthusiasm for the mission of the Gospel of Christ. Zeal for evangelistic work throughout the world is a necessary note of belief and love towards Christ. Indifference to mission work, scepticism as to its possible value and duty, though it is painfully common in the world, and both accepted in fact, and maintained in principle, by many who think and mean themselves to be Christians, is, in simple truth, a fatal disloyalty. Of course this or that particular mission or missionary may fail, more or less glaringly, in his own ideal purpose and significance. To see, with whatever scathing clearness of view, the inadequacy of individual persons or efforts, is no disloyalty; it is rather a direct and certain result of true enthusiasm. But to disbelieve in the cause, to hesitate about the duty, to class Christianity as merely one type, amongst many more or less perfect or imperfect types of religion, to doubt its sovereign relation to all mankind, to accept imperfect

[1] Luke xx. 18.

success as an excuse for desisting from enthusiasm; is utterly incompatible with any real understanding of what the Christian faith is. Such cold detachment is the opposite of zeal for the Lord. It is not the same religion at all as that of St John.[1] It cannot, when cross-examined, escape conviction as an essential lack of the knowledge, the belief, and the love, which are characteristic and indispensable notes of the Spirit of Christ.

These things, and others like these, are illustrations—not indeed of the defiant wickedness of the world, not even of the vices, the failures, the inconsistencies, known and recognized as such, which make a painful dualism in professedly Christian lives; but of that loss and lack of the true Christian faith and hope, which goes so far, in the midst of our modern world, to change and degrade the very significance of the Christian name. It is not vice as vice, nor failure as failure; it is the perversion of the Christian conception, the worldly slackening and loss of the ideal, the letting-slip, through indolence and distaste, of what is most vitally distinctive in Christian hope, and experience, and power, which has been the subject of the last few pages. It is this which is so fatally remote from Christ. It is acquiescent and comfortable. There is no struggle about it, and no aspiration. The life in it is smothered, and near to death.

In saying this we are very far from denouncing the conditions of common life in the world as such. There may be much of Christward aspiration and anxiety in the Court pageant, and the ball-room, and the banquet; as there may, on the other hand, amongst lives that are sordid and noisy in crowded city courts. The surroundings and temptations of luxury on the one hand, and the atmosphere on the other of fighting and pushing, of crowding and suffering, do not exclude,—on the contrary they may, in some

[1] 1 John i. 3, 4.

cases, even stimulate it. In either direction there is room as well for the wistful and aspiring, as for the lawless and the grovelling, life. But what is not compatible with the living movement of the Spirit of Christ, is acceptance, by preference, of ideals that have all been tuned down to the pitch of worldly comfortableness.

This explaining away of hope and slackening of ideals, and determined acquiescence in the standard of the world as good, when the higher aim was, or might perfectly well have been, familiar, is far nearer to the direct antithesis of the Spirit, than is much wild fury of passion in those who have had but little knowledge of good. Such life is a wilful scepticism—or a flat refusal—of the light and truth of life. To acquiesce in it is not to be an image of Christ upon earth, a personal reflection of the Person of the Crucified, living upon His Humanity as spiritual food, growing into ever perfecter consummation of oneness with Him, and recognizing, in perfect oneness with Him, the one effective atonement, the one true significance and goal, of the whole life of man. But in the midst of all the pitiful unrealities of Christianity, can any one doubt what a noise and a shaking and a coming together would inevitably follow from anything which (even without touching any other condition) should but reawake once more, throughout men's consciences, the true inward ideal and conviction of the meaning of the doctrine of the Atonement of Christ?

After what has been said about the power, on the one hand, which belongs to the ideal, and, on the other, the great extent, and the disastrous meaning, of its defect in conventional Christianity, it may seem almost superfluous to add anything further to intensify the conviction of its necessity. Yet the pressure of that necessity is illustrated so strikingly in one or two directions, that it really seems desirable to insist on it still. The fact is that the doctrine

of atonement, as we have endeavoured to conceive it, is no superfluous mystery, which, however wonderful it may be when men come to understand it, is yet irrelevant to their ordinary consciousness, and could, without any practical disadvantage in every-day life, be dispensed with or ignored. On the contrary, it is what the practical every-day consciousness itself absolutely needs and demands. There is that in the very constitution of human consciousness with which it perfectly fits, and to which it is wholly indispensable. Human consciousness cannot even be properly itself apart from it. And the consequence is that, however much it may be ordinarily overlaid or befogged, human consciousness is, in one way or another, constantly bearing its own witness to the truth of it. Any real appeal, straight from the Christ and the Christ-standard, strikes right home to human consciousness. We all know, at the bottom of our hearts, that there is, in real truth, but one meaning, and one standard, of human life. This is the secret of the extraordinary power of any preacher, or of any book, which without the least deflection or compromise of principle, bids men fearlessly, at every point, correct the standard of the world by the standard of Christ, and walk always and only "in His steps." For so far at least, and in respect of the central principle appealed to, there is no element of exaggeration in the appeal. The one legitimate aim and effort of every man, at every time, is to do exactly what is right. And to do exactly what is right, is to do exactly what Christ (so far as He can be conceived under similar conditions) would Himself have done. Between what is right to do, and what He would have done (so far as He could have been under similar conditions) there is no distinction at all. And at all times, in all ways, the scope and meaning of the life of a Christian, is to believe in doing, and to do, without diffidence or qualification, what is right.

But it is well to lay some emphasis upon the proviso which we have just twice repeated in parenthesis. For in the first place there are a vast number of situations in life, which constitute the most perplexing of practical problems, in which it is not compatible with a reverent conception of His Person, to conceive of Him as placed. It was wholly incompatible with the nature of the work which He came on earth to do, that He should have been within the scope of matrimonial responsibilities or anxieties, or should have been closely identified with party politics, or should have initiated a great commercial enterprise, or should have been a successful general, or should have dominated the public press. All these things are good; and a score of others, of which these are but samples, are also good; but it is levity of mind, not religious reverence, which will conceive of Him as directly conditioned by them. He is indeed a standard to all these; but the standard cannot be applied with any rough and ready directness of method. And in the second place, if we ask ourselves, more indirectly, not what He would have done, but rather to what end, in conditions so wholly dissimilar, the essential principles of His life would work out, or what His apostles and saints would have done, in conditions which are not so hopelessly incongruous to them; (which is in fact the same thing as asking, in the only reverent form, what it would perfectly beseem the Christ-Spirit to do): we have still to beware of rough and ready answers. In complicated circumstances it is often really difficult to know exactly what is right. We are not helped, but hindered, in our search for what is right, by the crude attempt to imitate, across all gulfs of intervening difference, the precise things which He did. Across all the complications of a duty that really is complicated, it is mere spiritual ignorance and the rashness of extreme presumption, that expects to find a short-cut by asking, and ex-

pecting off-hand to be able to answer the question, what would Christ have done? He would have done that which is the absolutely wisest and best. When we know what is absolutely wisest and best, we shall know what He would have done. But we are far more likely to find what He would have done, by learning dutifully what is wisest and best; than to discover, by a short-cut, what is wisest and best, through asking what He would have done, and presuming, in all the crudeness of spiritual indiscipline, to give off-hand, perhaps in biblical phraseology, a wholly unjust and superficial answer.

No sober-minded Christian would really expect to cut the knot of all his own practical difficulties thus. It is far less consistent still with Christian sobriety to presume, by a short and crude prescription like this, to map out, for all other men or classes of men, their several paths of spiritual duty and truth. It would be easy to enlarge upon this thought, and to illustrate it from many sides. But at this moment, after all, our object is not so much to expose the rashness necessarily involved in any attempt to define in detail the method of following His steps; as to welcome and affirm the truth of the principle as principle. So unqualified is the truth of the principle, that the utmost extravagance in the exposition of it goes only, after all, a limited way towards destroying its inherent fascination and power. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit, (which is the extension of the Incarnation, the application of the Atonement,) is that which reveals the possibility at once, and the true and dutiful method, of learning to do this which absolutely ought to be done.

There is also another direction in which the neglect of the doctrine and experience of the Holy Spirit, indispensable as it is to real Christianity, and therefore to the real constitution of human consciousness, avenges itself, too surely, upon those who are guilty of it. This

tendency, on the side of its baser development, will include all that we understand by the word Spiritualism. Its deeper and more aspiring aspect is Mysticism. As the self-styled spiritualism is the extreme imperfection (when it is not the gross caricature) of the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit: so the so-called mystical is too apt to become only a one-sided understanding of the essential mystery of Christian personality.

Spiritualism is the nemesis of unspirituality. The spiritualist plays upon the inherent consciousness of spiritual reality in those whose experience has never learned the meaning and methods of the Presence of God's Holy Spirit. He makes use of spiritual phrases, and spiritual instincts; knowing indeed that the spiritual is real, yet fancying that it is a specialized region apart, to be explored by special apparatus of quasi-scientific faculties. He does not know that the spiritual is as wide as life, that it includes the material, and is its ultimate goal and significance. He does not know that the spiritual is the crown of the moral, and can only be gauged or known, with any certainty or any fulness, in, and as, experience of moral righteousness. Instead of setting himself to apprehend the spiritual by the faculties and experiences—the bracing of character and the discipline of life—through which men can adore, and reflect, and therefore know, their God; he tries, by methods and powers to which the Holiness of God is irrelevant, to penetrate into his so-called spiritual, as into a new compartment of unexplored, and unhealthily fascinating, science. He is right in believing in, and demanding, the spiritual. But he is wholly, and for the most part even grotesquely, wrong, in the direction in which he looks for the spiritual, and his fundamental conception of what spiritual means. He thinks of it only as another, though more delicate and impalpable, form of the physical, amenable ultimately (if we

can but adjust them with sufficient subtlety) to the tests and methods of physical experience. He does not realize it as a mode of being of which our only direct knowledge is in that personal experience of self-communing with righteousness, to which all physical tests, methods, and conditions whatsoever, are felt to be merely transitory—and even, in the last resort, in a real sense, irrelevant—accidents. The spiritualist who does not, by his spiritualism, mean the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, which is God, made manifest in the manifest "fruits of the Spirit," is trying an impossible short-cut to the region of spirit, and substituting, for the highest imaginable reality, the most hungry counterfeit and caricature.

It may have seemed, perhaps, little less than offensive to mention just now, in the same breath, the spiritualist and the mystic. In both cases, indeed, a word of the noblest meaning has been perverted to strange, if not ignoble, uses. But the difference is very great. The word spiritualism has come to mean little else than its own degradation. The word mysticism has a far nobler history. And yet it may be said, with some truth, that the word mysticism, as a distinctive term, exists chiefly to express a disproportion. This is not said in anything like depreciation of the mystical aspect of the Christian life. On the contrary, the spirit of mysticism is the true and essential Christianity. Renewal of the study of mysticism is wholly a matter for rejoicing. But it will be felt that in all writing about mysticism there is a difficulty in defining what is written about. In truth there is an inherent ambiguity in our definitions of mysticism. We do not settle exactly which it is that we wish to define. Is it mysticism as ideally it ought to be? the essential harmony of truth which the mystics were (often inharmoniously) aiming at? Or is it the actual meaning which mysticism has borne, historically, in the life and thought of the "mystics"? To

frame a definition which shall include the different historical varieties of mysticism is difficult: to frame a definition which, whilst including them, shall characterize them as distinctive, excluding a perfectly real but non-mystical Christian experience, is an impossibility. It is comparatively easy to say what the real truth of Christian mysticism is. It is, in fact, the doctrine, or rather the experience, of the Holy Ghost. It is the realization of human personality as characterized by, and consummated in, the indwelling reality of the Spirit of Christ, which is God.

Mysticism as identical with true Christianity, mysticism as the realization of the Spirit of Holiness, the Spirit of the Creator of Heaven and Earth, in, and as, the climax of human personality, is intelligible enough. But if mysticism is to be distinguished from "simple" Christianity as a special experience apart, a distinctive compartment of exceptional possibility, it encounters insuperable difficulties. On the one hand there will be rival conceptions, with more or less equal claim to be regarded as distinctive of mysticism. On the other hand, whatever definition is adopted as distinctive, will be *ipso facto* an exaggeration. It is only by virtue of what is exaggerated or disproportioned in it, that mysticism can be conceived as a separate department, other than the realization of Christianity itself.

And in point of fact, not only have all forms of mysticism had their characteristic liabilities to exaggeration, but it is by their exaggerations that they have loomed large in history, and are, in the main, distinguished and characterized. The doctrine of God the Holy Ghost is what Christian mysticism has properly aimed at and meant. But Christian mysticism has, for the most part, historically, framed for itself some narrower definition and aim, realizing a part of the inclusiveness of the Divine Spirit of human personality, at the expense of the whole.

The ascetic mystic, while pursuing an ideal which is absolutely true, has really under-valued the dignity of the body, and the divine excellence of the harmony of bodily cleanliness and vigour and health.

The mystic who tries to find God negatively through the intellect, by disallowing, in thought, all the attributes of God, is saved only by his moral earnestness, and a happy incapacity of being fully consistent, from what would have been at first an intellectual scepticism, and ultimately a moral chaos also.

The contemplative mystic misconceives the true relation of thought to experience, and experience to thought: the part, therefore, which the life of service bears in the highest capacities of spiritual insight into truth.

The mystic who would rise to God by despising nature, fails to see the divineness of little things, the real expression of God in what is outward or inanimate.

The symbolic mystic, seeing God in things little or inanimate, very rarely understands aright the proportion between the wonderful revelation of God in nature, and that more wonderful and more capable reflection of God in man, which causes so many of the highest saints to seem absorbed in the life of practical service, and accounts for what would otherwise be wholly amazing,—the scriptural conception of love. Moreover he tries to find the completeness of God revealed in inanimate nature just as it stands; forgetting the extent to which inanimate nature also "groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now," and being subjected to the law of perfecting through sacrifice, has to reach its own ideal significance, not by simple development but rather through a process of transfiguring "deliverance"—"from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God."[1]

[1] Rom. viii. 21, 22.

One and all, they tend by disproportionate emphasis upon their own aspect of truth to impair the perfect harmony of the truth of the Spirit,—that very truth to which they only exist to bear witness; and it is precisely upon their exaggerations that conceptions, and definitions, of mysticism are apt to be made to depend. One and all, the exaggerations find their full correction in the Person of the Incarnate, our Lord Jesus Christ; for all the exaggerations are partial lights from the full splendour of the presence of His Spirit, which is the ideal meaning of Christian personality.

It is Christ who is the true mystic; or if the mode of expression be preferred, it is He who alone has realized all that mysticism and mystics have aimed at—with more, or with less, whether of disproportion or of success. And in Him this perfect realization evidently means a harmony, a sanity, a fitly proportioned completeness. It is an inward light which makes itself manifest as character; a direct communion of love which is also, to the fullest extent, wholly rational at once and wholly practical; it is as much knowledge as love, and love as knowledge; it is as truly contemplation as activity, and activity as contemplation. In being the ideal of mysticism, it is also the ideal of general, and of practical, and of *all*, Christian experience. For the most practical type of Christian experience misconceives itself, until it conceives itself as an expression, in action, of a central truth,—that truth of transcendent fact, which practical Christians are too often content to call "mystical," and, so calling it, to banish, or try to banish, from the region of practical life.

We may shrink indeed from any mere disbelief in experiences in which we ourselves have no part. In trance, in exalted contemplation, in raptness of spirit, there may be greater possibilities than we ordinarily dream of. We may shrink from limiting the possibilities of insight into

truth, in those who surrender themselves in childlike simplicity, body and soul, to the reception of truth. But we need not hesitate to say that no partial experience can be the more excellent for being partial. Active duty is not heightened by paralysis of contemplative power; and conversely, paralysis of the life of active duty and benevolence is a numbing, not a quickening, of spiritual faculty. True spiritual experience is not, as such, a remoteness from the livingness of life; rather it is to be livingly animated, for all purposes of living, with the Spirit of the Incarnate, which is God.

It is the width of this truth of the Christian creed which the mystic so often has missed. It is not that he has too high a doctrine of the Spirit. On the contrary, it is not high enough. Because he fails to apprehend the indwelling presence of the Spirit, which is God, as cardinal to the Christian creed and life, therefore he looks for the meaning of the doctrine of the Spirit, as something fenced apart, and exceptional in its conditions and results. Of mysticism as a distinctive aspiration, or abnormal possibility, or remote compartment of experience, nothing need have been heard in the history of Christendom, if only every Christian had been a mystic in the true sense, as assuredly every Christian ought to be; that is, had been so filled with the pervading Presence of the Spirit of the Incarnate (which is the Personal presence of the eternal God) that he himself, being constituted what he was by the character of the indwelling Spirit, "with unveiled face reflected as a mirror the glory of the Lord."[1] In proportion as mysticism either claims to be, or is regarded by ordinary Christians as being, an abnormal by-way or by-region of special experience, rather than as the realization in special fulness of that which is the central inspiration and meaning of all Christian life, as well practical as

[1] 2 Cor. iii. 18.

contemplative; in that proportion does the mysticism itself become directly liable to various forms of exaggeration and unhealthiness, while the Christianity which is content to remain "non-mystical" is impoverished at the very centre of its being. All Christians profess belief in the Holy Ghost. Had only all Christians understood, and lived up to, their belief, they would all have been mystics: or, in other words, there would have been no "mysticism."

Such, then, is our ideal. But once more who is there that realizes it? Something has been said about the many, in familiar life, who plainly fall short of it. What of the few, whom we might be inclined to call Saints? Or is the world simply divided into the many who fail, and the few who perfectly realize and reflect Christ?

If we should have the opportunity of cross-questioning the inner consciousness of those who seem to be saintliest, it is probable that while on the one hand, they would bear emphatic testimony to the truth that this, and nothing less than this, is to them the real ideal and significance of Life in Christ, on the other hand, they would be no less emphatic in disclaiming anything at all like an actual attainment of it. The more they realize what their life means, the less do they seem to have accomplished its meaning: even while (paradoxically enough) the very sense of non-accomplishment is rather their hope and confidence than their despair. They know that Christian life means, and that it will be perfectly consummated in, Christ. They are confident of the meaning, and confident of the issue. They know it moreover not as a merely blind faith, but with what is, in fact, the knowledge of experience. Yet their experience is so inchoate, that it is experience rather of a faith than of an achievement, of a

living principle out of which results must issue rather than of results already possessed.

As to the meaning of the ideal, or the certainty of the ideal, you will try in vain to shake the immovable confidence of their faith. For indeed it is more than what most of us mean by faith. It belongs to the highest form of all possible knowledge. It is part of the inherent consciousness of their own personality. Yet, immovable as is, on this side, their certainty, it still is a faith, and a faith believed rather than realized, on the side of its effects. These men are not conscious of an inherent righteousness. Rather, so exceptional is their insight into righteousness (and insight is affinity), that there is no class of men on the face of the earth who feel so keenly —and so truly — their own immeasurable failure of righteousness. They do not feel themselves animated by the Spirit of Christ,—living reflections of the glory of Christ. On the contrary, in proportion to their own insight into the vision of holiness, is their insight into, and their consciousness of, sin. They are the true self-accusers. They are the thorough penitents. Even this indeed is, in a certain way, a likeness with Christ, a schooling in the discipline of the Cross. For Christ, in the conditions which He deliberately undertook,—though free, and *because* free, from personal sin,—was yet the sin-bearer, the perfect—the only perfectly possible—penitent. But our thought at this moment requires not so much the discernment of the Christlike lineaments in the penitent as penitent; but rather, what is equally true, the discernment that the consciousness of the penitent, as penitent, is a consciousness rather of contrast than of affinity with Christ. What he feels is his unholiness, his incapacity, his remoteness from God. And what he feels in itself is absolutely true. Even he, though, as penitent, he is nearer to the truth than other men, yet errs rather

in *under* than in *over*-estimating his own actual failure, and incapacity, of righteousness. Penitent as he now is, he will yet be still more emptied, still more humiliated, still more utterly penitent, as he draws nearer to the great consummation. But our thought just now is not on the *incompleteness* so much as on the *reality* of his humiliation and emptiness. It is not incompatible—nay it intimately corresponds—with his own inherent certainty as to the meaning, and destiny, of his own personality. Yet as humiliation and emptiness it is quite unreservedly sincere and real. No one on earth is so absolutely unaffected in self-accusation and realization of sin, as the saint in whose spirit is the vision of God. He is, and he knows that he is, a sinner, without worth or dignity. He is, and he knows that he is, in himself by himself, guilty before His God without excuse, and impotent without hope. And therefore when he realizes also, as he does realize, in himself, the earnest of the presence, and the certainty of the destiny, of Christ; he realizes something, which, though it has indeed a present reality, is yet so in contrast with the present, that it may after all be truly described not only as of faith rather than of sight, but perhaps even as of blind faith, of faith whose eyes are fixed wholly on the far future, of faith magnificent in its transcendence, or even defiance, of all conditions sensibly realized.

After all, in respect of conditions sensibly realized, the difference between man and man on earth, the difference between the greatest sinner (whose eyes are yet turned feebly towards God), and the greatest saint (who could be no saint if he did not feel himself a sinner) is a difference only of degree: and it may be that this difference of degree may seem hereafter to be strangely, perhaps even infinitesimally, small, when compared with the difference between what the highest saint can now feel himself to

be, and what he even now believes—nay knows—that he shall himself, in the Spirit of Christ, become. The faithful Christians who are saints in Christ, are not enjoying a present fruition of holiness. They are looking forward to it in a faith which, in respect of all sensible conditions, is fearless in over-riding present experience, even whilst, as faith, it is itself inwrought with experience. They are, after all, steadily looking forward, in the certainty of an immovable faith, to something which they believe—and know—to be the very inmost truth of themselves, even whilst it is, in the certainty of immediate experience, not only external to, but in actual, often in painful, contrast with themselves.

Such, then, is the outcome of our exposition of Atonement. We would ask people to believe in the work of Christ's Passion as a real transformation of themselves, as finding its climax in the real climax of themselves. So far it may truly be said that we are demurring to a purely objective theory of atonement. Atonement cannot be described, or accounted for, simply as a transaction, external to the selves who are atoned for. In themselves is its ultimate significance. In themselves is its ultimate reality. Nor can they themselves be ultimately realized any otherwise save through it.

Are we then pointing to conditions merely subjective, as a substitute, or at least a sort of imitation, or reflex result, of Calvary? Are we making the real atonement a personal achievement? are we finding its original significance either in personal feeling or personal character? or are we trying to stimulate in ourselves a strong imagination of personal holiness? It is obvious that we are doing nothing of the sort. Any such imagination would be the most hollow, and the most pitiable, of make-believes. The sense of goodness in ourselves would prove only our incapacity of understanding goodness. Atone-

ment as a personal achievement would be impossible. Nor are we so far deceived as to the bitterness or the depths of sin by the grandeur of a transcendent (albeit a true) theory, as to look for the consummation of the meaning of Christian personality within the conditions, and disabilities, of present experience. Such consummation is no matter of present consciousness, or present fruition. To imagine so would be to degrade the augustness of the meaning of Christian personality.[1]

Nor is Christian personality attained, through effort, by those who, but for effort, had it not. There is indeed Christian effort. And there is imitation of Christ. But these are rather the necessary outcome, than the producing cause, of the Spirit of Christ. It is by His initiation rather than ours, and by the acts of His power rather than ours, that we were first brought into relation with Him, and that His Spirit is progressively imparted to us. He does ask of us a certain response of docility. He does ask us to be willing to receive, to be willing to correspond, to

[1] "I know a man in Christ, fourteen years ago (whether in the body, I know not; or whether out of the body, I know not; God knoweth), such a one caught up even to the third heaven. And I know such a man (whether in the body, or apart from the body, I know not; God knoweth), how that he was caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter. On behalf of such a one will I glory: but on mine own behalf I will not glory, save in my weaknesses. *ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου καυχήσομαι· ὑπὲρ δὲ ἐμαυτοῦ οὐ καυχήσομαι, εἰ μὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀσθενείαις.*" 2 Cor. xii. 2-5.

Of whom is St Paul speaking? There is one before his thought, whom he sharply contrasts with himself,—*ὑπὲρ δὲ ἐμαυτοῦ οὐ.* Who is it? Who is the "self" of whom he will not glory? and who is the "such a one" of whom he will? Are they not both—with whatever difference—himself?

Even, then, the veteran apostle and martyr, who, in vision, by anticipation, had himself seen and tasted the truer reality of himself, yet means by "himself," in the present, the imperfect self, the self characterized by weaknesses within and distresses without, and sharply chastened by the "thorn in the flesh," the "messenger of Satan to buffet" him.

As the clear vision of his transfigured self does not prevent his self-identification meanwhile with the weakness and distress; so does not his true self-identification with the weakness and distress obscure the truth that the transfigured being whom, having once felt, he cannot but contrast with himself, yet is, to say the least, something very far nearer than he is, to the true and ultimate reality of himself.

obey in order that we may receive, to rejoice in corresponding, to believe in what we have received, and shall become, to believe in ourselves and in Him. But it is always He who achieved, and who imparts. Essentially we are throughout receivers, not workers. The Pentecostal Spirit is bestowed in grace, bestowed on faith, bestowed through sacraments, anyway bestowed, not earned. Certainly we are not speaking of a subjective that can be detached even for a moment, even in imagination, from its own essentially objective original.

We have, then, a magnificent faith,—a faith, at once grounded in, yet transcending, experience; a faith in a magnificent future, which is at once incompatible with, and yet is the very truth and meaning, of the consciousness of the present. We do ask for belief, and indeed enthusiasm, for a certain conception (or consciousness) as to the relation between the achievement of Calvary and the inner meaning and possibilities of human personality. We do believe that the Spirit of Calvary is to animate ourselves; and that the animating of ourselves by the Spirit of Calvary is a reality wholly God's and wholly ours; wholly objective at once and wholly subjective; and we do believe that the mere belief in such a reality is itself the first proper condition of its own consummation,—is itself a transforming and enabling power, received from without, and yet vitally within, the real being of the self.

But precisely because this consummation is so much more future than present, so much more grasped by faith (though a faith which is experience) than realized in feeling or in sight, therefore after all, so far from parting company with those who in faith adore an atonement external to themselves, it is precisely with them that we shall seem, most and last, to take our stand. When we contemplate the Cross we do indeed recognize that we are

gazing on no remote transaction, no mere paying down (as it were) of purchase-money, but rather upon the meaning, the destiny, the true character, and revealed possibility, of ourselves. Yet even because its ultimate significance is to be within ourselves, we adore it as yet as external to ourselves. Except we first so believe, and adore, and love, we are trying to close up the very avenues through which the external fact should first begin to become the characteristic reality of ourselves. We study it indeed not as a transaction that is either properly, or ultimately, external. We see in it the revealed climax of human personality, and the one only possibility by which our imperfect personalities can hope to be consummated in that which alone can ever be their true meaning. We see ourselves really in it; and in it alone we discover the reality of ourselves. Yet after all, our present incompleteness is necessarily such that, here at least and now, the curtain falls, and must fall, upon us still in the attitude of rapt belief and imploring worship, towards what —though by faith we see our true selves nowhere save in it,—is still, to all sensible experience, quite outside—nay the contradiction—of ourselves. We are still in the ranks of those who live by fastening their eyes, in faith, as on the serpent of brass, set before their eyes to be an object of faith.

In the failure of ourselves, which is an integral part of experience, that which helps us most is that which we feel to be without, and beyond, ourselves. It will not comfort us so much, in our moments of weakness or dying, to be adjured to remember the dignity of our being, as to be pointed to the scene enacted once for all upon the Cross. We believe that Calvary wonderfully includes and conditions ourselves. Yet it is to Calvary, not as ourselves but as Calvary, that, in the breaking up of ourselves, we most earnestly desire to hold fast. We are left, here at

least and now, still gazing as from afar, not in fruition but in faith, on that which we have *not* realized in ourselves. We are still kneeling to worship, with arms outstretched from ourselves in a wonder of belief and loving adoration, that reality wholly unique and wholly comprehensive, the figure of Jesus crucified.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER

ON

THE ATONEMENT IN HISTORY

IT would be quite foreign to the present purpose to write a history of the doctrine of atonement. The historian of a doctrine must aim at completeness. He will do justice to every development or variation. He will overlook no eccentricity. And his finished work will often present more directly a curious picture of the working, perhaps of the failure, of the human mind, than a vivid or vivifying statement of the inner truth of the doctrine itself.

Such a study is full, no doubt, of its own fascination. But for minds whose great interest is the reality of the doctrine, as practical, living, and true, such a study is by no means always edifying. So far from leading minds straight to the living heart of truth, it seems often to perplex and repel. A comparison between different teachers or schools is occupied more, in proportion, with their differences, and perhaps eccentricities, than with the central reality which they diversely present. To pass in thought from one disproportion to another; to study, and dissect, successive inadequacies, if not grotesquenesses: is, to a mind partly puzzled and wholly eager, a repugnant, and sometimes even a perilous, exercise. If a man doubts the truth of the atonement to himself, he is hardly likely to be reassured by a close historical study of the different, more or less unsatisfying, ways, in which a great variety of minds have struggled to express it. The variety itself is distracting; and each several exposition, when tabulated in

comparison and contrast with others, is put in its own least persuasive, because least living, form. The very weariness and entanglement of the history of a doctrine, as history, makes it harder to many minds to embrace with any vivid insight, or moral enthusiasm, the living truth itself as living and as true.

But if a history, as history, is as much outside the purpose, as the power, of the present effort; that purpose may nevertheless be served by some glimpses into history. The glimpses, such as they are, may seem to be miscellaneous; but they will have, of course, a connected purpose. That purpose is to show how real is the freedom of essential Christian thought, from those conceptions of atonement with which it has become gradually, and has been supposed to be inherently, identified: and thereby also to vindicate, from the point of view of theological history, the view which has been taken in the foregoing pages. It is, then, even more for a defensive than for a purely historical purpose; it is to justify the rest of the volume against some not unnatural distrust, that, in the main, this supplementary chapter is written. It may be felt that there is a suspicion of newness about the present exposition: that it is more distinct, than is wise or right, from what look like the larger currents of traditional thought. To this I do not plead guilty. If there is anything in it which seems to our present assumptions to be novel, I should plead in reply not only that in much larger measure it is antique, conservative, orthodox, and scriptural; but that it is only the element of mistake in our present assumptions which causes even the appearance of novelty. The simplest way of justifying this plea is to try to exhibit, in their delicious largeness and simplicity, the mode in which the earliest generations of Christians felt and spoke about the cardinal fact of the atonement. I should like to be able to show that the essential position of the present volume would have sounded in no way either novel or bold to any Christian teachers or communities—though of course every teacher did not put everything in exactly the same way—until, at the least, the end of the Athanasian age.

For this purpose I propose to dwell a little upon the earliest Christian utterances, and to pass from them to Athanasius. From Athanasius, in particular, I hope that it will conclusively appear, not only that his own mind was wholly without some modes of thought about the atone-

ment which we are sometimes tempted to regard as inseparable from it; but also that he is altogether unconscious of any such assumptions in the mind of the Church of his time. If there be anything narrow or artificial in the explanations of Irenæus or Origen, or any others, I hope that Athanasius will make it plain enough that any such elements of rigidity belonged to the private efforts of individual theologians to illustrate the central faith of the Church; they were no part either of the central faith, or even, as yet, of those popular Christian conceptions which gathered round the central faith.

For the rest, there seem to be some special reasons for dwelling a little upon Anselm and Abælard: and I have ventured to try and make my position the clearer by direct comment upon one or two of the treatises upon the atonement which seem to be most current and most practically influential amongst ourselves.

To begin, then, with some references to the Apostolic Fathers.

In the epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians there are two passages, each of which strikes a single note, and strikes it most impressively. In the first the blood of Christ is the real possibility of human penitence. Human penitence—not vicarious penitence only in man's stead, but reality of penitence in man himself: this is its beauty, its joy, its preciousness, in the presence of God. It has "won for the whole world the grace of penitence."

Διὰ ἀπολίπωμεν τὰς κενὰς καὶ ματαίας φροντίδας, καὶ ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸν εὐκλεῆ καὶ σεμνὸν τῆς παραδόσεως ἡμῶν κανόνα, καὶ ἴδωμεν τί καλὸν καὶ τί τερπνὸν καὶ τί προσδεκτὸν ἐνώπιον τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἡμᾶς· ἀτενίσωμεν εἰς τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ γνῶμεν ὡς ἔστιν τίμιον τῷ Θεῷ τῷ Πατρὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκχυθὲν παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ μετανοίας χάριν ἐπήνεγκεν, κ.τ.λ.[1] I. ad Cor. vii.

In the other passage, the one thing that is absolutely clear is that the passion of Jesus Christ was all love, love beyond human conceiving, the love of God Himself. There is not a whisper here of anger, or vengeance. It is simply the unplumbed mystery of love.

[1] The text is that of Gebhardt, Harnack, and Zahn. Lightfoot reads ὑπήνεγκεν and upon it makes this note,—"ὑπήνεγκεν '*offered.*' So it is generally taken, but this sense is unsupported; for Xen. Hell., iv. 7. 2, Soph. El., 834, are not parallel. Perhaps '*won* (*rescued*) *for the whole world.*'" ἐπήνεγκεν would seem to convey the same meaning still more directly.

"Whoso has love in Christ, let him do the commandments of Christ. What the bond is of the love of God, who is there that can declare? The grandeur of its beauty who is sufficient to utter? The height to which love leads up is beyond telling. Love joins us unto God. Love covers over a multitude of sins. Love bears with all things. Love is all long-suffering. In love there is nothing mean, and nothing haughty. There is no schism in love, and no spirit of division. Love does all things in oneness of soul. In love the elect of God were all made perfect. Without love there can be nothing well pleasing to God. In love the Master took us unto Himself. For the love which He had toward us, Jesus Christ our Lord, in the will of God, gave His own blood for us, and His flesh for our flesh, and His life for our lives."[1]

An act wholly proceeding out of, wholly characterized by and consisting of, love: an act whose priceless beauty lay in this—that it was, in possibility at least, the actual penitence of all mankind: this is the conception of the atonement which meets us at the outset of post-apostolic literature. It is a conception singularly free from the technicalities and perplexing constraints of a good deal of the logic of subsequent writers; and perhaps hardly less striking, in respect of this contrast, than it is in its own large and living suggestiveness.

There is very little in the Ignatian letters which bears upon the rationale of the interpretation of Christ's death on the Cross. The event itself indeed, in its historical reality, is most earnestly insisted on, as the very centre of the Christian gospel and life.[2] It is astonishing into how many aspects of life it enters as not only a relevant, but the cardinal, thought. The following passages are collected by Bishop Lightfoot, when commenting upon the phrase, in the inscription of the epistle to the Ephesians, which speaks of the Church of Ephesus as "united and elected in the power of a real Passion through the will of the Father and of Christ." "This [ἐν πάθει]," he says, "should probably be connected with both the preceding words. The 'passion' is at once the bond of their union, and the ground of their election." For the former idea compare

[1] ἐν ἀγάπῃ προσελάβετο ἡμᾶς ὁ δεσπότης· διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην ἣν ἔσχεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν, ἐν θελήματι Θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σάρκα ὑπὲρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν. I. ad Cor. xlix.

[2] See, *e.g.* Trall. 9, Smyrn. 1.

Philad. 3. εἴ τις ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ γνώμῃ περιπατεῖ, οὗτος τῷ πάθει οὐ συγκατατίθεται; for the latter, *Trall.* 11. ἐν τῷ πάθει αὐτοῦ προσκαλεῖται ὑμᾶς. This latter relation it has, because in foreordaining the Sacrifice of the Cross God foreordained the call of the faithful. Thus their election was involved in Christ's passion.

"This word has a special prominence in the Epistles of Ignatius. In Christ's passion is involved the peace of one Church (*Trall.* inscr.) and the joy of another (*Philad.* inscr.). Unto His passion the penitent sinner must return (*Smyrn.* 5); from His passion the false heretic dissents (*Philad.* 3); into His passion all men must die (*Magn.* 5); His passion the saint himself strives to imitate (*Rom.* 6); the blood of His passion purifies the water of baptism (*Ephes.* 18); the tree of the passion is the stock from which the Church has sprung (*Smyrn.* 1); the passion is a special feature which distinguishes the Gospel (*Philad.* 9, *Smyrn.* 7). In several passages indeed it is co-ordinated with the birth or the resurrection (*Ephes.* 20, *Magn.* 11, *Smyrn.* 12, etc.); but frequently, as here, it stands in isolated grandeur, as the one central doctrine of the faith."

Many of the passages here quoted go chiefly to show the dominant place of the passion in the theology of Ignatius; but there are perhaps two specific thoughts which may be emphasized as inherent in them. The first is that to possess Christ is to desire to suffer with Him,[1] or (in other words), that a voluntary sharing in the passion of Christ is the life of Christ in us;[2] and the second, which is a corollary from the first, is that for us the effect of the passion is incomplete, until it finds a consummation within ourselves,—*our* penitence, *our* death, and therefore *our* life, and *our* resurrection through death.[3]

It may be allowable to refer, further, to the phrases in which the Blood of Christ is said to *be* love. In one context "faith" is the "flesh," and the "blood" is love; in another the "flesh" is the "bread of God," the spiritual food of the soul, and the "blood" is imperishable love.

[1] Ἐπιτρέψατέ μοι μιμητὴν εἶναι τοῦ πάθους τοῦ Θεοῦ μου. εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει, νοησάτω ὃ θέλω, καὶ συμπαθείτω μοι, εἰδὼς τὰ συνέχοντά με. Rom. vi.

[2] Οἱ δὲ πιστοὶ ἐν ἀγάπῃ χαρακτῆρα [ἔχουσι] Θεοῦ Πατρὸς διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, δι' οὗ ἐὰν μὴ αὐθαιρέτως ἔχωμεν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν εἰς τὸ αὐτοῦ πάθος, τὸ ζῆν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν. Magn. v.

[3] Compare the two passages just quoted with Ἀλλὰ μηδὲ γένοιτό μοι αὐτῶν μνημονεύειν, μέχρις οὗ μετανοήσωσιν εἰς τὸ πάθος, ὅ ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἀνάστασις. Smyrn. v.

Ἀνακτίσασθε ἑαυτοὺς ἐν πίστει, ὅ ἐστιν σάρξ τοῦ Κυρίου, καὶ ἐν ἀγάπῃ, ὅ ἐστιν αἷμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.[1]

Οὐχ ἥδομαι τροφῇ φθορᾶς, οὐδὲ ἡδοναῖς τοῦ βίου τούτου. ἄρτον Θεοῦ θέλω, ὅ ἐστιν σάρξ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, τοῦ ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ, καὶ πόμα θέλω τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ, ὅ ἐστιν ἀγάπη ἄφθαρτος.[2]

A passage is quoted from the epistle of Barnabas in which, (in contrast with the Israelites who were so incapable of receiving the covenant, when given, that Moses broke the two tables in pieces before reaching the people) Christians are said to have been made capable of God's covenant, "through the Lord Jesus, who was the heir of the covenant:"[3] and Christ is said to have come into the world for this, that[4] when we had recklessly thrown our hearts away to death, and were given over to the lawlessness of sin, He might Himself redeem us out of the darkness,—according to the charge given Him of the Father, that He should make ready for Himself a holy people.

Such a sentence does not carry us very far. But it may certainly be said, that, on the one hand, it is the "Righteousness" of Christ, not anything like His "punishment," which is instinctively thought of as the redeeming power; and, on the other hand, that it is not the excusing of man from punishment, but his recovery to holiness, which was the goal, and is the effect, of redemption.

A good deal more important than these is the well-known passage in the Epistle to Diognetus. The 7th and 8th chapters contain an eloquent statement of the thoughts (1) that the Incarnation, (and the atonement as the crowning purpose of the Incarnation,) proceeded from the Divine goodness of the Eternal Father, "communicated" to the Eternal Son,—*ἀλλ' οὗτος ἦν μὲν ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἔστι, καὶ ἔσται· χρηστὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀόργητος καὶ ἀληθής, καὶ μόνος ἀγαθός ἐστιν· ἐννοήσας δὲ μεγάλην καὶ ἄφραστον ἔννοιαν ἀνεκοινώσατο μόνῳ τῷ παιδί*: (2) that the Incarnate was Himself the very Maker and Lord of all things in Heaven and earth and under the earth,—*αὐτὸν τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων, ᾧ τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἔκτισεν, ᾧ τὴν θάλασσαν, κ.τ.λ.*: and (3) that this coming of the Creator to His sinful creatures was (against all human imagination of probability) not in anger, not in terror, not for judgment; but in gentleness and meekness,

[1] Trall. viii. [2] Rom. vii.

[3] *διὰ τοῦ κληρονομοῦντος διαθήκην Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ λάβωμεν.* c. xiv.

[4] *τὰς ἤδη δεδαπανημένας ἡμῶν καρδίας τῷ θανάτῳ καὶ παραδεδομένας τῇ τῆς πλάνης ἀνομίᾳ λυτρωσάμενος ἐκ τοῦ σκότους.* c. xiv.

in royal condescension, in divine love, to win, to persuade, to save,—ἆρά γε, ὡς ἀνθρώπων ἄν τις λογίσαιτο, ἐπὶ τυραννίδι καὶ φόβῳ καὶ καταπλήξει; οὐμενοῦν· ἀλλ' ἐν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ πραΰτητι ὡς βασιλεὺς πέμπων υἱὸν βασιλέα ἔπεμψεν, ὡς Θεὸν ἔπεμψεν, ὡς ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἔπεμψεν, ὡς σώζων ἔπεμψεν, ὡς πείθων, οὐ βιαζόμενος· βία γὰρ οὐ πρόσεστι τῷ Θεῷ. ἔπεμψεν ὡς καλῶν, οὐ διώκων· ἔπεμψεν ὡς ἀγαπῶν, οὐ κρίνων.

Thése chapters supply, then, the general background of the thought,—how unlike the implacableness of the Father and the punishment of the Son! how unlike even to the thought of a "just" kingdom of Satan, which God can only invade by force or fraud!—and it is upon this background of thought that we come to the sentences which speak of the Atonement more particularly.

"But when the measure of our iniquity was full, and it had become quite plain that nothing was to be looked for but its due reward,—punishment and death; and the time was come which God had before determined to make manifest His own goodness and power. (O surpassing kindness and love of God for man!): He hated us not, nor thrust us away from Him, nor remembered evil; but was long-suffering, was patient, in His pity took Himself our sins upon Him, Himself gave up His own Son as ransom for us,—the holy for the disobedient, the harmless for the harmful, the righteous for the unrighteous, the imperishable for the perishing, the immortal for those who were in death! For what besides could possibly have covered our sins, but only His righteousness? In whom could we, the disobedient and unholy, be possibly made righteous, save only in the Son of God? O the sweetness of the interchange! O work of God beyond all searching out! O bounty beyond imagining! That the sinfulness of many should be buried in One righteous Person; and the righteousness of One should make many sinners righteous!"[1]

I think it may fairly be said that, in this representation of the adorable wonder of the Redemption of mankind, the following principles may be recognized: (1) that the plight in which man lay was sin, sin within himself; and, through sin, the inherent incapacity of holiness. It is not how to deliver man from being treated as he deserves, but how to deliver him out of the deserving of death (a deserv-

[1] Τί γὰρ ἄλλο τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἠδυνήθη καλύψαι ἢ ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνη; ἐν τίνι δικαιωθῆναι δυνατὸν τοὺς ἀνόμους ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀσεβεῖς ἢ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ Υἱῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ; ὦ τῆς γλυκείας ἀνταλλαγῆς, ὦ τῆς ἀνεξιχνιάστου δημιουργίας, ὦ τῶν ἀπροσδοκήτων εὐεργεσιῶν· ἵνα ἀνομία μὲν πολλῶν ἐν δικαίῳ ἑνὶ κρυβῇ δικαιοσύνη δὲ ἑνὸς πολλοὺς ἀνόμους δικαιώσῃ. Ep. ad. Diog., ix.

ing from which death is inseparable); it is this which is the apparently insoluble problem. (2) The entire conception and process of Redemption is, from first to last, a revelation of unimaginable love; a love which can only elicit, from men who have eyes to see it, the profoundest emotions of amazement and of adoration: and this love is, at least, not less emphatically the love of the Father, than the love of the Son who died. (3) The Son of God, who died, was absolutely righteous; and that which was efficacious in His death, was the sovereign power of His righteousness. Whatever, in fact, the necessity of His suffering; it is not upon the amount of His suffering, as suffering, but upon the inherent and perfectly victorious character of the righteousness which triumphed through, and over, suffering, that the whole efficacy of His atonement is conceived as turning. (4) Whatever be the analysis of the explanation of it, the essential sinfulness of humanity was, in that sacrifice of perfect righteousness,—not ignored, not overlooked, not regarded as having paid its way by punishment, and so acquired a right to be tolerated, though sinful, but rather as merged, buried, done away, gone; and (5) the result is—wonder of wonders! not a fictitious imputation, nor a dishonest treatment of the unholy as holy: but is the actual beauty of holiness in man. What was conceivably possible in this one way only, is, in this one way, an accomplished fact. "In the Son of God" man *has become righteous:* and God, in man, is his mind, his light, his glory, his strength, his life.[1]

It need not, of course, be said that every one of these things is fully drawn out; still less that every question is fully answered which it would occur to us to ask about them; yet all these things seem to be necessary parts of the underlying thought of the writer of this letter, and what is not really consistent with these things is not really consistent with that conception of the atonement, which is more or less explicitly present to his mind.

The different indications which we have hitherto met with are in the most perfect agreement with one another: and they constitute, it is believed, a fair statement of the evidence which comes from the earliest generations of all. It would seem therefore that we are entitled to take the representation which is now before us, as, on the negative side, in the points which it leaves unsolved, so also

[1] Αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τροφέα, πατέρα, διδάσκαλον, σύμβουλον, ἰατρόν, νοῦν, φῶς, τιμήν, δόξαν, ἰσχύν, ζωήν. Ibid.

affirmatively, in the much more important principles which it instinctively postulates, as indicating not unfairly the most primitive and instinctive ideas about atonement in the post-apostolic Church.

Hitherto there has been nothing whatever to criticize. We may indeed desire to ask more. But we have had nothing which, as a positive statement, could be a cause of difficulty to any one. It is afterwards, when different expressions about the atonement begin to be questioned very closely, and pressed very far, that difficulties arise; and human logic begins, whether more or less, to entangle itself in the web of its own meshes.

It may be well therefore to pause at this point a little, and, before entering upon the later developments, or the immediate causes of them, to remind ourselves how complex and varied are the different conceptions, and by consequence, the different images, which are part of the expression, in the New Testament, of the doctrine of the atonement; a doctrine indeed of which it would be no rhetorical flourish to say that, in a larger sense, the whole New Testament is the expression.

Let it be remarked first of all that, to the work of Christ's Redemption, which is the subject before us, the death on the Cross is absolutely cardinal. The death is not merely the ending off of the life. It would be less untrue to say that the life is merely the preliminary necessity, with a view to the death. The life exhibits much of the significance of the death. But the death is the great outcome, the crucial climax, to which the life has led up. This first: but secondly, though the death is cardinal, it is not after all the death simply as death. It is the *victoribus* death, the passing through death, and conquering death by dying. He died who was inherent Righteousness. He died, who was inherent Life. The inherent life of righteousness in Him, whilst accepting death, shattered death. It is not, then, death simply, but the shattering of death: it is not death as an end, but death as a means to eternally triumphant life, which is the cardinal fact of which we are speaking. It is death; but it is something more complex than merely death; something, the full significance of which is not only not death, but is the antithesis, and annihilation, of death. We cannot possibly stop short on Good Friday evening. It is the Crucifixion,

and the Resurrection and the Ascension: it is the Passion, *and* the consummation of the Victory.

Then there are two other observations, of a partly preliminary kind, which it seems desirable to make. This complex fact of which we speak, before we ask for any analysis of its meaning, is broadly exhibited to us in scripture in these two aspects, viz. as (*a*) a manifest unveiling, to all creatures that could spiritually apprehend it, of the infinite wonder of the Love of God; as, *e.g.* Rom. v. 6-8, viii. 31-39, xi. 33-36; 1 John iv. 8, *sqq.*; and (*b*) as the object of the faith of Christians,—a faith in which the very character and being of the believer is transformed, *e.g.* John iii. 16, vi. 35, vii. 38, xi. 25, xii. 32, xiv. 1-29; Acts xiii. 39, xvi. 31; 1 Cor. ii. 2; Rom. iv.; Heb. xi. 1, xii. 2, etc.

Next, this death,—which was not death, but the crushing of death,—is a *sacrifice*, and the culmination and realization of all that the sacrifices of the Old Testament had but inchoately and imperfectly represented. Mat. xxvi. 26-28; Isaiah liii. with Acts viii. 34, *sqq.*, and Luke xxiv. 26-27; 1 Cor. v. 7; Heb. ix. 23-26, x. 12; Rev. v. 9, xiii. 8, etc.

With this goes the corresponding truth that the sacrifice was offered by Himself; and that He, in offering it, was a priest: and not a priest only, but the only true and full realization of the meaning of priesthood. John x. 18 and context, xvii. 19 and context, and Hebrews *passim*.

The whole meaning of Priesthood and Sacrifice becomes thus a part of the meaning of the sacrificial Death of Christ: not in the sense that Sacrifice, in Him, can be simply measured by what Sacrifice meant in the old Covenant, or before even that: but rather that all the lines of true tendency which are discernible as underlying, or implied in, the older sacrifices, must find their ultimate fulness of meaning in Him. All Levitical sacrifices together were but only an outline of what was in Him fulfilled. Yet their outline sketch, as far as it went, was true. And their lesser significance was only superseded, because it was absorbed, in something which included, while it transcended, them.

More particularly, He is spoken of in the New Testament, in this His victorious death of sacrifice, as "suffering for sins," *e.g.* 1 Pet. iii. 18; as "bearing" sins, *e.g.* Heb. ix. 28; as "made to be sin," 2 Cor. v. 21; as "made a curse," Gal. iii. 13;—all these phrases being along the line of sacrificial phraseology.

And all this, emphatically and always, "for us." This

"for us" is an integral part of almost all the phrases just quoted; and belongs to the argument of such diverse passages as Rom. v. and Heb. ii.

Sometimes, perhaps, this "for us" is expressed almost as if it meant as our "substitute," "in our stead" (a sense which obviously contains a partial truth), as in the phrases λύτρον and ἀντίλυτρον, or in 1 Pet. ii. 24—following Isaiah liii. (It is observable, however, that the peculiar phrase "imputation," ceases, in the R.V., to be a New Testament phrase. The Greek λογίζεσθαι does not carry with it all the peculiar associations of the English "impute.") But far more commonly and characteristically He is represented as suffering "for us," not as a substitute, but as a representative; not as doing something which we did not do, or that we might not do it; but as doing something which we ourselves, in Him, at once must do, and did. If the paradox is a startling one, it is the more worthy of fearless interrogation, and the less likely to be found to be weak or indefinite in meaning. The emphasis upon it is unmistakable, Rom. vi. 4-8, and viii. 17; Gal. ii. 20; Eph. ii. 5-6; Col. ii. 13 and iii. 3; 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12, etc.

Besides all this, there are various more or less metaphorical expressions under which the character of Christ's atoning act is described. Thus:

He is our *Redemption*—as Rom. iii. 24; 1 Cor. i. 30; Gal. iii. 13; Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14; 1 Pet. i. 18.

He is our *Ransom*—as Mat. xx. 28; Mark. x. 45; 1 Tim. ii. 6.

He is our *Deliverance* or *Recovery* from Satan and the power of darkness,—as Col. i. 13; 2 Tim. ii. 26; *cp.* Acts xxvi. 18.

These three terms, (the first two of which are not really distinguishable in the Greek,) are all unmistakably metaphors, expressing, under the similitude of certain familiar earthly forms of rescue, what the atoning act effects for man, in relation to that out of which he is rescued by it.

Again He is our *Propitiation*—as Rom. iii. 25; 1 John ii. 2; Heb. ii. 17 (R.V.)

He is our *Reconciliation*—as Rom. v. 10, 11; 2 Cor. v. 18, 19, 20; Eph. ii. 16; Col. i. 22.

He is our *Justification*—as Acts xiii. 39; Rom. iii. 24, 26, 30, iv. 5, 25, v. 9, viii. 30; 1 Cor. vi. 11; Gal. ii. 16, iii. 24.

These three terms may be taken, in the main, as expressing, more or less under earthly metaphor, the

alteration made in man's condition, in respect of his relation to the eternal and immovable Holiness of God.

But the term Justification is too many-sided to be brought under any single category. If it expresses partly a process of change—it expresses also an inherent condition—which is the result of the process. There is no ultimate distinction between to "justify" and to "make righteous"; between man's being pronounced righteous by the Truth of God, and man's being, in the Truth of God, righteous; between, therefore, God's "justification" and the "righteousness" of man. For this reason I deliberately repeat the word in a further group. Once more, then,

He is our *Justification* (as above).

He is our *Righteousness*—as 1 Cor. i. 30; 2 Cor. v. 21; *cp.* Jer. xxiii. 6, xxxiii. 16.

He is our *Sanctification*—as 1 Cor. i. 30; Heb. ii. 11, x. 10, 14, xiii. 12.

He is our *Peace*—Eph. ii. 14.

He is our *Life*—Rom. viii. 2; Gal. ii. 20; Phil. i. 21; Col. iii. 3, 4; 1 John i. 2.

Now in this last set of terms we have plainly passed,—but passed by imperceptible transition, because there is in fact no real line of difference or distinction,—from descriptions of His act regarded under metaphorical similitudes as a transaction about us, but external to ourselves: into language which, not metaphorically but literally and directly, characterizes it as an essential transformation within, and of, ourselves. He is victorious Righteousness within, and as, ourselves.[1]

[1] If any one will look out in a concordance the words just, justify, justification, justice, justifier, righteous, make righteous, righteousness, and see how these words bulk in the Old Testament and the New; and then remember that they are not two groups of words, but only in fact grammatical variations of one single word, and thought, in Greek; he will begin to realize the unreality of any rigidly technical definitions of the word in any of its forms.

The verb, for instance, which is translated "to justify" δικαιοῦν, occurs some fifteen times from the 3rd to the 8th of Romans. What does the word mean? On the one hand, the -οώ termination, as in χρυσόω, τυφλόω, πολεμόω, οἰκειόω, δουλόω, ἐλευθερόω, etc., is associated with the meaning "to make" so and so. On the other hand in received usage it is easily shown that δικαιόω, and some kindred words, are found only (or almost only) with the sense of "pronouncing" or "accounting" righteous. But is the distinction really valid? In human experience to "make righteous," literally, is an impossibility. Therefore the verb which is, in form, "to make righteous," can mean only, in practice, to pronounce, or regard, or treat as being so. But on the other hand, is it possible that when any one is pronounced, or regarded, or treated as righteous *by the very truth of God*, his being so pronounced can be, in its full or proper meaning, dissevered from his so being?

It will be felt, then, upon the whole survey, that we cannot possibly stop short of finding our climax in those passages which express, in its own characteristic language—the language at once of revelation and of experience—this transforming mystery of His Presence within ourselves. It is the extension,—which is also the effectiveness,—of the Incarnation; it is the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ; it is, in a word, the doctrine of the Holy Ghost.

I must ask to have it particularly observed that this is not a magnificent sequel, separable in kind from the atonement, and from the exposition of it. It is the necessary climax of the doctrine of the atonement; a climax without which atonement is not yet explicable, because it is not yet real, to experience, which is the only perfect knowledge.

I must add, then, as the culmination of our third group of terms, that He is *the Spirit of our spirit*, the only ultimate and essential reality of ourselves, as Rom. viii. 2, 9, 11, 13, 23; 1 Cor. vi. 17, xv. 45; 2 Cor. iii.; Gal. iii. 2, iv. 6; 1 John iii. 24, iv. 13; *cp.* John vii. 38, 39.

Upon this slight sketch of the living depth and com-

His righteousness may be still provisional and unconsummated. But it is a reality, not a fiction, even if an inchoate and provisional reality, in reference to which God pronounces the verdict "righteous." And if He pronounces righteous what was certainly not righteous before; could "making" be excluded from the import of the Divine act of "pronouncing" righteous, even if the word used were verbally limited, with the utmost distinctiveness, to "pronouncing?" But if, further, the word for "pronouncing righteous" has itself a grammatical form which would suggest primarily "making righteous" (although the limitations of human possibility had confined it to "pronouncing" in current human usage,) by what right can we be assured that "making righteous" is still no part of the meaning of the word, when it is used of Him in whom to "pronounce" *is* to "make"? To me it seems impossible for any man to say to how large an extent the underlying suggestiveness of the verbal form in *-όω*, *i.e.* the thought of "making righteous," is, or is not, consciously present, wherever the word is used of God's dealings with man. I doubt whether the consciousness that the word is, in form, "making righteous" is ever wholly absent from the mind of St Paul throughout these chapters; however often it may (possibly) be true that "pronouncing righteous" is nearer to the centre of his overt logic, and therefore, perhaps, more defensible, or secure, as translation. But "pronounce righteous" would not always be applicable as translation; and "justify" only seems to cover the ground better, so far as it still retains some ambiguity, and does not exclude "making righteous" from the form of the expression.

I have said this at the greater length, partly, at least, in defence of my own translation of *δικαιωθῆναι* in the passage quoted above, on p. 330, from the Epist. ad Diognetum. I do not believe that any rendering in English of its final clause would be adequate, which said less than that "the righteousness of One should make many sinners righteous"; which is exactly the assertion of Rom. v. 19.

plexity of the doctrine as it appears in Holy Scripture, it seems obvious to remark that no one with any ordinary modesty, that is with any ordinary insight into truth, would expect to be able to exhaust in thought,—still less to exhaust in simple logical statement,—the whole scope of its truth. A simple logical formula for atonement would be no more probable than a simple logical formula for experience of personality. Of course it does not follow that atonement, any more than personality, is to remain a contradictory or unintelligible conception. On the contrary, intelligence of it, in that insight of experience, which is the highest form of intelligence, is an inherent necessity of human consciousness. Human intelligence, in its higher forms, cannot but be continuously working upon, and towards, the realization of it. And meanwhile every impediment to its intelligence, which human logic has reared, in its perverseness or in its incompetence, must by human logic be tested and done away. To every generation of Christians it must be explained, and be intelligible. But it is not at all probable, *à priori*, that any generation of Christians will exhaust the depth of its significance. And it is not at all surprising if that (almost necessarily) partial conception of it, which is most intelligible to one generation, should fail to match precisely the necessities of the intelligent experience of another. For so profound, and so far back at the root of personal experience, are the essential facts which the word atonement sums up, that the doctrine itself remains, and will remain, something more and truer than the largest and truest explications of it in human imagery and human language. These do reflect it, vitally and really enough, to those whose natural language and imagery they are. But they are less than it, and cannot express it fully to all minds in all times. There is a sense in which every Church period,—there is a sense perhaps in which every Church member,—must find its living interpretation, in his own terms, for himself.

I am tempted to illustrate this matter by a sentence, written on a widely different subject in a paper printed in the *Guardian* of 21st March 1900. "Surely," writes the Dean of Christ Church, "the *De Monarchiâ* illustrates admirably the truth that the connection between arguments and conclusions is apt to be much less, much slenderer, than those who argue think. Most men, and more women, are more reasonable than their reasonings; they stand on stronger ground than they rely on. They

apprehend truth by a hidden complex, subtle, unanalysed process, all the while that they think themselves to be reaching out after it and striving towards it by explicit arguments which are artificial and inconclusive, needing far more support than they can yield." Something like this has been true, of theological, as well as of popular, expositions of the doctrine of Atonement. Probably no generation of Christians has ever really been at fault in its instinctive apprehension of the Atonement,—its essential nature, and its cardinal place, in Christian thought and life. But there have been expositions of it, in many generations, of which other generations have clearly discerned the essentially inconclusive, and, in some cases, untenable character. The current expositions of it have been, in their own setting, and for their own purpose, true, not false. But it has always lain deeper than the current expositions of it.

On the basis of this reflection, which appears to me to rise directly out of any survey of the mode of the presentment of the doctrine in the New Testament, it may be useful to go back a little to the variety of New Testament imagery. Besides all the more direct teaching about it in terms of Sacrifice and Priesthood, (which have, it is to be remembered, their own wonderful vista behind them of age-long teaching, worked in, as it were, to the very life-blood of Israel by ritual and worship, the most immemorial and august); it will be remembered that we distinguished three groups of phrases, by which the work of Christ's Sacrifice, and Christ Himself as the Sacrifice, and the worker of it, are in different passages deliberately described. The first set were mainly vivid metaphors. He was our Redemption, our Ransom, our Deliverance.

Now, as a matter of fact, the chief difficulties about the doctrine of atonement, for many centuries, rose out of the over-technical emphasis which was laid on these three words. If He was our Redemption, from whom did He buy us back? what price did He pay? by what right was the price due? and by what reckoning did it constitute a due equivalent? If He was our Ransom, to whom was the ransom given? If to the devil, what right had the devil to a ransom? or if he had the right to receive a ransom, why not to retain it? how did he accept a ransom which gave him nothing? If to God, in what sense did God hold us captive? or Christ purchase us from God? Again, If He was our Deliverance out of captivity, what

was the nature of the right under which we were held captive? what was the relation of the devil's dominion to God's dominion? and the precise justice or forbearance of God which prevented Him from delivering us by force? Obviously it is easy to multiply questions like these, and obviously they pass very quickly from being inquiries into truth, and become mere entanglements of error. Why so? Because a spiritual truth is expressed under a similitude of physical life; and because the similitude, though really illustrating the spiritual truth in the central point for the sake of which it was used, yet involves certain corollaries in the physical life, to which it cannot be assumed that there are spiritual parallels. Ransom was most familiar to the ancient world. When, at a great cost, Christ won us back from death to life, He did something which was made luminous to the thought of our fathers, by the use of the word ransom. But ransom involves a payment made to some other person: and involves the admission of his power, or his right, or both, to accept—or to refuse—either any ransom at all, or the adequacy of this particular ransom. In these particulars the suggested analogy broke down. And just in so far as these particulars were insisted on, the phrase "ransom," which had been luminous for truth, became a false light, misleading into error. This is to make false use of a true similitude.

So again, to speak of the dominion of darkness and sin and Satan is to speak of what human experience knows to be true. But directly corollaries are drawn from the phrase, and Satan becomes a quasi-independent sovereign, with rights of tenure and possession which it would be an injustice not to respect; the earthly setting of the similitude has been so misused, that truth has been clouded, after all, by a word which was, nevertheless, even obviously, true. In other words, these metaphors are illuminative up to a certain point, but they cannot be pressed into all corollaries.

It may be worth while at this point to draw some express distinction between different sets of phrases which may alike be said to be metaphorical. The same word covers several different things. Most words that are really profound are metaphorical in origin: that is, they begin with a concrete, bodily, and go on to a more abstract and spiritual, sense. Grace is primarily beauty of physical shape. Sin is primarily a missing of a mark. Words of grief or sorrow belong primarily to the physical sensation,

or physical expression, of pain. Father, Son, Spirit: it is obvious that every one of these words has an ordinary earthly significance first, which is pre-supposed, when it is taken over to serve a profounder purpose. It is obvious also that as, in the religious consciousness, the significance of such words deepens, the original physical sense is more and more left behind; even though the two senses of the word, the religious and the physical, may remain in common usage side by side. So obvious is this in the case of a great multitude of phrases, that the mind is no longer, in fact, in the least perplexed, by the scenery or circumstances of the original literalness of the word. It is so with almost all of the words just quoted. The words Father and Son are perhaps a partial exception. But if in the words Father and Son there are contained some ideas which Christian thought has historically had very serious difficulty in eliminating from its use of the words (the idea, most of all, of the necessary posteriority of a son); there are, no doubt, other ideas which have never even presented themselves to Christian thought. It is of some importance to claim even words like these as, in their origin, resemblances borrowed from physical experience. The words would only caricature and degrade spiritual consciousness if their meaning were constantly brought back to the limits of the original physical experience; yet that experience is sufficiently parallel to spiritual consciousness to furnish verbal vehicles for its expression, which are in a rudimentary way from the first, and can be made in Christian usage to become more and more progressively, illuminative of spiritual truth.

But besides such words as sin, and grace, and spirit, the significance of which has been, in fact, indefinitely altered and expanded by spiritual use, there are others which have been spiritually adopted up to a certain point; yet their meaning is rather determined by the earthly, than the spiritual, method of their use. To this class belong words like Ransom, or Rescue from Captivity. (Redemption has perhaps passed out of this class except when its meaning is very closely cross-examined.) And it is because these words remain primarily, after all, words of human circumstance; that minds have been so often perplexed as to the precise amount of human circumstance which is to be introduced into the spiritual significance of the words.

Other phrases there are, also plainly in a sense "meta-

phorical," which may not, at first sight, seem clearly to belong to the one, or the other, of these classes. The phrases which speak of Christ's work of love (or the love of Christians working in the Spirit of Christ) in specific terms of the ritual of sacrifice: the phrase of the third of St John, in which Christ Himself insists, with what strikes us at first as a needless rigour of literalness, upon using precisely the language of natural birth in reference to the spiritual changedness of man's nature in Him: the phrases of the sixth of St John, in which again the permanent relation of the believer to Christ is not allowed to be described in any terms less physically startling than those of eating His flesh and drinking His blood: these are instances in point. If all such language as this is undoubtedly, in a sense, "metaphorical"; yet no one, with the least sense of reverence, or the most superficial power of insight into the spiritual which lies behind, and illumines, and interprets the natural; would dream of supposing that by the use of that adjective he could rid himself of the responsibility, inseparable from spiritual intelligence, of learning to discern the wide sweep, the amazing directness, and the profound depth of its fundamental—we can only say, after all, its literal,—truth.

It would be, of course, outside our present scope to go into these in detail. But it seemed important, while dwelling on the word metaphor, and disowning some misconceptions of atonement which have arisen through failure to recognize the limitations to which metaphor may be liable; that we should guard ourselves against the very appearance of sharing in that extreme superficiality of thought, which would confuse all degrees of metaphor together, or fancy that whatever can be called metaphorical can have only such remote analogy with truth, that it may be, for practical purposes of argument, set aside as unimportant, if not untrue.

There are words which were originally, and are in a sense, metaphorical, in which we can plainly see that it is the original, physical, or "literal" sense, which is but a pale suggestion, a faint analogue, of the truth of their full significance: while the spiritual and so-called "metaphorical" meaning is the supreme and inclusive reality. What is the literal ἁμαρτία to the full meaning of "sin"? or the etymological Θεός or Deus to the ultimate content of the word "God"? Spiritual is far more than physical

"hunger"; and spiritual than merely natural "birth." While to dismiss the Eucharistic mystery as metaphor, though there is a sense in which the word is not verbally untrue, is simply to close up the faculties by which alone all profounder truth is discerned.

But to return. The untenable elements of thought which were often introduced into the theological explanation of the atonement (itself substantially always held in truth) from Origen to Anselm, and from Anselm to Luther, may be broadly said to have arisen out of exaggerated or disproportioned use of such metaphorical phrases as Redemption, Ransom, and Deliverance out of the dominion of Satan. The untenable elements of thought which have been too often characteristic of the atoning theories of popular Protestantism, may be said to have arisen out of a still more mischievous misuse of such phrases as those which constituted our second group, Propitiation, Reconciliation, and Justification. Out of these words have been drawn—perversely enough—the conceptions of an enraged Father, a victimized Son, the unrighteous punishment of the innocent, the unrighteous reward of the guilty, the transfer of innocence and guilt by fictitious imputation, the adroit settlement of an artificial difficulty by an artificial, and strictly irrelevant, transaction.

As to the third group of phrases classified above,—Christ our Justification, our Righteousness, our Sanctification, our Peace, our Life, the indwelling Spiritual reality of ourselves; we shall not indeed have to complain that they have been made the basis for perverse corollaries as to what Christ did in redeeming the world from sin: but rather that, in the attempt to compass in thought what Christ did as Redeemer of the world, they have been strangely allowed to drop out of sight. It is not of course suggested that they have dropped out of sight in all contexts or for all purposes. Yet in no respect probably have they played a part in modern Christian thought at all comparable to their prominence in the New Testament,—that is, in the thought and life of the apostles. And probably one direct reason for their diminished place in general Christian thought will be found to be the fact that they have so well-nigh completely disappeared from their place in the exposition of the doctrine of atonement: and have lost thereby not a little of what would otherwise have

been felt to belong to their own full proportion and significance.

The over-detailed use of the metaphors of the first group, is traced back by Mr Oxenham, in his history of the Catholic doctrine of the Atonement, to Irenæus and Origen. I am not concerned to criticize Mr Oxenham's statement. But it seems to me very easy to exaggerate the place which was really held, in the thought of such writers, by their own exegetical theories or suggestions. Even where a false exegetical theory of atonement has been most dominant, the real vital relation to atonement of personal human experience does not seem to have been generally obscured. And whatever may be traced back to the suggestive words of early Fathers, it would be very difficult to maintain that any false exegetical theory was in any real possession of the field for many generations after Irenæus and Origen. No teacher, perhaps, of varied mind and rich imagination, has had strong hold of any vital truth of experience, which he has not sometimes expounded or illustrated by modes of thought which proved in the end untenable. This is just the sort of thing which seems to be true, in this matter, of Irenæus and Origen. Their essential interpretation is scriptural and true. But they use phrases, in enforcing and illustrating it, which we, in reference to the history of later exaggerations, may not unreasonably feel to be unguarded. The passages quoted by Mr Oxenham from Irenæus amount really to very little. The principal passage is c. Hæreses V. i. It contains indeed one or two phrases, which suggest hard questions, and require explanation; in particular what it was that the "justice" of God required in His dealing with the "apostasy," *i.e.* the kingdom of Satan, or why He showed justice in "buying back" men therefrom without violence,—or what details the "buying" presupposes. But the questions are not asked and answered: still less answered in any crude or offensive form.[1]

[1] "Et quoniam injuste dominabatur nobis apostasia, et cum natura essemus Dei omnipotentis, alienavit nos contra naturam, suos proprios faciens discipulos; potens in omnibus Dei Verbum, et non deficiens in sua justitia, juste etiam adversus ipsam conversus est apostasiam, ea quæ sunt sua redimens ab ea non cum vi, quemadmodum illa initio dominabatur nostri, ea quæ non erant sua insatiabiliter rapiens; sed secundum suadelam, quemadmodum decebat Deum

Meanwhile on the other side it is right to remember that Irenæus has the clearest possible hold of the essential Christian principle that humanity is a corporate whole; that Christ is not an infinitesimal part, but the consummating whole, of humanity: and that, by consequence, Christ's atoning acts were not so much acts done by Him instead of us, as acts which, in His doing them, we all did. The image contained in the word "recapitulatio" is characteristic of his thought. "He summed up in Himself the whole long series of humanity, and so in a single concentrated achievement brought salvation to us, that what we had lost in Adam, *i.e.* to be in the image and likeness of God,—we might regain in Christ Jesus." He says indeed more than this; for in words not unlike those of Athanasius afterwards, he insists that He, the Word, had never been dissevered from the race of mankind. —"Qui et semper aderat generi humano."[1] Thus the Incarnation and its consequences are themselves in line with the inherent connection between the Logos and humanity. "Quando incarnatus est, et homo factus, longam hominum expositionem in se ipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem præstans, ut quod perdideramus in Adam, id est, secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse Dei, hoc in Christo Jesu reciperemus."[2]

Elsewhere, the obedience unto death, and the ascension unto life, are expressly predicated not of Him in contrast with us, but of "our race," of "ourselves." ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ πρώτῳ Ἀδὰμ προσεκόψαμεν, μὴ ποιήσαντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐντολήν· ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ Ἀδὰμ ἀποκατηλλάγημεν, ὑπήκοοι μέχρι θανάτου γενόμενοι.[3] Here the parallelism with Adam is complete: and "we" were obedient unto death in Christ, as vitally and as really as we sinned in Adam.

So again "It is for this that the Lord confesses Himself the Son of Man, summing up again into Himself that original man, out of whom the whole propagation by

suadentem, et non vim inferentem, accipere quæ vellet; ut neque quod est justum confringeretur, neque antiqua plasmatio Dei deperiret." V. i. 1. In the 21st chapter, Mr Oxenham seems to me to introduce, in his English translation, a definiteness of imagery which is wanting in the Latin. "The 'price' of our disobedience in Adam was paid by Christ's obedience" is a far more commercial statement than "soluta est ea . . . prævaricatio." "Price" is the really emphatic word; and there is no such word in the Latin at all. "Was cancelled," or simply "was done away," would probably represent "soluta est" better. Compare the previous uses of "dissoluta est" in the same chapter.

[1] *Cp.* the Athanasian οὗτι γε μακρὰν ὢν πρότερον, *infra*, *p.* 349.

[2] c. Hær., III. xviii. 1. [3] c. Hær., V. xvi. 3.

woman came; that as, through man conquered, our whole race went down into death, so, through man conquering, we might ascend unto life." "Propter hoc et Dominus semetipsum Filium hominis confitetur, principalem hominem illum ex quo ea quæ secundum mulierem est plasmatio facta est in semetipsum recapitulans; uti quemadmodum per hominem victum descendit in mortem genus nostrum, sic iterum per hominem victorem ascendamus in vitam."[1]

It is in the light of these utterances, and as a climax to them, that I would finally point to the conclusion of that very passage which was just now referred to as raising, no doubt, questions of perplexity. Here it is taught most explicitly that the real outcome of God's identification with man in the Person of the Incarnate, is the real union and communion of man with God,—God by the Spirit condescending to man, that man by the Incarnation might be brought to God; and that the method of the realization of this union and communion, in which alone the work of recovery is complete, is the outpouring of the Spirit of the Father. "Suo igitur sanguine redimente nos Domino, et dante animam suam pro nostra anima et carnem suam pro nostris carnibus (*τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν καὶ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀντὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων σαρκῶν*), et effundente Spiritum Patris in adunitionem et communionem Dei et hominis, ad homines quidem deponente Deum per Spiritum, ad Deum autem rursus imponente hominem per suam incarnationem, et firme et vere in adventu suo donante nobis incorruptelam per communionem quæ est ad eum."[2]

Such teaching as this, strong and positive and clear, is not really affected by the use of one or two phrases, in another direction, of ambiguous, or even, (if any one chooses to think so,) of indefensible meaning.

Origen goes, no doubt, somewhat further than Irenæus. On this,—as on many other subjects,—he expresses himself rather with freedom and force, than with any extreme guardedness of thought or phrase. But here too it is easy to exaggerate his meaning. Or rather here too it is clear, that however little we may defend, in all cases, the way in which he puts it, his essential meaning is true, alike to scripture and to experience. Such ideas as a deception of Satan, practised by God, are really foreign to the essence of his thought. It is no part of the present purpose to scrutinize closely such expressions. They are

[1] c. Hær., V. xxi. 1, [2] c. Hær., V. i. 1,

there of course. But it may be doubted whether they carried, to Origen or his readers, a picture at all so definite as they carry to us. And it is worth while, on the other hand, to notice how clearly many elements of a very different conception of atonement are all the while insisted on by Origen.

Notice first that whatever His death involved or meant it was His own act. He was not given up to die by the Father any more than by Himself. Thus after quoting Rom. viii. 32, "He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all," Origen adds: '*ἔδωκε δὲ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἑαυτὸν εἰς θάνατον, ὥστε οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ παρεδόθη.*'[1]

Secondly, the offering of His life to death is expressly spoken of as a valuable price, given as purchase-money for the souls of men. *ἄνθρωπος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν δώῃ τι ἀντάλλαγμα τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ, Θεὸς δὲ τῶν πάντων ἡμῶν ψυχῆς ἀντάλλαγμα ἔδωκε τὸ τίμιον αἷμα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, καθ' ὃ τιμῆς ἠγοράσθημεν, οὐ φθαρτοῖς ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ ἀπολυτρωθέντες, ἀλλὰ τιμίῳ αἵματι, ὡς ἄμνου ἀμώμου καὶ ἀσπίλου Χριστοῦ.*[2] This of course is strictly scriptural. But as to the meaning it bore to the mind of Origen, notice,

Thirdly, that this suffering of His is not, in strictness of thought, so much a vicarious suffering, that we might not suffer, as an enabling suffering, that we might be able to suffer in one way and not in another,—with one spirit and meaning, and not with another,—accepting suffering as salutary discipline, not enduring it as vengeance.

"He gave His back to the scourges, and His cheeks to the hands of the smiters, He hid not His face from the shame of spitting, that, as I suppose, He might deliver us who had deserved to suffer all these infamies, suffering them Himself for us. For He did not die in order that we may not die, but that we may not die for ourselves; and He was stricken and spat upon for us, in order that we, who had really deserved these things, may not have to suffer them as a return for our sins, but suffering them instead for righteousness' sake, may receive them with gladness of heart."[3]

[1] In Mat. Tom. xiii. 8, Vol. III. p. 580.

[2] 1 Pet. i. 18, with 1 Cor. vi. 20. In Mat. Tom. xii. 28, Vol. III. p. 546.

[3] Non enim mortuus est pro nobis, ut nos non moriamur, sed ut pro nobis non moriamur; et alapis cæsus est pro nobis, et exputus est, ut ne nos, qui digni fueramus omnibus his, propter nostra peccata patiamur ea, sed ut pro justitia patientes ea gratanter excipiamus. In Mat. Comment., series 113, Vol. III. p. 912. al. Tract. xxxv.

Fourthly, notice that death itself, so far from being the ultimate expression of punishment, is expressive rather of the precise opposite. It expresses the voluntary penance which cleanses from sin, as contrasted with the curse which seals the damnation of sin. This thought puts at once a new meaning upon the blood of Christ as the purchase of our souls.

"It remains to be shown that to possess sin, and have it in oneself, is a far graver thing than to receive the penalty of death. Death inflicted for sin is a purging of the sin for which it is commanded to be inflicted. The sin, then, is absolved in the penalty of death, nor is anything left, so far as that guilt is concerned, for the judgment day or the pain of eternal fire. But when any one is made to possess his sin, he carries it about with him, and it makes its abode in him; the penalty that has never been inflicted has never been, by infliction, done away; it is with the man even after death; and he who has not paid the penalty in time pays it in eternity. You see how far heavier it is to possess one's sin, than to suffer the penalty of death. . . . So now if there be any one of us who recalls in himself the consciousness of sin, . . . let him fly to penitence, and accept a voluntary doing to death of the flesh, that, cleansed from sin during this present life, our spirit may find its way, clean and pure, to Christ."[1]

This express recognition even of death inflicted for sin, as having the character rather of penance than penalty; as a means, not an end; as a method to life, not a consummation of death: and at the same time, of the intimate connection between this its morally regenerating power, and what is to be after all, on analysis, its essentially self-chosen character, a voluntary self-surrender to the extreme self-contradiction of penitence; is, in all ways, most suggestive.

In context, then, with these thoughts, and as interpreted by them, notice, Fifthly, that the death which He suffered is spoken of as the chastisement or discipline which was due to us—not for our destruction, but for our instruction, not that we might be made an appalling example, but that we might be able to receive peace. Such a death,—so righteously humble, obedient, voluntary, was the abolition, not the consummation, of judgment. "So it was that He took our sins and was bruised for our iniquities, and the chastisement which was owing to us that we might be

[1] In Levit. Hom. xiv. 4, Vol. II. p. 269.

instructed and receive peace fell upon him;[1] for this is how I understand 'the chastisement of our peace was upon Him.' . . . So in His humiliation, wherewith He humbled Himself, being made obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross, the judgment was taken away; for this is how I understand 'In His humiliation His judgment was taken away.'"[2]

And finally, notice that with Origen, as with the others, and as with St Paul, we corporately do what Christ did for us, being fashioned into reality of partnership alike with His death, and with His resurrection: the result being our own personal walking in newness of life, because of the light of God, which thereby has risen upon us. It is a real emancipation, from darkness and slavery, into life.

Ὅτε γὰρ σύμμορφοι γινόμεθα τῷ θανάτῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, οὐκέτι ἐσμὲν ὑπὸ τοὺς δεσμοὺς τῶν ὡς ἀποδεδώκαμεν βασιλέων τῆς γῆς, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τὸν λόγον τῶν κατὰ τοῦ Κυρίου συναχθέντων ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Πατὴρ τοῦ ἰδίου Υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν πάντων παρέδωκεν αὐτὸν, ἵν' οἱ παραλαβόντες αὐτὸν καὶ παραδόντες αὐτὸν εἰς χεῖρας ἀνθρώπων, ὑπὸ τοῦ κατοικήσαντος ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς ἐγγελασθῶσι, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου ἐκμυκτηρισθῶσιν, εἰς κατάλυσιν τῆς ἰδίας βασιλείας καὶ ἀρχῆς παρὰ προσδοκίαν παραλαβόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν, ὅστις τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἠγέρθη, τῷ τὸν ἐχθρὸν αὐτοῦ θάνατον κατηργηκέναι, καὶ ἡμᾶς πεποιηκέναι συμμόρφους, οὐ μόνον τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως, δι' ὃν ἐν καινότητι τῆς ζωῆς περιπατοῦμεν, οὐκέτι καθεζόμενοι ἐν χώρᾳ καὶ σκίᾳ θανάτου, διὰ τὸ ἀνατεῖλαν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς φῶς τοῦ Θεοῦ.[3]

We have lingered, perhaps a little unnecessarily, upon these words of Irenæus and Origen, because it is to Irenæus and Origen that the first introduction has been referred of conceptions which rather obscured, than illuminated, the intelligence of the vital truth of the Atonement. It is not probable that the thought either of Irenæus, or even of Origen, was greatly dominated by such conceptions. But how little way any such conceptions really went in the direction of obscuring—even if they found place in over-logical attempts to elucidate—the essential doctrine, or the essential hold of Catholic theology upon it, may perhaps be made clearer, if, without any attempt to follow more precisely the course of the history, we pass from

[1] In Joann. Tom. xxviii. 14, Vol. IV. p. 393.

[2] *Ἡ ὀφειλομένη ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ παιδευθῆναι καὶ εἰρήνην ἀναλαβεῖν κόλασις ἐπ' αὐτὸν γεγένηται. κόλασις* not *ποίνη*, discipline, not vengeance, as Mr Oxenham remarks.

[3] In Mat. Tom. xiii. Vol. III. p. 583.

Irenæus and Origen to the writings of Athanasius. For though Athanasius did not write a formal treatise on the doctrine of atonement, yet his teaching on the subject comes out, with the greatest spontaneity and freshness, in his exposition of the Incarnation, and his vindication of its true purpose and meaning, amid the stress of Arian controversy. From the teaching of Athanasius it is abundantly clear that at least in, and to the middle of, the fourth century of our era, there were no real obscurities or perversions which could be said to be attached, with anything like either official sanction, or general popular acceptance, to the view of the doctrine of atonement in the Catholic Church.

The following are the points which seem to emerge in the Athanasian thought upon the subject.

First there is the inherent connection between the Redeemer and His creation which He came to redeem. The relationship of created man to God, the eternal Logos, did not begin in the fact of the Incarnation; but the fact of the Incarnation grew, as it were naturally, out of it. As in the Person of the Eternal Logos God created man, so by inherent aptness, it was in the Person of the Eternal Logos that God restored man to life.

Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνάντιον φανήσεται, εἰ δι' οὗ ταύτην ἐδημιούργησεν ὁ Πατὴρ, ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν ταύτης σωτηρίαν εἰργάσατο.[1]

The human race was made 'λογικὸν' in the image of the Logos of God. Κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνα ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς, μεταδοὺς αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἰδίου Λόγου δυνάμεως, ἵνα ὥσπερ σκιάς τινας ἔχοντες τοῦ Λόγου καὶ γενόμενοι λογικοὶ . . . etc.[2]

He, the Logos, was never really separate from the human race: nor could the love of the Creator leave His creation to be obliterated, and as it were stultified, in the ruin of sin.

Τούτου δὴ ἕνεκεν ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἄϋλος τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος παραγίνεται εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν χώραν, οὔτι γε μακρὰν ὢν πρότερον. Οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ κενὸν ὑπολέλειπται τῆς κτίσεως μέρος· πάντα δὲ διὰ πάντων πεπλήρωκεν αὐτὸς συνὼν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ Πατρί. Ἀλλὰ παραγίνεται συγκαταβαίνων τῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ φιλανθρωπίᾳ καὶ ἐπιφανείᾳ. καὶ ἰδὼν τὸ λογικὸν ἀπολλύμενον γένος, καὶ τὸν θάνατον κατ' αὐτοῦ βασιλεύοντα τῇ φθορᾷ· ὁρῶν δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπειλὴν τῆς παραβάσεως διακρατοῦσαν τὴν καθ' ἡμῶν φθοράν, καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον ἦν πρὸ τοῦ πληρωθῆναι τὸν νόμον λυθῆναι, ὁρῶν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἁρπεὲς ἐν τῷ συμβεβηκότι, ὅτι ὢν αὐτὸς ἦν δημιοῦργος, ταῦτα παρηφανίζετο, etc.[3]

This kinship of the human mind or soul with the Logos,

[1] De Inc. ii. [2] De Inc. iii. [3] De Inc. viii.

was not only a past fact, which moved the compassion of the Logos to save: it was also the capacity in man of being saved—that is of receiving, and being made like to, God.

Ὡς γὰρ Λόγου ὄντος τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰκὼν ἐστιν ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος, οὕτως ὄντος αὐτοῦ Σοφίας εἰκὼν πάλιν ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν γενομένη σοφία· ἐν ᾗ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἔχοντες, δεκτικοὶ γινόμεθα τῆς δημιούργου Σοφίας, καὶ δι' αὐτῆς γινώσκειν δυνάμεθα τὸν αὐτῆς Πατέρα· 'Ὁ γὰρ ἔχων', φησὶ, 'τὸν Υἱὸν, ἔχει καὶ τὸν Πατέρα.' καὶ, 'ὁ δεχόμενός με, δέχεται τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με.'[1]

It will be observed that whilst it is unbefitting to God (*ἀπρεπές*) that man should perish, it was an impossible idea (*ἄτοπον ἦν*) that he should be simply released, till the law was fulfilled. Why was this an impossible idea? The word "threat" (*ἀπειλή*) seems to suggest the thought that it was because God had once said that the sinner should die, and His word could not be stultified. This thought, which no doubt is true, even if it does not carry our understanding very far, is expressed clearly in the previous chapter. But something more is implied, though it is less clearly expressed, in the disclaimer of the adequacy of penitence to compensate for sin, when sin has once for all spoiled the capacities of the nature. We might possibly have preferred a denial of the possibility of restorative penitence, under the condition of fallenness, to a denial of its adequacy—if only it had been possible; but in any case the passage, while formally emphasizing the necessity of God's consistency, points really to an inherent, as opposed to an arbitrary, impossibility of any off-hand mode of human restoration.

"What then was to happen? or what ought God to have done? To ask of men a repentance which should match the transgression? This might be said perhaps to be worthy of God, that as transgression brought mankind to corruption, so repentance should bring them back to incorruptibleness. But neither could God accept repentance equitably (for He would not have been found true if man had not come into the power of death), nor is repentance a recovery from a tainted nature, it is only a surceasing from sin. Had there been but one act of discord, with no consequent corruption of nature, repentance might have been well enough. But if the direct result of the transgression was that man's nature was corrupt and shorn of the grace which belongs to being in the image of God, what could still be done? Or what or who was required for the grace of

[1] c. Ar. ii. 78.

such a recovery, save the Logos of God who Himself in the beginning made all things of nothing? Only He could bring the corrupt to incorruption again, and yet preserve the equity of the Father's government. Just because He was the Logos of the Father, and supreme over all, therefore only He had power to renew His creation; only He sufficed to suffer on behalf of all, and to be the ambassador for all before the Father."[1]

In chapter xx. death is spoken of as a necessity—a debt that was "due." There is no attempt to analyze the necessity, or follow up, in any way, the metaphorical word "debt." Neither is there any inquiry into the character of the death that is due, whether it is the actual death of the body, or a penal death of the soul, nor any comment upon the relation between these two.[2] But the death which is owed is the death of all mankind: and therefore it is that He, who alone, as the author of being, could change corruptibleness into incorruption; He, who alone, as the very image of the Father, could restamp God's image on man; He, who alone, as the very life (*αὐτοζωή*) could make dying man immortal; He, who alone, as the all ordering Logos and only begotten Son, could teach man the real service of the Father; "offered the sacrifice on behalf of all, giving up to death in the stead of all, that humanity which

[1] *Τί οὖν ἔδει καὶ περὶ τούτου γενέσθαι ἢ ποιῆσαι τὸν Θεόν; μετάνοιαν ἐπὶ τῇ παραβάσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαιτῆσαι; Τοῦτο γὰρ ἂν τις ἄξιον φήσειεν Θεοῦ, λέγων, ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς παραβάσεως εἰς φθορὰν γεγόνασιν, οὕτως ἐκ τῆς μετανοίας γένοιντο πάλιν ἂν εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν. Ἀλλ' ἡ μετάνοια οὔτε τὸ εὔλογον τὸ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἐφύλαττεν (ἔμενε γὰρ πάλιν οὐκ ἀληθὴς, μὴ κρατουμένων ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων)· οὔτε δὲ ἡ μετάνοια ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνακαλεῖται, ἀλλὰ μόνον παύει τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μόνον ἦν πλημμέλημα καὶ μὴ φθορᾶς ἐπακολούθησις, καλῶς ἂν ἦν ἡ μετάνοια. Εἰ δὲ ἅπαξ προλαβούσης τῆς παραβάσεως, εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν φθορὰν ἐκρατοῦντο οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ τὴν τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα χάριν ἀφαιρεθέντες ἦσαν, τί ἄλλο ἔδει γενέσθαι; ἢ τίνος ἦν χρεία πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην χάριν καὶ ἀνάκλησιν, ἢ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πεποιηκότος τὰ ὅλα τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου; Αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἦν πάλιν καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν ἐνεγκεῖν, καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων εὔλογον ἀποσῶσαι πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα. Λόγος γὰρ ὢν τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντας ὤν, ἀκολούθως καὶ ἀνακτίσαι τὰ ὅλα μόνος ἦν δυνατὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων παθεῖν καὶ πρεσβεῦσαι περὶ πάντων ἱκανὸς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα.* De Inc., vii.

[2] It may be said, however, in the light of the 27th chapter, that the death from which men are delivered neither is, nor is not, the natural death of the body, regarded *simpliciter* in itself. Rather it is the death of the body in respect of that character and meaning which it would have had if Christ had not died. The physical fact of death indeed remains. But its meaning is transformed. The horror is gone out of it. Death is now a weak thing. It is dead. *οὕτως ἀσθενὴς γέγονε, ὡς καὶ γυναῖκας τὰς ἀπατηθείσας τὸ πρὶν παρ' αὐτοῦ, νῦν παίζειν αὐτὸν ὡς νεκρὸν καὶ παρειμένον.* Death was once a fierce tyrant. But death was bound tight hand and foot, by the victory, through dying, of Christ; and all now who in Christ pass through death can mock at his fears. "O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?"

was the shrine of Himself, that He might liberate all from the old transgression, and, proving Himself to be too strong even for death, might show, in the unscathed incorruptness of His own body, the first fruits of the resurrection of all."[1]

It will be observed that the thought of this passage emphatically recognizes two things. On the one side there is a perfectly unique possibility in the Son of God, of representing all mankind, and dying as the representative of all; a possibility which, if it rests in one direction on the verity of His manhood, rests no less on His being the Logos who was with God, and was God,—the Life of Life, the Image of the Father, the Creator of all created being; a possibility, therefore, which cannot even be conceived on any other side, or in any other person. And on the other hand, whatever possible obscurity there may be about the precise analysis of such words as debt, or necessity, or death, it is perfectly clear that the purpose and the result of this sacrifice of Christ's death, were to be, and were, the universal human conquest over death, in the universal emancipation of man from sin. This death meant a transformation of human liability, because of human character, far deeper and more real than could be expressed in any terms of a change of feeling on the side of God, a mere willingness to forego punishment, or pardon those who were not made capable of pardon.

Why could not God redeem man by a word of command, in power? Simply because such a command-word would not have had the effect which was required. What was required was a change, not so much in the treatment of man, as in man's deserving. It was not his freedom from punishment but his freedom from sin: it was not an external change but a change within himself, which was really to be brought about. God's change in purpose, or remission of penalty, would simply have failed to do what needed to be done.

"The equity of what was done may be recognised thus: if the curse had been removed by a word of power there

[1] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀφειλόμενον παρὰ πάντων ἔδει λοιπὸν ἀποδοθῆναι· ὠφείλετο γὰρ πάντας, ὡς προεῖπον, ἀποθανεῖν, δι' ὃ μάλιστα καὶ ἐπεδήμησεν· τούτου ἕνεκεν μετὰ τὰς περὶ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀποδείξεις, ἤδη λοιπὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων τὴν θυσίαν ἀνέφερεν, ἀντὶ πάντων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν εἰς θάνατον παραδιδοὺς, ἵνα τοὺς μὲν πάντας ἀνυπευθύνους καὶ ἐλευθέρους τῆς ἀρχαίας παραβάσεως ποιήσῃ· δείξῃ δὲ ἑαυτὸν καὶ θανάτου κρείττονα, ἀπαρχὴν τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀναστάσεως τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα ἄφθαρτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος . . . θανάτου γὰρ ἦν χρεία, καὶ θάνατον ὑπὲρ πάντων ἔδει γενέσθαι, ἵνα τὸ παρὰ πάντων ὀφειλόμενον γένηται. De Inc. xx.

would have been indeed a manifestation of the power of God's word; but man would only have been (as Adam was before the fall) a recipient from without, of grace which had no real place within his person; for this was how he stood in Paradise. Or rather he would have been worse off than this, inasmuch as he had already learned to disobey. If, under these conditions, he had again been persuaded by the serpent, God would have had again to undo the curse by a word of command; and so the need would have gone on for ever, and men would never have got away one whit from the liability of the service of sin; but for ever sinning they would for ever have needed to be pardoned, and would never have become really free, being flesh for ever themselves, and for ever falling short of the law because of the weakness of the flesh."[1]

What was really needed was that humanity itself, the humanity of all mankind, should again become divine, and capable of the holiness of God. Nor could anything short of the personal holiness of God in human nature effect this reunion of the human with the divine; and so really bring man back—not from the curse only, regarded as separable from sin, but from the curse which *is* sin, and therefore is death, to the life which *is* life.

"Again, if the Son had been a creature only, man would in no way have been rescued from death, not being united with God. For a creature cannot unite creatures with God, itself needing to be united; nor could a part of creation, itself needing to be saved, be the saving of creation. To avoid this He sent His own Son, who took created flesh, and became Son of Man; that, when all were within the danger of death, He, being other than all, Himself for all might offer His own body to death; and thenceforth, since through Him all died, the word of the sentence on man might be fulfilled (for 'in Christ all died'); and yet all might through Him be made free from sin and the curse

[1] Πλὴν καὶ τὸ εὔλογον τοῦ γενομένου θεωρεῖν ἔξεστιν ἐντεῦθεν· εἰ διὰ τὸ δυνατὸν εἰρῆκει, καὶ ἐλέλυτο ἡ κατάρα, τοῦ μὲν κελεύσαντος ἡ δύναμις ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὁ μέντοι ἄνθρωπος τοιοῦτος ἐγίνετο, οἷος ἦν καὶ ὁ Ἀδὰμ πρὸ τῆς παραβάσεως, ἔξωθεν λαβὼν τὴν χάριν, καὶ μὴ συνηρμοσμένην ἔχων αὐτὴν τῷ σώματι· τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὢν καὶ τότε τέθειτο ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ τάχα δὲ καὶ χείρων ἐγίνετο, ὅτι καὶ παραβαίνειν μεμάθηκεν. Ὢν τοίνυν τοιοῦτος, εἰ καὶ παρεπέπειστο ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄφεως, ἐγίνετο πάλιν χρεία προστάξαι τὸν Θεὸν καὶ λῦσαι τὴν κατάραν· καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον ἐγίνετο ἡ χρεία, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἔμενον ὑπεύθυνοι, δουλεύοντες τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ· ἀεὶ δὲ ἁμαρτάνοντες, ἀεὶ ἐδέοντο τοῦ συγχωροῦντος, καὶ οὐδέποτε ἠλευθεροῦντο, σάρκες ὄντες καθ' ἑαυτοὺς, καὶ ἀεὶ ἡττώμενοι τῷ νόμῳ διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός. c. Ar. ii. 68.

upon sin, and remain for ever truly alive from the dead and clothed in immortality and incorruption."[1]

"The Word became flesh that man might be capable of receiving God."[2] "He was made human that we might be made divine."[3] These are brief phrases which summarize the very essence of the thought.

Had He been less than very God, or taken less than the very reality of man, this union, for which He was Incarnate, could never have been complete.

"Never would man have been made divine by union with a creature, had the Son not been very God; never would man have stood at the Father's right hand, had He who put on flesh not been, in essential nature, His very Logos. And just as we should not have been set free from sin and its curse, had it not been, in essential nature, human flesh which the Logos took (for we should have been untouched by what was none of ours); so would man not have been made divine, had He who became flesh not been, by essential nature, from the Father—His own, and His very Logos. Therefore the union was on this wise—to make one the essentially human with Him who belonged to the essence of Deity, that so man's salvation and deification might be sure."[4]

What was needed then, was no plausible excuse for going back upon, nor artificial appearance of avoiding the necessity of going back upon, a word which had once been pledged. The question was not how man, though sinful,

[1] Πάλιν τε εἰ κτίσμα ἦν ὁ Υἱὸς, ἔμενεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲν ἧττον θνητὸς, μὴ συναπτόμενος τῷ Θεῷ· οὐ γὰρ κτίσμα συνῆπτε τὰ κτίσματα τῷ Θεῷ, ζητοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸν συνάπτοντα· οὐδὲ τὸ μέρος τῆς κτίσεως σωτηρία τῆς κτίσεως ἂν εἴη, δεόμενον καὶ αὐτὸ σωτηρίας· ἵνα οὖν μηδὲ τοῦτο γένηται, πέμπει τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν, καὶ γίνεται υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὴν κτιστὴν σάρκα λαβών ἵν', ἐπειδὴ πάντες εἰσὶν ὑπεύθυνοι τῷ θανάτῳ, ἄλλος ὢν τῶν πάντων, αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ πάντων τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα τῷ θανάτῳ προσενέγκῃ, καὶ λοιπὸν, ὡς πάντων δι' αὐτοῦ ἀποθανόντων, ὁ μὲν λόγος τῆς ἀπυφάσεως πληρωθῇ ('πάντες γὰρ ἀπέθανον ἐν Χριστῷ')· πάντες δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ γένωνται λοιπὸν ἐλεύθεροι μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τῆς δι' αὐτὴν κατάρας, ἀληθῶς δὲ διαμείνωσιν εἰσαεὶ ἀναστάντες ἐκ νεκρῶν, καὶ ἀθανασίαν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν ἐνδυσάμενοι. c. Ar. ii. 69.

[2] Ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, ἵνα τὸν ἄνθρωπον δεκτικὸν Θεότητος ποιήσῃ. c. Ar. ii. 59.

[3] Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς Θεοποιηθῶμεν. De Inc. liv.

[4] Οὐκ ἂν δὲ πάλιν ἐθεοποιήθη κτίσματι συναφθεὶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὴ Θεὸς ἦν ἀληθινὸς ὁ Υἱός· καὶ οὐκ ἂν παρέστη τῷ Πατρὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὴ φύσει καὶ ἀληθινὸς ἦν αὐτοῦ Λόγος ὁ ἐνδυσάμενος τὸ σῶμα. Καὶ ὥσπερ οὐκ ἂν ἠλευθερώθημεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τῆς κατάρας, εἰ μὴ φύσει σὰρξ ἦν ἀνθρωπίνη, ἣν ἐνεδύσατο ὁ Λόγος· (οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ἦν ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον·) οὕτως οὐκ ἂν ἐθεοποιήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὴ φύσει ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ ἀληθινὸς καὶ ἴδιος αὐτοῦ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, ὁ γενόμενος σάρξ. Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τοιαύτη γέγονεν ἡ συναφὴ, ἵνα τῷ κατὰ φύσιν τῆς θεότητος συνάψῃ τὸν φύσει ἄνθρωπον, καὶ βεβαία γένηται ἡ σωτηρία καὶ ἡ θεοποίησις αὐτοῦ. c. Ar. ii. 70.

might be treated, but how he could be brought out of being sinful. And Athanasius clearly feels that death is so inherently inseparable from sin, that the sinful cannot become sinless except through a process of dying. It was the reality of the human nature of the Logos, or (on the other side) it was the reality of the indwelling of the Logos in human nature, which constituted the possibility in and for human nature, of so dying as really to conquer, and recover from, sin. So much as this seems clearly to be insisted upon by Athanasius, even though he makes no attempt to analyze what it was in this unique, and uniquely possible, dying which constituted the conquest over, and recovery from, sin. That process of dying, which alone could eliminate sin, would itself have been impossible—it would have involved utter destruction—to anything less than the very Life of God; but when it was by the inherent Life of God, in the Person of Christ, outlived and overborne, the fact of having lived through the passage and process of dying became the capacity, in all humanity, of the life of the holiness of God.

"For the Logos, when He saw that there could be no escape for men from destruction without actually dying; yet the Logos, being the Son of the Father and incapable of death, could not die; He therefore took to Himself a body which could die; that this, being the body of the Logos who is over all, might satisfy death for all, and yet by virtue of the indwelling Logos might remain itself imperishable, and so destruction might be averted from all by the grace of the resurrection. Thus it is that, offering to death the body which He had taken to be His own, as a sacrificial victim without flaw or stain, He abolished death at a stroke from his fellowmen by the offering of that which stood for all. For being, over all, the Logos of God, when He offered, as a substitute for all, that body which was the very shrine of Himself, He justly fulfilled all that was owing in death. And so the imperishable Son of God, being one in mortal nature with all, justly clothed all with immortality, in the proclamation of the resurrection. For the destruction which belongs to death has now no more place against men, because of the Logos who indwells, through the one body, in them."[1]

[1] Ξυνιδὼν γὰρ ὁ Λόγος, ὅτι ἄλλως οὐκ ἂν λυθείη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ φθορὰ, εἰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ πάντως ἀποθανεῖν, οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ ἦν τὸν Λόγον ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς Υἱὸν, τούτου ἕνεκεν τὸ δυνάμενον ἀποθανεῖν ἑαυτῷ λαμβάνει σῶμα, ἵνα τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων Λόγου μεταλαβὸν, ἀντὶ πάντων ἱκανὸν γένηται

Here such phrases as His death sufficing in the stead of all (*ἀντὶ πάντων*) or being the offering of an equivalent (*τῇ προσφορᾷ τοῦ καταλλήλου*), which obviously express truth up to a certain point, are in no way pressed out of their proportion. Their suggestive metaphorical language is not allowed to be pushed (as in later thought it so often came to be) to the distortion, or exclusion, of the central thought. His death is not a mere alien thing of value, an 'equivalent' substituted for the death of men. But it is, potentially at least, the death of all men: for in Him all died. The very next sentence goes on to emphasize this thought by the illustration of a king who is said to live in a great city, because he lives in a single house within it; an illustration which, whatever may be thought of it as an illustration, plainly marks a serious attempt to explain how God Incarnate was in all men, not only in one.

But this thought is very far from depending upon a single imperfect illustration. There is nothing which is more central to the teaching of Athanasius upon the whole subject. His death, His resurrection, His exaltation, His consecration, whatsoever He is said to have received—all were corporate and representative, not individual or separate. These things only happened to Him that, in Him, they might be true of us. It was not He, it was we, who needed these things. For us they happened to Him. They are ultimately ours even more than they are His. Whatever His death really signified or effected (which is the point least analyzed by Athanasius), His death was our death, as truly as the correlative resurrection is our resurrection.

"Since then—Himself deathless, as the Image of the Father—the Logos took the form of a servant, and in His own flesh as man underwent death on our account, that through death He might present Himself to the Father for us: therefore on our account, and for our sakes, He is also said to be 'highly exalted' as

τῷ θανάτῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸν ἐνοικήσαντα Λόγον ἄφθαρτον διαμείνῃ, καὶ λοιπὸν ἀπὸ πάντων ἡ φθορὰ παύσηται τῇ τῆς ἀναστάσεως χάριτι· ὅθεν ὡς ἱερεῖον καὶ θῦμα παντὸς ἐλεύθερον σπίλου, ὃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἔλαβε σῶμα προσάγων εἰς θάνατον, ἀπὸ πάντων εὐθὺς τῶν ὁμοίων ἠφάνιζε τὸν θάνατον τῇ προσφορᾷ τοῦ καταλλήλου. Ὑπὲρ πάντας γὰρ ὢν ὁ Λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰκότως τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν καὶ τὸ σωματικὸν ὄργανον προσάγων ἀντίψυχον ὑπὲρ πάντων, ἐπλήρου τὸ ὀφειλόμενον ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ· καὶ οὕτως συνὼν διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁ ἄφθαρτος τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς εἰκότως τοὺς πάντας ἐνέδυσεν ἀφθαρσίαν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐπαγγελίᾳ. Καὶ αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ φθορὰ κατὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐκέτι χώραν ἔχει διὰ τὸν ἐνοικήσαντα Λόγον ἐν τούτοις διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς σώματος. De Inc. ix.

man; that as by His death we, in Christ, all died, so we should also in Christ be highly exalted, rising from the dead, and entering into the heavens 'whither as a forerunner Jesus entered for us,' etc. [Heb. vi. 20]. . . . But if at this time, for our sakes, Christ entered into the very heaven, who Himself was before, and for ever, Lord and Maker of the heavens, it follows that it is for us that He is described as 'exalted' now. And just as when He sanctifies all, He says to the Father that He 'sanctifies Himself for our sakes,' not that the Logos may be sanctified, but that He may in Himself sanctify us; so is the 'highly exalted Him' of this present passage, not that He may Himself be exalted highly—for He is the Highest—but that He for our sakes may be made righteousness, and we in Him be exalted, and come into the gates of the heavens. . . . So again it was not to Him that the gates were shut, who was Lord and Creator of all, but this too was written for us, on whom the door of Paradise was shut. . . . It was this exaltation in relation to *us* which the Spirit foretold in the 88th Psalm: 'In Thy righteousness shall they be exalted, for Thou art the glory of their strength' [Ps. lxxxix. 17–18]. But if the Son is righteousness, it follows that it is not He who is exalted, as if He lacked anything, but it is we who are exalted in the righteousness which He is."[1]

Christ is corporately and inclusively man, just as Adam was corporately and inclusively man: only the method of the corporate relation is different, and its effect is opposite.

[1] Ἐπεὶ οὖν εἰκὼν ὢν τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ ἀθάνατος ὢν ὁ Λόγος ἔλαβε τὴν τοῦ δούλου μορφήν,' καὶ ὑπέμεινε δι' ἡμᾶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ σαρκὶ τὸν θάνατον, ἵν' οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν διὰ τοῦ θανάτου προσενέγκῃ τῷ Πατρί· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λέγεται ὑπερυψοῦσθαι, ἵν' ὥσπερ τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ πάντες ἡμεῖς ἀπεθάνομεν ἐν Χριστῷ, οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Χριστῷ πάλιν ἡμεῖς ὑπερυψωθῶμεν, ἐκ τε τῶν νεκρῶν ἐγειρόμενοι, καὶ εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀνερχόμενοι, 'ἔνθα πρόδρομος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν εἰσῆλθεν Ἰησοῦς,' κ.τ.λ. . . . Εἰ δὲ νῦν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Χριστὸς, καίτοι καὶ πρὸ τούτου καὶ ἀεὶ Κύριος ὢν καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν οὐρανῶν, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ὑψωθῆναι νῦν γέγραπται. Καὶ ὥσπερ αὐτὸς πάντας ἁγιάζων λέγει πάλιν τῷ Πατρὶ 'ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁγιάζειν,' οὐχ ἵνα ἅγιος ὁ Λόγος γένηται, ἀλλ' ἵνα αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἁγιάσῃ πάντας ἡμᾶς· οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον 'ὑπερύψωσεν αὐτὸν,' οὐχ ἵνα αὐτὸς ὑψωθῇ· ὕψιστος γάρ ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ἵνα αὐτὸς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν 'δικαιοσύνη γένηται,' ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑψωθῶμεν ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰς τὰς πύλας εἰσέλθωμεν τῶν οὐρανῶν. . . . Καὶ ὧδε γὰρ οὐκ αὐτῷ ἦσαν αἱ πύλαι κεκλεισμέναι Κυρίῳ καὶ ποιητῇ τῶν πάντων ὄντι, ἀλλὰ δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ τοῦτο γέγραπται, οἷς ἦν ἡ θύρα κεκλεισμένη τοῦ παραδείσου. . . . Τὴν δὲ τοιαύτην εἰς ἡμᾶς γενομένην ὕψωσιν προανεφώνει τὸ πνεῦμα ἐν ὀγδοηκοστῷ ὀγδόῳ ψαλμῷ λέγον· 'Καὶ ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σου ὑψωθήσονται, ὅτι τὸ καύχημα τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν εἶ σύ.' Εἰ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶν ὁ Υἱὸς, οὐκ ἄρα αὐτός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐνδεὴς, ὑψούμενος, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν οἱ ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ὑψούμενοι, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτός. c. Ar. i. 41.

"No longer, according to our old birth-nature, do we die in Adam; but now that our birth-nature with all its weaknesses is transferred to the Logos, we are raised above earth, because the curse for sin is done away by reason of His presence in us who for us was made a curse. And justly so. For as, being all of earth, we die in Adam, so, being born again of water and spirit, are we all in Christ made alive, the flesh being no longer a thing of earth, but made to be 'logos' from henceforth, by reason of the Logos of God, who for our sakes became flesh."[1]

We are not, then, simply ourselves but He is in us; and we are what we are by virtue of Him who is in us. It is not He, simply, Himself, but He in us, who receives, and is blessed with, the blessings and gifts which are said to be poured on Him.

"When it is said 'Power was given unto me' and 'I received,' and 'for this cause God highly exalted Him,' these are gifts from God given to us through Him. For the Logos never was, nor was made to be, lacking in them; nor on the other hand were men capable of providing them for themselves; but they are given, through the Logos, to us. So then, as given to Him they are communicated to us; for it was just for this that He became man, that, as given to Him, they might pass over to us. For as mere man could not have won these things, so He who was Logos only could not have lacked them. And so the Logos was united with us, and then communicated to us His power, and exalted us on high. For the Logos, being in man, highly exalted man; and because the Logos was in man, it was man who 'received.' Since then it was because the Logos was in flesh that man was exalted, and received power, therefore it is to the Logos that these things are referred, since on His account they were given; for it is on account of the Logos in man that these gifts were given. And just as 'the Logos became flesh,' so man received the things which came through the Logos. For whatever man received, the Logos is said to have received, that it might be shown that when man was unworthy to

[1] *Οὐκέτι γὰρ, κατὰ τὴν προτέραν γένεσιν, ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ ἀποθνήσκομεν· ἀλλὰ λοιπὸν τῆς γενέσεως ἡμῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς σαρκικῆς ἀσθενείας μετατεθέντων εἰς τὸν Λόγον, ἐγειρόμεθα ἀπὸ γῆς, λυθείσης τῆς δι' ἁμαρτίαν κατάρας διὰ τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν 'ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν γενόμενον κατάραν'· καὶ εἰκότως γε. Ὥσπερ γὰρ, ἐκ γῆς ὄντες πάντες, ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ ἀποθνήσκομεν, οὕτως 'ἄνωθεν ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος ἀναγεννηθέντες,' ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιούμεθα, οὐκέτι ὡς γηΐνης, ἀλλὰ λοιπὸν λογωθείσης τῆς σαρκὸς διὰ τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον, ὃς δι' ἡμᾶς 'ἐγένετο σάρξ.'* c. Ar. iii. 33.

receive it, so far as his own nature went, he received it nevertheless on account of the Logos made flesh. . . . Since, then, through the union of the Logos with man, the Father, looking upon the Logos, bestowed upon man exaltation, possession of all power, and so forth; therefore to the Logos Himself are there referred, and as it were given to Him, all the things which through Him we receive. For as on our account He became man, so on His account are we exalted. Nor is it strange if just as on our account He humbled Himself, so on our account He is said to have been exalted. He bestowed the gifts, then, 'upon Him' for 'us on account of Him'; and 'highly exalted Him' for 'us in Him.' And so too, the Logos Himself, when we are exalted, and receive, and are succoured, gives thanks to the Father, as Himself exalted, and receiving, and succoured; transferring our conditions to Himself, and saying, 'all things which Thou hast given unto Me, I have given unto them.'"[1]

In this last passage, the clearness and the emphasis are most remarkable, with which he not only lays down the immanence of the Logos in ourselves as a doctrinal truth more or less mysterious and remote, but finds in it the whole of human capacity to Godward; and finds at the same time, in that capacitating, the very purpose and significance of Incarnation.

[1] *Ὅταν δὲ (λέγηται) ὅτι "Ἐδόθη μοι ἐξουσία" καὶ "ἔλαβον," καὶ "διὰ τοῦτο ὑπερύψωσεν αὐτὸν ὁ Θεὸς," τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐστι χαρίσματα δι' αὐτοῦ διδόμενα. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ Λόγος ἐνδεὴς ἦν ἢ γέγονε πώποτε· οὐδὲ πάλιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἱκανοὶ ἦσαν ἑαυτοῖς διακονῆσαι ταῦτα· διὰ δὲ τοῦ Λόγου δίδοται ἡμῖν· διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς αὐτῷ διδόμενα, ἡμῖν μεταδίδοται· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐνηνθρώπησεν, ἵνα, ὡς αὐτῷ διδόμενα, εἰς ἡμᾶς διαβῇ. Ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ψιλὸς οὐκ ἂν ἠξιώθη τούτων. Λόγος δὲ πάλιν μόνος οὐκ ἂν ἐδεήθη τούτων. Συνήφθη οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ τότε ἐξουσίαν ἡμῖν μετέδωκε, καὶ ὑπερύψωσεν. Ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ γὰρ ὢν ὁ Λόγος ὑπερύψωσε τὸν ἄνθρωπον· καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντος τοῦ Λόγου, ἔλαβεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ Λόγου ὄντος ἐν σαρκὶ ὑψώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐξουσίαν, διὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὸν Λόγον ἀναφέρεται ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ δι' αὐτὸν ἐδόθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ Λόγον ἐδόθη ταῦτα τὰ χαρίσματα. Καὶ ὥσπερ "ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο," οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου εἴληφε. Πάντα γὰρ ὅσα ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἴληφεν, ὁ Λόγος λέγεται εἰληφέναι· ἵνα δειχθῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λαβεῖν, ὅσον ἦκεν εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ὅμως διὰ τὸν γενόμενον σάρκα Λόγον εἴληφεν. . . . . Ἐπειδὴ οὖν, συναφθέντος τοῦ Λόγου τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰς τὸν Λόγον ἀποβλέπων ἐχαρίζετο ὁ Πατὴρ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ὑψωθῆναι, τὸ ἔχειν πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· διὰ τοῦτο αὐτῷ τῷ Λόγῳ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ ὡς αὐτῷ διδόμενά ἐστιν ἃ δι' αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς λαμβάνομεν. Ὡς γὰρ δι' ἡμᾶς ἐνηνθρώπησεν αὐτὸς, οὕτως ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτὸν ὑψούμεθα. Οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον εἰ, ὥσπερ δι' ἡμᾶς ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ δι' ἡμᾶς λέγεται ὑπερυψῶσθαι. "Ἐχαρίσατο" οὖν "αὐτῷ" ἀντὶ τοῦ "ἡμῖν δι' αὐτὸν," καὶ "ὑπερύψωσεν" ἀντὶ τοῦ "ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ." Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Λόγος, ἡμῶν ὑψουμένων, καὶ λαμβανόντων, καὶ βοηθουμένων, ὡς αὐτὸς ὑψούμενος, καὶ λαμβάνων, καὶ βοηθούμενος, εὐχαριστεῖ τῷ Πατρὶ, τὰ ἡμέτερα εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναφέρων καὶ λέγων "πάντα ὅσα δέδωκάς μοι, δέδωκα αὐτοῖς."* c. Ar. iv. 6, 7.

He is not afraid to say it very strongly. We ourselves as Christians, are now made 'sons of God': within *us* the presence of the Lord is seen and is worshipped: those who look upon *us*, see and testify that of a truth God is in us. And how is He in us? What is the method, and what is the proof of His Presence? There was only one thing more waiting to be said: and this too, Athanasius has said with clearness. The presence of the Lord within ourselves is the presence of His Spirit, which He gave us. He clothed Himself with the flesh which was subjected to sin, and, for sin, died, that He Himself might be, as Spirit, within us; and we, characterized by His Spirit, and so informed by Himself, might be raised to the height in Him.

"But in that the Lord, even when He was in the body, and known as Jesus, was worshipped, and believed to be Son of God, and through Him the Father was known, it would seem to be plain that it was not the Logos as Logos who received this grace but ourselves. For by reason of our kinship of nature with His Body, we ourselves also are become a temple of God, and have been made from henceforth sons of God; so that in us too now the Lord is worshipped, and those who see us proclaim, as the apostle said, that 'God is in them of a truth': as John also says in the Gospel 'as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become children of God,' and in the epistle he writes: 'By this we know that He abideth in us, by His Spirit which He hath given us.' And this is a token of the goodness which is to usward from Him, that we were exalted because the Lord most High was in us; while the Saviour humbled Himself in the taking of our humble body, and took the form of a servant, in putting on the flesh which was servant to sin."[1]

[1] Τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν σώματι γενόμενον τὸν Κύριον καὶ κληθέντα Ἰησοῦν προσκυνεῖσθαι, πιστεύεσθαί τε αὐτὸν Υἱὸν Θεοῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ ἐπιγινώσκεσθαι τὸν Πατέρα, δῆλον ἂν εἴη, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι οὐχ ὁ Λόγος, ᾗ Λόγος ἐστίν, ἔλαβε τὴν τοιαύτην χάριν, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς. Διὰ γὰρ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ συγγένειαν ναὸς Θεοῦ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ υἱοὶ Θεοῦ λοιπὸν πεποιήμεθα, ὥστε καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἤδη προσκυνεῖσθαι τὸν Κύριον, καὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας 'ἀπαγγέλλειν' ὡς ὁ Ἀπόστολος εἴρηκεν, 'ὅτι ὄντως ὁ Θεὸς ἐν τούτοις ἐστί·' καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Ἰωάννης ἐν μὲν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ φησίν· 'Ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτὸν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα Θεοῦ γενέσθαι·' ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἐπιστολῇ γράφει· 'Ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν ὅτι μένει ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος αὐτοῦ οὗ ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν.' Γνώρισμα δέ ἐστι καὶ τοῦτο τῆς εἰς ἡμᾶς παρ' αὐτοῦ γενομένης ἀγαθότητος, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν ὑψώθημεν, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν Ὕψιστον Κύριον· . . . αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωτὴρ ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ λαβεῖν τὸ ταπεινὸν ἡμῶν σῶμα, δούλου τε μορφὴν ἔλαβεν, ἐνδυσάμενος τὴν δουλωθεῖσαν σάρκα τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ. c. Ar. i. 43.

Not for Himself but for us, was He, as man, endowed with the Holy Spirit. Ours really is the anointing. We are His Christs. And He was Christ for this. This is the consummation of His Presence in us—that Presence of Christ's Spirit, characterizing us, which transfigures us from sin.

"But if it is for our good that He sanctifies Himself, and this He does after becoming man, it is very plain that the descent of the Spirit also, which came on Him in Jordan, came really on *us*, because He put on our body. It came not for the advancement of the Logos, but for our sanctifying, that we might share His 'Chrism,' and it might be said of us 'Know ye not that ye are a temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?' For when the Lord, as man, was washed in Jordan, it was we who were being washed in Him and by Him. And when He received the Spirit, it was we who were being made by Him capable of receiving it."

So He was anointed, not with the Old Testament oil, but above all His fellows, with "the oil of gladness," "which He Himself, through the prophet, interprets of the Spirit: 'The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He hath anointed me'; and the Apostle said also, 'How God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit.' Of what time is it that this is said of Him, but the time when, being in flesh, He was baptized in Jordan, and the Spirit descended on Him? And the Lord Himself says to His disciples, the Spirit 'shall take of mine,' and 'I will send Him,' and 'Receive the Holy Ghost.' Yet He who, as the 'Logos' and 'the brightness of the Father' imparts the Spirit to others, is now said to 'be sanctified,' because He has become man, and the body that is sanctified is His own. From that time therefore it was that we first began to receive the Chrism-unction and the Seal, as John says, 'Ye have a chrism from the Holy one'; and the apostle, 'and ye were sealed by the Holy Spirit of promise.' What is said therefore is on our account and for our good. . . . If He is God, and the throne of His kingdom is for ever and ever, how could God be advanced? or what did He lack who was sitting on the throne of the Father? But if, as the Lord Himself said, the Spirit is His, and taketh of His, and He Himself sendeth Him, it follows that it is not the Logos, as He is Logos and Wisdom, who is anointed with the Spirit who is given by Him, but it is the flesh, which was assumed by Him, which really is in Him

and by Him anointed; that the sanctification which came on the Lord as man, might come on all men from Him."[1]

So again: "It is not then the Logos, as Logos, who receives advancement — for all things have been His and are His for ever;—but it is men who first begin to receive in Him and from Him. For when He is at this time said to be anointed as man, it is we in Him who are anointed, just as when He is baptized, it is we who are baptized in Him. . . . For He did not say, 'for this cause He anointed thee that Thou shouldest become God, or King, or Son, or Logos'—for all this He was and is for ever, as has been shewn; but rather, 'because Thou art God and King, therefore art Thou anointed Christ, since none other could unite man with the Holy Spirit but Thou, the Image of the Father, after whom we were created from the beginning; for Thine is the Spirit also.' For no created nature could be adequate for this, since angels transgressed and man had disobeyed. Therefore was God required—and the Logos *is* God—to deliver by Himself those who were underneath the curse."[2]

The Spirit is not the Spirit of another, but the Spirit

[1] *Εἰ δὲ ἡμῶν χάριν ἑαυτὸν ἁγιάζει, καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ ὅτε γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, εὔδηλον, ὅτι καὶ ἡ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ τοῦ Πνεύματος γενομένη κάθοδος, εἰς ἡμᾶς ἦν γινομένη, διὰ τὸ φορεῖν αὐτὸν τὸ ἡμέτερον σῶμα. Καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ βελτιώσει τοῦ Λόγου γέγονεν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἡμῶν πάλιν ἁγιασμὸν, ἵνα τοῦ χρίσματος αὐτοῦ μεταλάβωμεν, καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν λεχθείη, 'οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι ναὸς Θεοῦ ἐστε, καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν;' τοῦ γὰρ Κυρίου, ὡς ἀνθρώπου, λουομένου εἰς τὸν Ἰορδάνην, ἡμεῖς ἦμεν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ λουόμενοι. Καὶ δεχομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἡμεῖς ἦμεν οἱ παρ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενοι τούτου δεκτικοί. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐδ' ὥσπερ Ἀαρὼν, ἢ Δαβὶδ, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐλαίῳ κέχρισται, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως παρὰ πάντας τοὺς μετόχους αὐτοῦ, ἐλαίῳ ἀγαλλιάσεως· ὅπερ ἑρμηνεύων αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα, διὰ τοῦ προφήτου φησί, 'Πνεῦμα κυρίου ἐπ' ἐμὲ, οὗ εἵνεκεν ἔχρισέ με·' καθὼς καὶ ὁ Ἀπόστολος εἴρηκεν, 'Ὡς ἔχρισεν αὐτὸν ὁ Θεὸς πνεύματι ἁγίῳ.' Πότε οὖν καὶ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴρηται, ἢ ὅτε καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος ἐβαπτίζετο ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ, καὶ 'καταβέβηκεν ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸ Πνεῦμα'; Καὶ μὴν αὐτὸς ὁ Κύριός φησι τὸ Πνεῦμα 'ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήψεται,' καὶ 'Ἐγὼ αὐτὸ ἀποστέλλω·' καὶ 'Λάβετε Πνεῦμα ἅγιον' τοῖς μαθηταῖς. Καὶ ὅμως ὁ ἄλλοις παρέχων ὡς 'Λόγος καὶ ἀπαύγασμα τοῦ Πατρὸς' λέγεται νῦν 'ἁγιάζεσθαι,' ἐπειδὴ πάλιν γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὸ ἁγιαζόμενον σῶμα αὐτοῦ ἐστιν. Ἐξ ἐκείνου γοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρξάμεθα τοῦ τὸ χρίσμα καὶ τὴν σφραγῖδα λαμβάνειν, λέγοντος τοῦ μὲν Ἰωάννου, 'Καὶ ὑμεῖς χρίσμα ἔχετε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου.' τοῦ δὲ Ἀποστόλου, 'καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ Πνεύματι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῷ ἁγίῳ.' Οὐκοῦν δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον. Ποία τοίνυν καὶ ἐκ τούτου προκοπὴ βελτιώσεως καὶ 'μισθὸς ἀρετῆς' ἢ ἁπλῶς πράξεως τοῦ Κυρίου δείκνυται; . . . . . εἰ δὲ, καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Κύριος εἴρηκεν, αὐτοῦ ἐστι τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λαμβάνει, αὐτός τε αὐτὸ ἀποστέλλει, οὐκ ἄρα ὁ Λόγος ἐστὶν, ᾗ Λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ Σοφία, ὁ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ διδομένῳ Πνεύματι χριόμενος, ἀλλ' ἡ προσληφθεῖσα παρ' αὐτοῦ σὰρξ ἐστιν ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ χριομένη· ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἁγιασμὸς, ὡς εἰς ἄνθρωπον τὸν Κύριον γινόμενος, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους γένηται παρ' αὐτοῦ.* c. Ar. i. 47.

[2] *Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ Λόγος ἐστὶν, ᾗ Λόγος ἐστὶν, ὁ βελτιούμενος· εἶχε γὰρ πάντα καὶ ἀεὶ ἔχει· ἀλλ' οἱ ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν, οἱ ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες τοῦ λαμβάνειν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ*

of Himself, who has in Him become, through His Incarnation, the Spirit of Man.

"But through whom, or by whom, should the Spirit be given but through the Son, whose the Spirit also is? and when could we possibly receive Him, save when the Logos became man? . . . . For since the flesh that was in Him was sanctified first, and He because of it was said to have 'received' as man, it is upon us, who receive of His fulness, that the resultant grace of the Spirit dwells." [1]

It was thus that death was conquered in man, because man was really separated from sin: and thus that the law, powerless in the form of command to man as he naturally is, was merged in the power of grace to those who, made capable now of receiving the Logos, realize, in the Spirit, their lives and themselves.

"For in this too the ministration which is through Him is better, in that 'what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh,' taking away from it its fallenness, in which it was held captive continually, so that it could not receive the mind of God. But in that He made flesh capable of receiving the Logos, He made us to walk no longer after flesh but after spirit, and to say, again and again, 'we are not in flesh but in spirit,' and that 'the Son of God came into the world not to condemn the world but' to deliver all men, and 'that the world through Him might be saved.' For then, as having to answer for its deeds, the world was judged under the law; but now the Logos has received the judgment into Himself, and suffering in the body for all, has conferred salvation upon all. This John saw and cried,

δι' αὐτοῦ. Αὐτοῦ γὰρ νῦν λεγομένου ἀνθρωπίνως χρίεσθαι, ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ χριόμενοι· ἐπειδὴ καὶ βαπτιζομένου αὐτοῦ, ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ βαπτιζόμενοι· . . . . . οὐ γὰρ εἶπε 'Διὰ τοῦτο ἔχρισέ σε ἵνα γένῃ Θεὸς, ἢ βασιλεὺς, ἢ Υἱὸς, ἢ Λόγος' ἦν γὰρ καὶ πρὸ τούτου καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ, καθάπερ δέδεικται· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ''Επειδὴ Θεὸς εἶ καὶ βασιλεὺς, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐχρίσθης· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλου ἦν συνάψαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ Ἁγίῳ, ἢ σοῦ τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ Πατρὸς, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γεγόναμεν. Σοῦ γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα.' Τῶν μὲν γὰρ γενητῶν ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἦν ἀξιόπιστος εἰς τοῦτο, ἀγγέλων μὲν παραβάντων, ἀνθρώπων δὲ παρακουσάντων. Διὰ τοῦτο Θεοῦ χρεία ἦν ('Θεὸς δέ ἐστιν ὁ Λόγος·') ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ τὴν κατάραν γενομένους αὐτὸς ἐλευθερώσῃ. c. Ar. i. 48, 49.

[1] *Διὰ τίνος δὲ καὶ παρὰ τίνος ἔδει τὸ Πνεῦμα δίδοσθαι ἢ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, οὗ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμά ἐστι; πότε δὲ λαμβάνειν ἡμεῖς ἐδυνάμεθα, εἰ μὴ ὅτε ὁ Λόγος γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος; . . . . . τῆς γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σαρκὸς πρώτης ἁγιασθείσης, καὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένου δι' αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι, ὡς ἀνθρώπου, ἡμεῖς ἐπακολουθοῦσαν ἔχομεν τὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος χάριν, ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ λαμβάνοντες.* c. Ar. i. 50.

'the law was given through Moses, but the grace and the truth came through Jesus Christ.' Better is the grace than the law, and the truth than the shadow."[1]

Nothing, as it seems to me, can be more emphatic than is, to the thought of Athanasius, the conception of a vital regeneration of humanity in general; that is to say, potentially at least, of humanity as humanity. What, then, is the secret or method of this stupendous transformation? It is certainly no mere change in the attitude, which would be, in fact, a change in the character, of God. It is not that God—with colourable ground first provided or otherwise—consents to treat man inconsistently with man's deserving or capacity. It is not in God at all, but in man, that the change is wrought: a divine change which actually produces a divine capacity (if we dare hardly say deserving) in man. It is certainly not, then, an act which properly affects one unit only in humanity: as if the Person of Christ were regarded artificially, as a substitute for mankind. It is not an act external to humanity in general, like an act of mere purchase or barter. Still less is it a balancing of an abstract equation by infliction of a quantum of vengeance as counterpoise to a similar quantum of sin. Least of all is it the self-indulgence of anger by irrelevant outpouring of vindictiveness upon an extraneous and innocent victim. The phrase 'vicarious punishment,' if it is not at all points wholly irrelevant to the Athanasian language, or wholly unrelated to the truth, has, at best, a relevancy so faint that it can do much to mislead, and comparatively little to illuminate, the thought that is content to be based upon it.

What is it, then? It is a Divine act, profound and many-sided. It is an act of almost inconceivable condescension, and goodness, and love. It is the self-identification of God with humanity; one primary aspect of which

[1] Καὶ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κρείττων ἡ δι' αὐτοῦ διακονία γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ 'τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου, ἐν ᾧ ἠσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς, ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ Υἱὸν πέμψας ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας κατέκρινε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ', ἐκστήσας ἀπ' αὐτῆς τὸ παράπτωμα, ἐν ᾧ διαπαντὸς ἠχμαλωτίζετο, ὥστε μὴ δέχεσθαι τὸν θεῖον νοῦν. Τὴν δὲ σάρκα δεκτικὴν τοῦ Λόγου κατασκευάσας, ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς 'μηκέτι κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα,' καὶ πολλάκις λέγειν· ''Ημεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐσμὲν ἐν σαρκὶ, ἀλλ' ἐν πνεύματι·" καὶ 'Ὅτι ἦλθεν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς 'εἰς τὸν κόσμον, οὐχ ἵνα κρίνῃ τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ' ἵνα πάντας λυτρώσηται, καὶ σωθῇ ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ.' Τότε μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ὑπεύθυνος, ὁ κόσμος ἐκρίνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου· ἄρτι δὲ ὁ Λόγος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐδέξατο τὸ κρῖμα, καὶ τῷ σώματι παθὼν ὑπὲρ πάντων, σωτηρίαν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐχαρίσατο. Τοῦτο δέ βλέπων κέκραγεν Ἰωάννης· ''Ο νόμος διὰ Μωσέως ἐδόθη, ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγένετο.' Κρείττων δὲ ἡ χάρις ἢ ὁ νόμος, καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια παρὰ τὴν σκιάν. c. Ar. i. 60.

is the willing surrender of humanity, in the Person of God, to that dying without which there can be no passage for the sinner to sinlessness; but to the very essence of which belong also the infusion, or reproduction, in humanity in general, of the living Spirit of the Divine Redeemer; the realization, in humanity, of His very Spirit, which, alike in His self-sacrifice to purgatorial dying, and in His inherent and essential victory, is His sanctification through dying,—nay, His 'deification'—of human character and life.

It would seem to me idle to try to divide these things: to say that the doctrine of the immanence of Christ, as Spirit, in humanity is one thing, and that the Redemption of humanity by the sacrifice of Christ's death is quite another; to say that the doctrine of the Spirit is true, and is a sequel to Redemption, but that it forms no part of the interpretation of Redemption itself; to say, in other words, that the doctrine of Redemption, or Atonement, either must be, or can be, completely interpreted by itself, apart from the separate doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Neither the thought of God, nor the thought of God's redeeming work upon man, is thus divisible into sundered parts. God is one. And the drama of the Atonement, however complex or many-sided, is one.

I cannot believe that the writer of the passages quoted above would have acquiesced in any real separation of these two aspects of the atoning purpose, or atoning effect, of the Incarnation of the Eternal Logos. But if so, I cannot but feel that the position of S. Athanasius as a whole is not really compatible with the technical interpretations of the doctrine of the Atonement which form so large a part, perhaps not of the living creed, but at least of the logical discussion, of later times. The fact that S. Athanasius did not write a formal treatise on the doctrine of Atonement is by no means necessarily a disadvantage to us. The different elements of his thought on the subject come out with sufficient clearness in his argumentative treatment of the Incarnation. Perhaps they come out the more freshly, and with all the fuller life, because they have not been too closely or formally swathed in the symmetry of a logic, which might possibly even in his case, as in the case of so many after him, have been too rigid to do full justice to them.

For the purpose of vindicating the view of Atonement taken in this volume against the charge of novelty, or

(what is generally implied in novelty) undue contradiction against a real Christian consensus, this glance into the mind of the first four centuries, incomplete as it is, might probably suffice.

And further, it seems reasonable to suggest that what plainly is true so far down in the history is true substantially very much further; and that things said in individual efforts, of exposition or of illustration, had not anything like the place in popular—any more than in authoritative—acceptance, which the modern world, looking backwards, has been inclined to suppose. The theories of Gregory of Nyssa, as of Origen in earlier times, were individual attempts at illustrative exposition, received in all probability and regarded as such. If, in the absence of other and better illustrations they gradually influenced popular imagination almost as if they had been authoritative; this was probably at most a very gradual and unconscious process. The intellect of the Church was not seriously at work upon the subject, and therefore never consciously reached, much less formulated, any conclusions which could for a moment claim to represent the real consensus or authority of the Church. Moreover, even where such theories were held, it is in the highest degree unlikely that they were held by those who adopted any more than by those who originated them, as an exhaustive statement of the truth. They are such forms of statement as would find place in the lecture room rather than in the oratory, in the speculation of a curious logic about religion, rather than in the religion of the heart. In devout Christian hearts, whose prayer was towards God, whose faith was in the Crucified, and who were led and moulded by the Spirit, such speculations never would displace an instinctive faith of larger and deeper import. Such a faith would always remain, however inconsistently, side by side with them and beneath them, more vital ultimately, and more real than they.

No doubt, as the centuries passed on, artificial modes of thought about the rationale of atonement became, or seemed to become, more integrally a part of the thought of the Church; and no doubt the inconsistency between such modes of thought and the deeper instincts of devotion came more frequently, and more clearly, to the surface of Christian consciousness. The absence, for the first ten centuries, of any serious attempt to co-ordinate such difficulties, as a whole, is really a proof not only of

the extent to which the Church was free from any authoritative ruling, or even discussion, upon the question; but of the very gradual process by which Christian consciousness realized the hampering character of certain (more or less instinctive or familiar) modes of illustration of the doctrine; and therefore also of the very imperfect extent to which those modes of illustration had entered into, or in any way affected, the true heart of Christian worship or of Christian faith.

Still, there were the misconceptions. And they did by degrees grow, alike in their own definiteness of outline, and in a certain sort of prescriptive authority. And, so growing, they did become more and more consciously oppressive to worship and to faith.

The *Cur Deus Homo* of S. Anselm, which must always be of importance as the first formal attempt to philosophize the whole subject, is animated (as is so often the case with the most constructive works of theology) by the desire to protest against misconceptions. And no doubt by the time of S. Anselm it required some measure alike of courage and of caution to stand openly against modes of thought which had become so far inveterate. Thus it is part of his caution or considerateness, that the objections which he plainly feels and wishes to satisfy are not urged by Anselm in his own name, but rather in that of his interlocutor Boso, who speaks as quoting, with a quite undefined degree of sympathy, or at least of perplexity, the difficulties started by the '*infideles*.' It is, then, formally, the *infideles* who cannot see how men were held in effective thrall; or how the kingdom of Satan or its subjects were outside the power of God; or how anything else was needed to set men free from punishment except the will of God; or what occasion there was for the Incarnation at all. With difficulties like these, which are partly Christian and partly anti-Christian, the argument as to the 'justice' of Satan's dominion is skilfully combined, the whole being put as the difficulty which the orthodox champion is called upon to explain.

"For under what tenure, or in what prison-house or in whose power were you detained, from which God could not have set you free, without redeeming you with such great effort, and at last with His own blood? . . . . . If you say that God had no power to do all this by His sole command, when you say that by a command He created all things,

you are inconsistent with yourselves in denying His power. Or if you admit that He could have done it in this way, but would not; how can you shew Him to be wise while you assert that it was His will to suffer what so ill became Him? For everything which you have to suggest was in His will only; for the wrath of God means nothing but His will to punish. Therefore if He does not will to punish man's sins, man is free from his sins, and from God's wrath, and from hell, and from the devil's power,—from all the things which he suffers by reason of sin; and all that he lost by the same reason of sin, he gets back again. For in whose power is either hell or the devil? or whose is the kingdom of heaven, but His who made all things that are? Every single thing which you either dread or desire, is subject to the irresistible power of His will . . . . .

"And as to that other position which we are accustomed to take, that it was due from God to deal with the devil for the release of man by law rather than by force; so that when the devil slew Him in whom was no cause of death, and who was God, he justly lost the power which he held over sinners; but otherwise God would unjustly have done him violence, since he had a right to the possession of man, for he had not snatched him by force, but man had come to him of his own accord; I can not see any force in it. For if devil or man had belonged to himself, or to any other than God, or had been held within any power other than God's, this might possibly be said; but since both devil and man belong only to God, and neither of them stands outside of God's power, what legal dealing should God have with His own property, for His own property, within His own property, except to punish His own slave who had persuaded his fellow slave to join him and run away from the master of them both; and so had been traitor enough to harbour the runaway, and thief enough to steal the thief, who belonged to his Lord? For thieves they were, both of them; since the one stole himself from his Lord, while the other was the instigator of the theft. . . . . For however justly man was tormented by the devil, yet the devil was unjust in tormenting him. . . . . Therefore there was no cause whatever in the devil why God should not deal with him by force for man's deliverance."[1]

[1] In qua namque, aiunt nobis, captione, aut in quo carcere, aut in cujus potestate tenebamini, unde vos Deus non potuit liberare, nisi vos tot laboribus et ad ultimum suo sanguine redimeret? . . . . Si dicitis quia Deus haec omnia

There is thus considerable skill in the way in which the question as a whole is introduced; and the modifications of current language which Anselm meant to adopt are interwoven with error which he meant to refute. The whole problem as stated is well worthy of the deepest thought and the most careful handling. Even to this day it would be no mean theological exercise to disentangle exactly, and to analyze, the fallacies and the truths which are woven together in these two chapters.

Anselm's constructive treatment, when we come to it, is a real contribution, no doubt, and yet it is to our eyes an obviously inadequate one. It has in part the character of a first attempt to philosophize completely. It is a starting point for much improvement upon itself, while its own inadequacies become quickly apparent.

It is indeed abundantly plain that S. Anselm's theory never can have represented with any adequacy the whole of the living thought which tried to express itself in it. He is trying to give symmetrical expression, in terms of logic, to a faith which lies deeper than his essay towards a logical exposition of it. It would be impossible to suppose that any really devout spirit could have felt, in his worship of the atonement, no more than is contained in Anselm's logic.

facere non potuit solo jussu, quem cuncta jubendo creasse dicitis, repugnatis vobismetipsis quia impotentem illum facitis. Aut si fatemini, quia potuit, sed non voluit, nisi hoc modo; quomodo sapientem illum ostendere potestis, quem sine ulla ratione tam indecentia velle pati asseritis? Omnia enim hæc, quae obtenditis, in ejus voluntate consistunt; ira namque Dei non est aliud quam voluntas puniendi. Si ergo non vult punire peccata hominum, liber est homo a peccatis, et ab ira Dei, et ab inferno, et a potestate diaboli, quæ omnia propter peccata patitur; et recipit ea, quibus propter eadem peccata privatur. Nam in cujus potestate est infernus aut diabolus; aut cujus est regnum coelorum, nisi ejus, qui fecit omnia? Quæcunque itaque timetis aut desideratis, ejus voluntati subjacent, cui nihil resistere potest . . . . Sed et illud, quod dicere solemus, Deum scilicet debuisse prius per justitiam, contra diabolum agere, ut liberaret hominem, quam per fortitudinem, ut cum diabolus eum, in quo nulla mortis erat causa, et qui Deus erat, occideret, juste potestatem, quam super peccatores habebat, amitteret; alioquin injustam violentiam fecisset illi, quoniam juste possidebat hominem, quem non ipse violenter attraxerat, sed idem homo se sponte ad illum contulerat: non video quam vim habeat. Nam si diabolus aut homo suus esset, aut alterius quam Dei, aut in alia quam in Dei potestate maneret, forsitan hoc recte diceretur; cum autem diabolus aut homo non sit nisi Dei, et extra potestatem Dei neuter consistat; quam causam debuit Deus agere, cum suo, de suo, in suo, nisi ut servum suum puniret, qui suo conservo communem dominum deserere et ad se persuasisset transire, ac traditor fugitivum, fur furem, cum furto domini sui suscepisset? Uterque namque fur erat, cum alter, altero persuadente, seipsum domino suo furabatur. . . . Quamvis enim homo juste a diabolo torqueretur, ipse tamen illum injuste torquebat. . . . Nihil igitur erat in diabolo, cur Deus contra illum ad liberandum hominem sua uti fortitudine non deberet. Ch. vi. and vii.

Of this, indeed, Anselm is abundantly conscious. He is constantly referring to the 'altiores rei rationes' which his expression cannot reach. One such phrase was quoted in the preface to these pages. Another very striking one is in the 16th chapter of the 2nd part. Another is near the end of the 19th chapter: "Puto me aliquantulum jam tuae satisfecisse quæstioni, quamvis hoc melior me facere plenius possit, et majores atque plures quam meum aut mortale ingenium comprehendere valeat hujus rei sint rationes." He is, of course, not wrong in attempting to rationalize what he knows that he can at best rationalize very incompletely. And his treatise has helped us all; though in part by helping us to see the inadequacy of some prima facie modes of interpreting certain realities of our own consciousness, which lie, in fact, deeper than our interpreting power. But it follows from this that we are able to criticize Anselm's theory with the utmost freedom, without even imagining for a moment that we are criticizing the heart of Anselm's faith.

The fact is that the failure of the *Cur Deus Homo* lies at the very outset of his attempt. It lies in his statement of the problem, and his view of the meaning of the terms with which he starts: What is sin? and what is forgiveness of sin? In his 11th and 12th chapters he raises such questions as these; and by the time he has answered them a really adequate rationale of atonement has become impossible. His answer to the great question may be as good as his statement of the question allows. But his question is conceived arithmetically, and raised really in terms of arithmetic. What wonder if the conclusion reached is also arithmetical? "Non est aliud peccare quam Deo non reddere debitum." Here is a definition, which—though true no doubt as far as it goes—is fatal. It makes sin in its essence quantitative, and, as quantitative, external to the self of the sinner, and measurable, as if it had a self, in itself. The problem caused by sin is exhibited as if it were a faulty equation, which by fresh balancing of quantities is to be equated aright. But, in fact, sin is not in what I *do* so really as in what I *am*. What I am may be evidenced, nay, may be actualized, through what I do. Yet the sin lies not in the deed, as deed; but in the 'I,' as doer of the deed. The 'I' is not distinguishable from the sin. The sin is within the 'I.' It is in what 'I' am.

It follows that it is an impossibility, in any full sense of the words, 'dimittere peccatum,' so long as, in real fact, 'peccatum' remains. But if sin is within the 'I,' it *does*

remain until the 'I' be changed. It is an essential alteration of the very constitution of the 'I,' not a transaction or equation external to the 'I,' in which the true forgiveness of sins finds its meaning. There could hardly be a better illustration than the Cur Deus Homo, of the inherent failure of any exposition of atonement, which is not, at every turn, in terms of personality; which does not find, in all the terms concerned, in sin, in punishment, in penitence, in forgiveness, in atonement, meanings which, if conceived of apart from personality, and not as aspects, or states, or possibilities *of personality*, would rapidly become no meanings at all.

The quantitative character of the conception comes out very clearly as Anselm works towards his final conclusions. The question is how to cancel the great "amount" of the "debt" of humanity to God. The service of Christ's life as man does not count for this purpose, for that was anyhow *due*, a due of humanity to God. But his death was (*a*) not due, and (*b*) infinite in amount. Therefore the amount of this, which was *not* due, being infinite, outweighed the amount of all the sins of the world, which though vast were not literally infinite. Nothing could be more simply arithmetical, or more essentially unreal. And yet the unreality of the conclusion is no more than was inevitably involved in the artificiality of the conceptions with which the logic first set out.[1]

Three further remarks may be added about S. Anselm. First, that while it is easy for us to say what is artificial and unsatisfactory in his thought, the process of disentangling the true heart of the thought itself from the

[1] Si dicimus quia dabit seipsum ad obediendum Deo, ut perseveranter servando justitiam subdat se ejus voluntati; non erit hoc dare quod Deus ab illo non exigat ex debito. Omnis enim rationalis creatura debet hanc obedientiam Deo. pt. II. ch. xi.

Video hominem illum plane, quem quærimus, talem esse oportere, qui nec ex necessitate moriatur, quoniam erit omnipotens; nec ex debito quia nunquam peccator erit; et mori possit ex libera voluntate, quia necessarium erit. Ibid.

Cogita etiam quia peccata tantum sunt odibilia, quantum sunt mala, et vita ista tantum amabilis est quantum est bona. Unde sequitur, quia vita ista plus est amabilis, quam sint peccata odibilia.

Boso. Non possum hoc non intelligere.

Anselm. Putasne tantum bonum tam amabile posse sufficere ad solvendum, quod debetur pro peccatis totius mundi?

Boso. Imo plus potest in infinitum.

Anselm. Vides igitur quomodo vita hæc vincat omnia peccata, si pro illis detur.

Boso. Aperte.

Anselm. Si ergo dare vitam est mortem accipere, sicut datio hujus vitæ prævalet omnibus hominum peccatis, ita et acceptio mortis. Ib. ch. xiv.

forms under which it expressed itself was really of course a gradual one, so that neither he himself (though he knew how much the truth must transcend his expression of it) nor his contemporaries (though they might demur, with more or less clearness, to some parts of his expression) were really able to see, as in process of time men learned to see, exactly how much of what he said belonged to his truth, and how much to the imperfectly illustrative forms in which he tried to embody it. The second remark will be that, in drawing marked attention to the imperfectness of the forms in which he embodied his thought, we have of necessity done injustice to the large amount of true insight and devotional reality—to the obvious sincerity that is, of the Christian Spirit—which breathes through what he says, even where the logical form of it is found to be ultimately least tenable. And the third will be that whatever he said was commended to his contemporaries, and to the whole Church, by this obvious sincerity of the spirit in which it was conceived; it was commended not only by the tactfulness of the manner in which he approached current prejudices, but still more by that most persuasive of arguments, the fragrance of a saintly life.

But fragrant as is the memory of the saintly Anselm, it is probable that modern thought is really more interested and more likely to be interested, in the somewhat fragmentary suggestions towards an explanation of the atonement, which are connected with the name of Abælard. The teaching of Anselm, whatever it might be, was likely to be commended by the reverence which inevitably belonged to his person and character. But with Abælard it was different. He never indeed brought his suggestions on the subject, which are chiefly in his commentary on the Romans, into a connected and completely self-consistent system. But if he had, they would hardly have been accepted. There was not the fragrant life, and the gracious personality, nor the persuasive tone, the devout patience, the constraining beauty of spirit, which would all have been necessary, in an age of rigid and narrow discipline of ecclesiastical thought, to commend in the teeth of a (not unnatural) suspicion of unorthodoxy, the really beautiful conceptions which underlay his thought. Neither was his conception adequately complete, nor was the tone of his exposition adequately persuasive. Nor, it must be added, was he personally quite capable of holding the position of

a mighty prophet in the Church. The life of Abælard is a tragedy throughout,—fascinating, if at all, as tragedy,—a life of stress and storm, full of its own strange horror, and strange pathos. Something more was needed than it was in him to supply, in order to commend—I will not quite say the Abælardian view of the atonement, but rather the view which he approached, but to which he did, after all, very imperfect justice, to the heart and conscience of Christendom. Whatever sympathy we may feel for him, intellectually or otherwise, it would not be fair to condemn those who, under all the circumstances, looked askance on his teaching and set themselves to oppose it, if only they had themselves been scrupulously fair in the methods of their opposition.

But incomplete and imperfectly consistent though his teaching was, it contains, beyond all question, the germ, and something more than the germ, of an exposition of the atonement far deeper and more inclusive than that of the theologians who condemned him.

It may be well to put together various things which he does say about Christ's atoning work, beginning with some of those in which he most conforms to the thought of his age, and asserts the things which he was accused of denying. Thus he asserts that, seeing that we were bought by the blood of Christ, we must have been bought from the master, who, by the bond of our sins, held us enslaved, and to whom it belonged to fix his price. It was the devil, then, who, as our master and owner, determined his price, and who asked for us the blood of Christ.

"Scriptum est in Epistola Petri quia redempti sumus precioso sanguine unigeniti, ab aliquo sine dubio empti cujus eramus servi, qui et pretium proposuit quod voluit, ut dimitteret quod tenebat. Tenebat autem nos diabolus, cui districti fueramus peccatis nostris. Poposcit ergo pretium nostrum sanguinem Christi."[1]

So, in commenting on the last verses of Rom. vii., he speaks of us as "justly delivered from the dominion of sin or the devil": "ut nos juste a dominio peccati sive diaboli possit eruere et a captivitate prædicta tanquam suos reducere."

So, on v. 6, he says that Christ's dying for the ungodly was to deliver them from condemnation,—"ut eos videlicet a damnatione liberaret."

[1] In Rom. Lib. II. (on ch. iv. 11).

So, on viii. 3, "God caused his co-eternal Wisdom to assume passible and mortal humanity, that while He subjected Himself to the punishment of sin, He might appear to have a personal share in the flesh that is conceived in sin." "Co-æternam sibi sapientiam fecit humiliari usque ad assumptionem passibilis et mortalis hominis, ita ut per pœnam peccati cui subjacebat, ipse etiam carnem peccati, id est in peccato conceptam, habere videretur." Commenting on the same passage, he goes on: "And for sin, that is, the punishment of sin, which He bore for us in the flesh"; "de peccato, id est de pœna peccati quam pro nobis sustinuit in carne, id est in humanitate assumpta non secundum divinitatem."

And so in the so-called Apologia he says, with confident brevity, that the Son of God was incarnate that He might deliver us from the slavery of sin, and the yoke of the devil, and might open to us by His death the entrance into everlasting life. "Solum Filium Dei incarnatum profiteor, ut nos a servitute peccati et a jugo diaboli liberaret, et supernæ aditum vitæ morte sua nobis reseraret."

On Rom. iv. 25, he lays down that there are two ways in which Christ died "for our sins"; first, because the sins which were the cause of His death, and of which He bore the 'pœna,' were our sins: and secondly, because His death was to do away our sins, purchasing our exemption from 'pœna,' while it also won us by the revelation of His love, and so drew away, from any will to sin, the souls that were in love with Him. "Duobus modis propter delicta nostra mortuus dicitur, tum quia nos deliquimus propter quod ille moreretur, et peccatum commisimus cujus ille pœnam sustinuit, tum etiam ut peccata nostra moriendo tolleret, i.e., pœnam peccatorum introducens nos in Paradisum pretio suæ mortis auferret, et, per exhibitionem tantæ gratiæ, quia, ut ipse ait, *majorem dilectionem nemo habet*, animos nostros a voluntate peccandi retraheret, et in summam suam dilectionem intenderet."

The relations of cause and effect, which are not quite clear in the second half of this thought, become clearer in his reply to the 'quæstio' raised upon the passage ending Rom. iii. 26. Here he says explicitly that our real justification, in which we are reconciled to God, is the Divine love kindled in our own hearts, through our apprehension of the Divine love manifested in the crucifixion. It is the supreme presence of love within ourselves—the

direct result of the passion of Christ, a love which lifts us out of the slavery of sin, into the true liberty of the children of God. It was for the kindling of this true liberty of love in man, that Christ declares Himself to have come.

"Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc justificati sumus in sanguine Christi, et Deo reconciliati, quod per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam, quod Filius suus nostram susceperit naturam, et in ipso nos tam verbo quam exemplo instituendo usque ad mortem perstitit, nos sibi amplius per amorem astrinxit; ut tanto divinæ gratiæ accensi beneficio, nil jam tolerare propter ipsum vera reformidet caritas. . . . Redemptio itaque nostra est illa summa in nobis per passionem Christi dilectio, quæ non solum a servitute peccati liberat sed veram nobis filiorum Dei libertatem acquirit; ut amore ejus potius quam timore cuncta impleamus, qui nobis tantam exhibuit gratiam, qua major inveniri ipso attestante non potest. *Majorem hac*, inquit, *dilectionem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat pro amicis suis.* De hoc quidem amore Dominus alibi ait, *Ignem veni mittere in terram, et quid volo nisi ut ardeat?* Ad hanc itaque veram caritatis libertatem in hominibus propagandam se venisse testatur. Quod diligenter attendens apostolus in sequentibus ait, *Quia caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis.*" [1]

The passage is a very striking one. But there are two matters for sincere regret; the first that he seems to lay so much causal stress upon the 'exhibition' of the love of the Cross, as though he conceived it as working its effect mainly as an appeal, or incitement, to feeling: and the second that he fails to follow up the clue which his own quotation of Rom. v. 5 might have supplied to him. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of Christ within the personality of Christians, would have supplied the whole truth which he desired, without the risk, to which his own expressions seem to be liable, of making the effect of Calvary itself appear primarily as an appeal to human emotions.

The same thought is re-echoed when he comes to the passage in Rom. v. itself. "Merito dixi caritatem diffusam in cordibus nostris. Nam propter quid aliud, nisi videlicet ut in nobis dilataretur caritas Dei?"

"Notandum vero est apostolum hoc loco modum nostræ redemptionis per mortem Christi patenter exprimere, cum

[1] Rom. v. 5, with 6 and 8. The passage is in the comment on Rom. iii. 26.

videlicet eum pro nobis non ob aliud mortuum dicit, nisi per veram illam caritatis libertatem in nobis propagandam, per hanc videlicet qua nobis exhibuit summam dilectionem, sicut ipse ait *Majorem hac dilectionem nemo habet etc. . . . . Commendat Deus.*] id est, ædificat sive confirmat. *suam caritatem in nobis.*] quoniam scilicet Dei *Christus Filius pro nobis mortuus est cum adhuc peccatores essemus.*] Quod si ita respexit cum essemus peccatores, morti scilicet unicum suum pro nobis tradendo, *multo magis ergo.*] id est, multo facilius sive libentius vel probabilius nunc respiciet nos ad salvationem jam justificatos in sanguine suo, id est, jam per dilectionem quam in eo habemus, ex hac summa gratia, quam nobis exhibuit, pro nobis, scilicet, adhuc peccatoribus moriendo. Et hoc est, *salvi erimus ab ira.*] scilicet futura, id est, a peccatorum vindicta, *per ipsum.*] videlicet Christum pro nobis semel morientem, et sæpius orantem, et assidue nos instruentem."

It was thus that the Cross really did what the law had tried and failed to do, for the law had *commanded* love to God and to man: but the Cross drew it out perforce: and in this love it is that sin is condemned and destroyed. This is what is meant when Christ is said to have been made a victim for us. "Non dicit opera legis, quæ nequaquam justificant, sed quod lex præcipit de his quæ ad justificationem attinent, sine quibus justificari non possumus, sicut est Dei et proximi caritas; quam lex imperfectam facit, sicut supra monuimus; sed per Christum in nobis perficitur. Et hoc est quod ait, *ut caritas Dei et proximi*, quam lex præcipit, in nobis perfecta nos justificaret. Ipsum quippe Christum tanquam Deum, ipsum proximum vere diligere, summum illud beneficium, quod nobis exhibuit, compellit; quod est in nobis peccatum damnare, id est, reatum omnem et culpam destruere per caritatem ex hoc summo beneficio. Quod verius, inquit, habetur apud Græcos *pro peccato damnavit peccatum ipse hostia pro peccato factus.* Per hanc hostiam carnis quæ dicitur pro peccato damnavit, id est delevit peccatum, quia remissionem quoque peccatorum nobis in sanguine suo et reconciliationem operatus est."[1]

Thus, then, we hang wholly upon Christ, in believing faith, which is our righteousness. "Hæc est illa justitia quæ ex fide est Christi, id est, ipsa fides in Christum habita nos justificans."[2]

And true faith is not only of the lips but of the heart and the will, of the character and the life. "Ore suo con-

[1] On Rom. viii. 3. [2] On Rom. x. 6.

fitetur, qui quod enunciat intelligit. Corde suo credit qui cor et voluntatem suam applicat his quæ credit, ut ipsa videlicet fides eum ad opera trahat; veluti cum quis credendo Christum a mortuis resurrexisse in vitam æternam, satagit prout potest ut vestigia ejus sequendo ad ejusdem vitæ beatitudinem perveniat." [1]

It would be unfair to pass from Abælard without some representation of those more pathetic expressions which exhibit, at least in part, the translation of his speculation into his experience. How really and how profoundly he conceived of the study of the Cross as entering into the very being of him who studied it, may be gathered from his 5th letter, the letter in which he attempts to give comfort to Heloissa, when she had bewailed, in language most piercing and pathetic, the haunting misery of her repentance.

"Art thou not moved to tears or to compunction by the only begotten of God, who, having done no wrong, was for thy sake and for all, seized by most impious men, and dragged away and scourged, and with covered face mocked, smitten with the hand, spat upon, crowned with thorns, and at length hung between thieves on the gibbet of the Cross, then so disgraceful, and slain by the sort of death which was then most appalling and accursed. Have Him, my sister,—thine own and the whole Church's true spouse—have Him before thine eyes, carry Him in thy mind! Gaze upon Him as He goes out to be crucified for thee, laden with His own Cross. Be thou of the people and the women who were bewailing and lamenting Him (quoting Luke xxiii. 27–31). Suffer thou with Him who suffered willingly for thy redemption, and be thou pierced with Him who was crucified for thee. Stand, in mind, ever at His sepulchre, and lament and mourn with the women, of whom it is written (as I said before) 'The women, sitting at the tomb, lamented the Lord with tears.' Prepare, with them, the ointments for His burial—yet better ointments than those, of the spirit not of the body—for He who received not those spices asks for these. So, with love's utter devotion, be thou pierced to the heart! He, Himself, by the word of Jeremiah, calls His believers to this fellowship of passion and of piercing. 'O all ye who pass by, behold and see if there be any sorrow like unto my sorrow,' that is, if there be any sufferer whose suffering so calls for sympathy and sorrow; since I alone, without fault, atone for the faults of others. He is, Himself, the way by which the

[1] On Rom. x. 9.

faithful pass out of exile to their home. And the Cross, of which He thus cries, He has lifted up as a ladder to us for this. He, the only-begotten of God, was killed for thy sake, as an offering, of His own will. Over Him, not another, let thy sorrow be in entering into His sufferings, and enter into His sufferings by sorrow! Fulfil the prophecy of Zechariah about devout souls: 'they shall wail,' he says, 'a wailing as for an only son, and shall mourn as one that mourneth over his first-born' (Zech. xii. 10). See, my sister, how great the lamentation is, among those that love the king, over the death of his first and only son. Observe the lamentation of the household, the mourning which possesses the whole court; and when thou comest to the bride of the only-begotten who is dead, her wailing will be greater than thou canst bear. Be this, my sister, thy lamentation, this thy wailing, for this is the Bridegroom to whom thou hast joined thyself in blessed marriage. He has bought thee, not with what is His, but with Himself. With His own blood He bought thee and redeemed thee. See what right He has over thee, and consider of how high a price thou art. The apostle, when he thinks of this price, and in the light of this price, weighs his value for whom it is given, and also what return he should make for so great a favour, says, 'God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.' Thou are greater than heaven, greater than the world; for thy price is the very creator of the world. What, I ask, did He see in thee—He, who has lack of nothing—that to win thee He did battle, even to the last agonies of a death so full of horror and of shame? What, I say, does He seek in thee except thyself? He is the true lover, who longs for thyself, not for anything that is thine. He is the true friend, who said Himself, when ready to die for thee, 'Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."[1]

[1] Non te ad lacrymas aut ad compunctionem movet unigenitus Dei innocens pro te et omnibus ab impiissimis comprehensus, distractus, flagellatus, et velata facie illusus, et colaphizatus, sputis conspersus, spinis coronatus, et tandem in illo crucis tunc tam ignominioso patibulo inter latrones suspensus, atque illo tunc horrendo et execrabili genere mortis interfectus? Hunc semper, soror, verum tuum et totius ecclesiæ sponsum præ oculis habe, mente gere. Intuere hunc exeuntem ad crucifigendum pro te et bajulantem sibi crucem. Esto de populo et mulieribus, quæ plangebant et lamentabantur eum. . . . Patienti sponte pro redemptione tua compatere, et super crucifixo pro te compungere. Sepulchro ejus mente semper assiste, et cum fidelibus feminis lamentare et luge; de quibus etiam ut jam supra memini scriptum est, *Mulieres sedentes ad monumentum lamentabantur flentes Dominum.* Para cum illis sepulturæ ejus

And here are a few sentences from the prayer which the letter ends by commending to her:

"Pardon thou, O most benign! Thou who art benignity itself! Pardon even the exceeding greatness of our sins, and may the unutterable vastness of thy pity explore the multitude of our offences! Punish us, I beseech thee, now, who confess our guilt, and spare us in the life to come! Punish for a season, that thou mayest not punish for ever! Take to thy servants the rod of correction, not the sword of fury! Make the flesh suffer, that thou mayest save the souls! Be with us to purify, not to revenge! in mercy rather than in justice! a pitying Father, not an austere Lord! Prove us, and try us, O Lord, as the prophet asks for himself; as if he plainly said, measure first my powers, and temper to them the burthen of thy trial! as blessed Paul said in promise to thy believers, 'For God is powerful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able, but will with the temptation make also a way of escape that ye may be able to bear it.' Thou, O Lord, hast joined us together; and hast separated us; when it pleased Thee, and how it pleased Thee. Now, O Lord, complete in the greatness of Thy mercy what Thou hast in mercy begun! Whom Thou hast separated once for all in the world, unite

unguenta, sed meliora spiritualia quidem, non corporalia; hæc enim requirit aromata qui non suscepit illa. Super his toto devotionis affectu compungere. Ad quam quidem compassionis compunctionem ipse etiam per Hieremiam fideles adhortatur dicens, *O vos omnes qui transitis per viam, attendite et videte si est dolor similis sicut dolor meus.* Id est si super aliquo patiente ita est per compassionem dolendum, cum ego scilicet solus sine culpa quod alii deliquerint luam. Ipse autem est via per quam fideles de exilio transeunt ad patriam. Qui etiam crucem, de qua sic clamat, ad hoc nobis erexit scalam. Hic pro te occisus est unigenitus Dei, oblatus est, quia voluit. Super hoc uno compatiendo dole, dolendo compatere. Et quod per Zachariam prophetam de animabus devotis prædictum est comple: *plangent*, inquit, *planctum quasi super unigenitum, et dolebunt super eum ut doleri solet in morte primogeniti.* Vide, soror, quantus sit planctus his qui regem diligunt super morte primogeniti ejus et unigeniti. Intuere quo planctu familia, quo mærore tota consummatur curia: et cum ad Sponsam unigeniti mortui pervenisti, intolerabiles ululatus ejus non sustinebis. Hic tuus, soror, planctus, hic tuus sit ululatus, quæ te huic Sponso felici copulasti matrimonio. Emit te iste non suis, sed seipso. Proprio sanguine emit te, et redemit. Quantum jus in te habeat vide, et quam preciosa sis intuere. Hoc quidem pretium suum Apostolus attendens, et in hoc pretio quanti sit ipse, pro quo ipsum datur, perpendens, et quam tantæ gratiæ vicem referat adnectens: *Absit mihi*, inquit, *gloriari nisi in cruce Domini nostri Jesu Christi, per quem mihi mundus crucifixus est, et ego mundo.* Major es cœlo, major es mundo; cujus pretium ipse conditor mundi factus est. Quid in te, rogo, viderit, qui nullius eget, ut pro te acquirenda usque ad agonias tam horrendæ atque ignominiosæ mortis certaverit? Quid in te, inquam, quaerit nisi te ipsam? verus est amicus, qui te ipsam, non tua, desiderat. Verus est amicus, qui pro te moriturus dicebat *Majorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.*

us to Thyself for ever in heaven; Thou our hope, our portion, our expectation, our consolation, O Lord, who art blessed for ever and ever. Amen.

"Farewell in Christ, Christ's spouse! in Christ farewell, and in Christ be thy life. Amen."[1]

It is abundantly clear that Bernard of Clairvaux did no justice to Abælard. The faith of Abælard in the Cross was a faith to inspire the most searching penitence, and the most ardent love; a faith which really reached beyond its own statement of itself; a faith in which a true penitent could live, and could die, in Christ. And yet, on the side of theological exposition, it was really defective still. It would have been, indeed, unfair for any prosecutor to assert that Abælard explained the *whole* meaning of Calvary as *only* an instruction, a pattern, an exhibition, a commendation of love. But that these things should be formally urged on the Pope by one whose indictment would not even be seen by the accused, far less answered, or checked in any way, but accepted as a judicial summing up of the case, was, judicially speaking, monstrous.[2] Yet

[1] Ignosce, O benignissime, immo benignitas ipsa, ignosce et tantis criminibus nostris, et ineffabilis misericordiæ tuæ multitudinem culparum nostrarum immensitas experiatur. Puni obsecro in praesenti reos, ut parcas in futuro. Puni ad horam, ne punias in æternum. Accipe in servos virgam correctionis, non gladium furoris. Afflige carnem ut conserves animas. Adsis purgator non ultor; benignus magis quam justus; Pater misericors, non austerus Dominus. Proba nos Domine, et tenta, sicut de semetipso rogat Propheta; ac si aperte diceret, Prius vires inspice, ac secundum eas tentationum onera moderare. Quod et beatus Paulus fidelibus tuis promittens ait: *Potens est enim Deus qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis, sed faciet cum tentatione etiam proventum ut possitis sustinere.* Conjunxisti nos Domine, et divisisti quando placuit tibi, et quo modo placuit. Nunc quod, Domine, misericorditer cœpisti, misericordissime comple. Et quos a se semel divisisti in mundo, perenniter tibi conjungas in cœlo. Spes nostra, pars nostra, expectatio nostra, consolatio nostra, Domine qui es benedictus in sæcula. Amen.

Vale in Christo sponsa Christi, in Christo vale, et Christo vive. Amen.

[2] Hæc est justitia hominis in sanguine Redemptoris; quam homo perditionis exsufflans et subsannans, in tantum evacuare conatur, ut totum quod Dominus gloriæ semetipsum exinanivit; quod . . . . passus indigna; quod demum per mortem crucis in sua reversus: ad id solum putet et disputet redigendum, ut traderet hominibus formam vitæ vivendo et docendo; patiendo autem et moriendo caritatis metam præfigeret. Ergo docuit justitiam et non dedit; ostendit caritatem, sed non infudit; et sic rediit in sua? (vii. 17). Non requisivit Deus Pater sanguinem Filii, sed tamen acceptavit oblatum; non sanguinem sitiens, sed salutem, quia salus erit in sanguine. Salus, plane, et non sicut iste sapit et scribit sola caritatis ostensio. Sic enim concludit tot calumnias et invectiones suas quas in Deum tam impie quam imperite evomuit, ut dicat: Totum esse quod Deus in carne apparuit, nostram de verbo et exemplo ipsius institutionem, sive ut postmodum dicit, instructionem; totum quod passus et mortuus est, suæ erga nos caritatis ostensionem vel commendationem (viii. 22). Ceterum quid prodest quod nos instituit si non restituit? . . . . si omne quod profuit Christus in sola

however keenly we may feel the judicial unfairness of Bernard and Innocent, there is certainly something to be said for Bernard's view, or instinct, that Abælard's position, as Abælard himself expounded it, had danger in it. The things which he had said about 'ransom' and 'purchase,' and 'bearing the *pœna* of sin,' ought of course to have been before any court which affected to try him. And yet it may be doubted whether they really quite cohere with his proper thought. He seems in them to be doing a somewhat conventional (and indeed in some cases even undue) homage to conventional modes of expression. Plainly his real heart is rather in such statements as that our real justification is the Divine Love within us. Was he then quite capable of expounding the atonement adequately upon this basis—the basis of his own truest feeling? He comes indeed, in many respects, very near to an exposition which, in depth and comprehensiveness and vital reality, would have been far in advance of what was current in his own, or indeed in almost any other generation. But I must own that he does not seem to me to attain to it. If S. Bernard, instead of arrogating the position of a judge, had been merely, in courteous controversy, pointing out what seemed to him to be dangerous tendencies, he might have been reasonably anxious about the emphasis laid on 'the instruction' through the 'exhibition' of love. It is true that such phrases say less than Abælard meant. The emphasis of his thought is not really so much upon Calvary as a picture exhibited before our eyes, as it is upon Calvary as a constraining and transforming influence upon our characters. It is not so much really upon the love of God manifested to us, as upon the love of God generated within us. The difference is important. And, so far, he is wholly in the right direction. But if the question be pressed, *how* is it generated? Abælard's exposition seems to have no deeper answer to give than that the exhibition of the Cross constrains it. He dwells on the Cross very finely, as an incentive to love; but hardly conceives of it more profoundly than as an incentive. He has lost the emphasis upon the thought of humanity as a corporate unity, summed up and represented in Christ, so that what Christ did and suffered, Christians themselves also suffered and did in Christ,—which was so strong and clear in the earliest

fuit ostensione virtutum, restat ut dicatur quod Adam quoque ex sola peccati ostensione nocuerit, ix. 23, etc. (All these are in Bernard's letter to Pope Innocent II.)

Christian theologians; and, on the other hand, he has totally failed to interpret the production of Divine love within us, not as a mere emotion of ours, elicited in us as our response to an external incentive, but as being the doctrine of the Holy Ghost;—that presence of Christ as constitutive Spirit within, which is the extension of the Incarnation and Atonement, the very essentia of the true Church of Christ, the real secret of the personal being of Christians, and therefore the characteristic doctrine of the Christian faith, as it is the characteristic experience of the Christian life.

Had he carried his thought on, this one bold step further, and had he possessed the charm of grave reserve and personal saintliness, which would have served to commend his theories to the hearts as well as to the thoughts, or rather to the thoughts, because first to the hearts, of his own contemporaries, the history of the doctrine in subsequent generations might have been very different. As it is, it may well be doubted whether Bernard was not at least half right in his underlying instinct; and whether the acceptance of Abælard's teaching in the somewhat inconsistent as well as incomplete form in which Abælard himself expressed it, would not have led towards a view of the Atonement which would have been perilously incomplete. In the stress laid upon that constraining appeal to the feelings which the story of the Cross is indeed, as subjective appeal, calculated to make, it is more than probable that the sense of the unique greatness of the historical fact, as historical fact, of the sacrifice of perfectly triumphant Righteousness, consummated once for all, for man, in man, and transforming, once for all, the meaning and the possibility of man,—would have been, to say the least, very seriously impaired.

Before closing this—most fragmentary—excursion into history, it seems well to add some consideration of the expositions of Atonement which have been most current in our own day and amongst ourselves.

There is probably no book on the subject more widely known and read amongst churchmen than the lectures of the late Dr Dale. But in order to appreciate it rightly, it is well to remember something of the conditions in reference to which it was written. In an age which had, for the most part, been accustomed to a doctrine of atonement of the rigidly logical and crudely substitutional kind,

the leaven of a more philosophical and more humanizing spirit had begun on many sides to be felt. The sermons, for instance, which were preached at Lincoln's Inn by the Rev. F. D. Maurice upon the Doctrine of Sacrifice breathe a spirit of devoutness and humanity very unlike that of the more conventional exponents of what was supposed to be orthodox theology. It may be doubted indeed whether the position of Mr Maurice, valuable as it was in its positive teaching, and in the temper which underlay its teaching, was really quite adequate to the truth. It had in it something of the character of a reaction: and probably, as is usual in such cases, did less than full justice to that against which it reacted. It protested against a crudely objective atonement. Perhaps the conception of atonement which it substituted gave hardly its adequate place to the objective fact. He was clear that the ultimate purpose of Christ's sacrifice was a moral transformation of ourselves. Perhaps he was hardly successful in correlating together with exactness the work of Calvary and its effects; or in showing *how* the moral transformation of mankind was connected with the fact of Christ's death. It is possible that he inclined too much to what is known as the simply subjective view: the thought of Christ's death as a constraining appeal and incentive to the love of man. I do not, however, propose to dwell at length upon the sermons of Mr Maurice, or to discuss the question of their adequacy, but should like before leaving them, to quote one passage of considerable length, which shows much of the best and deepest character of his thought:

"There was a time in our Lord's life on earth, we are told, when a man met Him, *coming out of the tombs, exceeding fierce, whom no man could bind, no, not with chains.* That man was *possessed by an unclean spirit.* Of all men upon earth, you would say that he was the one between whom and the pure and holy Jesus there must have existed the most intense repugnance. What Pharisee, who shrank from the filthy and loathsome words of that maniac, could have experienced one-thousandth part of the inward and intense loathing which Christ must have experienced for the mind that those words expressed? For it was into *that* He looked; *that* which He understood; *that* which in His inmost being He must have felt, which must have given Him a shock such as it could have given to no other. I repeat the words; I beseech you to consider them; He must have felt the wickedness of that man

in His inmost being. He must have been conscious of it, as no one else was or could be. Now, if we ever have had the consciousness, in a very slight degree, of evil in another man, has it not been, *up to that degree*, as if the evil were in ourselves? Suppose the offender were a friend, or a brother, or a child, has not this sense of personal shame, of the evil being ours, been proportionably stronger and more acute? However much we might feel ourselves called upon to act as judges, this perception still remained. It was not crushed even by the anger, the selfish anger, and impatience of an injury done to us, which, most probably, mingled with and corrupted the purer indignation and sorrow. Most of us confess with humiliation how little we have had of this lively consciousness of other men's impurity, or injustice, or falsehood, or baseness. But we *do* confess it; we know, therefore, that we should be better if we had more of it. In our best moments we admire with a fervent admiration—in our worse, we envy with a wicked envy—those in whom we trace most of it. And we have had just enough of it to be certain that it belongs to the truest and most radical part of the character, not to its transient impulses. Suppose, then, this carried up to its highest point, cannot you, at a great distance, apprehend that Christ may have entered into the sin of the maniac's spirit, may have had the most inward realization of it, not because it was like what was in Himself, but because it was utterly and intensely unlike? And yet are you not sure that this could not have been, unless He had the most perfect and thorough sympathy with this man, whose nature was transformed into the likeness of a brute, whose spirit had acquired the image of a devil? Does the coexistence of this sympathy and this antipathy perplex you? Oh! ask yourselves which you could bear to be away; which you could bear to be weaker than the other! Ask yourselves whether they must not dwell together in their highest degree, in their fullest power, in any one of whom you could say, 'He is perfect; he is the standard of excellence; in him there is the full image of God.' Diminish by one atom the loathing and horror, or the fellowship and sympathy, and by that atom you lower the character; you are sure that you have brought it nearer to the level of your own low imaginations; that you have made it less like the Being who would raise you towards Himself.

"I have taken a single instance, because you can better apprehend the whole truth in that instance, and because

from it you may understand that I am not speaking of abstractions, but of that which concerns us as human beings, as conscious sinners. But now carry on your thoughts beyond that particular man with the unclean spirit; carry them to any man in the crowds whom our Lord fed, and to whom He preached: carry them to these, because they were specimens of the race; because His knowledge of their evils is that which He must have had of the evils which are in all the world; because His sympathy with them is the sympathy which He must have had with all who bore their nature: and then you will, I think, begin to doubt whether S. Paul could have diluted the language which you find in the text without cheating us of a divine treasure. If he had said that Christ took upon Him *all the consequences* of our sins, would this have been an equivalent for the words, '*made Sin*'? There might be a deep meaning in that assertion. The sympathy which I have spoken of, extended, as we know, to all the ills of which men are heirs. The evangelist says, speaking of His healing the sick, *Himself took our infirmities and bare our sicknesses*; as if every cure He wrought implied an actual participation in the calamity. He endured in this sense the consequences of sin in *particular* men; He endured the death which is the consequence of sin in *all* men. But men have asked more than this. Their superstitions show how much more is required to satisfy them; they have asked for some god, or demigod, who could not only sympathize in their sorrows but in their evil; they could only conceive of sympathy coming through participation of it; the gods must do like them, be like them, or they are cold and distant objects of reverence. The demand is indeed monstrous; all the perverseness and bewilderment of sin lie in it. But to get rid of the falsehood of the desire, you must vindicate its truth. Here is the vindication: He knows no sin, *therefore* He identifies Himself with the sinner. That phrase, *identifies Himself with the sinner*, is somewhat nearer, I think, to the sense of the Apostle than the phrase, *takes the consequences or the punishment of sin*. But still, do you not feel how much feebler it is than his, feebler in spirit more even than in form? It conveys no impression of the sense, the taste, the anguish of sin, which St Paul would have us think of, as realized by the Son of God—a sense, a taste, an anguish, which are not only compatible with the *not* knowing sin, but would be impossible in

anyone who did know it. The awful isolation of the words, '*Ye shall leave me alone*,' united with the craving for human affection in the words '*with desire I have desired to eat this Passover with you*,'—the agony of the spirit which is gathered in the words, '*If it be possible, let this cup pass from me*,' with the submission of the words, '*Not as I will, but as Thou wilt*'; above all, the crushing for a moment even of that one infinite comfort, '*Yet I am not alone, because the Father is with me*,' when the cry was heard, '*My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?*'—these revelations tell us a little of what it was to be made Sin; if we get the least glimpse into them, we shall not dream that the Apostle could have spoken less boldly if he was to speak the truth."[1]

This quotation, whether it be more or less necessary for the present purpose, is one which it has been, for many reasons, a pleasure to make. But the tendency of which Mr Maurice is an attractive exponent, found expression in others also whose statements were less attractively reverent, whilst they tended far more certainly, and far more completely, to explain away, as a mistake, the Church's faith in the unique fact of the sacrifice of Christ. This form of thought is represented, significantly enough, in the essay upon Atonement which forms part of the commentary of the late Master of Balliol upon the Epistle to the Romans. Nothing, perhaps, represents quite so directly what Dr Dale was anxious to fight against, as this essay. And even apart from Dr Dale, it is a fair illustration of a strain of thought which has had, and still has, no small place, not so much in formal theology, as in the general instinct of a large part of Christian society.

Professor Jowett, like Dr Dale, is to be understood in the light of what he is anxious to oppose. He is writing against a logical theory of atonement, rigid, hard, and technical, which would understand it as wholly transactional, and wholly substitutional. "God is represented as angry with us for what we never did; He is ready to inflict a disproportionate punishment on us for what we are; He is satisfied by the sufferings of His Son in our stead. The sin of Adam is first imputed to us; then the righteousness of Christ. . . . The death of Christ is also explained by the analogy of the ancient rite of sacrifice. He is a victim laid upon the altar to appease the wrath of God. The institutions and ceremonies of the Mosaical religion are applied

[1] Sermon XII. on "Christ made Sin for us," pp. 185–189.

to Him. He is further said to bear the infinite punishment of infinite sin. When He has suffered or paid the penalty, God is described as granting Him the salvation of mankind in return."[1] This is what he wishes—naturally enough—to repudiate. But he does not repudiate this, as we should have desired, as a perverted and misleading interpretation of sacrifice and atonement. Rather he assumes that sacrifice and atonement can have no proper interpretation but this; and desiring to repudiate this, he repudiates, in fact, the conceptions of sacrifice and atonement altogether. "The language of Sacrifice and Substitution"[2] is something which is not so much to be explained aright as to be explained away. He labours not so much to give new life and depth to its meaning, as to show that men ought to look for life and depth elsewhere: for that these phrases are but transient figures; living significance is not to be pressed out of them.

The completeness with which he identifies the whole Scriptural and Catholic phraseology with the sort of hard Calvinistic associations which we should most of us agree with him in disowning, is illustrated by his assumption that the conception of Christ as inclusively representing mankind, and of man as corporately identified with Christ—partakers of His Cross and His Resurrection—is incompatible with the conception of atoning sacrifice! "For one instance of the use of sacrificial language," he writes, "five or six might be cited of the language of identity or communion, in which the believer is described as one with his Lord in all the stages of His life and death. But this language is really inconsistent with the other. For if Christ is one with the believer, he cannot be regarded strictly as a victim who takes his place."[3] "St Paul says, 'We thus judge that if One died, then all died, and He died for all, that they which live shall not henceforth live to themselves, but unto Him which died for them and rose again.' But words like these are far indeed from expressing a doctrine of atonement or satisfaction."[4] These astonishing statements show not only what it is that he really desires to oppose; but also, and far more strangely, with what unreserved completeness he identifies, with that which he desires to oppose, the whole phraseology of atonement, satisfaction, and sacrifice.

It will probably cost us some effort at the present time to realize the narrowness of the meaning which he attaches

[1] p. 547, 2nd ed. 1859. [2] p. 559. [3] p. 560. [4] p. 563.

to these terms; and therewith perhaps also, to realize within what comparatively recent times it was reasonably possible that they should be supposed to be identified with such a meaning. But so long as this thing was reasonably possible, it may be admitted that there was great need of a solvent; and as such a solvent, the contribution of Professor Jowett may be justified.

It is true, moreover, that in a more positive sense, the thought of Professor Jowett, and of those who agreed with him, was on wholly right lines, in so far as it insisted upon 'moralizing' the doctrine, and upon a rational apprehension of it. A theological system that is technical only and not spiritual—a view of a doctrine which sees it only as a transaction, without moral or mystical aspect—must be fatally wrong. All insistence upon a rational and moral interpretation of a doctrine which, as currently interpreted, had ceased to be moral or rational, is of permanent value. Here again, it is curious to see in a casual phrase, how completely Professor Jowett assumed that theology, as such, was other than moral; and therefore that his moral theory of atonement was an overthrow, rather than an interpretation, of dogmatic theology. "It is instructive," he actually says, "to observe that there has always been an undercurrent in theology, the course of which has turned towards morality, and not away from it."[1] Conceive it! an 'undercurrent' which has 'not turned away from' morality!

And further, it may be added that when, in the final page of his essay, he pleads for the living value of moral character, the direct result of personal nearness to Christ, as something both truer, and higher, than belief in a transactional atonement, and an unreally imputed righteousness, he is, alike in aim and in temper, really reflecting not a little of the discipline, the gentleness, the lofty aim, and the large-hearted tolerance of the Spirit—whom he desires to vindicate in argument because the echo of His presence is within his heart.

To say this is, no doubt, to say much. But it is not to accept Prof. Jowett as an interpreter of theology. And, indeed, whatever there may be about his thought that is of beauty or value; it is, in respect of its negations, its attempts to evaporate away the vital facts, and vital faith, of Christianity, a strange exhibition of ineffectiveness, if not of perversity. The apparent assumption that Christ's

[1] p. 569.

'parables' are conterminous with His 'teaching'; the divorce between His teaching and His history—of which the great culmination is the Cross—between, that is, His teaching by word and His teaching by action, or passion; the antithesis between the Gospels and St Paul; the explaining away of all particular statements as figures of speech borrowed from the Old Testament; and of the Old Testament, as if its relation of significance to the New rested on no divinely underlying truth, but could be paralleled by that of "the Iliad and Odyssey" to "the Platonic or Socratic philosophy": there is, as we read, a wonderful sense of failure, and laboured impotence, about all this. We can, indeed, look back upon it now with a quiet appreciativeness which has in it more of wonder than of indignation; but in its time it was formidable enough. There was a real danger of its acceptance as a true and enlightened exposition of Christian doctrine. And it is only in its reference to the peril of this mode of thought, seemingly enlightened but really latitudinarian, a mode of thought which would in the end have been solvent not only to the rigider Calvinism but to all definiteness and permanence of belief, that the value of Dr Dale's work can be estimated rightly.

In this reference Dr Dale had a work to do, and he has done it with effectiveness. The early chapters of his work are a careful study of Scripture, in some detail, in vindication of the atoning sacrifice of Christ, both as a fact objective and historical in itself, and also as cardinal to the Christian faith and life. There are, no doubt, expressions in these chapters which are open to criticism, more or less serious; and there are omissions, the most significant of which will be noticed presently. But in the main, the positive work of these chapters is, in reference to his immediate purpose, admirable. He has shown quite convincingly, that no conception of the work of Christ, or of the hope of Christians, is really compatible with the New Testament, which would sweep aside the fact, or minimize the transcendent significance, of the death on Calvary, regarded as the unique atoning sacrifice for the sins of mankind. He has shown that this atoning sacrifice is regarded, from one end of the New Testament to the other, as being the climax of the Incarnation, the central fact in the history of the world, the transformation of human possibility. This is the great strength of the book.

It will be felt, however, that his argument is directed more and more exclusively against those who would wholly

evaporate this fact; against a conception of the atonement which is *merely* 'subjective.' He is strong against an exaggeration in the subjective direction. On the other hand he hardly attempts, and certainly does not attain, any adequate synthesis of the two diverging aspects, the objective and the subjective, the transactional and the moral. We go in vain to his pages for that deeper insight which would really mediate between, and ultimately reconcile, the conflicting conceptions of truth. He is strong against a perilous exaggeration, in the sense of showing that it is untenable. But he is not strong, with that more valuable form of strength which would distinguish, in the view he opposes, what is exaggerated from what is true, and would give full place, and do full justice, to its truth. He is effective, therefore, to an important extent, as against Prof. Jowett. But he is far from effective in reference to those religiously inquiring minds, which, without being committed to Prof. Jowett's position, are asking, and must needs have, some rationale of the doctrine offered them, on which their intelligence can conscientiously rest. So far is he from doing justice to the truth of the moral theory, that he objects to the phrase 'moral theory' altogether. We may see what he means in speaking thus, and may sympathize largely with his meaning. But no such sympathy can make us feel it to be less than a disaster when he says, of the question with which Rom. vi. opens, that it "is a decisive proof that the Pauline conception of the relation between the death of Christ and the remission of sins is irreconcilable with the 'moral theory' of the atonement, *whatever form that theory may assume*."[1]

It is, all through, the vindication of the fact rather than the explanation of the fact, in which he is really strong. There are some very effective pages at the beginning of Lecture VII. in refutation of the suggestion that theologians invented the atonement![2] "All this," Dr Dale well says, "is precisely the reverse of the truth. Theologians did not invent the idea of an objective atonement in order to complete the symmetry of their theological theories. They have invented theory after theory, in order to find a place for the idea. That the death of Christ is the ground on which sin is remitted, has been one of their chief difficulties. To explain it, they have been driven to the most monstrous and incredible speculations. Had they been able to deny it, their work would have been infinitely

[1] *The Atonement*, p. 244; the italics are mine. [2] Cp. Jowett's essay, § 2.

simplified."[1] This distinction between the decisive clearness of the fact, and the comparative difficulty of its explanation, constitutes a sort of comment upon Dr Dale's own book. For it suggests at once the chief direction of criticism to which the book is open, and on the other hand also the real reason why, in spite of all such criticism, there still is an undying value in the book.

If we press for a rationale of the atonement which our mind and conscience can apprehend, we are driven, I think, in the book to accept it in some such form as this: (*a*) Christ, being made sin for us, suffered, in our stead, the actual punishment of sin; (*b*) this constituted a ground on which the moral justice of God could, and did, forgive us our sins.

Thus in reference to (*a*) he says: "He was forsaken of the Father, and He died. His other sufferings were such as the innocent may endure in serving the sinful and the wretched. On the Cross He submitted to the actual penalty of sin."[2] "It was a Vicarious Death. He died 'for us,' 'for our sins,' 'in our stead.' For the principle that we deserved to suffer was asserted in His sufferings, that it might not have to be asserted in ours. He was forsaken of God, that we might not have to be forsaken. He did not suffer that He might merely share with us the penalties of our sin, but that the penalties of our sin might be remitted."[3] It does not seem to me unfair to compare with these statements of his own, the explanation which he gives elsewhere of the famous passage of Luther's commentary on Gal. iii. 13. He says: "No doubt this is popular rhetoric, and popular rhetoric of a very intense and fervent kind. But Luther's rhetoric is only Luther's creed set on fire by imagination and passion. To take words like these as though they were a literal and scientific statement of what Luther believed about the death of Christ, would be to violate the most ordinary principles which must govern the interpretation of language. But he meant what he said, and the substance of the passage is this—Christ so assumed the penal responsibilities of mankind, that all who believe in Him are delivered from the penalties of sin. The law has inflicted on Him the sufferings, which but for His mercy would have been inflicted on us."[4]

When Dr Dale thinks of Christ as enduring "the actual penalty of sin," the one definite thing which seems to be at

[1] p. 269. [2] p. 424. [3] p. 433. [4] pp. 289, 290.

the core of his thought is the great cry of desolation upon the Cross. This, it will be noticed, was the culminating thought in each of the two passages which have been quoted. To these may be added the following, "Immediately before His death He was forsaken of God. When we remember the original glory in which He dwelt with the Father, His faultless perfection, and His unbroken communion with the Father during His life on earth, this is a great and awful mystery. That sinful men, even though they have been transformed into saints, should sometimes lose the sense of the Divine presence and the Divine love is explicable, but how was it that He, the Son of God, was forsaken by the Father in the very crisis of His sufferings? He Himself had anticipated this desertion with a fear which sometimes became terror. It seems not only possible but probable, and even more than probable, that the intense and immeasurable suffering which wrung from Him the cry, 'My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?' was the immediate cause of His death. On any hypothesis it accelerated His death."[1]

In another context, speaking with rather tentative suggestiveness in a different direction, he says, "How the Death of Christ effects the destruction of our sin, we may be unable to tell. Perhaps that great moral act by which Christ consented to lose the consciousness of the Father's presence and love—an act different in kind from any to which holy beings, in their normal relation to God, can be called—rendered it possible for us to sink to that complete renunciation of self which is the condition of the perfect Christian life; for that renunciation is also unique, and has no parallel in the normal development of a moral creature."[2]

It is probable that any theory of atonement must find its culmination in this great cry. But a theory which asserts that Christ bore the 'actual punishment' of sin, and finds in this cry the one direct justification for such an assertion, seems to me to isolate the cry overmuch as distinct in kind from everything that had gone before; as a single glimpse into what is in itself inexplicable, and yet as the only direct explanation of what atonement means.

But we pass to (*b*) the second thought, that this enduring by Christ of the punishment of sin constitutes a reason why God can and does 'forgive' us. This seems to be asserted by Dr Dale in what is, after all, a quantitative or

[1] p. 360. [2] p. 429.

equational form. "Christ is the 'Propitiation for our sins'; and therefore, He has allayed the Divine anger, so that God, for His sake, is willing to forgive us."[1] "If the punishment of sin is a Divine act . . . . it would appear that, if in any case the penalties of sin are remitted, some other Divine act of at least equal intensity, and in which the ill desert of sin is expressed with at least equal energy, must take its place."[2] "If God does not assert the principle that sin deserves punishment by punishing it, He must assert that principle in some other way. Some Divine act is required which shall have all the moral worth and significance of the act by which the penalties of sin would have been inflicted on the sinner. The Christian atonement is the fulfilment of that necessity."[3] "When the heart is shaken by fears of future judgment and 'the wrath to come,' a vivid apprehension of the Death of Christ, as the voluntary death of the Moral Ruler and Judge of the human race, will at once inspire perfect peace. Without further explanation, the conscience will grasp the assurance that since He has suffered, to whom it belonged to inflict suffering, it must be possible for Him to grant remission of sins."[4] "His hostility to our sins has received adequate expression in the Death of Christ, and now He is ready to confer on us the remission of sins for Christ's sake. The remission of sins . . . . brings to the man who has received it a sure and permanent escape from the hostility and the wrath of God."[5] Some of the expressions in these passages are particularly unfortunate. They provoke the query, which is hardly under the circumstances an unfair one,—May I, if my child is shamefully wicked, 'forgive' him, provided that, as an adequate expression of 'hostility,' I cut off my own finger first?

Elsewhere Dr Dale writes, "If we ask in what sense He effected this reconciliation, the reply is contained in the words which follow—'*Not imputing their trespasses* unto them . . . .' If we further ask what relation there is between Christ and the non-imputation to mankind of those trespasses by which God's righteous condemnation had been merited, the reply to this further question is given in the boldest representation of Christ's redemptive work to be found in the New Testament: God 'made Him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him.' This was the ultimate foundation of the Apostle's ministry, and the ground on

[1] p. 355. [2] p. 391. [3] p. 391-2. [4] p. 394. [5] p. 346.

which in Christ's stead, and as Christ's ambassador, he could entreat men to be reconciled to God. God reconciles us to Himself, according to St Paul, not in the first instance by delivering us from sin, but by not imputing our sins to us: the reconciliation is primarily, not the removal of our hostility to God, but the cessation of God's hostility to us. The ground of this reconciliation lies in the fact that God made Christ to be sin for us, and its ultimate result is that we are made the righteousness of God in Him."[1]

Now I am quite unable to acquiesce in the sense which in these chapters is put upon the words punishment and forgiveness; for punishment remains as retaliatory infliction from without by another; and forgiveness as simply remission, or non-infliction, of penalties; and I doubt the possibility of any rational explanation of atonement while this meaning for the two words is assumed. But the most fatal flaw in Dr Dale's exposition, regarded as a rationale of atonement, lies in this—that he has wholly omitted all reference to the presence, or work of the Holy Spirit. He has, in fact, essayed the impossible task of explaining how the atonement affects 'me' at a point, and upon a hypothesis, on which it does *not* affect me. He stops short of Pentecost; and short of Pentecost tries to show how I am included in the 'forgiveness' of God. But short of Pentecost 'I' am not so included. I am not forgiven—apart from the Spirit of Christ. I am not forgiven through the Spirit,—apart from His operation within myself. It is not the old unchanged 'I,' who am simply, for the sake of an equivalent, let go unpunished. But the old 'I,' brought at first by Divine grace within the region of forgiveness, am therein more and more progressively changed, till my forgiveness is consummated in infinite love. And this love is the love of the righteousness and of the truth, as directly as of the mercy of God. For righteousness and truth and wisdom and power and mercy and love are one.

The crucial point, then, after all, is Dr Dale's omission. And the crucial illustration of this is his exposition of atonement from St Paul's Epistle to the Romans. So exclusively do the thoughts of punishment, and Christ's death as a bearing of punishment, monopolize his mind, that he actually expounds the doctrinal argument of the epistle, as though it finally closed with the close of chapter

[1] p. 262-3.

vii. The 8th chapter, the grand culmination, the crowning glory of St Paul's exposition, is treated as though it had never been written at all; or, at most, as though it belonged to an utterly different subject, and had no relevance to the atonement whatever. There is absolutely not a hint of its existence. To those who believe that the 8th chapter is at once the climax of all that has gone before, and the indispensable key to any true insight into the rationale of the whole, as a whole; this blank ignoring of its very existence is the most curious illustration that could be conceived of the limitedness, or, to speak quite frankly, the failure, of Dr Dale's explanatory work.

I am quite aware that I have drawn my statement of Dr Dale's theory almost wholly from his first nine lectures; and that in the tenth, while there are emphatic passages which repeat the position of the nine, there are passages which belong to a different strain of thought. But while sincerely welcoming all that he there says as to the relation of Christ, as the Eternal Son, to the human race, and as to our ultimate holiness in Him, I must still say that these things seem to me to belong to another conception of the atonement, which is not the conception of his book. If they are, as they seem to me to be, inconsistent elements, they are inconsistencies for which we may well be altogether grateful. The volume is much the richer for them. For they bear their fragrant witness to a larger and a deeper truth than is properly included within the logic of the previous theory.

In conclusion, it seems to me just to say these two things. First, that whilst Dr Dale had a work to do in stemming a tide of thought that was dangerously latitudinarian, it must nevertheless be admitted that there was something really retrograde, as well as loyally conservative, in his own work. Indeed if, as years go by, nothing more could be said in explanation of the moral righteousness of the atonement than he has succeeded in saying, it is impossible not to feel some doubt whether belief in the atonement, even as fact, could be, on any large scale, ultimately maintained. On the other hand, so great is the value of his vindication of the fact, and so profound and so grateful is the response of the Christian consciousness thereto, as long as the fact is presented in any form whatever in which it can even seem to justify itself or to be intelligible (and the apprehension of the

heart herein is apt to be far wider and more reasonable than the theories by which it struggles to explain itself); that Dr Dale's work, after all, has stood, and will stand, as a real and solid contribution to the faith and goodness of his own generation.

In passing from Prof. Jowett and Dr Dale to Dr Macleod Campbell, we are, to a certain extent, going backwards, as far as the strict order of dates is concerned. Yet this order seems to be more convenient, inasmuch as Dr Macleod Campbell's thought, however much it may be open at some points to criticism, appears to be greatly in advance, alike in philosophical grasp and in theological insight, of the other two. And the order may find, perhaps, some further justification in the fact that most *English* readers of this generation are probably first, and most, familiar with Dr Dale. It must be owned that Dr Macleod Campbell is not an attractive writer. He is constantly prolix and difficult in style. Too often, indeed, this is simply a literary defect. But it is also connected with the largeness of a thought which is apt to be too many-sided for its language. If he confined himself stringently to the logic of the one thought instantly in hand, his style would be often far clearer. But the real thought would be less rich. What he would have pruned away would not have been merely superfluous. It would have contained many germs of real thought, incidental touches upon other, more or less relevant, aspects of truth. Still, for practical purposes these things cumber, even while in a sense they enlarge, the immediate thought.

We need not ask what occasions the writings of Dr Macleod Campbell. He himself supplies his own background. And very interesting is the representation which his pages contain both of Luther, and of the earlier and later Calvinism. He is anything but hostile. He writes with respect and sympathy of all these. And yet he burns to correct the untruths in their logic which are so transparently plain to the insight of his heart. He is touching in his insistence upon the Fatherhood of God as the fundamental truth of life, and the revelation of the truly filial relation in Christ,—"that spiritual relation to Christ in the light of which we can alone hear and respond to the call to follow God as dear children."[1] He is clear that the

[1] *The Nature of the Atonement*, p. 366 (314). The references are to the

root cause of the atonement is not the anger, but the love of God. "An atonement to make God gracious, to move Him to compassion, to turn His heart toward those from whom sin had alienated His love, it would, indeed, be difficult to believe in; for, if it were needed, it would be impossible. To awaken to the sense of the need of such an atonement, would certainly be to awaken to utter and absolute despair. But the scriptures do not speak of such an atonement; for they do not represent the love of God to man as the effect, and the atonement of Christ as the cause, but—just the contrary—they represent the love of God as the cause, and the atonement as the effect. 'God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him, might not perish, but have everlasting life.'"[1] He is interesting in his protest against a conception of atonement, the core of which is amount of suffering. "What I have felt—and the more I consider it, feel the more—is surprise that the atoning element in the sufferings pictured, has been to their minds *sufferings as sufferings*, the pain and agony *as pain and agony* . . . . my surprise is, *not* that, to men believing the sufferings contemplated to be strictly penal, the pain as pain should be the chief object of attention, being indeed that for which alone, on this view, a necessity existed; but my surprise is, that these sufferings being contemplated as an atonement for sin, the holiness and love seen taking the form of suffering should not be recognized as the atoning elements—the very essence and adequacy of the sacrifice for sin presented to our faith."[2]

He is suggestive again in his tentative definition of forgiveness. "Forgiveness—that is, love to an enemy surviving his enmity, and which, notwithstanding his enmity, can act towards him for his good; this we must be able to believe to be in God towards us, in order that we may be able to believe in the atonement. . . . If we could ourselves make an atonement for our sins . . . . then such an atonement might be thought of as preceding forgiveness, and the cause of it. But if God provides the atonement, then forgiveness must precede atonement; and the atonement must be the form of the manifestation of the forgiving love of God, not its cause."[3] And he is suggestive in his protest against the ordinary sense of the

second edition, published 1867. Those in brackets are to the sixth edition, 1886.

[1] p. 20 (17). [2] p. 116 (99, 100). [3] p. 18 (15, 16).

word punishment as used of the suffering of Christ; "it seems to me impossible to contemplate the agony of holiness and love in the realization of the evil of sin and of the misery of sinners, as penal suffering. Let my reader endeavour to realize the thought. The *sufferer suffers* what he suffers *just through seeing sin and sinners with God's eyes, and feeling in reference to them with God's heart.* Is *such* suffering a *punishment*? Is God, in causing such a divine experience in humanity, inflicting a punishment? There can be but one answer. . . . I find myself shut up to the conclusion, that while Christ suffered for our sins as an atoning sacrifice, what He suffered was not—because from its nature it could not be—a punishment."[1] As to this last point we may doubt, not whether Dr Macleod Campbell is essentially right, but whether he is quite wise in simply rejecting the word. 'Punishment' need not simply mean retributive vengeance. To deny that our Lord's sufferings were *in this sense* penal is one thing. But it is another and more doubtful matter, to deny that they can be called penal in any sense at all.

What, then, is the real character of the atonement? Dr Macleod Campbell's answer will appear sufficiently from a comparison of the following passages. It is "*the living manifestation of perfect sympathy in the Father's condemnation of sin.*"[2] "I have already urged the impossibility of regarding as penal *the sorrows of holy love endured in realizing our sin and misery.*"[3] "The distinction between penal sufferings endured in meeting a demand of divine justice, and *sufferings which are themselves the expression of the divine mind regarding our sins, and a manifestation by the Son of what our sins are to the Father's heart*, is indeed very broad."[4] "What a vindicating of the divine name, and of the character of the lawgiver, are the sufferings now contemplated, considered as *themselves the manifestation in humanity of what our sins are to God*, compared to that to which they are reduced if conceived of as a punishment inflicted by God!"[5]

"That oneness of mind with the Father, which towards man took the form of condemnation of sin, would in the Son's dealing with the Father in relation to our sins, take the form of a perfect confession of our sins. This confession

[1] p. 117 (101).
[2] p. 132 (113). The italics in this and the three following quotations are mine.
[3] p. 133 (114). [4] p. 133 (114). [5] p. 134 (115).

as to its own nature must have been *a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man.*"[1] "That response has all the elements of a perfect repentance in humanity for all the sin of man,—a perfect sorrow—a perfect contrition—all the elements of such a repentance, and that in absolute perfection, all—excepting the personal consciousness of sin;—and by that perfect response in Amen to the mind of God in relation to sin is the wrath of God rightly met, and that is accorded to divine justice which is its due, and could alone satisfy it. In contending 'that sin must be punished with an infinite punishment,' President Edwards says[2] that 'God could not be just to Himself, without this vindication, unless there could be such a thing as a repentance, humiliation and sorrow for this (viz., sin) proportionable to the greatness of the majesty despised,'—for that there must needs be 'either an equivalent punishment or an equivalent sorrow and repentance'—'so,' he proceeds, 'sin must be punished with an infinite punishment,' thus assuming that the alternative of 'an equivalent sorrow and repentance' was out of the question. . . . Either of these courses should be regarded by Edwards as equally securing the vindication of the majesty and justice of God in pardoning sin. But the latter equivalent, which also is surely the higher and more excellent, being a moral and spiritual satisfaction, was, as we have now seen, of necessity present in Christ's dealing with the Father on our behalf."[3] "A condemnation and confession of sin in humanity which should be a real Amen to the divine condemnation of sin, and commensurate with its evil and God's wrath against it, only became possible through the incarnation of the Son of God. But the incarnation of the Son of God not only *made possible* such a moral and spiritual expiation for sin as that of which the thought thus visited the mind of Edwards, but indeed caused that it *must be.*"[4] "There is much less spiritual apprehension necessary to the faith that God punishes sin, than to the faith that our sins do truly grieve God. Therefore, men more easily believe that Christ's sufferings show how God can punish sin, than that these sufferings are the divine feelings in relation to sin, made visible to us by being present in suffering flesh. Yet, however the former may terrify, the latter alone can purify."[5]

"We are now able to realize that the suffering we con-

[1] p. 135 (116, 117).
[2] *Satisfaction for Sin*, ch. II. 1–3.
[3] p. 137 (117–8).
[4] p. 138 (119).
[5] p. 140 (121).

template is divine, while it is human; and that God is revealed *in it* and not *merely in connection with it*; God's righteousness and condemnation of sin, being in the suffering, and not merely what demands it,—God's love also being in the suffering, and not merely what submits to it. Christ's suffering being thus to us a form which the divine life in Christ took in connection with the circumstances in which He was placed, and not a penal infliction, coming on Him as from without, such words as 'He made His soul an offering for sin'—'He put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself'—'By Himself He purged our sins,' grow full of light: and the connection between *what He is* who makes atonement, and the atonement which He makes, reveals itself in a far other way than as men have spoken of the Divinity of the Saviour, regarding it either as a strength to endure infinite penal suffering, or a dignity to give adequacy of value to any measure of penal suffering however small. Not in these ways but in a far other way, is the person of Christ brought before us now as fixing attention upon the divine mind in humanity as that which alone could suffer, and which did suffer sufferings of a nature and virtue to purge our sins. By the *word of His power all else* was accomplished, by *Himself He purged our sins—by the virtue that is in what He is*; and thus is the atonement not only what was rendered possible by the incarnation, but itself a development of the incarnation."[1] "The divine righteousness in Christ appearing on the part of man, and in humanity, met the divine righteousness in God condemning man's sin, by the true and righteous confession of its sinfulness uttered in humanity, and righteousness as in God was satisfied, and demanded no more than righteousness as in Christ thus presented."[2] "That due repentance for sin, could such repentance indeed be, would expiate guilt, there is a strong testimony in the human heart, and so the first attempt at peace with God is an attempt at repentance,—which attempt, indeed, becomes less and less hopeful, the longer and the more earnestly and honestly it is persevered in,—but this, not because it comes to be felt that a true repentance would be rejected even if attained, but because its attainment is despaired of. . . ."[3] "We feel that such a repentance as we are supposing (*i.e.* a repentance quite ideally and impossibly perfect) would be the true and proper satisfaction to offended justice, and that there would be more atoning worth in one tear of the true

[1] p. 141-2 (122). [2] p. 143 (123). [3] p. 144 (124).

and perfect sorrow which the memory of the past would awaken in this now holy spirit, than in endless ages of penal woe."[1] "In proportion as it is seen that that which expiates sin must be something that meets a demand of the divine righteousness, the superiority of a moral and spiritual atonement, consisting in the right response from humanity to the divine mind in relation to sin, becomes clear. But that superiority is surely rendered still more unequivocal when, from the conception of God as the righteous ruler, we ascend to that of God as the Father of spirits. It is then that we fully realize that there is no real fitness to atone for sin in penal sufferings, whether endured by ourselves or by another for us. Most clearly to the Father's feelings such sufferings would be no atonement; and yet are not these the feelings which call for an atonement,—is it not to them that expiation is most righteously due?"[2] "What I thus labour to impress on the mind of my reader is, that the necessity for the atonement which we are contemplating was moral and spiritual, arising out of our relation to God as the Father of spirits; and not merely legal, arising out of our being under the law."[3]

So he speaks of "the deep and fundamental distinction between the conception of Christ's enduring as a substitute the penalty of sin, and Christ's making in humanity the due moral and spiritual atonement for sin."[4] "No doubt the perfect response from humanity to the divine mind in relation to our sins, which has been in Christ's confession of our sins before the Father, has been the due and proper expiation for that sin,—an expiation infinitely more glorifying to the law of God, than any penal suffering could be; but that confession, as it would not have been at all, but in connection with that intercession for the transgressors which laid hold of the divine mercy on our behalf, so neither would it have been the suitable and adequate atonement for *our* sin apart from its fitness to be reproduced *in us*, and the contemplated result of its being so reproduced . . . . here was the highest righteousness, the divine righteousness in humanity: but that righteousness could never have been accounted of in our favour, or be recognised as 'ours' apart from our capacity of partaking in it; that is to say, apart from its being a righteousness in humanity, and, therefore, for all partaking in humanity."[5] "If the eternal life given to us in Christ is that divine life in humanity in

[1] p. 145–6 (125). [2] p. 184 (158). [3] p. 187 (160–1).
[4] p. 315 (270). [5] p. 331–2 (284).

which Christ made atonement for our sins, then the connection between the atonement and our participation in the life of Christ is not arbitrary but natural."[1] "No result referable to simple Almightiness could be the same glory. That God should, by a miracle, change a rebellious child into a loving child, would be no such glory to God as that the knowledge of the fatherliness rebelled against should, by virtue of the excellence inherent in that fatherliness, accomplish this result. 'We love Him because He first loved us.' The power to quicken love in us is here ascribed to the love with which God regards us, considered simply as love."[2]

Extracts such as these may be left to speak for themselves. To me it seems difficult to estimate too highly the debt which Christian thought owes to that reverent spirit whose insight has expressed itself in them. Nevertheless, it will really further our purpose to add some criticisms upon the book as it stands. Perhaps the leading criticism will be this: Dr Macleod Campbell appears to me to have discerned with more complete success the nature of the relation of Christ to God, than that of the relation of men to Christ. The identification of Christ with humanity, the 'recapitulation' of humanity in Christ, are aspects of truth which require to be dwelt upon with more emphasis, and perhaps with a more daring simplicity. I do not, of course, mean that this side of the truth is absent from his mind. Here, for instance, are a few passages which directly deal with it. "We are prepared, as to the prospective aspect of the atonement, to find that the perfect righteousness of the Son of God in humanity is *itself* the gift of God to us in Christ—to be ours as Christ is ours,—to be partaken in as He is partaken in,—to be our life as He is our life: instead of its being, as has been held, ours by imputation,—precious to us and our salvation, not in respect of what is inherent in it, but in respect of that to which it confers a legal title."[3] "Abstractly considered, and viewed simply in itself, the divine righteousness that is in Christ must be recognized as a higher gift than any benefit it can be supposed to purchase."[4] The honour done to God in humanity is "the revelation of an inestimable preciousness that was hidden in humanity . . . . the revealer of the Father is also the revealer of man, who was made in God's image . . . . humanity had this capacity only relatively, that is, as dwelt in by the Son of God; and, therefore, there was in the

[1] p. xv (xviii). [2] p. 340 (292). [3] p. 154 (132, 3). [4] p. 154 (133).

righteousness of Christ in humanity no promise for humanity apart from the Son of God's having power over all flesh to impart eternal life." [1] "What it is to be a man, what we possess in humanity, we never know until we see humanity in Him who through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God." [2] "'Our fellowship is with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ.' 'Father' and 'Son' here do more than indicate persons: they indicate that in these persons with which the fellowship is experienced. Eternal life is to the apostle a light in which the mind of fatherliness in the Father, and the mind of sonship in the Son, are apprehended and rejoiced in. . . . . To me it appears that the temptation to stop short of the light that shines to us in the communion of the Son with the Father in humanity is strong, and greatly prevails. But this light is the very light of life to us; for this communion is the gift of the Father to us in the Son." [3] "What is thus offered on our behalf is so offered by the Son and so accepted by the Father, entirely with the prospective purpose that it is to be reproduced in us. The expiatory confession of our sins which we have been contemplating is to be shared in by ourselves: to accept it on our behalf was to accept it as that mind in relation to sin in the fellowship of which we are to come to God." [4] "Our faith is, in truth, the Amen of our individual spirits, to that deep, multiform, all-embracing, harmonious Amen of humanity, in the person of the Son of God, to the mind and heart of the Father in relation to man,—the divine wrath and the divine mercy, which is the atonement. This Amen of the individual, in which faith utters itself towards God, gives glory to God according to the glory which He has in Christ; therefore does faith justify. . . . The Amen of the individual human spirit to the Amen of the Son to the mind of the Father in relation to man, is saving faith—true righteousness; being the living action, and true and right movement of the spirit of the individual man, in the light of eternal life." [5]

And yet, while he labours to emphasize our relation to Christ, he seems always to stop short, both in phrase and in thought, of that conception of our identification with Christ, which is at once the higher, the more comprehensive, and the more scriptural, conception. His thought is hampered, on the one hand, by the phrase justifying

[1] p. 160 (138). [2] p. 170 (147). [3] p. 172-3 (148-9).
[4] p. 177 (153). [5] p. 225-6 (194, 5).

faith, and all its conventional associations and claims in that atmosphere in which it has most been reverenced (with strange disproportion) as a thing abstract and apart: and on the other hand, by his comparatively imperfect familiarity with that conception and experience which may be said to be the most characteristic conception and experience of the historic Church, that is to say, its intense and instinctive realization of identity of spirit, in the life of sacramental communion, with the very Spirit of the Sacrifice of the crucified Christ. Even, then, when his thought is upon our relation to Christ, he is consciously or unconsciously separating us overmuch from Christ. The emphasis with which he speaks of Christ's righteousness as the 'divine' life in Christ,[1] when the equally true, and more characteristic, thought would be that it was a realization of 'human' righteousness, already in some faint degree lends itself to this. The phrase touches His contrast rather than His identity with ourselves. But we feel the same thing more clearly in the form of some of Dr Macleod Campbell's most favourite phrases. Two of them are 'the Son's dealing with the Father in relation to our sins'; and the description of this as taking 'the form of a perfect confession of our sins.' These occur together in the sentence quoted above from p. 135 (116, 117). Both phrases are characteristic, and both are misleading. If Christ *was* humanity perfectly penitent, humanity perfectly righteous, humanity therefore in perfect accord with, and response to, the very essential character of Deity, it is both inadequate and unfortunate to describe this, His re-identification of humanity with holiness by what He Himself was, as His 'dealing with the Father in relation to' us. Yet this 'dealing with' is one of Dr Macleod Campbell's regularly recurring phrases.[2]

Again to summarize Christ's atonement on Calvary as His expiatory confession of our sins, is to use a phrase which at once, and inevitably, distinguishes Him from us. The phrase is really almost a disastrous one. It seems, to our natural thought, at once so easy and so irrelevant—so irrelevant because so easy—to confess the sins of other people; that a theory of the atonement which is content to describe itself in this phrase 'Christ's confession of our sins' has no real hope of commending itself to the conscience of

[1] *E.g.*, on pp. 141–3, etc. (132 fol.).

[2] See pp. 135, 138, 204, 287, 288, 289, 294, etc. (116, 117, 120, 176, 183, 246, 247, 250, 252; or 260, 264, 266, 269).

mankind. The phrase, we may say at once, does very imperfect justice to the real thought of Dr Macleod Campbell. And yet it is his own most characteristic phrase. He quite certainly means by it much more than the words suggest. And he uses, occasionally, other phrases which come nearer to the fulness of his meaning. Thus, 'a perfect repentance in humanity for all the sin of man—a perfect sorrow—a perfect contrition'; a 'perfect response in Amen to the mind of God in relation to sin';[1] 'a condemnation and confession of sin in humanity which should be a real Amen to the divine condemnation of sin, and commensurate with its evil and God's wrath against it';[2] 'the divine mind in humanity which alone could suffer, and which did suffer sufferings of a nature and virtue to purge our sins';[3] these are phrases which go far deeper, for they make absolutely clear that what is meant is (1) a perfect realization of penitence, with that complete self-identity at once with holiness and with sin-consciousness which is the impossible paradox of perfect penitence; and (2) a realization of penitence, that is, of holiness, in and by *humanity*. Yet again, and again, as the volume goes on, Dr Macleod Campbell is content to refer back to his own theory as though it were adequately summarized by the phrase 'His confession of our sins':[4] so that we feel that it is not quite wholly the fault of Dr Dale that he is content to refer to the theory with a passing reference so inadequate as this, "Had He simply made a confession of sin in our name—the theory advocated by Dr Macleod Campbell in his very valuable treatise on the atonement—He would still have remained at a distance from the actual relation to God in which we were involved by sin."[5] Utterly inadequate as this reference is, it nevertheless indicates a real blot. The identity of Christ with humanity, and of humanity with Christ, is not adequately conceived. 'His confession of our sins before the Father,' His 'dealing with the Father in relation to our sins,'[6] are phrases which do *not* rise to the truth that in Him 'to confess' was 'to be.' He 'confessed the Father' by *being* the very manifestation of the Father to men. He confessed the sin of humanity by *being* the very manifestation of humanity, in its ideal reality of penitential holiness, before the Father.

[1] p. 137 (117, 8). [2] p. 138 (119). [3] p. 142 (122).
[4] *Cf.* together pp. 135, 136, 152, 157, 158, 177, 178, 182, 183, 204, 287, 288, 303, 308, 309, etc. (117, 126, 135–7, 150–3, 156–7, 169, 246–8, 260, 264, 265). [5] Dale, *On the Atonement*, p. 424. [6] pp. 135, 136 (117).

There is one passage in particular in which the lack of the simplicity of this conception is illustrated by the very attempts which he makes, incompletely as well as clumsily, to approach the result which this conception would at once have fully given. "In order," he writes, "to the completeness of the parallel between the hypothetical case" (*i.e.* the imagined case of a single man who had committed all the sin of the world and had also reached the ideal righteousness of penitence), "and the constitution of things in Christ which the Gospel reveals, Christ's confession of our sin must be seen in connection with our relation to the righteousness of Christ, and the sin confessed, and the righteousness in which it is confessed, be seen as if they were in the same person—being both in humanity; though the sin really exists only in humanity as in us, and used in rebellion by us rebels, and the righteousness only in humanity as in Christ, 'who through the Eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God.'"[1] This antithesis between His humanity and ours, and the 'as if' which it involves, illustrate the hesitation of his thought upon this side, and the difficulties which result.

But the attenuation of his theory, which in its real completeness is a very grand one, down to the one misleading word 'confession,' is not the only result which follows from an undue assumption of distinction and antithesis between Christ and ourselves. It is probably, at bottom, the same thing which leads Dr Macleod Campbell to give explanations of Christ's mental anguish in the Passion, such as may seem to match his individual consciousness, as a holy man suffering, rather than what may be called His representative consciousness, as humanity realizing penitential holiness. In Himself, regarded as a separate individual, there could be, of course, no *penitential* heaviness at all. Therefore in Him, regarded only as a separate individual, whatever seems to approach towards such heaviness of spirit, must needs be explained from some wholly different side. This might, perhaps, in itself be enough to warn us that any explanation of the heaviness of spirit in the Passion, which looked to Him only in Himself by Himself, and not to Him as inclusive Humanity, bearing 'man's' sin and consciousness in relation to sin, must necessarily, for that reason alone, be at fault. Yet this is the mistake which Dr Macleod Campbell appears to make.

We may notice this in a subordinate way, in the ex-

[1] p. 158 (136).

aggerated prominence which he gives, in commenting on the 'shame' of the cross, to the extreme sensitiveness felt, by loving goodness, to an unloving response. "Therefore our Lord, the true brother of every man, desired this response of heart from every man; and the refusal of it, the giving of contempt instead of favour, and scorn instead of that accord of true brotherhood which would have esteemed Him, as was due to Him, as 'the chief among ten thousand, and altogether lovely,' was as a death to that life which desired the favour thus denied."[1] The whole thought is a striking one. It is only when the thought is pressed as if it were the special meaning of the shame of the cross, that it is felt not as adding light, but rather as minimizing, if not explaining away.

These same things are true, on a far more striking scale, when we come to his explanation of the great cry on the cross. If this is a touchstone by which theories of atonement are tried, we shall have to admit that there must at least be something defective in the theory of Dr Macleod Campbell. He is indeed the extreme opposite to Dr Dale. Dr Dale made it the actual infliction of the retributive punishment due to sin. Against this Dr Macleod Campbell utterly protests. So far as he is protesting against this, we may sympathize with him without reserve. But when we come to his positive explanation, it is impossible not to feel that he has not so much explained the cry, as explained it away. What are the facts? The climax of the crucifixion, on the side of physical outwardness, is the darkness of the three hours. The sole interpretation of the inwardness of the darkness is in that cry, the most wonderful in the history of the world. The cry is itself a cry of pleading remonstrance. Because of what? Because of the sense of being forsaken of God. By no possibility can we say less than this. What, then, is at the heart of Dr Macleod Campbell's explanation, as the basal fact by which all interpretation must be characterized? Strange to say, it is this—that the suffering Christ never felt Himself forsaken at all. It is not a question of a contrast drawn between an absolute reality, and a temporary consciousness, of forsakenness. It is not a question of why, or how far, or in what way, or with what meaning, the sense of being forsaken could enter into His consciousness. It is, in fact, a denial that anything of the kind did enter into His consciousness at all.

[1] p. 269 (231).

This result is reached partly by an illegitimate use of the historical origin of the words at the opening of the 22nd psalm. It is assumed, first, that the meaning of the words as used by the psalmist, is a measure of their meaning in the supreme moment of the sacrifice of the Crucified : and secondly, that, as used by the psalmist, they must be taken as merely part of the outward setting of an utterance whose whole inner essence is expression of unbroken trust. Therefore the cry on the cross, that one great utterance of desolation which illumines and interprets the darkness, is to be interpreted as an utterance—not of desolation but of unbroken trust. This is the method exegetically. And this exegetical method is corroborated, or rather perhaps is inspired, by a conviction of the inherent impossibility that there should be, in Him, any consciousness of desolation. So it is that the conclusion is confidently reached—a conclusion which appears directly to contradict the words of the cry themselves. "The character of this psalm as a whole is therefore quite unequivocal, viz., a dealing of the Father with Christ, in which the cup of man's enmity is drunk by Him to its last drop, in the experience of absolute weakness—the true weakness of humanity realized, whereby scope is given for the trust of sonship towards the Father. . . . But trust in God, personal trust, is that of which the trial is most conspicuous as pervading the psalm—trust in utter weakness—trust in the midst of enemies—trust which the extremity of that weakness and the perfected enmity of these enemies tries to the utmost—trust which the Father permits to be thus tried ; but trust, the root of which in the Father's favour has not been cut off, nor even touched by any act of the Father or expression of His face as if He were turned into an enemy,—as if He looked on the suppliant in wrath,—as if He regarded Him as a sinner, imputed sin to Him. Not this, not the most distant approach to this."[1] He goes on to quote and italicize the following words, as expressly disallowing the idea of *any obscuring* of the Father's face: "He hath not despised nor abhorred the affliction of the afflicted ; *neither hath He hid His face from him*"[2]; words which, as he claims, "leave no place even for that negative wrath . . . which . . . has been set forth as a hiding of the Father's face." He disallows not only the fact of such aversion of countenance, but any approach whatever to any temporary experience or consciousness of being forsaken. "That we

[1] p. 280 (240). [2] verse 24.

meet here an interruption of the continuity of that life which was in the consciousness of the Father's favour, an exception to the experience of abiding in the Father's love because keeping His commandments . . . . of this, or anything in the most distant way suggestive of this, there is no trace."[1]

These are very strong phrases. It is difficult to imagine that they can be really warranted in this form. Not 'the most distant suggestion' of any 'exception' to the 'continuity' of the conscious 'experience' of abiding in the Father's love: there is, in this, as in what he says of the darkness on p. 305 (262), a painful sense of unauthorized and almost wilful minimizing, such as, along with his use of the word 'confession,' has done much to discredit his theory as a whole, and to prevent it from exercising all the influence over thought which, in its deeper aspects, it certainly deserves.

Once more I must suggest that all these difficulties would be modified by a stronger conception as to the representative, or rather the inclusive, completeness of the Humanity of Christ, and the nature of the directness of our relation to Him. And I must add that this conception would at once have been strengthened, had he realized beforehand the impossibility of explaining atonement in its personal relation to ourselves, apart from the doctrine of the Holy Ghost. He wholly lacks, or rather his exposition of atonement wholly lacks, any reference to that outpouring of the Spirit of Holiness, the very Spirit of the Incarnate and the Crucified, which *is* our personal identification with Him, and therefore is alone the realization of the atonement within ourselves. It is one more instance, after all, of the impossible effort to expound the relation of Calvary to ourselves, otherwise than in and through exposition of Pentecost.

Exposition of Pentecost involves further the Church and the Sacraments. It involves them both, of course, as spiritually rather than mechanically conceived. They are the methods of spiritual reality, not substitutes for it. But they are methods of divine appointment, and certainly not humanly dispensable. Had he been born and bred within the range of all that (as it were) instinctive conception and consciousness, in relation to sacramental communion, which characterizes the best and deepest tradition of the Catholic Church; had it been to him

[1] p. 281 (241).

Christ's own method for the personal identification, in Spirit, of His mystical Body the Church, and of all her members, with the very atoning Sacrifice of Calvary; he could hardly, in expounding the rationale of atonement, have ignored so completely the relevance of all this side of Christian experience. How far he is in fact from an adequate conception of sacraments may be illustrated by the manner in which he goes out of his way, quite needlessly and even (from a churchman's point of view) quite unintelligently, to depreciate the conception of regeneration in baptism.[1] His doctrine of atonement requires no reference to the Eucharist at all.

The debt which Christian thought owes to Dr Macleod Campbell's work is a very great one. And yet it seems, after all, that his comparative lack of wide popular acceptance is intelligible: and, indeed, it would be impossible to most of us to accept his whole exposition, without reserve, as it stands.

There are, no doubt, other books also which have made their real contribution to modern thought, and upon which it would be a pleasure to comment. But the examination of the treatises of Dr Macleod Campbell and Dr Dale may be sufficient to serve the practical purpose; and this chapter is already too long. I will therefore end only with a reference, brief but audacious, to the recent Hulsean Lectures of Archdeacon Wilson. They are full of fresh air, instinct with real and vigorous movement and life. They are alive, they are direct, they are stimulating, they are real. No one can read them without being braced as well as refreshed by them. None the less I cannot but think that he has minimized, to the point of explaining away, many elements in the stern teaching which is characteristic alike of the Old Testament and of the New, as to the depth of sin and the gravity of penitence, as to the import of death and the inherent necessity of sacrifice, and therefore as to the true significance of Calvary in the regeneration of mankind. And yet, if I rightly understand him, I fancy that I can sympathize with every single thing which affirmatively he either means or desires. The view which has been taken in these pages seems to me to give a more vital, and a truer, place to some aspects of truth which loom large in the Gospel message, and yet to him are little

[1] p. 366-7 (314-5).


more, if I do not misunderstand him, than misleading figures of speech. Yet my own view unites with his in setting aside all that is really material, or transactional, or unworthy, in those interpretations whose crudeness or untruth we alike desire to correct; whilst I persuade myself that it realizes every element of his positive thought. This, then, is the effrontery of my audacity; that though, whilst rejoicing in his spirit, I am unable to accept his exposition as it stands, I do not see why he should not accept mine. I hardly dare think of the terms in which many people, in the position of the Archdeacon, would characterize this impertinence. What he will say of it I know not. And yet I think that he will judge it without a breach of that kindly tolerance of spirit, which is itself, perhaps, in some part responsible, if I have really ventured to say too much.

Perhaps this chapter hardly needs a summarizing conclusion. But I may end, as I began, with expressing a conviction that the true doctrine of the atonement, in the New Testament and in early Christian thought, and faith, and worship, is singularly free from those encrusting difficulties of false explanation, which have attached themselves to it in the course of ages; and for the sake of which it is so largely discredited by certain elements in modern thought, which, if they are foolishly careless about being orthodox, are nevertheless in themselves both robust and, in great measure, true. We do not want the New Testament itself to be rewritten in any particular, or in any particular explained away. We may well be suspicious of any theories, however naïve or however confident, which are based upon the necessity of such a treatment. But none the less we may be convinced that interpretations of the New Testament which seem at first sight (from the modern point of view) to have been immemorial in the Church, are really nothing more than the gradual development of mistaken attempts at exegesis, which are natural (perhaps even necessary) stages in the growth of a full intelligence, but are themselves neither primitive nor scriptural.

It is upon Scripture that we take our stand; admitting no interpretation of Scripture as authoritative which cannot claim a consensus of clearly conscious faith and deliberate teaching, alike universal and continuous, through-

out the history of the undivided Church. The authority of such a consensus, and the authority of Scripture—alike of the New Testament by itself, and (more strikingly still) of the New Testament as the fulfilment and illumination of the Old,—can indeed be pleaded, with a truth and force which are wholly irresistible, on behalf of the crucial importance of the Death, and Life through Death, of the Lord Jesus Christ, as an atoning sacrifice for the sin of the whole world. It cannot be pleaded on behalf of any one of those interpretative theories which have perplexed either ancient or modern thought.

Once more let me repeat that this does not mean that the fact must—or can—be held apart from rationalizing interpretation. The fact could not, as unintelligible to reason, be held or believed at all. But the fact, though never wholly compassed by our intelligence, is never unintelligible. Reason can—and must—understand it. Reason can—and must—take cognizance of whatever has been said irrationally in its explanation or defence. It is rational through and through; and it is to be rationalized by the intelligent conscience of mankind. But it is a fact, the necessity of which, and the results of which, lie too far back in the very structure of human consciousness, the very possibility of human character, to admit of any rough and ready, or mathematical, or simple, or final, interpretation. The fact itself is eternal and immutable. The fact itself is the very centre of the Gospel message to a world of suffering and sin. But the understanding of it must develop progressively; for it must seem to vary, while it grows in depth, with man's deepening capacity for intelligence of God, and of himself.



INDEX

ABÆLARD, 372-382; interpretation of justification and redemption, 375; letter to Heloissa, 377 *sqq.*; his limitation, 381.
Adam, the first and the second, 88 *sqq.*, 266, 267, 344, 357.
"Amen," the, 399, 403, 405.
Analogies of Trinity, 170-176.
"Another," 99, 100, 107, 227, 256, 287.
Anselm, St, 218, 367-372, see under *Cur Deus Homo?*
Apostolic Fathers, 326-332.
Asceticism, 148, 313.
Athanasian Creed, the, 82.
Athanasius, St, 325, 326, 349-365; relation of Logos, as Creator, to humanity, 344, 349, 351, 352; Logos incarnated to conquer death by dying, 354-357; Logos inherent in humanity, 356-360; by the Spirit, which is His own, 360-364.
Atonement, the essential problem, 74, 110, 111, 329, 350-353; presentment of, in the New Testament, 332-336; juridical imagery misleading, 80; illustration of a mother, 80, 122; the body the instrument of, 113, 266, 267; as a transaction, 138, 218, 278, 371, 386, 410; objective and subjective, 140 *sqq.*, 281, 319-321; moral theory of, 143, 388, 390; lived upon in the Eucharist, 267; Christ is consummation of, 282-286; deeper down in human consciousness than any theories of it, 337, 369, 370, 412; gradualness of misconceptions, 343, 348, 366, 411.
Augustine, St, *de fide et symbolo*, 170; *de Trinitate*, 160, 171, 206.

BALLIOL, late master of, 386-389.
Baptism, as incorporation into Christ, 260, 261, 265; as regeneration, 261, 263.
Baptismal formula, the, 182, 186.
Baptismal rights, in relation to Laying on of hands, 263, 264.
Barnabas, letter of, 329.
Bernard, St, 380-382.
Body, the, the instrument of atonement, 113, 266, 267; its consecration in atonement and Eucharist, 266, 267.
Body and Spirit, 270, 271.

CALVARY, only explicable through Pentecost, 151, 152, 281, 321, 322, 382, 394, 409.
Calvinism, 387, 396.
Campbell, Dr Macleod, 396-410; on suffering, punishment, and forgiveness, 397, 398; theory of atonement, 398-402; inadequately represented by the word "confession," 404-406; criticism upon, 402-410; on the shame of the Cross, 406; on the Cry on the Cross, 407-409; omission of sacraments, 409.
Cause to oneself, to be a, 224, 225.

Christ, identically not generically God, 82, 92, 279; inclusively not generically man, 88 *sqq.*, 92, 279; His human nature not impersonal, 93, 94; not so much a dualism "God *and* man" as a unity "God as man," 95 *sqq.*; as Incarnate is never not Incarnate, 95, 97, 108; the revelation of Deity to man, 95, 97, 111, 112, 155, 167, 189, 192; the revelation of humanity to man, 97, 98, 111, 282, 283; His human character the reflection of Another, 99, 107, 193; His meditation and prayer, 101; His activity of obedience, 102; the phrase "not of myself," 103-107; His death as the climax of obedience, 114, 116; His identification with man, and the point of view of sin, 128; His death the consummation of penitence, 129, 130, 317; and therefore the triumph of inherent righteousness, 130, 132; (*cp.* St Athanasius, on the inherence of the Logos in humanity, 344-363;) the atonement is Himself, 47, 275, 276, 282-286, 405; His presence continuous through the Spirit, 156, 169, 181, 194-197, 259, 264, 272, 281, 282, 285; Baptism is incorporation into, 260, 261, 265; lived on by Christians in the Eucharist, 266 *sqq.*; is the consummation of human personality, 250, 252, 255, 272, 275, 276, 282-286; 319-322; *cp.* 356-365.
Christ Church, Dean of, 337.
Church, the, is the Spirit, 259, 264, 272, 281, 282; is Christ, 258, 259, 261, 264, 272, 281, 282, 285.
Clement of Rome, St, 326.
Confirmation, 261-264.
Contemplation, a stage towards love, 146, 281.
Conventional Christianity, 299 *sqq.*
Corporate conception of humanity, 65, 87, 119, 124-126, 344, 345, 356-365, 402.
Cross, the Cry on the, 131, 134; Mr Maurice on, 386; Dr Dale on, 392; Dr Macleod Campbell on, 407-409.
Cui servire regnare, 228.
Cur Deus Homo? 367; less than Anselm's real faith, 369; definition of sin, 370; theory purely quantitative, 370, 371; commended by his saintliness, 371, 372.
Cynicism, 302.

DALE, Dr, 382-396; on punishment, 4; on atonement as an objective reality, 139; his strength, 386, 391, 396; his theory of atonement, 391-394; on the Cry on the Cross, 392; criticisms on, 393, 394-396; on Dr Macleod Campbell, 405.
Dante, *de Monarchia*, 337.
Death, the, of Christ, 133, 280; as the climax of obedience, 114, 116; as the consummation of penitence, 129, 130, 317; as the triumph of inherent righteousness, 130, 132, 329, 355.
Diognetum, Epistola ad, 329-331, 336.
Discipline, the proper meaning of punishment, 11, 13, 23, 39, 40.
Dualism, not to be predicated of Christ, 96.
Dying, experience of, 114, 293.

EATING, the sacred significance of, 267-271.
Edwards, President, 399.
Elijah, 289.
Elisha's servant, 289.
Epistola ad Diognetum, 329-331, 336.
Equal choice between alternatives is not free will, 221 *sqq.*
Equals, forgiveness between, 67-70.
Equation theory of punishment, 10.
Equation theory of Atonement, 370, 371, 393.
"Eternal Generation," 211, 212.
Eucharist, the, a living upon Atonement, 267, 273.
Eusebius, 208, 210, 215.
Experience, the only perfect knowledge, 161, 317.
Experience of dying, 114, 293.

FATHER, Son, and Spirit, in what sense words of metaphor, 184, *cp.* 340.
Filioque, the, 195.

Flesh and Blood of Christ, represent His Humanity, 266; specially as the instrument of Atonement, 267.
Forgiveness, as remission of penalty, 49, 50, 394; or of debt, 370; Dr Macleod Campbell on, 397; in Christianity can only mean *rightful* forgiveness, 51, 60, 280; as ignoring of guilt, 53; what it really is—the embrace of righteous love, 55, 61, 62, 71, 72, 279; correlative to forgiveableness, 56; not arbitrary nor optional, 57; on earth, is provisional, 61, 62; towards a little child, 64-66; towards an equal, 67-70; with no reference to holiness, is pagan, not Christian, 72.
Free Will, in what sense we possess it, 220 *sqq.*; is not equal choice between alternatives 221, *sqq.*; nor even to make one's own, in doing things of any kind, 223; but to be a cause to oneself of what is right for the self, 225-228; a capacity, therefore, of response, 226; whose climax is divine obedience, 228; perfected only in the Spirit of Christ, 233.
Future, the, a form of present, 33.

GENTLEMANLY, 258.
God, the Unity of, 83, 154, 166; threefoldness within, 155, 164, 165; "mutual inclusiveness," 157, *cp.* 169; the word "Person" applied to, 158, 160, 162, 178; relation of the Father and the Son, 185, 187, 208-215; perfectly revealed in Christ, 94, 111, 155, 167, 189, 192; through the Spirit, 195 *sqq.*
Gradualness of misconceptions about the Atonement, 343, 348, 366, 411.
Gregory of Nyssa, 366.
Guilt, two sets of penal consequence upon, 17.

HELL, 12, 15, 24.
Heloissa, Abælard to, 377-380.
Hippolytus, on the Valentinians, 184; *contra Noetum*, 208, 209.
History of doctrine, its drawbacks, 324.
Holiness, the essentia of perfect penitence, 38, 39, 41-46, 117, 278.
Hooker, quoted, 84, 169, 206.
Hulsean lectures, 410.
Human faculties, at their highest, coalesce in personal unity, 240, 245.
Human justice inherently imperfect, 9, 77.
Humanity, corporate solidarity of, 65, 87, 119, 124-126, 344, 345, 356-365, 402.

"I," 150 (*cp.* 31, 32, and 217), 249, 250, 251, 252.
Ideal, practical power of, 295, 298.
Ignatius, St, 327-329.
Illingworth, Rev. J. R., 171, 173.
Impersonal, not a predicate of Christ's humanity, 93, 94.
In His steps, 307.
Incarnation, the dominating idea of the New Testament, 185 *sqq.*, 282; the Person of the Son and the Spirit revealed in relation with, 181, 182, 185, 203; shapes the salutations of all the Epistles, 189 *sqq.*, 282.
Indifference, to sin, 303; to missions, 304; to goodness, 305, 306.
Innocent II., 381.
Irenæus, St, 343-345.

JOHN, St, words "Father" and "Son" not found in opening verses of, 185.
Jowett, Professor, 386-389.
Juridical imagery as to atonement misleading, 80.
Justice, human, inherently imperfect, 9, 77.
Justification, 335; Abælard on, 375.

LADYLIKE, 258.
Laying on of hands, 261-264.
Lightfoot, Bishop, 326, 327.
Logos, the, 186, 193, 209-214; antecedent relation to humanity, 344, 349, 351, 352; inherent realization in humanity, 355, 358-363.
Love, in what sense man possesses it, 245 *sqq.*; perfected only in the Spirit of Christ, 246; through the method of sacrifice, 248; the spring of peni-

Love—*continued.*
tence, 28; the clue to forgiveness, 64; the climax of forgiveness, 61, 71, 73, 279.
"Loving" and "being in love with," 136, 146 *sqq.*
Luther, 342, 391, 396.

MARCELLUS of Ancyra, 208 *sqq.*
Martyrdom, in a sense, self-chosen, 114.
Mason, Dr, 264.
Maurice, Rev. F. D., 383-386.
Metaphor, as applied to spiritual terms, 183, 339-342; the words Father, Son, and Spirit, in what sense a, 184, 346.
Milligan, Dr, 195.
Mirror of Deity, perfect humanity a, 252-254.
Missions, indifference to, 304.
Monastic obedience, its untruth, 230; its strength and beauty, 232.
Moral theory, 143, 388, 390.
Mother, illustration of a, 80, 122.
Murderer, a word of past or present meaning? 37.
Music, 175, 282.
Mutuality, the most intelligible element in Tri-Personal consciousness, 166.
My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me? 131, 134; Mr Maurice on, 386; Dr Dale on, 392; Dr Macleod Campbell on, 407-409.
Mysticism, 311-316.

NESTORIANISM, 93, 96.
Newman's *Arians*, quoted, 84.
Non-communicant Christianity, 300-302.

OBEDIENCE, to God and to men, 102, 103, 229-231; not a breaking of the will, 229; false conception of, 229, 230; the truth of, 228, 232, 257; Christ's death the climax of, 114, 116.
Objective Atonement, 140 *sqq.*, 281, 319, 321.
Origen, 345-348.
Oxenham, H. N., *the Catholic doctrine of the Atonement*, 343, 344.

PARADISE, St Paul and, 320.
Past, the, a form of present, 33; can it be undone? 35-41, 47.
Penitence, is never realized in experience, 2, 22, 31, 39, 40; save in and through Christ, 284; is the great reality of experience, 44, 284; what it really is,—its identification with the Spirit of Holiness, 38, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 117, 278; *in its* perfectness impossible to the sinful, 42; possible only to the perfectly sinless, 43, 117, 279; as sorrow, 27, 28; as love, 28; as faith, 29; its atoning quality, 37, 38 *sqq.*, 41, 43, 130, 397-402; vicarious, 75, 76, 80, 118; vicarious, of deeper capacity than personal, 121-124; consummated in the death of Christ, 129, 283.
Penitent thief, the, 29, 239, 290.
Pentecost, indispensable for apprehension of atonement, 151-153, 321, 322, 382, 394, 409.
Pentecostal Church, the, 45, 91, 272, 275, 281, 285, 409.
Person, value of the word as applied to "Persons" of Deity, 159 *sqq.*
Persons of the Trinity mutually inseparable, 158, 167-169.
Personality, punishment only explicable in terms of, 6; and penitence, 26; and forgiveness, 50; is affected by sin, 32; the seat of the real problem of atonement, 150; not isolated, nor to be defined by exclusiveness, 120, 157, 252; intelligible only in experience, 161; relation between experience of human and idea of Divine, 161; the place of "response" in the total of, 174-176; what is it? 153, 219; realized only in the indwelling Spirit of Christ, 248, 250, 252-254, 275, 284, 297, 322; not equally real in the evil and in the holy, 225, 251; as humanly revealed in Christ, a total dependence on God, 193, 256; a Christian formula for, 255.
Personality of God, 177-179.
Personality of the Holy Spirit, difficult

Personality—*continued.*
to human understanding, 176; the difficulty no bar to understanding Him as gift or response, 180; but this to be transcended, 181.
Philosophical, dependent upon spiritual insight, 242-244.
Prayer, in Christ, 101; in the Christian, 256.
Present, the future a form of, 33, the past a form of, 33.
Punishment, Dr Dale on, 4; Dr Macleod Campbell on, 397, 398; only applies to personality, 6; human, inflicted with a view to society, 9; represents *penitential* discipline, 11, 17; its real end, penitence, 13, 19 *sqq.*, 131, 278; self-acting in its higher realities, 15, 283; approximate definition of, 12, 22, 23; atoning only in proportion as it becomes penitence, 23, 30, 36, 278.

RANSOM, 334, 339.
Reason, the meaning of, 233 *sqq.*; not individualistic, 235; a hierarchy of reasonable truths, 236; of which the most complex are the deepest, 237; moral and spiritual, 238; in its climax coalesces with will and love, 240, 245; natural changed into spiritual through sacrifice, 241-244; perfected only in the Spirit of Christ, 244.
Reason and Religion, 237.
Rebaptismate, de, 264.
"Recapitulatio," 344, 345, 402.
Reconciliation, 334, 342, 394.
Redemption, 334, 338, 340.
Reflection of God is human perfectness, 94, 107, 193, 256.
Regeneration, 261, 263, 410.
Relation of Confirmation to Baptism, 263, 264.
Remorse, 36.
Representative, Christ the true, 283.
Response, an element in the total of personality, 174, 175, 203; capacity of, 47, 226, 252, 254.
SABELLIANISM, suspicion of, 85, 86, 165; in Marcellus, 210.
Sacramental system, the, 91, 258; means Christ, 258, 261, 285.
Sacramental materialism, 275.
Sacrifice, the condition of freedom of will, 227, 228; and of the crowning of reason, 241, 242; and of the crowning of love, 248.
Sacrifice, the, of Christ, 333, 334, 338, 387, 389; as an example, 149; as an object of love, 114, 150, 376-381.
Sacrilege of crushing human will, 229.
Saints, consciousness of, 316 *sqq.*
Salutations of the epistles wholly shaped by the fact of Incarnation, 189 *sqq.*
Sanday, Dr, 198.
Simon, son of John, 136.
Sin, affects the personality, 32.
Son, in what sense a word of metaphor, 184; its primary reference to the Incarnate, 185 *sqq.*, 208-215.
Spirit, the Holy, 46, 152; revealed as continuance of the presence of the Incarnate, 156, 169, 181; is to us therefore primarily the Spirit of the Christ, 194-197, 203; and so constitutes the Church of Christ, 254, 264, 272, 281, 285; as αὐτὸ and as Αὐτὸς, 177; Personality of, difficult to human understanding, 176; but we do well to understand Him as gift or response, 180; which, really, *is* Personal, 181, 282; is the consummation in us of free will, 233; of reason, 244; of love, 246; of ourselves, 204, 248-255, 275, 282, 320, 345, 360; the undiscerned work of, in the Church, 290-294.
Spiritualism, 310.
Stephen, St, 68.
Subjective atonement, 141 *sqq.*, 281, 284, 319, 321.
Substitution, 386, 387, 393, 401.

THIEF, the penitent, 29, 239, 290.
Transactional theory of atonement, 138, 218, 278, 371, 386, 410.
Trinitate, de, St Augustine, 160, 171, 206; Vigilius Tapsensis, 193.

Trinity, the Persons of, mutually inseparable, 158, 167-169; danger of distinguishing them as qualities, 172, 206; analogies of, 170-176.
Tri-personal, not properly intelligible to uni-personal consciousness, 161, 173.
Tri-theism, 84, 156.

UNFORGIVING servant, the, 62.
Unity of God, 83, 154; not the unity of singularity or distinctiveness, 166.

VALENTINIANS, 164.
Vengeance not atoning, but the reverse, 18, 24, 132, 401.
Vicarious, penitence, 75, 76, 80, 118, 283; deeper in capacity than personal penitence, 121-124; penalty, 78, 79; punishment, 278, 283.
Vigilius Tapsensis, 193.

WILL, see Free will.
Wilson, Archdeacon, 410, 411.
Woman, the, which was a sinner, 28.
Wrath, the, of Jesus, 304.

PRINTED AT THE EDINBURGH PRESS, 9 & 11 YOUNG STREET

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

Ministerial Priesthood

CHAPTERS

(*Preliminary to a Study of the Ordinal*)

ON THE RATIONALE OF MINISTRY AND THE MEANING OF CHRISTIAN PRIESTHOOD

WITH AN APPENDIX UPON

ROMAN CRITICISM OF ANGLICAN ORDERS

Second Edition, with a New Introduction. 8*vo.* 14*s.*

"This admirable work not only enhances Dr Moberly's high reputation as a philosophical theologian, but also confers a permanent enrichment on Anglican theology."—*The Guardian.*

"We have the pleasure of thanking Dr Moberly for an opportune, interesting, lucid, and most valuable book. . . . A book which should be studied by at least such of the clergy as lay claim to theological acquirement, and may convey to the intelligent laity most valuable information upon a most important subject."—*Church Times.*

"As one of the authors of 'Lux Mundi,' Canon Moberly's exposition is distinguished by the high qualities which have made the school to which the writer belongs so influential in the Church of England. . . . An attractive mysticism, broadly human sympathies, and deep religious feeling pervade the volume, and the author displays no common degree of dialectical subtlety, with a firm grasp of the principles concerned."—*Manchester Guardian.*

"Dr Moberly's book is a learned and careful monograph."—*Record*

WORKS BY THE REV. CHARLES GORE, D.D.

Canon of Westminster.

A SERIES OF SIMPLE EXPOSITIONS OF PORTIONS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

Crown 8vo. Green Cloth. 3s. 6d. each

Fourteenth Thousand

The Sermon on the Mount

Tenth Thousand

The Epistle to the Ephesians

Sixth Thousand

The Epistle to the Romans

Vol I.—*Chapters I. to VIII.*

Last Volume Published

The Epistle to the Romans

Vol. II.—*Chapters IX. to the end. With Appendices*

Sixth Thousand

The Mission of the Church

Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d

Tenth Thousand

The Incarnation of the Son of God

BAMPTON LECTURES FOR 1891. *8vo. 7s. 6d.*

Second Edition

Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation

8vo. 7s. 6d.

Edited by the Rev. CHARLES GORE, D.D.

Lux Mundi

A SERIES OF STUDIES IN THE RELIGION OF THE INCARNATION

Crown 8vo. 6s.

Essays on Church Reform

8vo. 10s. 6d.

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.


00067646

67646

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Dr. Geetha Ravikumar
on 02 April, 2019